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Abstract 
Despite the potential importance of the link between peak oil and the geography of world 
trade, so far remarkably little research has been conducted for that matter. Particularly, there 
is a gap in the literature regarding the impact of peak oil on international trade patterns at the 
industry level. The dissertation contributes to filling that gap. 
The study uses the VEC model approach to analyse the influence of peak oil on the 
geography of international trade, thereby using the example of steel exports to the United 
States between 1998 and 2008. The hypothesis tested is that peak oil, which involves high oil 
prices and rising international transport costs, leads to an increasing regionalisation of 
international trade flows at the cost of long-distance trade. 
Steel exports to the U.S. are analysed by steel export category, country and region. Steel 
exports per steel product category are analysed for 18 countries, total steel exports are 
analysed for 64 countries, and steel exports per region are analysed for 8 regions. The 
findings suggest that following an oil price shock, steel export volumes decrease for 
countries/regions geographically distant to the U.S. and increase for countries/regions 
geographically close to the U.S. 
The evidence also reveals the significant explanatory power oil prices have for steel exports 
to the United States and that price patterns play a role in the realignment process of 
international trade flows in the global steel industry. The findings are in line with economic 
trade theory with regard to the importance of the distance of trade and indicate that due to 
peak oil, trade globalisation, at least in the steel industry, may be at risk. 
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Introduction 
During the 2000s, an oil production scenario referred to as peak oil theory achieved 
mainstream attention for the first time and was subject of intensive debates. The discussions 
regarding peak oil were fuelled by upward-spiralling oil prices and rapidly growing demand 
for crude oil. At the same time, an increasing number of geologists and forecasters stressed 
that conventional crude oil production will eventually reach a tipping point where oil supply 
cannot keep up with demand due to geological or physical limitations. 
Against this backdrop, the dissertation analyses the impact of peak oil on the geography of 
international trade. Therefore, the purpose of the dissertation is to analyse the impact of 
higher oil prices rather than its causes. The hypothesis tested is that peak oil, which involves 
rising oil prices and international transport costs, will eventually lead to an increasing 
regionalisation of international trade flows at the cost of long-distance trade. In this context, 
the study analyses the variation of steel export volumes to the U.S. from 64 geographically 
close and geographically distant countries for the time period between 1998 and 2008 by 
applying the VEC model approach. 
The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1 defines the key terms for the dissertation 
topic, peak oil and globalisation. Chapter 2 then reviews the literature and chapter 3 analyses 
the interdependencies between peak oil, international ocean transport costs and trade 
globalisation. Subsequently, chapter 4 describes the datasets used in the econometric analysis 
while chapter 5 describes the adopted econometric approach. The econometric estimates 
obtained are analysed in chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 links the findings of the econometric 
analysis to the history of globalisation and chapter 8 provides an outlook into possible future 
prospects and policy recommendations. Chapter 9 concludes. 
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1 Definition of Peak Oil and Globalisation  
Disputes and confusion regularly start around issues of definition (Scholte 2005: 8). 
Therefore, in chapter 1 the two key terms for the dissertation, peak oil (1.1) and globalisation 
(1.2), are defined. 
 
 Hubbert’s Law and Definition of Peak Oil  1.1
Section 1.1 first describes Hubbert’s Law (1.1.1) and then defines peak oil (1.1.2). 
 
1.1.1 Hubbert’s Law 
Hubbert’s Law is a well-known depletion model invented by geologist Martin King Hubbert 
(Cavallo 2005; Sorrell et al. 2009). The model can generally be applied to various raw 
materials such as iron ore and fossil energy sources such as coal, natural gas or crude oil. 
The best-known application of Hubbert’s Law is the peak oil theory which increasingly 
achieves mainstream attention1 (Li 2007) and which is used below to describe Hubbert’s 
model. 
The peak oil theory implicates that once about half of the recoverable crude oil has been 
extracted from a given oilfield, production starts to decline (Illum 2004; Lahart 2006; Ryan 
2005). The ideal-typical characteristic of production of a single oil well follows the pattern 
of a bell-shaped curve and can be subdivided into three phases. The first phase is 
characterised by a continuous expansion of oil production (pre-peak). During the second 
phase, the amount of oil that can be extracted per day flattens and an extraction-maximum is 
reached (at-peak or plateau). Finally, the production output begins to backslide (decline) 
(Cavallo 2002; Zittel and Schindler 2003). 
Hubbert’s Law assumes that a nation’s oil production pattern also follows the pattern of a 
single oil well (Ball 2004). This implicates that the characteristic bell-shaped extraction 
process of a single well is also representative for aggregates of oilfields (Campbell et al. 
2003; Fishman 2009). According to Hubbert, the peak of a nation’s oil discoveries is 
followed by a time-delayed peak of oil production (Ball 2004; Campbell 2002). A 
cumulation of all curves for the standard distribution of all oil producing nations culminates 
in one ‘Hubbert-Curve’ representing the progression of conventional world oil production.  
Hubbert applied his theory to the United States and concluded that U.S. oil production, 
excluding Alaska and Hawaii (Hoyos 2004), would peak between 1966 and 1971 (Robelius 
2007; Wells 2005). Given the enormous U.S. spare capacity at the time of his prediction in 
1956 (Cavallo 2005; Ryan 2005) and the steadily rising output of oil production, few experts 
took Hubbert seriously (Duncan 1999). However, Hubbert’s prediction proved to be accurate 
as U.S. conventional oil production reached its all-time high in 1970 at 9.1 million bpd 
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(Deffeyes 2001: 1; Hallock et al. 2004; Wells 2005) eleven years after U.S. oil discoveries 
had peaked in 1959. Conventional U.S. crude oil production has declined since then. 
Hubbert’s accomplishment consists of the fact that he has directed attention from the reach 
of oil reserves to the global production maximum because the point in time at which 
conventional oil supply is not able to keep up with demand is of greater significance. The 
mathematical derivation of Hubbert’s Law is described in the appendix, section A1. 
 
1.1.2 Definition of Peak Oil 
Peak oil refers to the point in time2 at which global oil production reaches its physical limit 
and enters into a permanent decline (Leeb 2006: 88; Paul 2007: 200; UK ITPOES 2008). 
More precisely, peak oil describes the period of time in which the maximum of daily 
worldwide conventional crude oil production is reached. 
However, the implication that peak oil would be predictable right on the day and that world 
oil production would immediately start to decline afterwards is wrong. On the one hand, 
there are determining factors on the supply side (geopolitical factors such as turmoil in the 
Middle East; technological factors such as oil production process developments) and the 
demand side (economic factors such as worldwide economic growth rates) that are not 
exactly pre-visible and can prepone or postpone peak oil in a time-frame of several years. On 
the other hand, it is possible that the occurrence of peak oil will only be recognised 
retrospectively (Friebe 2004; Simmons 2005).  
Most likely, national and private oil companies will be anxious to maintain the extraction 
maximum by using all technology available, thereby keeping the conventional production 
level flat and creating a production plateau that might last for some time (Energy Economist 
2005; Roberts 2004: 46). This may delay the decline of global conventional production (Paul 
2007: 35). However, those measures could eventually lead to a time-delayed steeper and 
more sudden decline (Roberts 2004: 46). In this context, it is noteworthy that global 
conventional oil production stagnated between 2005 and 2008 (Hamilton 2008). 
Peak oil will be (or has been3) a non-recurring historical incident and will presumably lead to 
economical and societal structural change as for the first time since the beginning of the 
Industrial Revolution, geological supply of an essential energy source will not keep up with 
demand (Deffeyes 2005: xi).  
There are different perceptions of peak oil. A perception particularly proposed by geological 
circles is that the midpoint in oil production and the subsequent physical supply gap that will 
open up for the first time in history will cause an oil price shock4 (Stieler 2006) and non-
linear oil price increases (Jung 2006).  
Economic circles advocating the peak oil theory have a rather different line of reasoning. 
According to the ‘economic’ perception, although peak oil has led to a plateau in 
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conventional crude oil production5 (production may start to decline in the mid-term), there 
will be no immediate supply gap because declining conventional production can be 
substituted by unconventional production from sources such as tar sands, shale oil and 
(arctic) deep-water oil. According to the World Energy Outlook 2012, until 2035 the net 
increase of global oil production will be entirely driven by unconventional oil (IEA 2012). 
This assessment of the IEA is tantamount to the fact that peak oil is imminent. The 
increasing share of unconventional oil, however, leads to rising production costs which are, 
amongst other things, due to a less favourable energy return on energy investment6 (EROEI), 
and subsequently to higher oil prices (Adams 2009; Farrell and Brandt 2006; Hall 2010: 3; 
Rubin 2012: 36ff.). In addition to rising production costs, strong demand growth during 
much of the 2000s may have led to what Hamilton (2008: 12) describes as a ‘scarcity rent’: 
“The sharp run-up in price through June 2008 might be consistent with a newly calculated 
scarcity rent.” Hamilton argues that since then scarcity rents may have become a permanent 
factor in the price of oil. 
In principle, the question whether oil prices increase due to a physical gap in cover between 
supply and demand or due to increasing production costs following the substitution of falling 
conventional oil production by unconventional oil production is of minor importance for the 
dissertation topic. Regardless whether oil prices are going to rise due to real physical 
scarcity, a scarcity rent, or rising production costs, the fact that the global economy is facing 
a price problem in view of oil remains. According to the World Energy Outlook 2012, 
average crude oil import prices are going to increase to $125 per barrel (in year 2011-dollars) 
in 2035 and to $215 in nominal terms. In case Iraq fails to increase its oil supply to world 
markets, average import prices may increase by another $15 per barrel in year 2011-dollars 
(IEA 2012). In fact, the decisive factor for the dissertation is that increasing oil price levels 
may translate into higher transport costs which might translate into economic boom-and-
bust-cycles and increasing oil price volatility. 
Economic theory suggests that strongly increasing oil prices lead to recessive trends 
(Hamilton 1983) especially in net oil importing national economies and for the global 
economy. The recessive trends may then lead to decreasing oil prices since economic 
shrinking processes reduce oil demand. Low oil prices, however, facilitate economic 
recovery which in turn involves growing demand for oil. Growing demand for oil translates 
into yet another round of oil price spikes which again result in (global) recessive trends. As 
indicated above, repeating boom-and-bust-cycles come along with increasing oil price 
volatility. 
There are already indicators for such boom-and-bust cycles and increasing oil price volatility 
(Adams 2009). This begs the question to what extent boom-and-bust-cycles, oil price 
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volatility, and increasing international transport costs will eventually impact economic 
globalisation and long-distance trade. 
 
 Definition of Globalisation 1.2
Although ideas of globalisation have an awe-inspiring intellectual ancestry including Lenin, 
Marx, Mill, Smith, Heckscher and Ohlin or Keynes (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996), the 
term ‘globalisation’ only began to be used regularly in the 1980s and 1990s (Bird and Rajan 
2001; Bourguignon et al. 2002; O’Rourke and Williamson 2002). Nowadays, globalisation is 
a catchword used worldwide (James 2002: 1).  
However, there is no commonly accepted definition of globalisation. On the contrary, 
multiple definitions exist. Because the term globalisation as used in the public, political and 
scientific discourse has multiple meanings, globalisation has become a thoroughly contested 
subject (Bourguignon et al. 2002; Chase-Dunn et al. 2000; Hooker 1996). According to 
Giddens (1996) “there are few terms that we use so frequently but which are in fact as poorly 
conceptualised as globalisation.” Therefore, the discourse about globalisation has at times 
become unobjective and unscientific (Bird and Rajan 2001). As a result, it is sometimes 
difficult to separate the signals from the noise in the debate on globalisation (Srinivasan 
2002). Therefore, it is essential for the sequel of the dissertation to provide an adequate 
working definition of globalisation.  
First, it is necessary to define globalism and to describe the interrelation between globalism 
and globalisation. Keohane and Nye (2000: 105) define globalism as “a state of the world 
involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances.” Globalism can be 
described as a multidimensional phenomenon with multiple shapes or facets such as military, 
environmental, social or cultural globalism. The fundamental dimension of globalism for the 
dissertation, however, is economic globalism.  
The link between globalism and globalisation can be described as follows: Globalisation is 
the process of increasing globalism, thereby determining how ‘thick’ globalism becomes at 
any given time (Keohane and Nye 2000: 108). From this angle, globalisation can be defined 
as “the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thick” (Keohane and Nye 2000: 
108). On the contrary, de-globalisation is the process of decreasing globalism, thereby 
determining how ‘thin’ globalism becomes at any given time and can therefore be defined as 
the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thin. 
In order to provide a precise and sharp working definition of globalisation, it is necessary to 
identify its elements. Scholte (2005: 91) lists internationalisation, liberalisation, 
universalisation, westernisation and supra-territorialisation as elements or characteristics of 
globalisation. The dissertation focuses on economic internationalisation and liberalisation. 
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The working definition can therefore be narrowed down by a restriction on economic 
globalisation parallel to the restriction on economic globalism. 
Abdelal and Segal (2007: 103) define economic globalisation as the “worldwide flow of 
capital, goods, and labour.”7 In this context, the dissertation focuses on the impact of peak oil 
on worldwide trade flows. Chase-Dunn et al. (2000) define trade globalisation as the extent 
to which the long-distance and global exchange of commodities increases or decreases 
relative to the exchange of commodities within national societies. This definition serves as 
an adequate working definition. 
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2 Review of the Literature 
At least since the oil price shocks in 1973/1979, the macroeconomic effects of oil prices 
have been studied extensively (Korhonen and Ledyaeva 2010). According to Mirza and 
Zitouna (2008), “it is well known that oil shocks create many macroeconomic direct and 
indirect effects on inflation, employment, GDP, real wages and productivity. These have 
been well studied and documented since the early 1980s. … The impact of oil prices through 
the cost of transportation and international trade has been little studied though.” The 
dissertation contributes to fill that research gap. Therefore, the literature review gives an 
overview of the literature that deals with the impact of peak oil or high oil prices on the 
geography of international trade. On the other hand, the literature review does not discuss 
articles about the impact of oil price shocks on inflation, employment, GDP, real wages or 
productivity. 
The literature describing or analysing the link between peak oil, international transport costs, 
and trade globalisation provides anecdotal evidence (2.1), descriptive evidence (2.2), and 
quantitative/econometric evidence (2.3). The final section of the literature review (2.4) 
summarises and evaluates the findings described in the previous sections. 
 
 Anecdotal Evidence 2.1
Between 2006 and 2008, a number of reports described the efforts of companies (e.g. IKEA, 
Tesla Motors) to readjust their (global) supply chains in response to increasing fuel 
prices/transport costs (Engardio 2008; Girotti and Kilgore 2006; Hoffman 2008; Mortished 
2008; Rohter 2008; UNCTAD 2008; Wood 2008). These reports provide anecdotal rather 
than quantitative evidence and the examples given are not necessarily representative for the 
respective industries. 
Moreover, Rohter (2008) lists some of the industries most affected by transport cost pressure 
on international supply chains (furniture, footwear, toys, electronics, food and steel). 
Furthermore, Fantazzini et al. (2011) and Phillips (2005) point out that high international 
transport costs act very much like tariffs, thereby impacting long-distance trade volumes. 
 
 Descriptive Evidence 2.2
In a series of articles, Curtis (2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009) and Curtis and Ehrenfeld (2012) 
argue that peak oil (and global warming) will undermine globalisation based on low 
transport costs with the consequence of increasing regionalisation and shorter supply chains 
in many industries (e.g. manufacturing, food production) due to shifting comparative 
advantages. Curtis and Ehrenfeld stress that initial shifts in transport modes (e.g. from air to 
ocean transport) in order to reduce fuel costs at the cost of high-speed transport will be 
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followed by more fundamental adaptions to reshape international supply chains at the cost of 
long-distance trade. The authors exemplarily cite international steel trade. In 2008, U.S. 
domestic steel production figures increased for the first time after many years of contraction. 
Some domestic steel mills used iron ore imports from Brazil for steel production, thereby 
bypassing expensive trans-Pacific iron ore shipments from Brazil to China (upstream trade 
costs) and expensive steel shipments from China to the U.S. (downstream trade costs). 
According to Pellényi et al. (2008), rising oil prices have a direct effect on production costs 
and transport costs of firms. When increasing transport costs cannot be passed to consumers 
and cannot be outbalanced by efficiency gains or fuel substitution, companies may change 
their supply-chain strategies or relocate production. The authors argue that current theories 
and practices in supply chain management were designed in the 1990s under the assumption 
of low oil prices which led, amongst other things, to the invention of just-in-time 
manufacturing strategies where inventories are minimised by smaller, more frequent 
shipments, and offshore sourcing. In 2007/2008, however, a number of European businesses 
started to restructure their distribution networks e.g. by transport mode switching to adapt to 
higher oil prices and to put a stop to rising transport costs. Pellényi et al. stress that structural 
changes in the global economy such as trade liberalisation, freer movement of capital, 
technological progress and the reduction of transportation and communication costs allowed 
markets to become more integrated and enabled the fragmentation of production processes to 
take advantage of the most cost-effective locations for individual stages in the production 
process. However, while lower production costs outweighed transportation costs at low oil 
price levels, this might change with higher oil prices. In addition to providing descriptive 
evidence, Pellényi et al. also conduct quantitative/econometric research. Their findings are 
described in section 2.3. 
Hall et al. (2006) stress that low energy costs during the latter part of the 20th century 
conveyed the impression that transportation costs were of limited importance in explaining 
global supply chains. The authors argue that peak oil will be a strong ‘reality check’ for 
economic systems that rely on cheap transport through their supply chains. As the costs of 
maintaining the existing distribution structure are going to increase and comparative 
advantages will be compromised, a new phase of change in transport and economic 
geographies may occur. Hall et al. indicate that the crucial question may be whether the 
current distribution system sowed the seeds of its own end by constantly increasing oil 
demand in the transport sector or whether the current structure is flexible and adaptable 
enough to cope with rising transport costs. 
Rubin and Tal (2006, 2008) and Rubin (2009, 2012) also argue that high transport cost levels 
as witnessed in the 2006 to 2008 period will cause a significant reduction of long-distance 
trade (particularly in U.S.-Chinese trade) in the nearer future. They argue that as a result of 
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peak oil, rising transport costs will in tariff-equivalent terms offset much of the trade 
liberalisation efforts of previous decades, thereby shortening global supply chains in 
industries with low value-to-weight ratios. The authors base their claims on the following 
facts (effective May 2008):  
 
- In May 2008, oil prices accounted for almost 50% of total shipping costs.  
- Between 2005 and 2008, every $1 rise in oil prices fed directly into a 1% rise in 
transport costs. 
- In 2000, when oil prices stood at $20 per barrel, transportation costs were the 
equivalent of a 3% U.S. tariff rate. In May 2008, when average oil prices stood at 
$125, transport costs were the equivalent of a 9% tariff-rate. With oil prices at $150, 
the tariff-equivalent rate would be 11%. 
- At 2008 oil price levels, every 10% increase in ocean trade distance translated into a 
4.5% increase in ocean transportation costs. 
- In 2000, at $20 per barrel of oil the cost of shipping a 40-foot container from 
Shanghai to the U.S. East Coast was $3,000 (including inland costs). In May 2008, 
at $125 per barrel the cost of shipping a 40-foot container was $8,000 and at $200, 
the cost might be up to $15,000. 
- Producing a ton of steel takes only 1.5 hours of labour input. At 2008 oil price 
levels, the cost advantage of China over the U.S. was significantly reduced by 
upstream and downstream transport costs or even reversed. In May 2008, Chinese 
steel exports to the U.S. were down 20% on a year-over-year basis. At the same 
time, U.S. domestic steel production was up 10%. 
- Goods with a high value-to-freight ratio carry implicitly small transportation costs 
relative to total costs, while goods with a low value-to-freight ratio carry relatively 
large transport costs. In 2008, freight-sensitive Chinese exports accounted for 42% 
of total exports to the U.S. down from 52% in 2004. 
 
Two articles referring to Rubin and Tal (Murphy 2008; The Economist 2008) also discuss 
the scenario of a reduction of Chinese trade with the U.S. due to high oil price levels. 
However, the undertone of these articles is more cautious when it comes to the significance 
of the impact on Chinese-U.S. trade levels. Murphy (2008) argues that falling transport costs 
resulting from the relocation of production sites from China to countries geographically 
closer to the U.S. could come at the cost of rising labour costs and less potential for 
economies of scale. Herold (2012) mainly reproduces the article of Rubin and Tal (2008) and 
adds some information on the interdependencies of peak oil, transport costs, and 
globalisation.  
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Jacoby and Halbert (2007) analyse the impact of the oil price increase during the 2000s on 
international supply chains. They emphasise that lean supply chains depend on cheap 
transport to reduce inventory requirements and that lean theory and practice were invented 
when oil prices where at $25 per barrel. The authors also highlight that fuel surcharges due 
to rising oil prices increased substantially beginning in 2006, thereby putting pressure on 
international supply chains. When international transport becomes more expensive, 
managing just-in-time supply chains becomes more challenging and in many cases slower 
and cheaper transport modes need to be selected. In the long run, rising and/or volatile oil 
prices can influence sourcing decisions. Then, remote sourcing locations tend to be 
substituted by less distant sourcing locations. The authors conclude that the impact of rising 
oil prices on international supply chains remained limited until the end of 2006 and that the 
majority of supply chains would not need major realignment until oil prices reach the $100 
mark. However, the report was published in January 2007 and therefore does not take into 
account the dramatic oil price increases between January 2007 and July 2008 when oil prices 
increased from $50 to $147. 
Alexander (2011) describes possible cripple effects as a result of transport cost increases due 
to peak oil, thereby citing the examples of the global food and steel industries. 
Wakeford (2007) points out that trade globalisation is based on abundant, cheap oil fuelling 
international transport systems. The author expects a partial reverse of the globalisation 
process (especially in sectors relying heavily on oil-fuelled transport) as a result of peak oil 
and expects an increase in localised production and consumption. Wakeford also describes 
possible effects on the South African economy. South Africa exports about 25% of the goods 
produced (which are transported over long distances to a significant extent) and is therefore 
characterised as being vulnerable to oil price spikes.  
Ralston (2008) stresses that only transport based on cheap oil made possible economic 
globalisation in its current form. As strongly increasing oil prices make transportation fuel 
more expensive, long-distance transportation structures are impacted to a significant extent. 
According to Friedrichs (2010), globalisation has been fuelled by cheap and abundant 
energy. Friedrich notes that increasing conflicts over scarce energy may undermine the 
global economic and political globalisation processes observed in previous decades. 
Jen and Bindelli (2008) argue that the East Asian trade model based on cheap transport, 
cheap labour and vertical specialisation will be significantly impacted by peak oil because 
the production network requires components to be shipped multiple times thus making 
affordable transport costs a necessity. The authors also suggest that peak oil may lead to 
increasing regionalisation at the cost of long-distance trade. Moreover, Jen and Bindelli 
suggest possible positive effects in the long run such as a reduction of global trade 
imbalances. 
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A study of the Centre for Transformation of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr 
Transformation Centre 2010; Schultz 2010) concludes that peak oil might pose a systemic 
risk for the global economy and for international trade. The study refers to crude oil as an 
essential determinant of globalisation because oil is the basic source for multiple 
transportation fuels and therefore a basic requirement for the transport of goods over long 
distances. The study further characterises cheap international transport as the backbone of 
globalisation and argues that the international division of work or the extent of vertical 
specialisation would not be possible without low international transport costs. The possible 
implications for the German economy are described as extensive because it is one of the 
most globalised economies by international standards. In a scenario for the global economy, 
the study forecasts an increase in transport costs at final selling prices and decreasing trade 
volumes in the short run and the possible collapse of global supply chains in the midterm. 
Finally, the authors of the study argue that peak oil might pose a systemic risk and that an 
economic tipping point might lead to a chain reaction that might severly destabilise the 
global economy. Economies are functional within a band of relative stability where cyclical 
variation and other shocks can be absorbed while the economy’s functional principles lead to 
recurrent equilibriums within the system. Beyond this band of relative stability, however, the 
system may react chaotic. The disintegration of complex economic systems including its 
interdependent infrastructures might trigger such non-linear reactions. 
Delbruck (2005) analyses the impact of rising oil prices on New Zealand’s economy and 
concludes that due to the country’s geographical isolation, a permanent increase of 
international fuel prices may raise the price of imported goods and may reduce the 
competitiveness of export-oriented industries. 
A report on behalf of New Zealand’s government (NZ Govt 2009) also analyses the link 
between rapidly rising oil prices and the performance of New Zealand’s economy. The 
report states that the country’s level of exposure to positive oil price changes is more acute 
than for many other countries due to the distance to international markets because high 
and/or volatile oil prices are immediately felt by primary production exporting sectors with 
long transport networks to global markets. Exemplarily, the report mentions the export of 
high-volume commodities like milk and forestry products where transport costs represent a 
high proportion of overall costs. The report concludes that New Zealand’s economy is likely 
to suffer overproportionally from rising oil prices resulting from peak oil due to its distance 
to global economic centres. 
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 Quantitative/Econometric Evidence 2.3
Mirza and Zitouna (2009) justifiably criticise the above-cited articles for being too much 
anecdotal and/or descriptive to allow for valid conclusions about the link between peak oil, 
international transport costs, and the geography of world trade. The studies providing 
quantitative or econometric evidence are introduced below. 
 
Guerrero de Lizardi and Padilla-Perez (2010) examine whether  North American (Mexico), 
Central American (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua), and 
Caribbean countries (Dominican Republic) profit from peak oil at the cost of remote 
countries by increasing their export levels to the U.S. as a result of comparatively low 
transport costs for shipments destined to the United States.  
For that purpose, the authors use the MAGIC (Module for the Analysis of Growth in 
International Commerce) software developed by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to analyse countries’ market shares in the 
U.S. market. MAGIC is an analytical tool that contains a database with U.S. import data 
from the U.S. Department of Commerce from 1990 to the present (The study uses data for 
the time period between 1990 and 2008.). The methodology applied in MAGIC is based on 
the Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN) model which is a single equation model derived 
from Constant Market Share Analysis (CMSA).8  
The authors consider product analysis as the best path to explore the development of relative 
shares in the U.S. import market. The manufactured products selected for analysis (women’s 
beach wear, men’s beach wear, men’s underwear, fibre optic cables, beer, automatic circuit 
breakers, orange juice, baseballs, plastics for automobiles, tobacco) were chosen on the basis 
of two criteria. First, the product analysed registers significant and consistent penetration in 
the U.S. statistically speaking. Second, there must be an Asian country among the main 
competitors for U.S. import market share.  
In case countries geographically close to the U.S. can increase their market share at the cost 
of remote countries, the authors expect the statistical relationship between the oil price and 
the relative price of a product (which is a weighted average of absolute product prices) for 
the geographically close countries to be negative so that import market shares increase. 
Based on the estimated elasticity values of the relative price of a product with respect to the 
oil price, the authors simulate the change in the U.S. import market share for a proximate 
country resulting from a reduction in the relative price of a product for four oil price 
scenarios (WTI oil price at $60, $90, $120, $150). The results for the selected products for 
each country are summarised in table 2.1. The authors find that for every product analysed, 
the market share of the countries included in the analysis increases with rising oil prices. For 
example, when oil prices rise from $60 to $150, the Mexican market share in U.S. imports 
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for women`s beachwear increases by 8.1% (men’s beach wear: +3.7%; fibre optic cables: 
+5.4%; beer: +3.7%; automatic circuit breakers: +6.0%; orange juice: +3.7%; plastics for 
automobiles: +18.8%).  
Table 2.1 U.S. Import Market Share in % 
MEXICO
Women's  Beach Wear 24.3 23.9 26.6 29.3 32.0
Men's Beach Wear 15.2 15.0 16.2 17.5 18.7
Fibre Optic Cables 47.3 48.5 50.3 52.1 53.9
Beer 44.7 45.5 46.7 48.0 49.2
Automatic Circuit Breakers  - 50.8 53.6 56.3 56.8
Orange Juice 31.2 32.0 33.2 34.5 35.7
Plastics for Automobiles 11.2 15.2 21.4 27.7 34.0
COSTA RICA
Men's  Beach Wear  - 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.2
Men's Underwear 11.7 11.1 14.0 16.9 19.8
Orange Juice 10.2 11.3 13.1 14.8 16.6
Baseballs 18.6 19.5 21.0 22.5 23.9
Plastics for Automobiles 7.2 12.7 21.4 30.1 38.7
El SALVADORE
Women's  Beach Wear 6.3 8.0 10.8 13.6 16.3
Men's Beach Wear 11.2 10.8 13.1 15.5 17.8
Men's Underwear 15.9 16.3 16.9 17.5 18.2
Beer 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
GUATEMALA
Women's  Beach Wear 6.4 6.3 6.7 7.0 7.3
Beer 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
HONDURAS
Women's  Beach Wear 12.8 13.2 13.8 14.5 15.1
Men's Beach Wear 18.7 17.9 22.1 26.3 30.4
Men's Underwear 13.4 13.9 14.6 15.4 16.2
Orange Juice 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
Tobacco 2.0 3.2 5.0 6.9 8.7
NICARAGUA
Women's  Beach Wear 2.9 3.3 4.1 4.8 5.5
Men's Beach Wear 3.3 2.4 7.3 12.2 17.1
Tobacco 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.5
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Women's  Beach Wear 1.1 0.0 6.3 12.5 18.8
Men's Beach Wear 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7
Men's Underwear 12.1 12.3 12.6 12.9 13.2
Beer 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.5
Automatic Circuit Breakers  - 39.7 41.5 43.2 43.2
Tobacco 79.8 80.6 81.9 83.2 84.5
Source: Guerrero de Lizardi and Padilla-Perez (2010)
*2008: real market share;  $ 60 -$ 150: simulated market shares
U.S. Import Market Share in %*
Country/Product
2008 $ 60 $ 90 $ 120 $ 150
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The authors conclude that exports from the countries listed above are likely to increase at the 
cost of exports from remote countries (e.g. manufactured goods exported from East Asia) 
when high oil price levels persist in coming years. It is at least questionable whether the 
findings for the selected goods can be generalised for the 30,000 goods exported from the 
Central and North American countries to the U.S. as the authors propose. 
 
In a series of papers, Mirza and Zitouna (2008, 2009) and Kousnetzoff, Mirza and Zitouna 
(2008) study the effect of high oil prices on the geography of international trade.  
Mirza and Zitouna (2009) examine the hypothesis that countries are affected differently by 
high oil prices depending on their geographical location. Thereby, rising oil prices are 
assumed to distort the relative price of goods which leads to a reallocation of resources 
across countries with the result of increasing regionalism at the cost of long-distance trade. 
First, the authors set up a general transport cost function that includes fixed and variable 
transport costs and take it to the test. They find that, as expected, more distant countries are 
affected overproportionally by an increase of oil prices relative to geographically close 
trading partners. By affecting variable transport costs, rising oil prices alter the structure of 
transport costs among trading partners, thus acting as a factor of distortion in relative prices. 
This mechanism leads to a reallocation of international trade at the cost of remote countries 
and fosters regionalism at the expense of trade globalisation.  
Second, Mirza and Zitouna use the datasets provided by Feenstra and Hummels containing 
data on U.S. bilateral imports and transport costs to calculate the elasticity of transport costs 
to oil prices for the time period 1974-20019. The authors estimate an elasticity of 0.103 for 
long-distance exporters (more than 10,000km) and an elasticity of 0.088 for close U.S. 
trading partners (less than 3,000km). Next, they estimate the elasticity of foreign supplier 
market shares in the U.S. to freight rates to be around 1.12. From there, the authors infer the 
elasticity of relative market shares to oil prices and find that a 10% increase in oil prices 
leads to a 0.04% reduction of market shares for distant U.S. trading partners and an increase 
of market shares of 0.13% for close U.S. trading partners.  
Third, the authors apply these elasticities to determine the impact of the 2000s oil price 
shock on the distribution of U.S. imports between 1999 and 2006. During that period, 
Mexico`s and Canada`s export shares increased by 2.2% to 3% and India`s and China`s 
export shares decreased by 0.4% to 0.7%.  
Finally, Mirza and Zitouna simulate the impact of the oil shock in the 2000s on the relative 
probability to export to the U.S. between 1999 and 2006 for different countries. Thereby, the 
relative probability to export is estimated for a given year (e.g. 2006) by calculating the 
propensity to export for a given country and then dividing it by the mean probability to 
export (estimated over the whole sample for that year). The authors find that the probability 
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to export to the U.S. increased by 4% for Canada and 3.5% for Mexico and decreased by 
0.8% for China, 0.6% for Japan and 0.1% for India.  
It is noteworthy that the authors did not include the 2007-2008 period in the analysis. During 
that period, real oil prices reached their highest levels (2007: $72.3; quarters 1-3 in 2008: 
$113.3) (EIA 2011a; b). Oil prices during the sample period, however, were considerably 
lower (1999: $19.3; 2000: $30.4; 2001: $26; 2002: $26.2; 2003: $31.1; 2004: $41.5; 2005: 
$56.6; 2006: $66.1) (EIA 2011a). Therefore, Mira and Zitouna’s estimates may have been 
more pronounced if the 2007-2008 period would have been included in the analysis. Then, 
the oil price increase during the sample period would have been 7.5 fold (1999-2008) instead 
of 4.5 fold (1999-2006). In this context, it needs to be mentioned that a neuralgic point might 
be reached at a given oil price level where the response of international trade flows to rising 
oil prices may become non-linear. Another point of criticism is that the time period used for 
the estimation of the elasticities (1974-2001) consists of two sub-periods, one where oil 
prices reached very high levels (1974-1984) and one where oil prices were low (1985-2001) 
so that it is possible that both sub-periods level each other out. 
 
In earlier research, Mirza and Zitouna (2008) use the same methodological approach as in 
Mirza and Zitouna (2009) to estimate that a 1% increase in distance leads to an increase of 
transportation costs by 0.008% and to simulate the oil price effect on the market shares of 
countries exporting to the U.S. when oil prices double. The results of the simulation have 
been summarised in table 2.2 ordered by world regions.  
The trends for the different regions are as follows: 
- Europe: When oil prices double, the market share of European countries in the U.S. 
market is reduced marginally by 0.1%-0.2%, is not affected, or increases marginally 
by 0.1%-0.2% (exceptions: Ireland +0.3%; UK +0.3%; Iceland +0.5%). 
- C.I.S.: The market share of C.I.S. countries is reduced by 0.2%-0.3% with the 
exception of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine which are not affected at all. 
- North America: The market share of North American countries in the U.S. market 
increases significantly by 0.7%-1.6%. 
- South America: The market share of South American countries in the U.S. market is 
not affected (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) or increases by 0.1%-0.8%. 
- Africa: The market share in the U.S. decreases by 0.1%-0.7% for the vast majority 
of African countries. A small minority of African countries is either not affected or 
can increase its market share marginally by 0.1%-0.2% 
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- Middle East: The market share Middle Eastern countries in the U.S. decreases by 
0.1%-0.4%. 
- Asia: The market share of Asian countriesin the U.S. decreases by 0.2%-0.7%. 
- Oceania: The market share in the U.S. is reduced for all Oceanian countries by 
0.2%-0.6%. 
Table 2.2 Evolution of Market Shares in Response to a doubling in Oil Price 
Country
MS 
Evolution Country
MS 
Evolution Country
MS 
Evolution Country
MS 
Evolution
(in %) (in %) (in %) (in %)
EUROPE C.I.S. AFRICA MIDDLE EAST
Cyprus -0.2 Tajikistan -0.3 Mauritius -0.7 Oman -0.4
Greece -0.1 Usbekistan -0.3 Madagascar -0.7 UAE -0.4
Bulgaria -0.1 Turkmenistan -0.3 Seychelles -0.6 Qatar -0.4
Macedonia 0.0 Kyrgystan -0.3 Mozambique -0.6 Bahrain -0.4
Moldowa 0.0 Azerbaijan -0.2 South Africa -0.6 Saudi Arabia -0.3
Malta 0.0 Armenia -0.2 Malawi -0.6 Kuwait -0.3
Albania 0.0 Kazakhstan -0.2 Zimbabwe -0.5 Iran -0.3
Romania 0.0 Georgia -0.2 Tanzania -0.5 Iraq -0.3
Bosnia 0.0 Ukraine 0.0 Zambia -0.5 Jordan -0.2
Hungary 0.0 Russia 0.0 Somalia -0.5 Israel -0.2
Croatia 0.0 Belarus 0.0 Kenya -0.5 Lebanon -0.2
Slovakia 0.1 NORTH AMERICA Burundi -0.5 Syria -0.2
Italy 0.1 Trinidad and Tobago 0.7 Rwanda -0.4 Turkey -0.1
Slovenia 0.1 Barbados 0.7 Uganda -0.4 ASIA
Austria 0.1 Greenland 0.8 Djibouti -0.4 Indonesia -0.7
Poland 0.1 Saint Kittis Nevis 0.8 Ethiopia -0.4 Singapore -0.6
Lithuania 0.1 Netherland Antilles 0.9 Congo (RDC) -0.4 Malaysia -0.6
Czech Republic 0.1 Panama 0.9 Sudan -0.3 Sri Lanka -0.6
Latvia 0.1 Dominican Republic 1.1 Congo -0.3 Cambodia -0.5
Estonia 0.1 Nicaragua 1.1 Central Africa -0.3 Thailand -0.5
Switzerland 0.1 Haiti 1.1 Gabon -0.3 Vietnam -0.5
Finland 0.1 El Salvador 1.1 Equa-Guinea -0.3 Burma -0.5
Germany 0.2 Jamaica 1.2 Chad -0.3 Laos -0.5
France 0.2 Honduras 1.2 Cameron -0.3 Philippines -0.5
Sweden 0.2 Guatemala 1.2 Egypt -0.2 India -0.5
Spain 0.2 Belize 1.3 Nigeria -0.2 Bangladesh -0.5
Denmark 0.2 Bermuda 1.3 Benin -0.2 Hong Kong -0.4
Benelux 0.2 Mexico 1.4 Togo -0.2 Nepal -0.4
Netherlands 0.2 Bahamas 1.4 Ghana -0.1 Pakistan -0.4
Norway 0.2 Canada 1.6 Niger -0.1 Afghanistan -0.3
Portugal 0.2 SOUTH AMERICA Cote d'Ivoire -0.1 China -0.3
UK 0.3 Uruguay 0.0 Burkina Faso -0.1 Korea -0.2
Ireland 0.3 Argentina 0.0 Liberia 0.0 North Korea -0.2
Iceland 0.5 Chile 0.0 Mali 0.0 Japan -0.2
Brazil 0.1 Tunisia 0.0 Mongolia -0.2
Paraguay 0.1 Sierra Leone 0.0 OCEANIA
Bolivia 0.3 Guinea 0.0 Australia -0.6
Peru 0.4 Guinea-Bissau 0.1 Papua New Guinea -0.5
Suriname 0.5 Algeria 0.1 New Zealand -0.4
Guyana 0.6 Gambia 0.1 New Caledonia -0.4
Ecuador 0.7 Senegal 0.1 Fiji -0.3
Colombia 0.8 Mauretania 0.1 Kiribati -0.2
Venezuela 0.8 Morocco 0.2 Samoa -0.2
Source: Mirza and Zitouna (2008)
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By tendency, countries from regions geographically close to the U.S. (North America, South 
America) can increase their market shares significantly, while countries from geographically 
remote regions lose moderately (C.I.S., Middle East) or significantly (Asia, Oceania). The 
effect of doubling oil prices on the market share of European countries to the U.S. is almost 
neutral.  
Although the figures in table 2.2 do not seem to be dramatic at first glance, the authors argue 
that the sextuple increase of oil prices between 1999 and the first quarter of 2008 would have 
non-negligibly increased North American trade. In this scenario, the oil price shock during 
the 2000s would have led to an increase of Canada`s and Mexico`s sum of market shares by 
almost 7.5%. The authors conclude that the very large shift of oil prices during the 1998-
2008 period seems to have acted as an endogenous factor stimulating the regionalisation of 
trade flows.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that the estimates for some countries are quite surprising 
when compared with other countries. Take the estimates for Asian countries for example. Is 
it realistic that in reaction to doubling oil prices the market share of the modern economies of 
Singapore and Malaysia decreases by 0.6% and the market share of China decreases by 0.3% 
while the market share of Mongolia and North Korea (Do North Korea and the U.S. trade at 
all?) only decreases by 0.2%? 
 
In another study, Kousnetzoff, Mirza and Zitouna (2008) find that due to the 7.5-fold 
increase in oil prices between 1998 and 2008, the volume of goods transported to the U.S. by 
air decreased by 12.3%, thereby slowing the mobility of goods traded. Moreover, they find 
an increase of 3.1% in the per-ton value of goods exported to the U.S. and an increase of 
4.1% of Canada’s and Mexico’s respective market share for exports to the U.S.  
With regard to the methodology applied, the authors emphasise that econometric analysis has 
been used to generate the estimates described above and refer the reader to Mirza and 
Zitouna (2009) for more details. Therefore, it can be assumed that the same methodological 
approach as in Mirza and Zitouna (2009) has been used. 
 
A series of articles by Ma and Van Assche (2010) and by Gangnes, Ma and Van Assche 
(2011a, b) examine the impact of peak oil or high oil prices on the sensitivity of distance to 
international trade.  
Ma and Van Assche (2010) use data from the Chinese processing trade regime for the 1988-
2008 period to examine the impact of peak oil on global production networks (GPN). The 
authors use an augmented gravity model which is a generalised version of the model 
invented by Ma et al. (2009) to test two hypotheses.  
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The first hypothesis tested is that ceteris paribus, rising oil prices increase the sensitivity of 
Chinese processing exports to import and export distance. The estimated coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant suggesting that oil price spikes indeed make Chinese 
processing exports more sensitive to upstream and downstream trade distance.  
The second hypothesis tested is that ceteris paribus, oil price shocks reduce China’s share of 
processing exports in total exports, especially for distant destinations. The estimated 
coefficients indeed suggest that increasing oil prices reduce the share of China’s processing 
exports in total exports for far away destinations.  
The findings are in line with Yi`s (2003) theoretical prediction that inter-GPN trade is more 
sensitive to changing trade costs than regular trade. 
 
In later research, Gangnes, Ma and Van Assche (2011a, b) examine the impact of oil price 
spikes on global trade, particularly within GPNs. The authors estimate a set of gravity 
models on a panel dataset from China Customs Statistics which includes data on trade by 
customs regime (processing trade vs. regular trade) and by transport mode (air transport vs. 
maritime transport) for the 1988-2008 time period. That is, they use the same dataset as Ma 
and Van Assche (2010).  
The authors find that Chinese exports become more sensitive to distance when oil prices 
spike. They also find that this effect is more pronounced for processing exports where goods 
cross borders multiple times. Finally, Gangnes et al. find that goods transported by air are 
less vulnerable to the effects described above. The authors explain the difference with the 
high value-to-weight ratio of goods transported by air and with the relatively greater 
importance of factors other than transport costs such as timeliness. The latter finding 
partially contrasts the estimates of Kousnetzoff et al. (2008).  
Although the estimates of Gangnes et al. are statistically significant, their economic effects 
remain relatively small. For the 2002-2008 period when oil prices quadrupled, the authors 
estimate an increase in the elasticity of Chinese exports to distance of 5%-7%. They also 
estimate the impact of an oil price spike from $26 to $100 depending on the type of trade 
(processing vs. non-processing) and transport mode and find that in air-intensive industries, 
distance elasticity increases by 0.02 to 0.03 per cent points for processing and non-
processing exports respectively. The effect is more pronounced in non-air-intensive 
industries where the distance elasticity increases by 0.13 per cent points for processing 
exports and by 0.09 per cent points for non-processing exports.  
The authors admit that their study is subject to significant limitations resulting from the time 
period used and the empirical specification employed. They point out that oil prices 
remained low during the first half of the sample period making it difficult to precisely 
compute oil price effects. This statement leaves the reader wondering why the sample has 
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not been narrowed down to the period of the oil price spike between 1998 and 2008. 
Moreover, Gangnes et al. point out the difficulty to separate the impact of oil prices from 
other time-varying factors. Finally, the specification used imposes constant elasticities of the 
distance effect with respect to the price of oil which may not be an appropriate assumption. 
 
Lutz and Meyer (2009) analyse the impact of high/rising oil prices on German trade 
volumes, thereby using the INFORGE (INterindustry FORecasting GErmany) and 
GINFORS (Global INterindustry FORecasting System) models which are described as 
structural econometric models or econometric input-output models. More precisely, 
INFORGE is described as an econometric input-output model owing to the econometric 
calculation of its parameters and to existing input-output connections. The model 
disaggregates the German economy into 59 industries. GINFORS is a bilateral trade model 
which is designed to depict the economies of 50 countries and two regions (OPEC and the 
Rest of the World) in structural detail and links them by using bilateral trade data for 25 
commodities and 1 service good.  
In the baseline scenario, oil prices are at $80 in 2010 and increase to $100 in 2020. Lutz and 
Meyer find that German exports increase by 0.3% as a reaction to the increase in oil prices. 
The increase of exports is mainly due to high trade shares in oil exporting countries which 
increase spending when oil prices rise and to the country’s strong investment goods industry. 
Thereby, the increase in exports is mainly due to rising machinery, motor vehicle, radio, TV 
and communication equipment exports. However, the authors point out that Germany is 
among the countries with the lowest oil vulnerability index worldwide and that the impact on 
other economies which are more vulnerable to rising oil prices is likely to be negative. 
 
Lehr et al. (2011) research the macroeconomic effects of peak oil on national economies by 
using a ‘peak oil scenario’ and publish results for the German economy. Like Lutz and 
Meyer (2009), Lehr et al. (2011) also use the GINFORS model described above for their 
analysis. They describe the model as a ‘sectorally disaggregated global energy-environment-
economy model’ combining econometric-statistical analysis with input-output analysis.  
The authors estimate a reduction of German exports by 5.5% and a reduction of imports by 
15.9%. Lehr et al. state that the effect on the German economy might be low relative to other 
economies due to the high-quality goods produced for which transportation costs are 
relatively less important. Moreover, the proximity to export markets might dampen the effect 
of peak oil while remote countries such as Japan may be affected overproportionally. More 
generally, Lehr et al. state that the transport industry will be affected in the first place while 
indirect effects will be felt along global supply chains.  
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However, the above-cited results were estimated based on scenarios where oil prices increase 
to $400 and/or $600 by 2020 at constant prices which seems quite excessive. The authors 
also stress that the estimates should be interpreted with care as the oil price levels assumed in 
the scenarios have never been experienced before. Finally, Lehr et al. emphasise that even 
small changes in the parameters of the GINFORS model could alter the results substantially.  
 
Pellényi et al. (2008) simulate shifts in international trade patterns as a result of increasing 
oil prices. They use the global simulation model (GSIM) designed by Francis and Hall 
(2003) for the purpose of analysing global, regional, and unilateral trade policy changes. The 
authors describe the model as a multi-region, imperfect substitutes model of world trade that 
employs a partial equilibrium approach in which sectoral effects are not considered.  
The simulation of changing trade patterns is based on the assumption of the existence of a 
specific set of changes to import tariffs which, in its effect on trade flows, is equivalent to a 
change in the price of oil. In other words, Pellényi et al. introduce equivalent ad valorem 
tariff rate changes which shall simulate the effects of an assumed increase in oil prices from 
25€ to 60€ for the EU, the U.S., China, Japan, and ‘the rest of the world’ (ROW).  
The simulation results indicate that as a consequence of the oil price increase, EU exporters 
face the equivalent of an additional tariff rate of 1.6%. Moreover, exporters from the other 
countries/regions analysed are faced with the following additional tariff rates: U.S.: 2.9%, 
Japan: 1.7%, China: 6.6%, rest of the world: 3.2%.  
The other results of the simulation are presented in table 2.3 where the figures on the 
diagonal represent the estimated changes in domestic output and the figures off the diagonal 
represent the estimated changes in bilateral trade flows. Thereby, it is remarkable that China, 
which is widely regarded as an economic powerhouse, faces the biggest losses in terms of 
bilateral trade flows (bilateral trade trade flows with the EU: -10.4%; USA: -8.4%; Japan: -
9.9%; ROW: -6.5%) compared to the other countries/regions analysed. On the other hand, 
the EU and Japan increase their exports or loose only slightly, while the U.S. increases its 
exports or looses moderately. 
Origin
EU USA Japan China ROW
EU -1.1 0.9 -0.8 6.4 1.1
USA -3.6 -1.9 -2.9 4.3 -1.6
Japan -0.9 0.9 -1.1 6.5 1.1
China -10.4 -8.4 -9.9 -4.5 -6.5
ROW -4.4 -2.6 -4.1 3.5 -2.0
Note: ROW = Rest of world
Destination
Oil price shifts from EUR 25 to EUR 60 per barrel
Table 2.3 Simulated Effects of an Oil Price Shock on Bilateral Trade Flows (in %) 
Source: Pellényi et al. 2008 
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At an oil price of $30 per barrel, sourcing goods from China by U.S. firms leads to average 
net final cost savings of 18% while bunker fuel costs make up about 4% of final selling 
prices. Based on these figures, Pellényi et al. calculate that sourcing/importing from China 
becomes uneconomic for U.S. firms once oil prices reach $165 per barrel.  
 
Chen and Hsu (2012) examine the impact of high oil price volatility10 on trade globalisation. 
That is, the authors’ focus is not primarily on high oil price levels but on the fluctuation of 
oil prices. Chen and Hsu argue that peak oil may lead to increasing oil price levels and 
increasing oil price volatility due to economic boom-and-bust cycles. As a result, 
international trade is not only impacted by high oil prices through the transport cost channel 
but also through the uncertainty channel as a result of oil price volatility. For instance, oil 
price volatility may prompt consumers to postpone purchases or companies to postpone 
irreversible investments (for example in geographically remote countries). The reduction of 
domestic consumption and investment expenditures may lead to a reduction of aggregate 
demand and may therefore reduce international trade. 
The authors use annual data from 1984 to 2008 for 84 countries on international trade and 
the structural VAR model with new identification assumptions proposed by Kilian (2009) for 
their analysis.  
Chen and Hsu find a negative and statistically significant relationship between oil price 
volatility and international trade. The relationship is robust to different oil price volatility 
measures. They also find that oil supply shocks discourage trade while oil demand shocks 
may also provide positive impulses to trade. The latter finding, however, is statistically 
insignificant. Moreover, the authors find that oil price volatility significantly reduces trade 
volumes of net oil importers (both imports and exports) while the impact is statistically 
insignificant (the impact on imports is positive but insignificant; the impact on exports is 
mixed but insignificant) for net oil exporters. Chen and Hsu conclude that oil price volatility 
has a significant adverse impact on trade globalisation and may lead to deglobalisation. 
Motivated by soaring crude oil prices during the 2000s and their potential implications for 
trade globalisation, Beverelli (2010) uses single regression analysis or single OLS and IV-
GMM regressions to examine whether – and to what extent – maritime freight rates in the 
container, dry bulk, and tanker trades are affected by variation in bunker fuel prices, thereby 
using Brent crude oil prices as a proxy for bunker fuel.  
First, Beverelli estimates the elasticity of oil prices on maritime freight rates to be 0.40. 
Next, Beverelli finds that a 10% increase in Brent oil prices leads to an increase of container 
freight rates between 1.9% and 3.6%. That is, the estimated elasticity is between 0.19 and 
0.36. Similarly, a 10% increase in Brent prices leads to an increase in oil tanker freight rates 
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of 2.8%. Finally, a 10% increase in Brent oil prices leads to an increase of iron ore freight 
rates between 8.9% and 10.5%.  
This essentially means that steel producers in countries with iron ore scarcity are facing a 
considerable disadvantage when compared to steel producers in countries with iron ore 
abundance. In this context, the author points out that demand for iron ore is relatively 
inelastic due to the limited potential for substitution by other minerals and its importance as 
major input in the steel production process. Moreover, finding more proximate locations for 
iron ore sourcing may prove to be difficult since the iron ore market is dominated by two 
countries, Australia and Brazil.  
Beverelli also emphasises that the impact of rising transportation costs resulting from 
increasing oil prices may vary among the type and value of goods shipped. For example, 
transport costs are generally more important for low-value goods than for high-value goods 
due to the higher share of transport costs to final selling prices. Furthermore, the author 
emphasises that especially the trade flows and patterns of developing and landlocked 
countries, which already face transport costs above average, may be at risk. 
 
Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010) study the impact of oil price shocks on oil-producing and 
oil-consuming economies. For that purpose, the authors use quarterly data for oil 
producing/exporting Russia and its main trading partners (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
China, USA, UK, Switzerland, Finland) for the 1995-2006 period and utilise the 
methodology invented by Abeysinghe (1998; 2001) where the oil price is treated as an 
exogenous variable. However, in Abeysinghe’s structural VAR model, the growth rates of 
the countries analysed do not only depend on changes in the price of oil but also on other 
countries’ growth rates via a bilateral export matrix. The rationale behind this model set up is 
that higher growth rates in one country increases other countries` exports to that country. The 
model focuses on two types of cross-country linkages, direct effects due to bilateral trade and 
indirect effects via output multipliers. That is, the trade linkages are used for the estimation 
of multiplier effects of a shock as it is transmitted through the output fluctuations of other 
countries.  
The authors find that oil exporting countries profit from oil price shocks due to higher oil 
revenues but at the same time, their exports to oil importing countries are reduced because 
demand for goods in oil importing countries decreases. On the other hand, other countries 
are able to increase their exports to the oil exporting countries because of the increasing 
revenues of oil exporters following an oil price shock. 
 
Because standard trade models have not been able to deliver the result that tariff reductions 
are responsible for postwar trade growth (The models fail to deliver both the magnitude and 
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pattern of trade expansion.), Bridgman (2008) uses a vertical specialisation trade model to 
analyse the role of transport costs for trade growth. More precisely, the author describes the 
model as a ‘tractable general equilibrium model with Ricardian trade in intermediate goods’. 
Model building is based on the following assumptions: 
1. Transport costs are quantitatively important. 
2. Energy is an important input to transportation. 
3. Energy is difficult to substitute away from. 
4. Higher energy costs are associated with higher transportation costs. 
Bridgman compares postwar trade expansion data between 1960 and 2005 with the estimates 
generated by the simulated trade model. After rising rapidly in the late 1960s, the estimated 
model trade shares indicate no sustained growth for the period from 1974 to 1985. Trade 
growth then increases rapidly after 1985 while both model and data trade growth slows in the 
2000s. That is, postwar trade growth increases significantly during periods where oil prices 
are low (late 1960s, 1985-2000) and slows down significantly in periods where oil prices 
increase (1974-1985, much of the 2000s). Bridgman concludes that oil price shocks have 
significant effects on trade growth. He also points out that when oil price levels during much 
of the 2000s are sustained, international trade may suffer in the near future. 
 
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006, 2010) test for structural breaks in the trade ratios 
(imports/GDP and exports/GDP) of 59 countries during the post-war period (1948-1993), 
thereby using the Vogelsang (1997) test. The Vogelsang test for detecting shifts in the trend 
function of a dynamic time series can also be used for trending and unit root regressors. 
 The authors’ goal is to determine whether trade liberalisation or the oil price shocks in 
1973/79 are responsible for the detected structural breaks. They find that the majority of the 
breaks detected for the sample of 59 countries occurred between 1973 and 1981. During this 
period of time, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn detect 24 significant breaks (55% of the total 
significant breaks) in import ratios and 24 significant breaks (64% of the total significant 
breaks) in export ratios. Due to the different country specifics, it is rather unlikely that the 
structural breaks exactly match with the occurrence of the oil shocks should they be 
responsible for the shift in the ratios. However, even if the time period under consideration is 
narrowed down to 1973/74 and 1979/80, a considerable number of structural breaks detected 
occurred during that period (import ratios: 14 breaks or 32% of the total significant breaks; 
export ratios: 12 breaks or 33% of the total significant breaks). Moreover, for many of the 
countries included in the analysis the averages of actual post-break ratios are below the 
averages of the extrapolated pre-break ratios.  
The authors therefore conclude that the 1973/1979 oil shocks account for most of the 
structural breaks in the trade ratios. Two possible explanations for these findings may be 
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reduced demand for internationally traded goods due to the recessions following the shocks 
or a reduction of international trade due to increasing transport costs. 
 
Bergin and Glick (2007) measure the degree of global commodity price convergence - which 
serves as an indicator for global economic integration - between 1990 and 2005. The authors 
use data on prices for 101 tradeable commodities in 108 cities in 70 countries for their 
analysis. First, Bergin and Glick compute mean squared error (MSE) measures of price 
dispersion across all country pairs for any of the 101 product categories.  
They find a U-shaped pattern of commodity price convergence/dispersion for several sub-
groupings of countries, selected regions, and selected commodity groups. Prices converge 
from 1990 to 1997 and then disperse from 1998 to 2005. After estimating gravity regressions 
by using the gravity model, Bergin and Glick find that this time-varying pattern coincides 
remarkably well with oil price fluctuations (in other words: rising oil prices in the second 
half of the sample period reversed some of the convergence gains in the first half of the 
sample) and that high oil prices have an influence on price dispersion by increasing price 
wedges with growing distance.11  
The results indicate that rising oil prices (the oil price variable is highly significant) have an 
impact on global price dispersion via the transport cost channel and that the rising price of 
oil during the 2000s led to an increase of the sensitivity of distance to trade. The results 
might have been even more pronounced if the 2006-2008 time period would have been 
included in the analysis. 
 
Finally, a survey of Industry Directions (2007) conducted in 2006 finds that at that time, high 
oil prices forced manufacturing companies to think about adaptions in their supply chains. 
Of the 139 manufacturing executives participating in the study, 78% stated that their 
companies increasingly focused on their supply chains as a consequence of higher oil prices 
and 70% stated that they were planning to adapt their supply chain strategy. Another 22% of 
the respondents acknowledged that oil prices might reduce their margins. 
 
 Summary 2.4
The literature reviewed in sections 2.1 and 2.2 provides anecdotal and/or descriptive 
evidence. The explanatory power of such evidence is limited. On the contrary, the literature 
reviewed in section 2.3 provides quantitative or econometric evidence. The 
quantitative/econometric evidence in the literature indicates a significant impact of rising oil 
prices on the sensitivity of international trade to distance during the 2000s.  
The effect might have been even stronger if the oil price shock would have been entirely 
supply-driven. The reason for this lies in the different nature of supply-driven and demand-
driven oil price shocks which might affect long-distance trade differently (Fukunaga et al. 
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2009; Kilian 2009; The Economist 2012). Fukunaga et al. (2009) argue that the oil price 
surge between 2002 and 2008 might have had a relatively smaller effect on real economic 
activity and on the structure of international trade compared to the oil price shocks in the 
1970s, because it was not entirely supply-driven (such as peak oil) but also demand-driven. 
Second, some analyses (e.g. Mirza and Zitouna 2009: 1999-2006; Bergin and Glick 2007: 
1990-2005) do not include the whole period of oil price increases in their studies. This may 
have influenced some estimates because the most significant oil price increase occurred 
between January 2007 and July 2008 when oil prices rose from $50 per barrel to $147 per 
barrel.  
Recapitulatory, irrespective of the different methodological approaches used (such as VAR 
and gravity modelling, vertical specialisation trade models, GINFORS, INFORGE, GSIM, 
MAGIC), the studies reviewed all provide evidence for a link between oil prices, 
international transport costs and the geography of international trade. In this context, the 
literature indicates an adverse effect of rising oil prices on global supply chains and long-
distance trade through the transport cost channel. 
Despite the potential importance of the link between persisting high oil price levels and the 
geography of world trade, which is indicated by a growing body of literature in recent years, 
so far remarkably little research has been conducted for that matter. Particularly, there is a 
gap in the literature with regard to the impact of rising oil prices during the 2000s on 
international trade volumes and the shape of international trade at the industry level. 
Thereby, it would be particularly interesting to study industries whose sensitivity on the 
distance of trade is likely to be overproportionally affected by high oil price levels, for 
instance industries producing products with low value-to-weight and/or low value-to- 
freight-cost ratios such as the steel industry. The dissertation contributes to filling that gap. 
From a methodological point of view, the vector error correction (VEC) model used also 
contributes to the existing literature because this methodological approach has not yet been 
applied for analysing the importance of the link between rising oil prices, transport costs and 
the geography of world trade. The selection of the VEC model is justified in section 5.1 of 
the methodology chapter. 
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3 Analysis I: Oil Prices, International Transport Costs and Trade 
Globalisation 
Chapter 3 provides the knowledge base about the basic fundamentals underlying the analysis 
of the econometric estimates in chapter 6 to give the reader essential background 
information. 
The hypothesis tested in chapter 6 by using the example of steel exports to the U.S. is that 
peak oil, which involves high oil prices and rising international transport costs, leads to an 
increasing regionalisation of international trade flows at the cost of long-distance trade. 
It is assumed that rising oil prices influence the shape of international trade via the transport 
cost channel. Therefore, section 3.1 gives an overview of the literature analysing the 
responsiveness of international trade to transport costs and the relative importance of 
transport costs as a barrier to international trade. 
Steel is almost exclusively shipped via ocean. Therefore, section 3.2 first describes the 
progression of ocean transport costs over time and then describes the working mechanism of 
the ocean transport cost channel. More specifically, the relationship between oil prices, fuel 
costs, ocean transport costs and international trade is explained. 
In chapter 6, evaluation criteria, among them determinants of ocean transport costs, are used 
for the interpretation of the econometric estimates. The evaluation criteria selected are ocean 
trade distances, port infrastructure, and economies of scale. Section 3.3 gives an overview of 
the literature analysing the role of these criteria in determining ocean transport costs. 
 
 Transport Costs as a Determinant of International Trade 3.1
Section 3.1 is structured as follows: Section 3.1.1 first describes the responsiveness of 
international trade to transport costs. Section 3.1.2 then outlines that international transport 
costs act very much like tariffs and that nowadays transport costs tend to outbalance tariffs as 
a barrier to international trade. Section 3.1 therefore provides background knowledge 
regarding the role of transport costs in international trade.  
 
3.1.1 The Responsiveness of International Trade to Transport Costs 
Trade liberalisation and declining transport costs top the list of usual suspects when it comes 
to the causes of post Second World War trade growth (Hummels 1999b; 2007b). Behar and 
Venables (2010: 2) emphasise that  “transport costs shape trade, and are in turn determined 
by underlying variables such as distance and other features of geography, infrastructure 
quality, trade facilitation measures, fuel costs and transport technology.” However, despite 
the importance of transport costs for the growth of international trade, there are 
comparatively few studies on the relationship between transport costs and trade growth 
(Clark et al. 2002). 
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Limao and Venables (2001) analyse the quantitative importance of transportation costs as a 
determinant of trade flows. They find that the elasticity of trade flows with regard to the 
transport variable is -2 to -3.5. According to Limao and Venables (2001: 466), “taking a 
value of -3 means that doubling transport costs from their median value (that is, raising the 
transport cost factor from 1.28 to 1.56) reduces trade volumes by 45%. Moving from the 
median value of transport costs to the 75th percentile (transport cost factor 1.83) cuts trade 
volumes by two-thirds.”  
Baier and Bergstrand (2001) estimate the relative importance of determinants for 
international trade growth between 1958 and 1988 for 16 OECD countries. The authors find 
that income growth accounts for 66% of trade growth and that 26% of trade growth is due to 
trade liberalisation. Only 8% of trade growth can be attributed to decreasing transport costs. 
However, the assumption that falling transport costs did not contribute to a large extent to 
the growth of trade in the second half of the 20th century does not necessarily mean that 
significantly increasing transport costs do not have a significant impact on international 
trade growth in the 21st century. 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) find that increasing transport costs can account for reduced growth 
rates of manufactured imports. They also find that the doubling of shipping costs (e.g. from 
an 8% to 16% c.i.f. band) leads to a reduction of annual import growth of slightly more than 
one-half of a percentage point. 
Despite the small number of studies dealing with the impact of international transport costs 
on trade growth, there is common sense in the literature that transport costs are a trade 
barrier which can have a significant impact on the volume and the patterns of international 
trade (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Behar and Venables 2010; Clark et al. 2002; Fink 
et al. 2002; Golub and Tomasik 2008; Hesse and Rodrigue 2004; Kumar and Hoffmann 
2002; Lundgren 1996; Quinet and Vickerman 2004; Tanaka 2010; Thompson 2000).  
 
3.1.2 The Relative Importance of Trade Barriers: Transport Costs vs. 
Tariffs 
In order to measure their relative importance as a trade barrier, transport costs can be 
compared to other trade barriers, particularly tariffs. Comparing transport costs with tariffs is 
reasonable, because the impact of transport cost reductions on trade is equivalent to the 
impact of lower tariffs (Kumar and Hoffmann 2002: 45). According to Thompson (2000: 1), 
“price in the exporting country multiplied by the exchange rate, plus the transportation cost 
times one, plus the tariff rate, equals price in the importing country. In trade, we always talk 
about the possibility of having prohibitive tariffs and what an impediment the tariff wedge 
can be to international trade. But if you look at this equation, the transportation cost is just as 
significant as the import tariff so that high transportation costs can work against the trade 
flows in exactly the same way as high tariffs.” 
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However, international economic analysis regularly used to neglect the effects of transport 
costs as a trade barrier due to the presumption that the role of transport costs in impeding 
trade is relatively small when compared to other trade barriers such as tariffs (Finger and 
Yeats 1976; Sampson and Yeats 1977). As a consequence, in contrast to the large existing 
body of literature regarding theoretical and empirical consideration of protection by tariffs, 
studies researching transportation costs as a trade barrier are comparatively rare (Conlon 
1982; Laussel and Raymond 2006). 
The GATT negotiations led to a constant reduction of tariff rates over time. As a result, 
worldwide average import tariffs were reduced from 8.6% to 3.2% between 1960 and 1995. 
In case of the average tariff rate on U.S. imports, there was a cutback from 6.0% to 1.5% 
since negotiations started in 195012 (Clemens and Williamson 2002; Hummels 2007a). 
While tariffs have become a less significant trade barrier over time, the relative importance 
of transport costs to total trade costs has grown (Amjadi and Yeats 1995; Clark et al. 2002; 
Hummels 2007b; Radelet and Sachs 1998). Studies examining customs data consistently find 
that transport costs post a trade barrier at least as large as, and frequently larger than tariffs 
(Hummels 2007b). In 1958, transport costs for the median good were half as much as tariff 
duties on steel exports to the U.S. (Waters 1970) and, according to Finger and Yeats (1976), 
equal to tariff duties in 1965.13 In recent decades, however, papers that have directly 
investigated the relative importance of transport cost barriers versus tariff barriers have 
consistently identified transport costs as the more important barrier to trade (Hummels 
1999b).  
Fink et al. (2002) stress that the average impact of transport costs on imports exceeds the 
impact of tariffs for the majority of U.S. trading partners. Similarly, Limao and Venables 
(2001) and Clark et al. (2002) point out that as trade liberalisation has significantly reduced 
artificial trade barriers, the effective rate of protection provided by transport costs is now, in 
many cases, considerably higher than that provided by tariffs. For example, transport costs 
for Latin American countries like Chile and Ecuador exceed by more than twenty times the 
average tariffs they face in the U.S. market (Clark et al. 2002).  
Especially between 2000 and 2008, there has been a rapid increase in the transport cost-tariff 
balance in favour of transportation costs as a result of constantly increasing crude oil prices. 
According to Hummels (2007b), in 2004 aggregate expenditures on shipping for total U.S. 
imports were already three times higher than aggregate duties paid. For the median 
individual shipments to the U.S. in 2004, exporters paid $9 in transportation costs for every 
$1 they paid in tariff duties. In May 2008, when oil prices were well above the $100 mark, 
Rubin and Tal (2008) emphasised that rising crude prices impacted international transport 
costs at an unprecedented rate and that in tariff-equivalent terms, rising transport costs offset 
the liberalisation efforts of the last three decades. Furthermore, Rubin and Tal argue that in 
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2000 when oil prices were at $20 per barrel, transportation costs were the equivalent of a 3% 
U.S. tariff rate. In Mai 2008 at $125 per barrel, transport costs were the equivalent to a tariff 
rate of more than 9%. At $150 per barrel of oil, the tariff-equivalent rate is at 11% and can 
be compared to average tariff rates in the 1970s and at $200, transport costs would be back at 
a level equivalent to tariffs prior to the Kennedy Round GATT negotiation in the mid-1960s. 
 
 Ocean Transport Costs and International Trade 3.2
Steel is almost exclusively shipped via ocean. Section 3.2 therefore focuses on the 
development of ocean transport costs over time (3.2.1) and on the description of the working 
mechanism of the ocean transport cost channel (3.2.2). 
 
3.2.1 Ocean Transport Costs over Time 
Studies providing systemic evidence on the development of ocean transport costs since the 
1950s are surprisingly rare (Hummels 1999b; 2007a). Golub and Tomasik (2008) emphasise 
that despite the importance of transportation costs as a factor conditioning economic growth 
and trade growth, there have been few attempts to estimate transport costs over time. 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) report falling ocean transport costs over time while Lundgren 
(1996) refers to almost constantly decreasing costs for 120 years. With regard to bulk 
shipping transport costs, Lundgren reports that freight rates declined by 65-70% between 
1950 and 1995.14 Chasomeris (2007) refers to declining relative shares of worldwide 
international transport costs over time (cif/fob ratio: 7.8% in 1970; 6.6% in 1980; 5.2% in 
1990). 
Hummels (2007b) provides the most comprehensive study on ocean transport cost 
developments over time (Findlay and O’Rourke 2001) by using ad valorem datasets 
containing comparably high-quality data. He finds that prices for ocean transport changed 
little from 1950 to 1970 and increased substantially between 1973 and 1985, followed by a 
steady decline until the early 2000s. According to Hummels (2007b), it was only when crude 
oil prices began to drop in the mid-1980s that ocean shipping costs really began to decrease. 
Similarly, Stopford (2009: 89) reports steadily falling freight rates for the cost of 
transporting commodities by ship from the mid-1980s until 2004.15 
Although the exact extent of transport cost reductions during the second wave of 
globalisation (see 7.5.1) may be debatable (Kumar and Hoffmann 2002: 42), it can be said 
that even if they did not fall as dramatically as they did during the 19th century, they 
remained low for most of the 1950-2000 period (Bordo et al. 1999) with the exception of the 
1970-1985 period and fell dramatically during the 1985-2000 period. 
Lundgren (1996) regards this trend as an important prerequisite for an expansion of global 
trade with low-valued goods like coal and ores. At the turn of the century, Radelet and Sachs 
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(1998) argued that maritime transport costs are much less of a barrier to international trade 
and a greater division of labour than they once were and that there would be reasons to 
believe that shipping costs will continue to fall in the future. According to Hummels (2007b: 
152), however, the contrary is true for 2000-2008: “Indeed, ocean freight costs in recent 
years have again begun to increase with the cost of crude.” 
 
3.2.2 Oil Prices, Ocean Fuel Costs, the Ocean Transport Cost Channel 
and International Trade 
Stopford (2009) classifies ocean transport costs into five categories: operating costs, periodic 
maintenance costs, cargo-handling costs, capital costs, and voyage costs.16 Voyage costs can 
be defined as “variable costs associated with a specific voyage” (Stopford 2009: 221) and 
consist of the following sub-components (Stopford 2009: 232f.): 
 
 VCtm = FCtm + PDtm + TPtm + CDtm 
 
where 
VC  =  voyage costs 
FC  =  fuel costs 
PD  =  port and light dues 
TP  =  tugs and pilotage 
CD  =  canal dues 
tm =  ton-miles 
 
The most significant voyage cost sub-component are bunker fuel costs.17 Ocean fuel costs 
can have a substantial impact on freight rates and the shape of international maritime trade. 
Section 3.2.2 proceeds as follows: Section 3.2.2.1 analyses the relationship between oil 
prices and ocean fuel costs. Section 3.2.2.2 then describes the relationship between oil prices 
and ocean fuel costs over time. Finally, section 3.2.2.3 defines the relationship between the 
ocean transport cost channel, international trade and long-distance trade volumes. 
 
3.2.2.1 The Oil Price – Ocean Fuel Cost Relationship 
Ocean transport depends on crude oil-based fuels which remain the main source of fuel 
propelling the ocean shipping fleet. Therefore, the industry is affected by oil price spikes 
(UNCTAD 2008, 2009). Shocks to the worldwide demand for and supply of crude oil have 
an effect on ocean transport fuel prices. Hummels (2007b) finds an elasticity of maritime 
transport costs with respect to fuel costs of 0.33. 
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During the sample period used in this study (1998-2008), the impact of sharply increasing oil 
prices on bunker fuel costs has been strongest between 2002 and 2008 (Hummels 2009). 
Between 2005 and 2008 every one dollar rise in oil prices directly fed into a 1% rise in 
transportation costs via the fuel cost channel (Rubin and Tal 2008). In 2007/2008, most 
industries were affected by the impact of rising fuel costs but the ocean transport industry 
was hit particularly hard18 (WSC 2008). When oil prices went up from $30 in 2003 to $100 
in January 2007, the average daily fuel bill of a cargo vessel increased from $9,500 to 
$32,000 (Smith 2009). At 2008 oil price levels every 10% increase in shipping distance 
translated into a 4.5% increase of ocean transport costs (Rubin and Tal 2008). In May 2008, 
shipping companies were struggling worldwide when oil prices exceeded the $120 mark, 
thereby pushing bunker fuel prices to $552 per ton, a $26 per ton increase compared with 
March 2008 and a relative increase of 87% since January 2007 (WSC 2008). Between 2002 
and 2008, ocean fuel costs increased by a total of 500% (Wilson 2008). 
According to Behar and Venables (2010), the relative share of fuel costs at total ship 
operating costs can make up between 40% and 63% depending on ship size.19 In May 2008, 
the World Shipping Council reported that fuel costs represented as much as 50-60% of total 
ship operating costs, depending on the type of ship and service20 (WSC 2008) . 
 
3.2.2.2 The Oil Price – Fuel Cost Relationship Over Time 
Pressure put on the ocean transport industry by rising crude oil prices is not a new 
phenomenon. Behar and Venables (2010) and Hummels (2007b) emphasise that rising fuel 
costs resulting from the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979 also had an upward effect on 
transportation costs in the 1970s. Between 1973 and 1974, maritime transport costs increased 
four-fold in real terms (Hummels 2007b). Du Jonchay (1978: 51) estimates that the relative 
share of fuel costs for a 25,000dwt bulk carrier tripled from 10% to 29% between 1970 and 
1975. This increase was to a significant extent due to the 1973 oil price shock (see table 3.1).  
According to Stopford (2009: 233), fuel prices increased by 950% during the 1970-1985 
period. Leaving aside improvements in fuel efficiency, fuel accounted for about 13% of total 
shipping costs in 1970, a figure that increased to 34% by 1985.  
Table 3.1 Fuel Costs as % of Operating Expenses 
1970 14% 10% 17% 8%
1975 37% 29% 40% 22.5%
Regular-Line 
Freighter     
(16,000 dwt)
Fuel Costs as % of Operating Expenses
Source: du Jonchay 1978: 51
Container Ship 
Australia-Far 
East type
Bulk Carrier 
(25,000 dwt)
Oil Tanker 
(200,000 dwt)
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The 1970-1985 ocean fuel price increase had a negative impact on international trade. Ocean 
trade volumes declined by 6% between 1974 and 1975 and by 15% between 1970 and 1983 
(Stopford 2009: 38). 
. 
3.2.2.3 International Trade and the Ocean Transport Cost Channel 
The impact of oil prices on international trade in general and particularly on long-distance 
trade volumes translates via fuel prices through the transport cost channel (Behar and 
Venables 2010). The impact on long-distance trade is overproportional because variable 
transport costs are higher than for short-distance trade while fixed costs are not affected by 
an increase in trade distance (Mirza and Zitouna 2008, 2009; Kousnetzoff et al. 2008; 
Gangnes et al. 2011 a, b). 
In case of maritime transport, crude oil prices lead to rising ocean bunker fuel prices which 
then lead to increasing ocean transport costs. Ocean transport costs then affect international 
trade and particularly long-distance trade volumes as shown in figure 3.1. 
 
Krugman (2008) stresses that international trade volumes might decline by up to 17% in case 
fuel costs would stay at 2008 levels for a long time, thereby shaping the geography of world 
trade. In 2008, the sustainability of current trade patterns was increasingly called into 
question by a growing number of trade observers who argued that increasing transport costs 
may reverse trade globalisation by eliminating comparative advantages21 of remote low-cost 
production platforms such as China (UNCTAD 2008).  
According to the UNCTAD maritime report (2008: 29), “further research and analysis is 
needed to thoroughly investigate the actual implications of higher oil prices on transport, 
comparative advantages, growth and development.” The dissertation aims to contribute 
knowledge to this relatively new field of research. 
 
 
  
Source: Author’s illustration 
Figure 3.1 Ocean Transport Cost Channel 
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 Determinants of Ocean Transport Costs 3.3
In chapter 6, a number of evaluation criteria are used for the interpretation of the 
econometric results (see 6.1.2, 6.1.3). Among the evaluation criteria used are determinants of 
ocean transport costs. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the literature on the determinants 
chosen for interpretation. These are trade distance (3.3.1), port infrastructure (3.3.2), and 
economies of scale (3.3.3). 
 
3.3.1 Trade Distance 
Trade distance22 is the most obvious and most studied geographical determinant of (ocean) 
transport costs23 (Clark et al. 2002). Due to the fact that transport costs co-vary with trade 
distance (Hummels 2007a, b), distance has been used as a standard proxy for transport costs 
in a number of studies (Clark et al. 2002; Geraci and Prewo 1977; Knox and Agnes 1994; 
Limao and Venables 2001; MacKinnon et al. 2008: 11; Wilsmeier and Martinez-Zarzoso 
2010) under the assumption that transport costs increase monotonically with rising distance24 
(Tanaka 2010). 
The following sub-sections describe the impact of distance on ocean transport costs (3.3.1.1), 
the impact of distance on international trade volumes (3.3.1.2), and the link between distance 
and trade globalisation (3.3.1.3). 
 
3.3.1.1 Trade Distance and Transport Costs 
The literature suggests that distance leads to an increase in transportation costs (Kumar and 
Hoffmann 2002: 43). Mirza and Zitouna (2009) describe this relationship as follows: An 
increase in trade distance of a given quantity and price increases variable transport costs 
while leaving fixed transport costs unaffected. Because the relative share of variable costs 
for trade with distant trading partners is higher than for trade with close partners, transport 
costs for distant partners become more sensitive, an effect that becomes even stronger in case 
of an oil price shock. 
Clark et al. (2002) estimate that a 100% increase in distance raises maritime transportation 
costs by 20%.25 Radelet and Sachs (1998) find that each additional 10% in sea distance leads 
to an increase of transport costs of 1.3%. Rubin and Tal (2008) report that at record-high oil 
prices in 2008, every 10% increase in ocean trade distance translated into a 4.5% increase in 
transportation costs. 
Limao and Venables (2001) estimate that the transport costs for shipping a standard 
container from Baltimore in the United States to selected international destinations increase 
by $380 (or 8% for a median shipment) for an extra distance of 1,000km. If the journey is 
broken into an overland and a sea component, an extra 1,000km by sea raise transport costs 
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by $190 (4%  of a median shipment) whereas an increase of 1,000km for overland transport 
raises costs by $1,380 (30% of a median shipment).26 
Hummels (1999a) estimates the elasticity for distance and transport costs for different 
commodities. Elasticity figures are between 0.2 and 0.3 with an average elasticity of 0.27. 
Behar and Venables (2010: 20) report an elasticity of 0.2. Wilsmeier et al. (2006) find a 
slightly higher elasticity (0.33-0.38) for intra-Latin American ocean trade.  
Geraci and Prewo (1977), Hummels (1999a), and Fink et al. (2002) find that transport costs 
rise at a decreasing rate with distance. Fink et al. (2002) estimate a coefficient on distance 
between 0.2 and 0.3. Their research also confirms that transport costs increase with distance, 
but less than proportionally. Abe and Wilson (2009) estimate an elasticity of transport costs 
per unit weight with respect to port-to-port distance between 0.14 and 0.21.  
 
3.3.1.2 Trade Distance and International Trade Volumes 
Distance is negatively related to trade (Behar and Venables 2010; Clark et al. 2002; 
Krugman 1995). A meta-study by Disdier and Head (2008) examines 103 papers on distance 
and concludes that the vast majority of the literature confirms the negative relationship. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) also survey several studies applying the gravity model27 
and find that the bilateral trade distance between two countries typically enters with a 
coefficient of about τ1 = -0.9. Bourguignon et al. (2002) report that the typically estimated 
elasticity of trade flows with respect to distance is between -0.9 and -1.25. They compare 
trade volumes at different distances relative to their value at 1,000km. With an elasticity of -
1.25, trade volumes at 4,000km are down by 82%, and at 8,000km they are down by 93% 
(Bourguignon et al. 2002).  
Frankel and Romer (1999) and Carruthers et al. (2003: 118) find that nations close to world 
markets enjoy higher levels of trade compared to remote economies. Chasomeris (2007) and 
Limao and Venables (2001) find that Africa’s poor trade performance is particularly due to a 
penalty on long trade distances.28 Additionally, several studies suggest that distance has a 
strong influence on trade in manufactures (Aviat and Coeurdacier 2004; Portes and Rey 
1999; Scholte 2005: 76). Behar and Venables (2010) find that GDP and distance typically 
account for about 70% of the cross-country variation in trade. Hummels (2007b) finds that 
countries primarily trade with neighbours. About 25% of international trade takes place 
between countries sharing a common border. One reason for this may be more developed 
transportation networks between neighboring countries (Mirza and Zitouna 2009). Moreover, 
roughly 50% of global trade occurs between countries which are less than 3,000km apart. 
After controlling for other plausible correlates like country size, tariff barriers or income, 
Hummels (2007b) finds that the distance of trade explains much of bilateral trade volumes. 
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The fact that trade volumes are related to the distance of trade indicates the sensitivity of 
international trade to transportation costs (Hummels and Lugovskyy 2006; Krugman 2008). 
 
3.3.1.3 Trade Distance and Trade Globalisation 
As a result of economic globalisation, long-distance trade has grown in recent decades 
(Hesse and Rodrigue 2004). According to Janelle and Beuthe (1997: 203), by creating 
distance via the elongation of supply lines, globalisation generates its own demand for 
transport, thereby placing a toll on energy requirements.29 Mirza and Zitouna (2009) also 
emphasise that increasing global trade volumes induce higher global demand for 
transportation and fuel, which then results in rising prices for the latter. A main driver of 
increasing trade distance is the trend towards vertical specialisation of production in recent 
decades in line with trade globalisation. This trend results in longer transport distances due to 
foreign sourcing (inbound) for manufacturing and for delivery to customers (outbound)30 
(Bardi et al. 2006: 5).  
In other words, distance and trade globalisation can be linked by evaluating the relationship 
between trade globalisation, the location of manufacturing and transport costs. In an ideal 
typical scenario, Krugman and Venables (1995: 861) describe this relationship and the 
inherent process as follows: Initially, they suppose that transport costs between regions are 
high. Therefore, the respective regions are essentially self-sufficient and procduce their own 
manufactured and agricultural products. An alleged gradual reduction of transport costs then 
allows for increasing trade between regions and a two-way trade in manufactures arises. 
However, as long as transport costs stay above a certain level, no vertical specialisation in 
manufacturing is taking place. Once transport costs fall below a critical point, the world 
economy begins organising itself into an industrialised core and a deindustrialised periphery. 
As transportation costs continue to decline, the importance of being close to markets and 
suppliers becomes less important. Meanwhile, the peripheral regions provide producers the 
advantage of lower wages. At some point, the continuous transport cost reduction is 
sufficient so that lower wage rates in the periphery more than offset the disadvantage of 
remoteness from suppliers and markets. Then, manufacturing gets an incentive to move from 
the core to the periphery, thereby leading to an increase in the distance of trade. 
In case the above description by Krugman and Venables is correct – what would rapidly 
rising transport costs due to peak oil mean for the location of manufacturing and for the 
process of trade globalisation? Would the process described above be reversed to a certain 
extent? And what would be the impact on the export of the semi-manufactured commodity 
steel from geographically distant countries such as China to the U.S.? The econometric 
analysis in chapter 6 provides answers to these questions. 
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3.3.2 Port Infrastructure  
Infrastructure is an essential determinant of transport costs (Kumar and Hoffmann 2002: 42; 
Limao and Venables 2001). Poor infrastructure leads to increasing transport costs 
(Wilsmeier and Martinez-Zarzoso 2010; Martinez-Zarzoso et al. 2003). On the other hand, 
while costly to undertake, infrastructure investments reduce transport costs substantially 
(Behar and Venables 2010: 11).  
Limao and Venables (2001) find that infrastructure accounts for up to 40% of the variation in 
transport costs for coastal economies. A nation with relatively poor infrastructure, for 
instance ranging at the 75th percentile in an international ranking would reduce its transport 
costs by 30-50% by upgrading to the 25th percentile. An improvement from the 75th 
percentile to the median is, according to Limao and Venables, equivalent to a distance 
reduction of 3,466km by sea or 419km by land and an increase in trade volumes by 28%. 
With regard to infrastructure and maritime transport costs, port efficiency is particularly 
important because ports are the gateways to global trade in ocean transport networks 
(Rodrigue 2009; Sampson and Yeats 1977). Therefore, given the important role of maritime 
transport in enabling global trade and growth, well-functioning and efficient ports and 
shipping services are essential for global trade, international production processes and highly 
integrated economies (UNCTAD 2009). 
Due to the fact that most goods travel by ship31 (Behar and Venables 2010) and because 
ports are a crucial interface between land and sea (Stopford 2009: 81), an efficient port 
infrastructure leads to considerable cost savings (Hummels 2009; Radelet and Sachs 1998). 
According to Stopford (2009: 81), port improvement plays an important part in reducing sea 
transport costs. Clark et al. (2002) analyse the impact of port efficiency on maritime 
transport costs and find that improving the efficiency of a port from the 25 th to the 75th 
percentile lowers shipping costs by 12% while a deterioration from the 75th to the 25th 
percentile would, on average, be equivalent to being 60% or 5,000 miles farther away from 
the markets. Clark et al. conclude that port efficiency is an important determinant of 
maritime transport costs.32 
 
3.3.3 Economies of Scale 
In the ocean transport industry, economies of scale can be described as the relationship 
between transport costs and ship size (Chasomeris 2007; Stopford 2009: 222; Wilsmeier and 
Martinez-Zarzoso 2010). Increasing transport volumes have a strong negative effect on 
transport costs (Kumar and Hoffmann 2002: 43) due to declining unit transport costs which 
decrease because of shrinking fixed costs per unit (Rodrigue and Browne 2008: 161).  
In the bulk shipping industry, the minimisation of unit shipping costs is of key importance 
(Stopford 2009: 78). Hence, there is a strong rationale in ocean shipping to achieve 
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economies of scale as they are linked with operation cost reductions, particularly for bulk 
carriers (Rodrigue and Browne 2008). 
During the last 30 years, perhaps the most striking feature of the world shipping fleet  has 
been the rapid growth of ship size, particularly in the fleet’s bulk sector (Stopford 2009: 
153). The upward trend for bulk carriers is, amongst other things, a consequence of the fact 
that the ocean transport industry has more or less a monopoly on the transport of large 
volumes of cargo between continents (Christiansen et al. 2007: 191).  
The average size of bulk carriers increased from less than 20,000dwt in 1960 (Lundgren 
1996) to 56,000dwt in 2006 (Stopford 2009: 76). The average size of newly delivered bulk 
carriers in 2009 was 71,000dwt indicating a continuing trend towards economies of scale33 
(UNCTAD 2009: 92). Due to this trend, the unit transport costs per ton34 (Sampson and 
Yeats 1977; Stopford 2009: 354) and, even more important, the average cost per cargo ton-
mile have been reduced significantly over time (Christiansen et al. 2007: 202).  
The following example illustrates the effect economies of scale have on costs per cargo ton. 
In 2005, annual costs for a 30,000dwt bulk carrier were about $191 per cargo ton, compared 
with $143 per cargo ton for a 47,000dwt bulk carrier, $120 per cargo ton for a 68,000dwt 
bulk carrier, and $74 per cargo ton for a 170,000dwt Capesize bulk carrier. Over time, the 
overall growth of ship size reduced unit shipping costs by 75%. Therefore, economies of 
scale played a major part in keeping maritime transportation costs low (Stopford 2009: 40, 
75, 224). In relative figures, switching from a Handy bulk carrier to a Handymax carrier 
saves about 22% per cargo ton, whilst moving to a Panamax carrier saves 20%, and upsizing 
to a Capesize carrier saves another 36% per ton. 
These figures indicate that economies of scale are a main reason for decreasing ocean 
transport costs (Lundgren 1996). Despite the trend to economies of scale, however, Pedersen 
(2001) stresses that the importance of ocean transport costs has not decreased over time35.  
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4 Data Series 
In chapter 4, the rationale behind the selection of the research variables used for analysis is 
explained and the data series used are described (4.1). Moreover, the rationale behind the 
selection of the sample period and data frequency is also explained (4.2). 
 
 Variable Selection and Data Series Description 4.1
Section 4.1 desribes the reasons for the selection of the research variables used for analysis 
and the data series used for the research variables ‘U.S. Steel Imports’ (4.1.1), ‘U.S. Steel 
Import Value’ (4.1.2), ‘Real Oil Price’ (4.1.3), ‘Exchange Rates’ (4.1.4) and ‘U.S. Real 
GDP’ (4.1.5).36 
 
4.1.1 U.S. Steel Imports 
Variable Selection 
Selected Commodity/Industry 
The international steel industry has been chosen for the analysis for the following reasons: 
The industry employs two million people and a further two million contractors. Moreover, 
four million people work in supporting industries. The industry is a key product supplier for 
the automobile, construction, transport, power, and machine goods industries amongst others 
and therefore is a cornerstone of the global economy (World Steel Association 2012). 
Furthermore, steel, which is usually worth between $600-1,000 per ton (Stopford 2009: 54), 
is a key commodity for the development of industrialised and industrialising nations 
(UNCTAD 2008).  
Steel products are standardised internationally to a large extent, thereby making possible 
comparability on an international stage. Finally, the value-to-weight and the value-to-freight-
cost ratios (high share of transport costs in relation to final selling prices) for steel are low 
compared to other commodities. Therefore, economic theory suggests that long-distace steel 
trade should be relatively vulnerable in view of rapidly rising transport costs due to spiking 
crude oil prices. 
 
Selected Importing Country 
The United States have been chosen as the steel importing country for the study, because the 
U.S. economy is the biggest national economy with significant steel imports and a distinct 
domestic steel industry, the third-largest worldwide.37 Moreover, the U.S. Census Bureau 
publishes accurate statistics on international trade due to consistent data collection 
standards/procedures and regular data quality assessments (U.S. Census 2002). 
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Selected Exporting Countries 
During the sample period (see 4.2), 121 of the 240 U.S. trading partners exported steel to the 
United States (U.S. Census 2012a). Of those 121 countries, 50 have been excluded from the 
analysis because of their low export frequency38, and 7 countries39 have been dropped from 
the analysis due to data availability problems and/or the introduction of a new currency 
during the sample period. The remaining 64 countries40 used for the analysis are listed in 
table 4.1. 
 
In addition to the total export datasets of the 64 countries analysed, the ‘American Iron and 
Steel Product Groups’ datasets of the 18 most important steel exporting countries are used 
for a more in-depth analysis. Among the 18 countries selected41, there are 14 of the top 15 
exporters of semi-finished and finished steel products in 2008.42 From a geographical point 
of view, the analysis by steel product category includes countries from all eight world 
regions43: 
- Europe: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain 
- C.I.S.: Russia, Ukraine 
- North America: Canada, Mexico 
- South America: Brazil 
- Middle East: Turkey 
- Africa: South Africa 
- Asia: China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan 
- Oceania: Australia 
Based on the above-mentioned facts, U.S. steel imports have been selected as the dependend 
variable for this study. The variation of this variable during the sample period (see 4.2) shall 
be explained by the explanatory variables introduced below. 
Table 4.1 Selected Exporting Countries 
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Dataset Description 
The dataset that includes data for U.S. steel imports and U.S. steel import values has been 
collected from the U.S. Census Bureau. The U.S. Bureau of the Census is responsible for 
collecting, compiling, and publishing trade statistics for the United States (U.S. Census 
2010a). In this context, the Census Bureau’s Foreign Trade Division, the official U.S. 
Government source for statistics on foreign trade (U.S. Census 2003), publishes the ‘U.S. 
Merchandise Trade Statistics’, the official source of information about U.S. imports and 
exports (U.S. Census 2002; 2010b) which include the ‘U.S. Imports for Consumption of 
Steel Products (FT900A)’ section (U.S. Census 2011a). The trade data published in this 
report are compiled from documents collected by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection44 
(U.S. Census 2009a).  
The data are initially collected and compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau based on the terms 
of commodity classifications of the ‘Harmonized System (HS)’45, which is interrelated with 
the ‘Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)’.46 The import statistics are based on 
the ‘Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated for Statistical Reporting 
Purposes (HTSUSA)’ which is the import version of the HS (U.S. Census 2009a; 2010b). 
The FT900A section includes monthly aggregates for U.S. steel imports in quantity metric 
tons (qmt) and the U.S. steel import customs value47 in nominal U.S. dollars48 (Higbee 2011, 
2012; U.S. Census 2004). 
These datasets are available online from November 1998 until the present.49 They include 
data on total U.S. steel import volumes per country of origin and data for 39 ‘American Iron 
and Steel Product Groups’ for each country of origin. The steel product groups are listed in 
table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 American Iron and Steel Product Categories 
1A Ingots And Steel For Castings 15 Bars – Reinforcing 23 Wire Drawn 
1B Blooms, Billets and Slabs 16 Bars – Cold Finished 28 Black Plate 
3 Wire Rods 17 Tool Steel 29 Tin Plate 
4 Structural Shapes Heavy 18 Standard Pipe 29A Tin Free Steel 
5 Steel Piling 19 Oil Country Goods 31 Sheets Hot Rolled 
6A Plate Cut Lengths 20/20A-C* Line Pipe 32 Sheets Cold Rolled 
6B Plates In Coils 21A Mechanical Tubing 33A Sheets & Strips Galv Hot Dipped 
7 Rails Standard 21B Pressure Tubing 33B Sheets & Strips Galv Electrolyt 
8 Rails All Other 21CD Stainless Pipe & Tubing 34 Sheets & Strips All Other Metal 
9 Railroad Accessories 21E Pipe & Tubing Nonclassified 35 Sheets & Strips – Electrical 
14 Bars – Hot Rolled 22A Structural Pipe & Tube 36 Strip –Hot Rolled 
14A Bars – Light Shaped 22B Pipe For Piling 37 Strip –Cold Rolled 
*20 Line Pipe until December 200050 20A Line Pipe > 16 Inches In Diameter; from January 2001
20B Line Pipe ≤ 16 Inches In Diameter; from January 2001
Source: U.S. Census 2007 20C Line Pipe – Not Specified; from January 2001
Categories
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4.1.2 U.S. Steel Import Value 
Variable Selection 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2012b), the U.S. steel customs value is the price 
actually paid or payable for steel when sold for exportation to the United States, excluding 
U.S. import duties, freight, insurance, and other charges incurred in bringing the 
merchandise to the United States. 
The customs value for steel includes upstream trade costs for commodities used for steel 
production (e.g. iron ore and coking coal), labour costs and other production costs on which 
comparative advantages in the very fluid and competitive steel market are based. For this 
reason, the U.S. steel import value has been selected as an explanatory variable that can 
explain the variance of the U.S. steel import variable. On the other hand, the U.S. steel 
import value does not include maritime fuel costs. In this study, the real oil price is used as a 
proxy for maritime fuel costs (see 4.1.3). 
 
Dataset Description 
The dataset that includes data for U.S. steel imports and U.S. steel import values during the 
sample period has been collected from the U.S. Census Bureau and is described in section 
4.1.1. 
 
4.1.3 Real Oil Price  
Variable Selection 
The dissertation analyses the impact of high crude oil prices on U.S. steel imports. 
Therefore, the oil price variable, which is used as a proxy for bunker fuel costs, is the most 
important explanatory variable for this study. Beverelli (2010) finds that for the time period 
between June 1990 and November 2008, the coefficient of correlation between bunker fuel 
prices and the Brent oil price series is 0.98. At the same time, the Brent oil price series and 
the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price series, which is used in this study, are almost 
identical during  the sample period (see figure 4.1).  
According to Beverelli (2010: 8), “the correlation between WTI and Brent is equal to 0.994; 
therefore the use of one or the other indicator should not be a concern.” Hence, it is 
reasonable to use the WTI series as a proxy for bunker fuel costs. 
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Dataset Description 
The oil price data series used in this study has been obtained from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) and contains monthly oil price data for the WTI oil grade. 
The EIA is the statistical and analytical agency of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 
The premier source of energy information in the U.S. conducts a comprehensive data 
collection program covering the full spectrum of energy sources, end uses, and energy flows 
(EIA n.d.a). 
The data series contains monthly WTI oil price data from January 1986 – to the present51 in 
U.S. dollars.52 The EIA calculates the monthly oil price data from daily data by taking an 
unweighted average of the daily closing spot prices for a given product during the specified 
time period. (EIA 2011c, n.d.b) 
WTI is “a crude stream produced in Texas and southern Oklahoma which serves as a 
reference or ‘marker’ for pricing a number of other crude streams and which is traded in the 
domestic spot market at Cushing, Oklahoma.” (EIA n.d.e.) There are actually three different 
blends serving as benchmarks for crude oil pricing, WTI, Brent, and Dubai (Korhonen and 
Ledyaeva 2010). World oil prices are established in relation to these markers (EIA n.d.c; 
OECD 2007). Therefore, it is common practice to select one of these reference blends for 
research. WTI has been chosen because it is most important for the U.S. economy. WTI is 
produced domestically and traded in the spot market in Oklahoma and on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) (EIA n.d.d). WTI oil prices are frequently used in other 
studies (e.g. Chen and Hsu 2012; Faria et al. 2008; Korhonen and Ledyaeva 2010). As 
Figure 4.1 Brent vs. WTI, 11/1998-09/2008 
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Source: Author’s illustration (EViews®), data: EIA 2011e; 2011g;  
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already described above, the correlation between WTI and maritime bunker fuel is close to 1 
for the sample period which makes WTI a good proxy for ocean bunker fuel. 
 
4.1.4 Exchange Rates 
Variable Selection 
Exchange rates influence international trade due to appreciation (a currency becomes more 
valuable) and depreciation (a currency loses value) and related exchange rate risks (Gerber 
2008: 211ff). Due to the fact that appreciation/depreciation trends are influencing 
international (steel) trade volumes, the exchange rate variable has been included in the 
econometric analysis. 
 
Dataset Description 
The exchange rate datasets used for the econometric analysis have been collected from the 
Federal Reserve Bank (FED), from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and from the OANDA currency conversion system. Each of the 
datasets collected contains the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the currency of one 
of the 64 steel exporting countries analysed. The specifics of the datasets are described 
below. 
The FED’s ‘Foreign Exchange Rates – G5’ release contains monthly averages of bilateral 
exchange rates (FRB 2011, 2012).53 The averages “are based on daily noon buying rates for 
cable transfers in New York City certified for customs purposes by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York.” (FRB 2012) 
The ‘Financial Indicators’ dataset published by the OECD is a subset of the ‘Monthly 
Monetary Statistics’ dataset which is part of the ‘Main Economic Indicators’ (MEI) database 
and contains monthly bilateral exchange rates between the U.S. and the other 33 OECD 
member countries as well as exchange rates between the U.S. and the non-member countries 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa54 (OECD n.d.). 
The exchange rates provided by the OANDA currency conversion system55 are averages for 
the global foreign exchange market. The data are gathered from the OANDA fxTrade 
currency platform and from other market data vendors and financial institutions from which 
interbank market rates are taken. Averages are taken from the data collected over a 24 hour 
period and are then rounded to up to five significant digits. The data are then further 
aggregated to monthly and quarterly averages (OANDA n.d.c). In the conversion system, 
exchange rates are available for all active currencies for any date since 199056 (OANDA 
n.d.b).  
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4.1.5 U.S. Real GDP 
Variable Selection 
The U.S. GDP, or “the market value of goods and services produced by labor and property in 
the United States” (U.S. Census 2012b), influences U.S. import volumes. In brief, economic 
theory suggests that significant growth in U.S. GDP eventually leads to rising incomes and 
increasing consumption which then translates into increasing import levels. Vice versa, 
negative U.S. GDP growth leads to stagnating/falling incomes and decreasing consumption 
which then translates into decreasing import levels (Gerber 2008: 220). 
Steel import volumes to the U.S. can be impacted significantly by a growth/decline of GDP 
figures because the steel industry is a key product supplier for the automobile, construction, 
transport, power, and machine goods industries amongst others (World Steel Association 
2012). Therefore, the U.S. real GDP variable has been included in the econometric analysis. 
 
Dataset Description 
Data for the U.S. GDP are only published on a quarterly basis, e.g. by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). The frequency chosen for this study, however, is monthly. 
Therefore, monthly U.S. Real GDP data were purchased from E-forecasting57, a provider of 
business-related indicators and datasets. 
The purchased dataset contains monthly U.S. real GDP data, which are expressed at 
seasonally adjusted, chained 2002 dollars, from 1959 until the present.58 The monthly figures 
are calculated as follows: In order to develop the series, a systematic diffusion process 
relates monthly information of three monthly indicators to quarterly GDP. The three monthly 
indicators are 
1. a national monthly output index based on monthly estimates of labour productivity 
which are combined with monthly labour data. 
2. production indices covering the goods producing sectors of the U.S. economy which 
are constructed from output measured in physical units and inputs used in the 
production process. 
3. monthly measures of incomes derived from production and adjusted for price 
changes. 
These three national composite components are aggregated into a monthly GDP series after 
they have been labour-adjusted for productivity, production of goods, and incomes.  
After estimating the monthly GDP data by applying real-time monthly diffusion metrics, the 
series is statistically standardised to the quarterly GDP published by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (DOC) (E-forecasting 2012; Simos and Simos 2005).   
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 Sample Period/Sample Size and Data Frequency 4.2
The sample period selected (11/1998 – 09/2008) includes 119 observations and covers the 
time period between the end of the Asian crisis in 1997/98 and the beginning of the global 
financial crisis in September 2008 (Lehman bankruptcy).  
The start and end dates of the sample period were selected for the following reasons: 
Between the mid-1980s and most of the 1990s, oil prices were comparatively low. Including 
oil prices from that period does not make sense for the analysis of the impact of high oil 
prices on steel exports to the United States. After the beginning of the financial crisis in 
September 2008, oil prices plunged rapidly from $133 to $30. Although, oil prices have 
again risen above the $100 mark since then, at the time of this writing the world economy 
remains in a state of crisis where normal evaluation standards cannot be imposed. 
The data frequency chosen is monthly aggregates. Daily and weekly U.S. steel import data 
are not available and the number of observations would have been insufficient if annual 
aggregates would have been used. Therefore, monthly aggregates are best suited for the 
analysis. 
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5 Methodology 
Chapter 5 first describes the rationale behind the selection of the methodological approach 
for the study (5.1). The subsequent sections then describe the specification and estimation 
(5.2) and the analysis of VAR/VEC models (5.3). Here, only the main equations used for 
calculation are emphasised and brief descriptions are given due to space limitations and 
because the methodological approach used has become very standard in recent years. 
References for further reading have been placed throughout the text where necessary. 
 
 Choice of Econometric Approach  5.1
In econometrics, model selection is a serious matter that should not be taken lightly because 
the choice of an econometric approach includes implicit decisions regarding the outcome of 
a research project. Therefore, the model selection process or the decision making process 
leading the the choice of the appropriate model for the study is explained in detail. 
In that context, section 5.1.1 first describes the decision making process regarding the choice 
between vector autoregression models and simultaneous equation models. Section 5.1.2 then 
explains the rationale behind the choice of a restricted VAR or error correction model and 
why an unrestricted VAR model has not been selected. 
 
5.1.1 Vector Autoregression Models vs. Simultaneous Equation Systems 
The econometric approaches typically applied for the analysis of multivariate time series are 
simultaneous equation (SEQ) systems and vector autoregression (VAR) models. Both 
approaches employ some kind of linear regression or maximum-likelihood methods for 
estimation. There are, however, differences when it comes to the models’ implicit 
assumptions and building blocks forming the basis for inference and interpretation. 
SEQ model building rests upon (economic) theory which is then rendered into a set of 
equations. This modus operandi necessitates choices about the endogeneity and exogeneity 
of variables. The decision making process results in a single structural system of equations 
which expresses the relationships among the incorporated variables. 
The VAR approach does not intend to estimate the accurate structure of the underlying 
relationships among the time series analysed but instead focuses on the underlying 
correlation and the dynamic structure of the time series used. Here, the main focus is on the 
data and their dynamics and the model’s central tenet is that restrictions imposed on data and 
parameters used should be viewed skeptically. Contrary to standard SEQ systems, the VAR 
approach is based on the creation of a complete dynamic specification of the time series in a 
system of equations. This procedure originates from the Wold decomposition theorem 
(Hamilton 1994: 108f.; Wold 1954).  
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The invention of the VAR methodology can be credited to Sims (1972, 1980) who rejected 
the SEQ approach for the following reasons: 
- According to Sims, identification restrictions on parameters used in the SEQ 
approach are often not theory-based and may therefore cause incorrect conclusions 
regarding the model’s structure and estimates. 
- Sims stresses that SEQ models are regularly built on tenuous assumptions with 
regard to the endogeneity and exogeneity of the variables used. Due to the fact that 
the true lag lengths of the variables involved are not known a priori, identification is 
then based on possibly specious assumptions in terms of exogeneity. The formal 
identification of dynamic simultaneous equation models, however, requires 
knowledge about the exact true lag length for each variable or the identification 
assumptions may not hold (Hatanaka 1975). 
 
The method proposed by Sims aims to ensure that the approach to modeling multiple time 
series makes possible the comprehensive characterisation of the dynamics of time series. In 
order to account for the dynamics of the variables involved, a multivariate autoregressive 
model can be used that regresses each variable on its past values and on the past values of 
the other variables included in the system. Usually, the identical lag length is used for each 
variable in the equation. The selection of adequate variables is based on (economic) theory 
while the specification of the model’s structure proceeds by testing for the appropriate lag 
length using sample data.  
Rather than beginning with a set of structural, dynamic, or a-priory causal relationships 
among the variables, VAR models start with the assumption that the reduced form dynamics 
are of main interest. That is, instead of imposing possibly structural or dynamic restrictions 
on the relationships among the time series, a VAR model has an own equation for each 
variable used in the analysis. After every variable has been regressed on its past values and 
the past values of the other variables in the system and after testing for autocorrelation, the 
resulting residuals become exogenous shocks or innovations. It is then possible to analyse 
the responses of each equation to exogenous shocks to estimate to what extent exogenous 
shocks in each variable affect the observed system. Subsequent to checking for these 
dynamics, inferences about the Granger causal relationships between the variables can be 
made and the endogenous structure and dynamics of the series can be determined. 
As already indicated above, the key distinction between the VAR and the SEQ approach is 
the treatment of identification assumptions. The SEQ approach takes assumptions as fixed, 
invariant, and specified by theory. In the VAR approach, however, the correctness of zero-
order restrictions (for example excluding variables from specific equations or omitting 
lagged values of variables from specific equations) is taken into doubt. The VAR model 
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approach aims to eliminate biases from flawed restrictions by trading off these biases for a 
certain extent of inefficiency. On the other hand, biases in the SEQ model are often due to 
omitted lagged values which in fact should have been included. Sims argues that the lags of 
some variables are often wrongly excluded in the SEQ model identification process. Such 
incorrect restrictions result in the omission of relevant lagged variables, thereby producing 
omitted variable bias. The solution forwarded in the VAR approach is to include all possible 
lags, in case of doubt more than necessary, thus trying to prevent biases at the cost of 
efficiency. 
In VAR models, the decisive identification assumption is how the contemporaneous effects 
of the respective variables are related to each other. VAR models are specified in terms of 
the lagged values of the variables in the system on each other. Therefore, identification 
concerns the specification of the residual or contemporaneous covariance matrix of the 
residuals alone, thereby allowing for the separation of the model’s interpretation from the 
identification process. Accordingly, it is possible to explicitly look how decisions regarding 
identification are related to the path of the variables’ dynamics. 
Pagan (1987) stresses that VAR models work best when they are based on a simple and 
unbiased specification accounting for the uncertainty about the dynamics and the model. 
Therefore, contrary to the ‘specify-estimate-test-respecify’ logic of SEQ models, in VAR 
models few hypothesis tests are used to justify their specification. 
Both approaches introduced above have specific advantages/disadvantages (e.g. risk of 
misspecification vs. risk of inefficiency). However, the main reason for adopting the VAR 
approach for this study is due to the analysis tools available which best serve the purpose to 
analyse the impact of oil price shocks on long-distance trade. According to Breitung et al. 
(2004: 161), the VAR approach is predestined to analyse the impact of economic shocks 
such as oil price shocks, exchange rate shocks or monetary shocks. When the primary target 
is to examine the dynamics among specific variables and the impact of (oil price) shocks on 
other variables as is the case here, the VAR approach is typically superior to the SEQ 
approach because it is less likely to be overly precise via ad hoc model pretesting. Using a 
VAR model makes possible the investigation of the ‘causal effects’ of endogenous variables 
on each other (Granger causality testing), the dynamic impact of changes in one variable on 
the other variables in the model (impulse response analysis), and the amount of variance in 
each variable which can be attributed to each variable itself and the other variables in the 
equation system (variance decomposition analysis) (Brandt and Williams 2007: 4-15; 
Canova 1999: 78; Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007: 149; Stevans and Sessions 2010). 
For these reasons, the VAR approach has also been adopted in a number of other studies 
researching the impact of oil price shocks on other economic variables such as GDP (see for 
example Hamilton 1996, 2003; Kilian and Vigfusson 2011; Lee et al. 1995; Mork 1989). 
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5.1.2 Vector Autoregression Models vs. Vector Error Correction Models 
In recent decades, the influence of Sims’ methodologic invention in the profession has been 
pervasive (Canova 1999: 73) and nowadays VARs play a crucial role in modern approaches 
to analyse economic time series (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007: 126). However, the 
approach has been and continues to be subject to continuous development. One reason for 
enhancements of the methodology has been the “cointegration revolution” (Kirchgässner and 
Wolters 2007: V; Lütkepohl 2005: VII) following the work of Engle and Granger (1987) that 
started in the late 1980s/early 1990s and had an influence on applied work in a substantial 
manner (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007: V), for example in form of the invention of error 
correction models (Lütkepohl 2004: 158). 
In economics, trending time series are quite common (Lütkepohl 2005: 2). Therefore, the 
presence of unit roots in time series used is an important issue in VAR modelling because 
the requirements for estimation and the distributions of the parameters demand covariance 
stationarity (Brandt and Williams 2007: 47; Hamilton 1994).To fulfil the requirement of 
covariance stationarity, the roots of the multivariate lag polynominal for the VAR model 
need to be outside the unit circle. When a VAR contains non-stationary time series, this can 
lead to spurious regressions (Stevans and Sessions 2010). 
In order to avoid spurious regressions, non-stationary time series used to be differenced. 
However, if possible data transformations that difference the data to remove trends should be 
avoided. By differencing the data the long-term components of the series are removed, 
thereby eliminating a large portion of the variable’s trends and paths which shall be 
explained and distorting the relationship between the original variables (Brandt and Williams 
2007: 47; Hackl 2005: 317; Lütkepohl 2005: 244). 
When trending time series have a common stochastic trend, they are cointegrated (Lütkepohl 
2004: 87). Then, the differencing of the time series can be avoided. Therefore, VARs 
specified in first differences should only be set up if non-stationary variables which are not 
cointegrated shall be used (Lütkepohl 2005: 244; Stevans and Sessions 2010). According to 
Lütkepohl (2004: 87), “if cointegrating relations are present in a system of variables, the 
VAR form is not the most convenient model setup. In that case, it is useful to consider 
speficic parameterizations that support the analysis of the cointegration structure. The 
resulting models are known as vector error correction models (VECM).” 
A VECM is a restricted VAR model designed for use with cointegrated non-stationary time 
series. The specification of VECMs includes a cointegrating relation term also known as the 
error correction term (EViews 2010). Before deciding between an unrestricted VAR and a 
restricted VAR (or VECM), Engle and Granger suggest that one should first test for the 
presence of unit roots in each variable used and then test for cointegration relationships 
among the variables if necessary. In case cointegration exists between I(1) variables, an 
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unrestricted VAR should be set up and transformed into a VECM, thereby producing a 
stationary system with non-stationary individual time series. After that, one should proceed 
with standard estimation and inference (Brandt and Williams 2007: 47; Canova 1999: 83; 
Freeman et al. 1998). 
The samples used in this study all contain at least two trending time series. “If some of the 
variables are I(1), a VECM is the suitable modelling framework” (Lütkepohl 2004: 112) 
when a cointegration relationship exists among the I(1) variables. Therfore, a VECM is used 
for estimation in case cointegration relationships between the trending variables can be 
identified (Götze 2008; Sims et al. 1990) because ignoring cointegration relationships among 
I(1) variables may lead to substantial biases in the calculated impulse response and variance 
decomposition estimates (Stevans and Sessions 2010). 
 
5.1.3 Summary 
The selection of an econometric model is a serious matter that should not be taken lightly. 
Therefore, section 5.1 gives a detailed account of the decision making process involved in 
the choice of the appropriate model and explains why the VAR approach has been chosen 
instead of the SEQ approach and why a restricted VAR or VECM is used for estimation 
instead of an unrestricted VAR model. 
In that context, it needs to be mentioned that the both restricted and unrestricted VAR 
models are subject to criticism in the literature as indicated above. However, a more detailed 
discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of VAR modelling would certainly go 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. For more detailed VAR-criticism, the reader is 
therefore referred to Brandt and Williams (2007: 56ff.), Canova (1999: 103ff.), Darnell 
(1994: 423), and Patterson (2000: 645ff.). 
 
 VAR/VEC Specification and Estimation 5.2
Figure 5.1 shows the process of specification, estimation and analysis of a VAR/VEC model 
as suggested by different econometric textbooks (e.g. Brandt and Williams 2007; Darnell 
1994: 422; Lütkepohl 2004: 110; 2005: 325, 345). 
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Section 5.2 first describes the specification and estimation process of VAR/VEC models and 
the specification tests applied. Section 5.3 then describes the analytical process and the 
analysis tools used. 
The specification/estimation process is structured as follows: After testing for the presence 
of unit roots in the time series used (5.2.1), the appropriate lag length for the model is 
specified (5.2.2) and the trending time series in each sample are tested for common 
cointegrating relationships (5.2.3). Depending on the outcome of these specification 
procedures, a restricted (VEC) or unrestricted VAR model is estimated (5.2.4). After the 
adequate model has been set up, it is essential to test for autocorrelation to make sure that the 
residuals are uncorrelated over lagged time periods (5.2.5). 
 
5.2.1 Testing for Unit Roots 
In order to test for unit roots in the times series used for analysis, the data series are 
displayed graphically (5.2.1.1) and unit root tests are conducted (5.2.1.2). 
 
Figure 5.1  Process of Specification, Estimation and Analysis of the 
VAR/VEC Model 
Source: Author‘s illustration 
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5.2.1.1 Graphical Display 
The data series used are displayed graphically (see appendix, section A2) to get a first 
impression of the respective time series and to look for possible local trends (short time 
stretches in which a time series appears to move in a specific direction) and unit roots. 
 
5.2.1.2 Testing for Unit Roots 
The samples analysed in this study all contain variables with unit roots. This had to be 
expected because many macroeconomic time series such as real GDP or exchange rates 
typically have unit roots (Franz 2005). A unit root or stochastic trend variable is 
characterised as integrated of order d (I(d)) because it needs to be differenced d times to 
make it stationary. 
Therefore, prior to bivariate or multivariate time series modelling, the data series used need 
to be pre-tested for the presence of unit roots in order to prevent spurious regressions due to 
the use of nonstationary time series as documented by Granger and Newbold (1974). 
The reason for this is that the causality between dependent and explanatory variables can be 
overstated when the variables have a similar underlying trend. In that case when a strong 
relationship between two or more variables is not caused by a real underlying causal 
relationship, the variables are said to be spuriously correlated, thereby resulting in spurious 
regressions in which the t-scores are likely to be overstated. This in turn may lead to 
incorrect model specification. As indicated above, the danger of obtaining apparently 
significant regression results from unrelated data can be prevented by testing the data series 
used for nonstationarity or rather unit roots59 (Hill et al. 2008: 333f.; Studenmund 2010: 
417ff.). 
There are multiple unit root tests which can be used to test for nonstationarity of which the 
Dickey Fuller Test (DF) is used most frequently (Dickey and Fuller 1979). The Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, which has been developed by Said and Dickey (1984) is a 
significant extension of the basic DF test allowing for the possibility that the error term t is 
autocorrelated. Such serial correlation may occur in case a model does not have a sufficient 
number of lag terms to capture the full dynamic of a process. In practice, it is best to use the 
ADF to ensure that the errors are uncorrelated. The extended ADF test equation for a model 
with intercept60 is 
 
[5.1]  Δ yt = α + γ yt-1 + 
å
=
m
s
a
1
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where Δ yt-1 = (yt-1 - yt-2), Δ yt-2 = (yt-2 - yt-3), … .  
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As many lags as needed are added to make sure that the residuals are not autocorrelated (Hill 
et al. 2008: 335). The null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are set up as follows: 
H0: γ = 0 and H1: γ < 0. 
H0 is tested by estimating the test equation by least squares and by examining the so called τ 
(tau-) statistic with its specifically created critical values for γ = 0 which are valid for one-
tail tests. The critical values can be found in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993: 708) and Hill 
et al. (2008: 337). While τ ≤ τc suggests stationarity, τ > τc suggests nonstationarity. 
In case of nonstationarity, the datasets are again tested for stationarity after taking first 
differences. In the ADF testing process, different information criteria can be applied. The 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) has been selected for unit root testing. However, the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Hannan Quinn Criterion (HQC) are also used 
for control purposes and to get additional information regarding the likelihood of unit roots 
in the time series. The ADF test results can be found in the appendix, section A3. 
For a more detailed discussion of the ADF test, the reader is referred to Hill et al. (2008: 
335ff.) or Studenmund (2010: 421ff.). 
 
5.2.2 Lag Length Specification 
Because subsequent testing procedures (e.g. tests for cointegration and serial correlation) and 
the VAR coefficients or VAR estimation results are influenced by lag length, the optimal lag 
length p is determined next (Patterson 2000: 623).  
When determining the optimal lag length, usually enough lags are included to capture the 
full cycle of the data (e.g. 12 lags for monthly data). In case some seasonality is expected to 
be carried over from year-to-year and across the months longer lag lengths (e.g. 13-15 for 
monthly data; 6-10 lags for quarterly data) may be used in order to capture the cyclical 
components in the year and any residual seasonal components in the majority of cases. This 
is necessary because even in de-seasonalised data, it is quite possible to have residual 
seasonal patterns in the data which must be modelled. 
If the maximal lag length used is changed in the lag length determination process this may 
also yield different results. Therefore, it is quite common that a number of models with 
different lag lengths must be estimated to determine the optimal lag length (Cottrell and 
Lucchetti 2012: 206; Lütkepohl 2004: 153). As a consequence, different maximal lag lengths 
(10-15) are tested to make sure that the lag length suggested is not influenced by the 
maximal lag length chosen. 
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Another rule for lag length selection is that no more than one quarter of the degrees of 
freedom available for each equation should be used.61 There are two main reasons for this 
limitation: 
 
1. If too many degrees of freedom are used, this leads to relatively inefficient estimates. 
2. If too many lags are included, the OLS estimates cannot be computed, because too 
many lags may lead to a singular and noninvertible (X’X) matrix. 
 
The most common approach used to test for lag length in a VAR model is the use of 
information criteria such as the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) or the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) which are based on the 
likelihood function for a model and determine the trade-off between model fit and 
parsimony. In case of two models which fit the data equally well, the more parsimonious 
model would be penalised less and would therefore be preferred. Thereby, the information 
criteria introduced above penalise additional parameters differently: 
[5.2]     ),(2ˆlog)( 2 mpmTpAIC ++å=  
[5.3]     ),)(log(ˆlog)( 2 mpmTTpBIC ++å=  
[5.4]  ))))((log(log(2ˆlog)( 2 mpmTTpHQC ++å= , 
where 
T  = sample size under a model with pmax lags 
åˆlog   = log determinant of the error covariance for a model with p lags 
m  = number of endogenous variables in the VAR model. 
 
The final term in each of equations [5.2] – [5.4] is a penalty for the model’s number of 
parameters. Thereby, the higher the number of parameters, the greater the penalty to the 
respective fit of the criterion statistics. 
The lag length p which eventually yields the smallest value – dependent on the number of 
lags p < pmax included in the model – is considered the optimal lag length for the model. Of 
course, the information criteria may select different optimal lag lengths and lag length 
selection can also be influenced by the choice of pmax. Therefore, different values for pmax 
should be tested88 (Brandt and Williams 2007: 24ff.; Maddala 2001: 527). Thereby, different 
information criteria (SIC, AIC, HQC) are used for decision making (The information criteria 
may recommend different optimal lag lengths (Schulze 2004).) with a first preference for the 
SIC62 and a second preference for the HQC as recommended by Lütkepohl (2005: 326) and 
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Kirchgässner and Wolters (2007: 133). Using multiple information criteria for decision 
making is also common practice in other studies (e.g. Constantin and Cernat-Gruici 2010, 
Jiménez-Rodríguez 2008).  
The reason for preferring the SIC and HQC over the AIC is that the SIC and HQC are 
consistent for stationary and integrated processes while the AIC, although employed 
regularly (e.g. see Frank and Garcia 2010), is not consistent and asymptotically 
overestimates the the true order of the (finite) maximal lag length. Moreover, the SIC is 
preferred over the HQC because it performs very well when it comes to lag length 
specification (Patterson 2000: 649). By tendency, the following proposition holds for the lag 
lengths suggested by the different information criteria: 
 
16)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ ³££ TforAICpHQCpSICp  
 
It is noteworthy that the information criteria can be used for I(1) processes with cointegrated 
variables (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007: 133; Lütkepohl 2005: 327). 
 
5.2.3 Testing for Cointegration 
The concept of cointegration has been developed by Granger (1981) and Engle and Granger 
(1987) and can be defined as follows: “Cointegration consists of matching the degree of 
nonstationarity of the variables in an equation in a way that makes the error term (and 
residuals) of the equation stationary and rids the equation of any spurious results. Even 
though individual variables might be nonstationary, it is possible for linear combinations of 
nonstationary variables to be stationary, or cointegrated.” (Studenmund 2010: 424) 
The Johansen test was developed by Johansen (1991; 1995) to identify the number of 
cointegrating vectors in a VAR model and is used by default for multivariate time series 
models. In a VAR model of order p  
 
[5.5] ttptptt xByAyAy e++++= -- L11  
 
yt is a k-vector of I(1) variables,  xt is a d-vector of deterministic variables, and ɛt is a vector 
of innovations. This unrestricted VAR can be rewritten as a VECM  
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where  
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According to Granger’s representation theorem when the coefficient matrix П has reduced 
rank r < k, then there are k 
´
 r matrices α and β each with rank r so that П = αβ’and β’yt is 
I(0). Thereby, r represents the number of cointegrating relations and each column of β is the 
cointegrating vector. As explained below (see 5.2.4), the elements of α are the adjustment 
parameters of a VEC model. The rationale behind Johansen’s method is to compute the П 
matrix from an unrestricted VAR model and to test whether the restrictions implied by the 
reduced rank of П can be rejected (EViews 2010: 685f.). 
Before carrying out the test, it is necessary to make an assumption about the trend underlying 
the data used because one of five deterministic trend assumptions needs to be selected. 
Assumptions 1 and 5 are rarely used. Assumption 1 should be used when all series included 
in the test have zero mean. Assumption 5 assumes quadratic trends in the levels of the time 
series which is a very rare case that is not realistic for the vast majority of economic datasets. 
Assumption 2 should be used when none of the series have a trend and assumption 3 should 
be used when all trends are stochastic. Finally, assumption 4 should ba selected when some 
of the series included are trend stationary (EViews 2010: 687; Götze 2008; Nastansky and 
Strohe 2011; Schwarz 2010). A more detailed discussion of the five trend assumptions can 
be found in Johansen (1995: 80-84). 
Two tests are used to determine the number of cointegrating relations r, the trace test and the 
maximum eigenvalue test (Lütkepohl 2005: 329). Thereby, one can proceed sequentially 
from r = 0 to r = k – 1 until the test procedures fail to reject.  
The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative 
hypothesis of k cointegrating relations, where k is the number of endogenous variables, for r 
= 0, 1, …, k – 1. The trace test statistic for the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations is 
computed as follows:  
[5.8]  rRL rt ( | å
+=
--=
k
ri
iTk
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)1(log) l   
 
where λi is the i-th largest eigenvalue of the П matrix. 
The maximum eigenvalue test tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against 
the alternative hypothesis of r + 1 cointegrating relations. The maximum eigenvalue test 
statistic is computed as follows:  
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[5.9]  rRL (max | )1(log)1 1+--=+ rTr l  
      rRL rt (= | 1() +- rRLk rt | )k  
For r = 0, 1, …, k – 1 (EViews  2010: 690f.; Patterson 2000: 621). 
The results of both tests may differ occasionally (Constantin and Cernat-Gruici 2010; 
Johnston and DiNardo 1997: 302; Murray 2006: EXT 7-13). The main difference between 
both testing procedures lies in the different formulation of the alternative hypothesis 
(Nastansky and Strohe 2011). 
In a model with n variables, there can be at most n – 1 linear independent cointegrating 
vectors. One can therefore distinguish between three cases: 
 
1. r = 0: There are no cointegrating vectors and therefore, there is no cointegration. 
2. 0 < r < n: There are r cointegrating vectors/cointegrating relationships. 
3. r = n: The matrix II is invertible and the the processes are all I(0). Hence, there is no 
cointegration. 
 
When there are no cointegrating vectors, a VAR model in first diffences can be used. If there 
between r = 1 and r = k – 1 cointegrating relations, a VECM should be used. When there are 
r = k cointegrating relations, a VAR model in levels should be used (Cottrell and Lucchetti 
2012: 211; Harris 1995: 79; Patterson 2000: 619). The results of the Johansen test can be 
found in the appendix, section A3. 
For an in-depth discussion of the Johansen test, the reader is referred to Darnell (1994: 
203ff.) 
 
5.2.4 Estimation of the VAR/VEC Model 
After testing for cointegration, an unrestricted VAR or a VEC model can be built. The basic 
unrestricted VAR and VEC models have been set up in equations [5.5] and [5.6] and the 
basic methodology for both the unrestricted VAR and the VEC model has been explained in 
section 5.1. 
To put it briefly, the VAR model is a system of unrestricted reduced form equations with 
endogenous variables. VEC models are an alternative to the basic VAR approach. They can 
be obtained from the levels VAR form [5.7] by subtracting yt – 1 from both sides and 
rearranging terms (Lütkepohl 2004: 89). An error correction mechanism (ECM) specifies 
how two or more series of variables are related to one another via the series’ short-term and 
long-run dynamics. VEC models can be applied to stationary and nonstationary data. 
However, they are usually used to analyse datasets with common stochastic trends or rather 
unit roots. ECMs created for multiple time series use an explicit representation of the 
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trend(s) of such time series, thereby preventing the occurrence of spurious regressions 
accounting incorrectly for trends in the data and leading to incorrect inferences (Brandt and 
Williams 2007: 18; Granger and Newbold 1974; Hill 2008: 230f.). 
 The most common method used to estimate a VAR/VEC model is the Cholesky 
decomposition. When the Cholesky decomposition is used, the ordering of the variables in 
the model matters because this method of orthogonalisation prejudices a certain causal 
structure. Due to the triangular form of the matrix used for estimation, the first element or 
variable in the matrix is not affected by the other elements. The second variable, however, is 
influenced by the first but not by the remaining variables, while the third is influenced by the 
first and second variables and so on. That is, there is a recursive causal structure in terms of 
Wold (Breitung et al. 2004: 162f.). 
When using the Cholesky decomposition for estimation, the ordering of the variables in the 
system is significant because the orthogonalisation and the estimates produced by VAR/VEC 
models may be influenced (Hamilton 1994: 322; Lütkepohl 1991: 155ff.). Therefore, 
different orderings should be tested and the results should be compared. If the results do not 
differ significantly, then the ordering becomes less meaningful (Canova 1999: 94; Cottrell 
and Lucchetti 2012; Möller 2004). Before opting for a certain ordering of the variables, a 
sensitivity analysis has been conducted with different orderings and the results have been 
compared. Although the results are quite similar in many cases, there are some cases where 
the results obtained differ significantly.  
Another strategy that can be used to find the appropriate ordering for the study is to choose 
the ordering based on economic theory. According to Lütkepohl (2005: 61), “The ordering 
has to be such that the first variable is the only one with a potential immediate impact on all 
other variables.” In other words, when the focus of a study is on the impact of an exogenous 
shock in one variable (e.g. oil) on another specific variable in the model (e.g. steel exporting 
figures) then the ‘impacting’ variable or rather the most influncial variable should be placed 
first in the ordering while the ‘impacted’ variable should be placed second (Cottrell and 
Lucchetti 2012: 208f.; Frank and Garcia 2010). This way, the second ‘impacted’ variable 
(e.g. steel exporting figures) is only influenced by the ‘impacting’ variable (e.g. oil) but not 
by the other variables included in the model. This way, the second variable in the ordering is 
only impacted by the first. Therefore, the following ordering has been chosen for this study: 
 
OIL QMT VALUE EXRA RGDP 
 
where 
OIL = crude oil price 
QMT = steel exports to the U.S. in quantity metric tons 
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VALUE = steel export value 
EXRA = exchange rates 
RGDP = U.S. real GDP 
Other studies examining the impact of oil price shocks on other variables by using a 
VAR/VEC model have also put the oil variable first in the ordering (e.g. Brown and Yücel 
1999). 
 
5.2.5 Testing for Autocorrelation 
After the model has been estimated, it is necessary to test for autocorrelation to make sure 
the model is robust. According to Brandt and Williams (2007: 28), “VAR estimation is quite 
robust as long as the residuals are uncorrelated over time.” That is, in order to make sure that 
the results obtained via VAR models are unbiased, it is essential to test for autocorrelation 
and to make sure that the residuals are uncorrelated over lagged time periods. Thereby, in 
VAR models correlated residuals across variables via contemporaneous effects must be 
expected by design. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test can be applied to test for serial 
correlation (5.2.5.1). Moreover, the VAR model can be overfitted to make sure that there is 
no autocorrelation in the residuals (5.2.5.2). 
 
5.2.5.1 Lagrange Multiplier Test  
In the univariate version of the LM test, the residuals from an OLS model are regressed on 
the lagged values of the dependent variable and the lagged values of the residuals. It is tested 
whether the regression coefficients for the lagged residuals in the unrestricted model are 
zero. In the multivariate version, two additional VARs are fitted, thereby using the residuals 
from a VAR(p) model of yt.  
The LM test for serially uncorrelated residuals is conducted in four steps: 
 
1. An unrestricted artificial VAR is estimated, thereby allowing for the possibility that the 
residuals in the original VAR of yt are correlated. This step is implemented by estimating 
the VAR 
 [5.10]  thhttppttt uBeBeAyAye ++++++= ---- LL 1111 . 
 
This VAR is formed by regressing the matrix of the residuals on lags 1 to p of y and lags 1 
to h of the residuals from the original model.  
 
2. A second artificial VAR is then estimated. This VAR is the restricted model  
where B1 = … = Bh = 0: 
5 Methodology 
5.2 VAR/VEC Specification and Estimation 
  338 60 
[5.11]  Rtppttt uAyAye +++= -- L11 . 
    The second restricted model then corresponds to the null hypothesis that the original 
VAR’s residuals are uncorrelated. 
 
3. Next, the residual covariances for the two artificially created VAR residual models are 
constructed (equations [5.10] and [5.11]) 
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Thereby, the first residual covariance matrix is estimated from the unrestricted artificial 
regression while the second residual covariance matrix is estimated from the second 
restricted artificial regression. 
 
4. After steps one to three have been implemented, it is possible to compute the χ2 LM test 
statistic in order to evaluate the presence of autocorrelation in the VAR residuals by 
[5.13]  LM = T[m-tr( )
~~ 1-
åå Re ], 
where 
m  = number of (endogenous) variables in the system 
tr( )  = trace operation 
 
The test statistic is distributed χ2 with hm2, that is, the number of restrictions on the restricted 
model’s parameters under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals.63  
It is noteworthy that Brüggemann et al. (2004) have shown that the LM test for serial 
correlation can also be used in conjunction with VECMs (Lütkepohl 2005: 346) and that the 
LM has also been applied by other studies (e.g. Asche et al. 1999) to test for autocorrelation.  
 
5.2.5.2 Measures against Autocorrelation in the Residuals 
If no autocorrelation is detected, the methods described below are used to analyse the 
estimates of the VAR/VEC model (see 5.3). If autocorrelation is detected, measures against 
the autocorrelation in the residuals must be taken. The method used by default to make sure 
that a VAR/VEC model has white noise residuals is to overfit the model. Thereby, additional 
lags are added until a lag length has been determined where no autocorrelation can be 
detected. 
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Although adding additional lags may lead to a certain degree of inefficiency, the 
consequences are still less dramatic when compared to the consequences of autocorrelation 
(Brandt and Williams 2007: 62). 
 
 VAR/VEC Analysis 5.3
The individual parameters of unrestricted VAR models and VECMs can hardly be 
interpreted meaningfully (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007: 135). Therefore, other methods 
such as Granger causality tests (5.3.1), impulse response analysis (5.3.2) and variance 
decomposition analysis (5.3.3) are used to determine the relationships among the variables 
analysed. These methods are briefly introduced below. 
 
5.3.1 Testing for Granger Causality 
When testing for Granger causality (GC), the statistical usefulness of one variable for 
predicting another is tested by applying a hypothesis test. That is, GC assesses the 
relationships among time series in an unrestricted VAR model in that it observes the value of 
individual variables for explaining the other variables in the system (Granger 1969; Sims 
1972). 
For a bivariate VAR model with the variables tY  and tZ , the following applies: 
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Based on this system of equations, GC can be defined as follows: “For linear models, tY
Granger causes tZ  if the behaviour of the past tY  can better predict the behaviour of tZ  than 
tZ ’s past alone.” (Brandt and Williams 2007: 32) 
The reverse is also true. For equations [5.14] and [5.15], in case tZ  Granger causes tY , the 
coefficients for tZ ’s past value in tY  are nonzero, or rather 0¹ib for i = 1, 2,…, p. 
Likewise, in case tY  Granger causes tZ  in the tZ  equation, the coefficients for the past 
values of  tY  are nonzero, or rather 0¹ig  for i = 1, 2,…, p. 
Testing for GC implies to assess whether the past values of a variable Yt-1,…, Yt-p, can predict 
the present value of variable tZ  in a VAR. Formal GC testing is then carried out by applying 
an F test or a χ2 test for the joint hypothesis that the possible causal variable does not cause 
the other variable. As defined above, the H0 hypothesis of the test is one of noncausality.  
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For the GC test, H0 is specified as follows: 
 :0H  Granger noncausality  tZ does not predict tY  if  
  .021 ==== pbbb L  
 :AH  Granger causality  tZ does predict tY  if  
  .0,,0,0 21 ¹¹¹ por bbb K  
 
The Granger causality concept presumes all tested time series to be stationary. However, 
economic time series are often nonstationary. In this study, each sample contains at least two 
variables with unit roots. In the presence of unit roots, Granger causality estimates may be 
biased against the null hypothesis (Brandt and Williams 2007: 66f.; Hamilton 1994: 554) and 
spurious Granger causality may occur. The test results would then be biased (He and 
Maekawa 2001; Schulze 2004).  
To prevent spurious Granger causality in the presence of unit roots, the Toda/Yamamoto 
procedure can be applied (Giles 2011a, b; Lütkepohl 2005: 318; Toda and Yamamoto 1995). 
The testing procedure works as follows: After determining the optimal lag length k, a (k + 
dmax)th-order VAR model is estimated where dmax is the suspected maximal order of 
integration. That is, when the highest order of integration in the model is I(1), then dmax =1. 
The coefficient matrices of the last dmax lagged vectors in the model are then ignored because 
they are considered as zeros. Linear or nonlinear restrictions on the first k coefficient 
matrices can then be tested by applying the standard asymptotic theory (Kirchgässner and 
Wolters 2007: 232; Toda and Yamamoto 1995). 
 
5.3.2 Impulse Response Analysis 
Section 5.3.2 describes the impulse response analysis for unrestricted VAR models (5.3.2.1) 
and VEC models (5.3.2.2) and the estimation of error bands for impulse responses (5.3.2.3). 
 
5.3.2.1 Impulse Response Analysis for Unrestricted VAR Models 
Impulse response analysis used to identify dynamic causal relationships among variables 
(Brandt and Williams 2007: 36). When one variable reacts to an impulse in another variable, 
the latter may be called causal for the former. This type of causality can be analysed by 
tracing out the effect of an exogenous shock in one variable on another variable (Lütkepohl 
2005: 51). Typically, the magnitude of the innovation is one standard deviation of the 
residuals in the VAR model. Then, the initial responses are traced out as functions of time 
(Brandt and Williams 2007: 41). 
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When the process yt in an unrestricted VAR model is I(0), the response to shocks in the 
variables of a given system can best be seen in the Wold moving average (MA) 
representation 
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can be estimated recursively from the reduced-form coefficients of a VAR in levels.The 
coefficients of the MA representation then reflect the responses to impulses introduced into 
the system. The (i, j)th elements of the matrices Фs are viewed as a function of s. They trace 
out the expected response of yi, t+s to a unit change in yjt, thereby holding constant the past 
values of yt. Because the change in yit given {yt-1, yt-2, …}, is measured by innovation uit, the 
elements of Фs represent the impulse responses of the elements of yt with respect to the 
innovations ut. For an unrestricted stationary VAR, Фs → 0 as s → ∞. That is, the response 
to the impulse is transitory and vanishes over time. 
The analysis of impulse responses has been criticised because the underlying shocks are 
unlikely to occur in isolation when the components of ut are instantaneously correlated or 
rather when Ɖu is not diagonal. Hence, orthogonal impulses, which can be calculated by 
using a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix Ɖu, are used by default. When Β is 
a lower triangular matrix so that Ɖu = ΒΒ’, the orthogonalised shocks are given by εt = Β
-1ut. 
Therefore, the following can be obtained form [5.16]:  
 
[5.18]  ,110 L+Y+Y= -ttty ee  
 
where Ψi = ФiB (i = 0, 1, 2,…). Here, Ψ0 = B is lower triangular. Hence, an ε shock in the 
first variable has an instantaneous effect on all other variables in the system while a shock in 
the second variable cannot have an instantaneous effect on the first variable, the third 
variable cannot have an instantaneous effect on the first and the second variable, and so on 
(see 5.2.4). Given that the ε shocks in the Wold causal chain are instantaneously uncorrelated 
or orthogonal, the impulse responses are often referred to as orthogonalised impulse 
responses (Breitung et al. 2004: 165f.). 
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When using the Cholesky decomposition, the ordering of the variables in the equations of the 
VAR model is crucial. According to Brandt and Williams (2007: 91), “changing the ordering 
alters the normalisation of the Cholesky decomposition and the order in which the equations 
are shocked in the computation of the moving average response.” If the correlations among 
the residuals are rather low, the ordering is not a decisive factor when computing the impulse 
responses. When there is strong correlation among the series, however, the ordering affects 
the interpretation of the results. 
In case the innovations in the variables in the system are uncorrelated, the choice about how 
to compute the contemporaneous correlations is not of primary importance. When the 
contemporaneous correlations are highly correlated, however, different approaches should be 
taken into consideration: 
 
1. In case not all of the variables in the VAR model are highly contemporaneously 
correlated, the subset of correlated variables should be placed together in the Cholesky 
ordering. While not too much can be learned about the impacts of the contemporaneously 
correlated variables on each other, more can be learned about their impact on the other 
variables in the system. 
2. A sensitivity analysis can be conducted to see how the dynamics of the system’s impulse 
responses are altered by the different choices regarding the contemporaneous orderings. 
(Brandt and Williams 2007: 37ff.). 
 
As described above, the IRFs indicate how a VAR/VEC model reacts to a specific impulse 
(Möller 2004). In this case, the response of steel exports from different countries to the U.S. 
in quantity metric tons to a shock in real oil prices is estimated, thereby using a Cholesky 
one-standard deviation as a shock introduced into the system. The responses to the shock, 
which is introduced into the system in period one, are then calculated for a fifteen month 
time period. The focus of the analysis is on the immediate reaction to the shock until the line 
representing the impulse responses crosses the zero line and the shock starts to die down 
over time. The IRFs are displayed graphically (see appendix, section A4) and in tabular form 
(see chapter 6). 
 
5.3.2.2 Impulse Response Analysis for VEC Models 
If cointegration between I(1) variables is present but not imposed in estimation, the result is 
both misspecification error and bias in the computation of the impulse responses. Therefore, 
the VEC model should be used for estimation when there is cointegration among trending 
variables (Stevans and Sessions 2010). 
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When computing impulse responses for VEC models, the main obstacle is the fact that in the 
presence of cointegrated I(1) variables, the long-run dynamic multiplier is undefined. As a 
consequence, the Wold representation does not exist for cointegrated processes (Masten 
2011; Stevans and Sessions 2010). However, according to Lütkepohl et al. (2006: 28), 
“although the Wold representation does not exist for nonstationary cointegrated processes, 
the Фs impulse response matrices can be computed in the same way for nonstationary 
processes. Thus the forecast error impulse responses are available even if some variables are 
not I(0).” 
The presence of unit roots prevents the inversion of a levels VAR model to an MA 
representation. However, Sims et al. (1990) and Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992) have shown 
that impulse responses for VECMs can be estimated based on a levels VAR model (Jang 
2001; Lütkepohl and Krätzig 2005: 35). The algorithm used to convert the VECM into a 
VAR in levels can be found in Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992) and Jang (2001). According to 
Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992), after the transformation, the impulse responses can be 
estimated recursively by 
 
[5.19]  
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where Ψ0 = Ιn, Фm = (ϕm,ij), and ϕm,ij is an m-step response of the ith variable to the jth 
innovation (Jang 2001: 14f.). 
Therefore, impulse response analysis is also valuable in cointegrated systems because in 
principle it can be used in the same way as for stationary VARs (Lütkepohl and Reimers 
1992; Lütkepohl 2005: 321).  
Nevertheless, there is one significant difference that needs to be considered when 
interpreting impulse responses of cointegrated systems. The impulse responses generated for 
a stationary VAR converge to zero as time (s) increases. However, impulse responses 
generated for a system with cointegrated I(1) variables in some cases may not converge to 
zero as s increases (Frank and Garcia 2010; Lütkepohl 2005: 262ff.). This essentially means 
that a one-time impulse may have a permanent effect in the sense that it shifts the system to a 
new equilibrium (Breitung et al. 2004: 168; Lütkepohl and Reimers 1992). 
Concluding, it is possible to estimate impulse response functions for cointegrated systems 
although the statistics converge more slowly than in stationary systems and in some cases 
have a permanent effect and do not go back to equilibrium (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007: 
233). Therefore, impulse responses which have a permanent effect have not been included in 
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the analysis. Figure 5.2 shows examples of impulse responses with positive/negative 
permanent effects. 
 
 
However, the impulse responses without permanent effects which have been included in the 
study can be interpreted in the same way as the estimates from an unrestricted VAR in levels 
(Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007: 233). 
The impulse response and variance decomposition estimates are computed by using EViews. 
The error bands for the impulse responses are computed by using GRETL. Both econometric 
packages calculate the estimates by transforming the VECM into a VAR in levels as 
described above. Therefore, the estimates created by EViews and GRETL are identical 
(EViews.com 2013). 
 
5.3.2.3 Error Bands for Impulse Responses 
In order to determine whether the impulses produced are statistically significant, error bands 
or bootstrap confidence intervals64 are produced. The standard approach for the estimation of 
error bands is based on the construction of the following interval: 
[5.21]  )()(ˆ ttc ijij d±  
In the interval, )(tijd are functions determining the upper and lower bounds of the 
confidence interval for some 100 (1- α) region for the response at time )(, tct ij .These 
bounds are by default presented graphically by plotting the functions ijijij cttc ˆ),()(ˆ d- , and 
)()(ˆ ttc ijij d+  as functions of t.  
There are different calculation methods for the estimation of error bands and the functions 
)(tijd . The most accepted method, however, is to conduct a simulation in order to estimate a 
sample of the responses and to summarise this sample. In this context, it is common practice 
to compute a Monte Carlo sample65 from the (posterior) distribution of the VAR coefficients. 
Figure 5.2 Impulse Responses with Positive/Negative Permanent Effects 
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When applying this method, a (posterior) sample of the VAR parameters is created. VAR 
coefficients are multivariate normal with mean ))(,ˆ(~ 1-¢Äå XXBMVNB . The inverse of 
the posterior estimates of the residual covariance, 1-å , has a so-called Wishart distribution66 
with ~1-å Wishart (S, T) where S  is the sample estimate of 1ˆ -å . Based on these facts, a 
sample of the VAR impulse responses can be generated as follows: 
1. 1-å is drawn from the inverse Wishart distribution. 
2. A draw of the autoregressive coefficients must be taken from 
))(,ˆ(~ 1-¢Äå XXBMVNB  by using Ɖ from step 1. 
3. The draw from steps 1 and 2 can then be used to calculate a set of impulse 
responses. 
4. The computed responses from step 3 must be saved. 
5. Steps 1 to 4 need to be repeated N times, where N provides the appropriate precision 
about the responses of interest. 
The N sets of smm ´´  responses are then summarised to provide an estimate of the 
impulse responses’ variance. Thereby, the number of samples (N) used typically lies between 
1,000 and 5,000, and is dependent on the level of precision necessary and the scale of the 
data.  
A normal approximation to the average ijcˆ can then be calculated from this sample: 
[5.22]  )()(ˆ tztc ijij sa± , 
where 
a
z  stands for the normal probability density quantiles and )(tijs  is the standard 
deviation of cij(t), the response of variable i to shock j at time t (Brandt and Williams 2007: 
41ff.). 
Impulse responses with confidence intervals not containing zero are considered to be 
statistically significant while responses whose confidence intervals include zero for the time 
horizon of the responses are not statistically significant. 
There are different opinions among econometricians which error bands shall be used to 
determine the statistical significance of the estimates. Exemplarily, Sims and Zha (1995) 
prefer to use “intervals with coverage or posterior probability .68 (one standard error in the 
Gaussian case). In much applied work .90, .95 or .99 probability intervals are used. We think 
… it would be a good idea to make one-standard-error intervals the norm, as they are likely 
to be closer to the relevant range of uncertainty.” In yet another article, Sims and Zha (1999) 
also opt for 68% error bands since they provide a more accurate summary of the responses 
central tendency while Brandt and Williams (2007: 91ff.) use different error bands for their 
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research. Here, multiple error bands (68%, 90%, 95%) are used to determine the statistical 
significance of the estimates. 
 
5.3.3 Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The focus of the variance decomposition (VD) method is on determining how much of the 
variation of each variable in the system is due to dynamic changes in the other variables used 
in the analysis. The VD method measures how much of the forecast error in the variables is 
due to variable X and how much can be attributed to variable Y. That is, by using VD 
testing, it is possible to determine how changes/innovations in one variable lead to change in 
another. Therefore, the more of a variable’s X forecast errors can be attributed to another 
variable Y, the more important Y is for predicting or explaining X. 
Variance decomposition is carried out by calculating the variance of a VAR model’s forecast 
errors. It is necessary to use the VMA representation of the VAR for this calculation. The 
forecast errors for a VAR system at period s can be estimated by using the following 
equation: 
[5.23]  112211ˆ +--+-++++ ++++=- tsststststst eCeCeCeyy L . 
The left-hand side of equation [5.23] represents the difference between the observed value of 
the endogenous variables’ vector at time t + s and the predicted values from the VAR while 
on the right-hand side, there is the VMA representation of the forecast errors over the actual 
period T = s  back to period s – 1. Equation [5.23] mathematically describes how the present 
innovations in the VAR model are functions of the model’s past innovations. The moving 
average coefficients 
l
C  are defined for the VMA representation of the VAR model. 
Equation [5.23] then shows that the innovations in the VAR model are a function of their 
own past value in the VMA representation. 
The forecast error variance in equation [5.23] is  
[5.24]  
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where [ ]tt eeE '=å represents the covariance of the forecast errors at period t. 
Orthogonalised forecast innovations can be expressed as follows: 
[5.25]  mmttttt auauauAue +++==
-
L2211
1
0 , 
where ut = (u1t, u2t … umt), ai represents the ith column of the decomposition of the 
covariance of the residuals, 10
1
0 '
--
=å AA . By default, this is a Cholesky decomposition of 
the error covariance matrix where matrix 10
-A accounts for the contemporaneous correlations 
among the innovations. Due to the fact that the matrix is by definition a lower triangular 
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matrix, the orthogonalised residuals stand for a specific pattern of linear combinations of the 
residuals. 
The orthogonalisation procedure can be used for the decomposition of the forecast error 
variance with respect to time and each variable. This is typically done by replacing the 
residual covariance Ɖ in equation [5.24] with the orthogonalised residual covariance in 
equation [5.25]. The orthogonalised variances of the forecast errors in equation [5.24] can 
then be expressed as follows: 
[5.26]  
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Equation [5.26] represents the moving average representation rescaled into the 
orthogonalised residuals. The variance matrix can then be calculated for the s forecast 
horizon periods where the ith row of the matrix stands for the variance of that equation and 
where the jth column represents the covariance which is explained for the ith row variable. 
The elements of the s forecast variance matrices therefore give information regarding the 
extent to which the variation in each variable can be explained by its own innovation and the 
extent to which the variation is due to variation in the innovations of the other variables 
included in the system (Brandt and Williams 2007: 45ff.). 
According to Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992: 56), variance decompositions “are also 
available for cointegrated systems and are computed using the same formulas as in the 
stationary case.” That is, VD estimation for VEC models is based on the levels VAR form 
analogous to the estimation of impulse responses (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007: 233; 
Lütkepohl 2005: 264) (see 5.3.2.2). 
Decomposition estimates are calculated for a time period of 15 months. The estimates are 
displayed graphically (see appendix, section A4) and in tabular form (see chapter 6). 
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6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
Chapter 6 analyses the econometric estimates obtained by implementing the methodological 
approach described in chapter 5. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.1 describes 
the analytic procedure used. The subsequent sections then analyse the econometric estimates. 
The analysis has been subdivided into three parts. Section 6.2 analyses the econometric 
estimates for steel exports to the U.S. for steel exporting countries. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 then 
analyse the estimates for steel exports to the U.S. for steel exporting regions and for steel 
product categories. Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
 Analytic Procedure 6.1
Section 6.1 describes the analytic procedure used for the analysis of the econometric 
estimates for steel exporting countries (see 6.2) and regions (see 6.3).67 That is, the purpose 
of the section is to familiarise the reader with the analytical approach applied below. 
The analysis for each steel exporting country/region has been divided into six sub-sections: 
1. Impulse Response Analysis 
2. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
3. Granger Causality Analysis 
4. Trade Distance Analysis 
5. Competitiveness Analysis 
6. Conclusion 
 
The procedures applied in sub-sections 1-5 are described below. Section 6.1.1 first explains 
the way of proceeding adopted for the analysis of the impulse response, variance 
decomposition, and Granger causality estimates in sub-sections 1-3. Section 6.1.2 then 
describes the trade distance analysis in sub-section 4. Thereby, the criteria used for the 
selection of bilateral trade distances and the computation of the trade distances are also 
explained. Finally, the rationale behind the selection of the macroeconomic key performance 
indicatiors used for the competitiveness analysis in sub-section 5 is explained in section 
6.1.3. 
 
6.1.1 Analysis of Econometric Estimates 
Section 6.1.1 describes the procedure applied for the analysis of the impulse response 
(6.1.1.1), variance decomposition (6.1.1.2) and Granger causality estimates (6.1.1.3). 
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Analytical Structure 
1. Impulse Response Analysis 
2. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
3. Granger Causality Analysis 
4. Trade Distance Analysis 
5. Competitiveness Analysis 
6. Conclusion 
 
6.1.1.1 Impulse Response Analysis 
The impulse responses estimated are interpreted in the first sub-section of the analysis for 
each steel exporting country/region. Thereby, the statistical significance of the impulse 
responses is estimated by using 68%, 90%, and 95% error bands. Moreover, the impulse 
response section describes the length of the immediate reaction of steel exports to a one-
standard deviation shock in oil prices, and the peak of the immediate reaction. The graphical 
display of the impulse responses including error bands can be found in the appendix, section 
A4. 
 
6.1.1.2 Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The variance decomposition estimates are interpreted in the second sub-section of the 
analysis for any steel exporting country/region selected. Thereby, the variance 
decomposition estimates are classified into five categories which indicate whether the 
variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation in the oil price 
variable is very low, low, moderate, high or very high: 
- 0%  ≤ very low  < 5% 
- 5%  ≤ low < 10% 
- 10%  ≤ moderate  < 20% 
- 20%  ≤ high  < 30% 
- very high > 30%  
The graphical display of the variance decomposition estimates can be found in the appendix, 
section A4. 
 
6.1.1.3 Granger Causality Analysis 
The Granger causality test results are analysed in the third sub-section of the analysis for 
every steel exporting country/region. The estimates show whether steel exports to the U.S. 
depend on past oil price values. They are evaluated in terms of significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level. 
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6.1.2 Distance of Trade – Upstream and Downstream Transport Costs 
Trade distances are used in the fourth sub-section of the analysis for each steel exporting 
country/region.  
Analytical Structure 
1. Impulse Response Analysis 
2. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
3. Granger Causality Analysis 
4. Trade Distance Analysis 
5. Competitiveness Analysis 
6. Conclusion 
 
In previous studies, the distance of trade has been regularly used as a proxy for transport 
costs (see 3.3.1). In this study, oil prices are used as a proxy for bunker fuel costs (see 4.1.3). 
As bunker fuel costs increase with distance, upstream and downstream trade distances are a 
reasonable addition for the analysis because countries whose steel exports to the U.S. are 
overproportionally affected by fuel costs due to their geographic location can be identified.  
Section 6.1.2 proceeds as follows: Section 6.1.2.1 explains why maritime upstream trade 
distances between the main exporters of iron ore and coking coal and the countries/regions 
exporting steel to the U.S. are used in the analysis. The section also describes the basis on 
which the upstream trade distances were calculated and how they were calculated. Section 
6.1.2.2 then explains the rationale behind the use of maritime downstream trade distances 
between steel exporting countries/regions and the United States. Finally, section 6.1.2.3 
defines the categories into which the estimated trade distances have been classified. 
 
6.1.2.1 Upstream Trade Distances 
Steel production requires a number of steelmaking raw materials some of which are 
distributed unevenly between countries and regions. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the 
materials used in the steel production process, their properties in steel, and the global steel 
industry’s relative share of use. 
Depending on factor endowments and geographic location, the steel industries of countries 
can face substantial upstream transport costs or bunker fuel costs. In the respective analyses 
of the steel exporting countries/regions, the coking coal and iron ore trades are used to 
illustrate the upstream transport fuel costs the different steel industries analysed are 
confronted with. For that purpose, bilateral trade distances between the most important 
exporters of both raw materials and the steel exporting countries included in the analysis 
have been calculated. The selection and computation of these trade distances are described 
and justified below. 
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Selection and Calculation of Coking Coal Upstream Trade Distances for the Analysis 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 specify the main coking coal importing and exporting countries.  
Although coking coal is mined in many countries, the number of countries exporting 
considerable volumes of coking coal is rather small. Table 6.3 shows that in 2010 (2011), 
eleven (ten) countries accounted for 270Mt of 271Mt (274.9Mt of 276Mt) or 99.6% (99.6%) 
of the global coking coal trade.  
Table 6.2 Coking Coal Importers (in Mt) 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Brazil n.a. 15.0 19.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 12.0 12.0
China n.a. 7.0 9.0 6.0 11.0 n.a. 48.0 38.0
Germany 7.0 7.0 9.0 10.0 9.0 n.a. 8.0 9.0
India n.a. 20.0 19.0 23.0 29.0 n.a. 30.0 19.0
Italy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.0 5.6
Japan 86.0 63.0 73.0 54.0 58.0 n.a. 58.0 54.0
South Korea 21.0 21.0 20.0 23.0 24.0 n.a. 28.0 32.0
Taiwan 7.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 6.0 n.a. n.a. 4.0
Turkey n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.0 4.6
Ukraine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.0 7.0
United Kingdom 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 n.a. 6.0 6.0
Other 87.0 82.0 60.0 116.0 118.0 211.0 59.0 84.8
Total 214.0 227.0 222.0 247.0 262.0 211.0 271.0 276.0
Sources: WCA n.d.a, b, c; WCI 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; OECD 2012
Iron Ore Provides the ferrous content in the steel 98
Coking Coal Produces coke, heat source and reducing agent in BF  > 80   
Manganese Desulpherises and as alloying element for strength 90
Silicon Used to de-oxidise steel 60
Nickel Anti-corrosion (nickel content in stainless steel 8-10%) 60
Chromium Anti-corrosion (in stainless steel, average content 18%) 75
Zinc Used to galvanise steel (enhances corrosion resistance) 60
Tin Brings protective coating to steel (food and drink cans) 20
Vanadium Brings extreme hardness to steel (high-strength steel) 85
Tungsten Brings extreme hardness to steel (high-speed steel) 20
Molybdenum Resistance to heat, corrosion (high-end steel). Brings 
weldability to steel (construction steel)
60
Raw Material Properties in Steel
Steel Industry's 
Share of Use (in %)
Ferrous Scrap Main elements for EAF-steel, combined with iron in 
BOF to reduce levels of heat
100
Table 6.1 Steelmaking Raw Materials, Properties, and Share of Use 
Source: OECD 2012, Table 1 
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Australia and the U.S. are the two largest exporters of coking coal. Table 6.4 shows that 
Australia accounted for 50%-57% of total coking coal exports between 2004 and 2011 while 
the U.S. accounted for 11%-23% of total exports with tendency to rise.  
Taken together, both countries 
accounted for roughly two thirds 
of total exports between 2004 and 
2008 and for about three quarters 
of total exports in 2010 and 2011. 
Therefore, most coking coal net 
importers source coking coal 
from Australia and/or the United 
States. This makes both countries 
a good proxy for the estimation 
of coking coal trade distances. 
Hence, Australia and the U.S. 
have been selected as exporting countries for the calculation of the coking coal upstream 
trade distances used for the analysis. 
In 2010, six seaports on the Gulf Coast and the East Coast accounted for 94% of total U.S. 
coal exports, whereby 68% of total exports consisted of coking coal. Port Norfolk, Virginia 
(East Coast) is the largest coal export facility in the U.S. accounting for about 30% of total 
coking coal exports in 2010. Port Mobile, Alabama is the largest coal export facility on the 
Relative Share of Coking Coal Exports (in Mt)
Australia United States Ɖ
2004 52.3% 11.2% 63.5%
2005 55.1% 11.5% 66.5%
2006 54.5% 11.3% 65.8%
2007 53.4% 11.7% 65.2%
2008 52.3% 14.9% 67.2%
2009 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2010 57.2% 18.8% 76.0%
2011 50.7% 22.8% 73.6%
Table 6.4 Coking Coal Exports of Australia and the   
U.S.  
Source: Author’s calculations; data: see tables 6.2 and 6.3 
Coking Coal Exporters (in Mt) 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia 112.0 125.0 121.0 132.0 137.0 n.a. 155.0 140.0
Canada 26.0 26.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 27.0 28.0
China 6.0 6.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 n.a. n.a. 3.0
Colombia 1.0 0.1  -  -  - n.a. 1.0  -
Czech Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.0 2.1
Indonesia 17.0 19.0 25.0 31.0 30.0 n.a. 2.0  -
Kazakhstan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0
Mongolia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.0 20.0
New Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.0 2.1
Poland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.0 1.7
Russia 14.0 12.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 n.a. 14.0 14.0
South Africa 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 n.a. 1.0  -
United States 24.0 26.0 25.0 29.0 39.0 n.a. 51.0 63.0
Other 11.0 11.9 36.0 36.0 36.0 21.0 1.0 1.1
Total 214.0 227.0 222.0 247.0 262.0 211.0 271.0 276.0
Sources: ACA n.d.; WCA n.d.a, b, c; WCI 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009
Table 6.3 Coking Coal Exporters (in Mt) 
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Gulf Coast with about 10% of total coking coal exports in 2010 (EIA 2011d). Both ports are 
therefore good proxies to estimate coking coal trade distances between the U.S. and its 
trading partners.  
The two largest (coking) coal export handling operations in the world are located at the port 
of Newcastle (New South Wales), Australia (ACA n.d.b) which makes Newcastle a good 
proxy to estimate coking coal trade distances between Australia and its trading partners. 
At the other end, at least one major port of destination has been chosen for each coking coal 
importing country included in the analysis based on port size.68 
The distance between the ports of departure and destination has been estimated by using a 
port distance calculator69 (vesseltracker.com n.d.). No trade distances have been calculated 
for coking coal net exporting countries because they do not depend on coking coal imports. 
This gives the steel industries of coking coal net exporting countries a comparative 
advantage based on factor endowments which is considered in the subsequent analysis. 
 
Selection and Calculation of Iron Ore Upstream Trade Distances for the Analysis 
The international iron ore market is even more concentrated than the coking coal market. 
Although iron ore is mined in about 50 countries, Australia, Brazil, China and India actually 
account for 84% of global iron ore production (OECD 2012).  
In 2011 Australia (38%) and Brazil (30.2%) accounted for more than two thirds of total iron 
ore exports (see table 6.5) with tendency to rise (Australian exports increased by 8.9% in 
2011 and Brazilian exports were up 12.1%.) (OECD 2012; USGS n.d.; WCI n.d.a,b). 
Therefore, most iron ore net importers source iron ore from Australia and/or Brazil. This 
makes both countries a good proxy for the estimation of iron ore trade distances. 
Port Hedland is located in 
the resource-rich Pilbara 
region in north-west 
Australia and is a large 
volume bulk mineral export 
port where iron ore makes 
up the vast majority of cargo 
shipped. With Port Walkott 
and Port Dampier located 
nearby, a total of three large 
ports in the region are used 
to ship a significant share of Australia’s total iron ore exports. Therefore, port Hedland is 
used as port of departure for iron ore upstream trade distance calculation.  
in MMT in %
1 Australia 438.8 38.0
2 Brazil 348.6 30.2
3 India 78.8 6.8
4 South Africa 52.2 4.5
5 Ukraine 34.1 3.0
Rest of the world 202.5 17.5
World total 1,155.0 100.0
Rank Country
Exports
Table 6.5 Iron Ore Exports 2011 
Source: OECD 2012, table 5; percentages: Author's calculations 
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Port Ponta Ubu includes one of Brazil’s largest iron ore loading terminals and is known for 
very efficient loading operations (Wilhelmsen Ships Service 2008). Therefore, Ponta Ubu is 
also used as port of departure for iron ore trade distance calculation. 
As for the calculation of coking coal trade distances, a port distance calculator has also been 
used for estimating iron ore trade distances between the ports of departure and arrival. Iron 
ore net exporting countries (reference years: 2007, 2008) have been excluded because they 
do not depend on iron ore imports. This gives the steel industries of net exporting countries a 
comparative advantage based on factor endowments.70 
 
6.1.2.2 Downstream Trade Distances 
In order to get an impression of the trade distances involved for exporting steel to the United 
States, bilateral downstream trade distances have been calculated between the U.S. and the 
steel exporting countries included in the analysis. 
The ports of Long Beach (West Coast), New York (East Coast) and New Orleans (Gulf 
Coast) are destinations for significant volumes of U.S. steel imports (WPS n.d.a,b,c) and 
have therefore been selected as ports of arrival for steel trade distance calculation. The ports 
of departure in the exporting countries have been selected based on port size (e.g. Rotterdam 
for the Netherlands and Hamburg for Germany). 
 
6.1.2.3 Classification of Trade Distances 
The bilateral upstream and downstream trade distances calculated have been classified into 
the following categories: 
- very short distance trade:    0km – 1,999km 
- short-distance trade:   2,000km – 3,999km 
- moderate-distance trade:  4,000km – 5,999km 
- long-distance trade:   6,000km – 9,999km 
- very long distance trade:            ≥ 10,000km 
 
6.1.3 Macroeconomic Key Performance Indicators 
In the fifth sub-section of the analysis for each steel exporting country/region, 
makroeconomic key performance indicators are used to explain why the steel industries in 
some countries are better able to absorb high oil prices than others.  
Analytical Structure 
1. Impulse Response Analysis 
2. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
3. Granger Causality Analysis 
4. Trade Distance Analysis 
5. Competitiveness Analysis 
6. Conclusion 
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The Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) is published annually by the World Economic 
Forum. The GCR of 2008/2009 analyses the competitiveness of 134 countries by using 12 
pillars of economic competitiveness. Each pillar includes several sub-criteria for the 
evaluation of a country’s competitiveness (Schwab and Porter 2008).  
The GCR publishes rankings for all steel exporting countries included in the analysis for 
each of the sub-criteria so that the relative competitiveness of each country can be compared 
for each performance indicator selected. Moreover, the report also states whether the 
position of a country in the ranking indicates a competitive advantage or disadvantage. The 
rankings for the sub-criteria are summarised by the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). 
The GCI is also a ranking and expresses the overall competitiveness of an economy relative 
to the economies of the other countries included in the report. 
In addition to the GCI, a number of sub-criteria have been selected from the GCR of 
2008/2009 to compare the competitiveness of the steel exporting countries/regions. The 
criteria selected include the overall infrastructure and the port infrastructure of each country. 
The importance of (port) infrastructure for international trade is described in section 3.3.2. 
Moreover, the domestic and foreign market size71 of each country are used as a proxy for 
economies of scale. The importance of economies of scale72 for the bulk trades (and 
therefore for the coking coal, iron ore and steel trades) is described in section 3.3.3.  
Finally, the GCR also provides information on the stage of development73 of each country 
and discriminates between countries that are  
1. factor-driven (= developing country) 
2. efficiency-driven (= industrialising country) 
3. innovation-driven (= industrialised country).74 
The stage of development can be a helpful indicator for the analysis because countries in the 
same stage of development often have similarities in terms of comparative advantage, for 
example when it comes to labour costs. As economies move along the path of development, 
wages tend to rise, thereby reducing their comparative advantage. 
Finally, data on wages75 and compensation costs76 have been collected from the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) and have been included in the analysis because differences in 
wages and compensation costs play an essential role for the shape of international trade. This 
is because companies/industries often relocate based on cheap (or skilled) labour. The BLS 
publishes data on manufacturing wages77 for 30 of the 64 steel exporting countries included 
in the analysis. The institution also publishes data on hourly compensation costs for primary 
metal manufacturing78 (25 of 64 countries) and for fabricated product manufacturing79 (24 of 
64 countries). Although data on labour costs are not available for all 64 countries, the data 
published at least give an indication of the wage and compensation cost differences between 
certain countries/regions. 
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6.1.4 Summary 
Section 6.1 introduces the reader to the analytical procedure applied below. The analysis for 
each steel exporting country/region has been divided into six sub-sections. After reading 
through section 6.1, it should now be clear how the econometric estimates in sub-sections 
one (impulse response analysis), two (variance decomposition analysis) and three (Granger 
causality analysis) are assessed (see 6.1.1). Moreover, the rationale behind the calculation 
and use of bilateral maritime upstream and downstream trade distances in sub-section four is 
explained (see 6.1.2). Finally, the reasons for using macroeconomic performance indicators 
for the analysis in sub-section five for each steel exporting country/region are described. 
The remarks in section 6.1 regarding the analytical procedure used provide the guideline for 
the understanding of the subsequent analysis and the reader is encouraged to read the 
respective passages again should any questions regarding the way of analytical proceeding 
come up while reading through the analysis. 
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that the econometric estimates (impulse responses, variance 
decomposition, Granger causality) analysed in sub-sections 1-3 of the analysis for each steel 
exporting country/region are summarised throughout the text in tabular form. The data on 
bilateral upstream and downstream trade distances and key performance indicators (overall 
infrastructure, port infrastructure, domestic market size, foreign market size, manufacturing 
wages, hourly compensation costs) included in sub-sections 4-5 throughout the text can be 
found in tabular form in the appendix, section A5. 
 
 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Country 6.2
In section 6.2, the econometric estimates for the steel exporting countries from the European 
Union (6.2.1), other Europe (6.2.2), the C.I.S. (6.2.3), North America (6.2.4), South America 
(6.2.5), Africa (6.2.6), the Middle East (6.2.7), Asia (6.2.8), and Oceania (6.2.9) are analysed 
and put in perspective. 
 
6.2.1 European Union  
Section 6.2.1 analyses the econometric estimates for 23 of 27 members of the European 
Union. Prior to the analysis of the estimates for each country, the estimates for the EU-
member countries are listed in tabular form to facilitate the possibility to draw comparisons 
between the estimates for different countries.80 
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Table 6.6 VEC Analysis - European Union 
Country
Time Period 
(months)
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1 -513.974
2 -999.042 *
3 -1,444.040 **
4 -206.915
5 -1,150.761 *
6 -2,121.334 ***
7 -447.014
1 -113.443
2 -3,709.419 ***
3 -1,818.669 *
4 -816.405
5 -1,755.368 *
6 -1,910.333 *
7 -1,356.804
1 -273.561
2 -420.612
3 -1,180.800
4 -139.811
5 -450.425
6 -656.133
1 -1,479.738 **
Denmark 1 -7.409 * 17.1 0.11
Estonia 1 -295.370 * 54.0 0.65
Finland 1 -346.208 9.2 0.00
1 -273.170
2 -1,310.668 *
3 -177.920
4 -1,238.966
5 -734.960
Germany 1 -808.914 12.8 0.20
1 -54.622
2 -33.745
3 -169.069 *
4 -83.122
France 16.9 0.80
Hungary 7.9 0.07
Bulgaria 12.4 0.68
Czech 
Republic
38.4 0.01
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
Austria 22.8 0.07
Belgium 23.0 < 0.01
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VEC Analysis - European Union (continued)
Country
Time Period 
(months)
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Ireland 1 154.553 4.5 0.85
1 -1,779.317 *
2 -1,427.685
3 -1,613.490 *
4 -3,540.715 ***
5 -2,380.887 *
6 -2,952.837 **
7 -1,912.474 *
1 -16.070
2 -642.809
3 -65.989
4 -357.254
Lithuania 1 -38.252 ** 5.3 0.50
1 -830.361 *
2 -1,076.678 *
3 -25.689
4 -301.482
5 -507.856
1 -462.186
2 -441.719
1 -1,709.251 *
2 -2,402.533 **
3 -767.379
1 -63.326
2 -68.925
3 -16.280
Romania 1 579.121 13.4 0.40
1 -46.107
2 -44.205
3 -20.331
1 -1,693.335 *
2 -701.235
3 -180.341
1 -895.626 *
2 -198.898
3 -513.958
4 -84.600
1
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Source:                                                                        
Author's calculations (EViews®)
Sweden 23.5 0.26
United 
Kingdom
64.888 9.4 0.39
Slovakia 8.5 0.35
Spain 12.5 < 0.10
Poland 22.9 0.26
Portugal 20.1 0.17
Luxembourg 16.3 0.67
Netherlands 25.6 0.04
Italy 21.9 0.05
Latvia 3.6 0.33
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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6.2.1.1 Austria 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Austrian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for seven months. The impulse response peak is reached six 
months after the shock at -2,121qmt. The impulse response values for periods two (= 2nd 
month after the shock) (68% error bands), three (90% error bands), five (68% error bands), 
and six (95% error bands) are statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock the oil price variable accounts for 22.8% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. This indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 10% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Austria produces coking coal domestically (2008: 1,554tst) and may also import coking coal 
from neighbouring net exporter Czech Republic81 if necessary. Therefore, upstream trade 
costs and trade distances for coking coal imports are expected to be comparatively moderate. 
Austria is a net importer of iron ore with net imports of 5,017tmt in 2008. 
Because Austria is landlocked, no direct maritime trade distances can be calculated. The 
trade distance calculated for neighbouring Italy shows that iron ore imports from the largest 
exporting countries (Australia, Brazil) involve very long upstream trade distances. This also 
accounts for downstream steel export trade distances to the United States. These distances 
may pose a significant trade barrier at high oil prices. The burden of being landlocked is 
another trade barrier for Austria.  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Austria is an industrialised country placed 14th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country 
consists of a highly developed overall infrastructure (rank 6) and is quite competitive in 
terms of domestic market size (rank 34) and foreign market size (rank 37) by international 
standards. 
Austrian manufacturing wages are slightly below U.S. wages ($20.86 vs. $21.50). Hourly 
compensation costs are not available for the fabricated product manufacturing sector. Austria 
is not competitive in terms of hourly compensation costs in the primary metal manufacturing 
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sector when compared to the U.S. ($49.57 vs. $31.82). Therefore, there are no wage or 
compensation cost benefits that could balance long-distance trade costs for steel exports to 
the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The largely statistically significant seven-month decrease of Austrian steel exports to the 
U.S. due to a shock in the oil price variable may be driven by long upstream and downstream 
trade distances. The fact that the country is landlocked and has a comparative disadvantage 
against the U.S. in terms of labour costs may also play a role. 
 
6.2.1.2 Belgium 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A shock to oil prices leads to a negative response of Belgian steel exports to the U.S. which 
lasts for seven months. The impulse response peak is reached two months after the shock at  
-3,709qmt. The impulse response values for periods two (95% error bands), three, five and 
six (68% error bands) are statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable contributes about 23% of the volatility 
in the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Belgium produces coking coal domestically (2008: 2,545tst) but is a net importer of iron ore 
(2008: 12,636tmt).82 
Importing iron ore from one of the main exporting countries involves long/very long trade 
distances (Australia: 18,131km; Brazil: 9,647km). Trade distances for coking coal imports in 
addition to domestic production would also be long or very long (Australia: 22,452km; U.S. 
East Coast: 6,797km83). Finally, steel downstream trade distances to the U.S. are also long 
by international standards (U.S. East Coast: 6,424km). These distances pose a burden for 
upstream/downstream trade at high oil price levels.  
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Competitiveness Analysis 
Belgium is an industrialised country placed 19th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country 
profits from a well-developed overall infrastructure (rank 15) and an excellent port 
infrastructure (rank 7). Moreover, Belgium is in the top thirty in terms of domestic (rank 28) 
and foreign market size (rank 29) which might help to generate economies of scale if the 
Belgian steel industry is not too fragmented. 
Belgian manufacturing wages are slightly above U.S. wages ($22.88 vs. $21.50). Belgium is 
not competitive with the U.S. in terms of hourly compensation costs in the primary metal 
manufacturing ($46.97 vs. $31.82) and the fabricated product manufacturing ($26.15 vs. 
$37.82) sectors. Therefore, Belgium has a comparative labour cost disadvatage in relation to 
the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The largely statistically significant seven-month decrease of Belgian steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one standard deviation oil price shock may be driven by long upstream and 
downstream trade distances for iron ore imports and steel exports. The decline in steel 
exports may be fostered by a comparative disadvantage in labour costs in relation to the 
United States. Obviously, Belgium’s well-developed infrastructure cannot outbalance the 
impact of the oil price shock. Additionally, Belgian steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per 
steel export category in section 6.4.2.1. 
 
6.2.1.3 Bulgaria 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Bulgarian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for six months. The impulse response peak is reached three 
months after the shock at -1,181qmt. The impulse responses are statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 12.4% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. That is, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Bulgaria produces coking coal domestically. However, production volumes seem to decrease 
over time (production volumes in 2005: 819tst; 2006: 737tst; 2007: 578tst; 2008: 369tst). 
Bulgaria imports considerable quantities of iron ore (2008: 526tmt). 
Importing iron ore from the main exporting countries involves very long upstream trade 
distances (Australia: 13,768km; Brazil: 11,362km). In case of coking coal imports in 
addition to domestic production, trade distances would also be very long (Australia: 
18,088km; U.S. East Coast: 10,216km). Finally, steel downstream trade distances to the U.S. 
are also long (U.S. East Coast: 9,843km). Long-distance trade poses a burden for 
upstream/downstream trade at high oil prices.  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Bulgaria is an industrialising country placed on position 76 in the GCI of 2008/2009. The 
Bulgarian infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 109; port infrastructure: rank 79) is 
underdeveloped by European and international standards. In terms of market size, Bulgaria is 
ranked on positions 60 (domestic market size), and 59 (foreign market size).  
No data are available on Bulgarian manufacturing wages and compensation costs. However, 
it can be assumed that Bulgarian labour costs are lower in relation to the U.S. because labour 
costs in industrialising countries are by tendency below labour costs in industrialised 
countries. The labour cost advantage should balance long-distance transport costs to a certain 
extent but is likely to shrink with rising oil prices. 
 
Conclusion 
The six-month long decrease of Bulgarian steel exports to the U.S. resulting from a one-
standard deviation oil price shock may be driven by long-trade distances, underdeveloped 
infrastructure, and low market size. The composition of steel exports may also play a role. 
Industrialising countries tend to export low-value steel products. For those products, the 
relative share of transport costs to final selling prices is higher than for high-value products 
exported form industrialised countries. Low labour costs might contribute to the statistical 
insignificance of the decline of steel exports to the United States. 
 
6.2.1.4 Czech Republic 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A positive oil price shock leads to a one-month decline of Czech steel exports to the United 
States. The decline (-1,480qmt) is statistically significant at 90% error bands. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 38.4% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is very high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 5% level (and almost at the 1% level; p-value: 0.0115). The 
GC test result confirms the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
The Czech Republic is one of the main coking coal exporters (2010: 4Mt). On the other 
hand, the country imports significant quantities of iron ore (2008: 6,800tmt). 
Because the Czech Republic is landlocked, no direct maritime trade distances can be 
calculated. As a result of the country’s geographic location, iron ore imports from overseas 
and steel exports to the U.S. involve considerable overland transport in addition to the long 
maritime trade distances involved. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The Czech Republic is an industrialised country ranked 33rd in the GCI of 2008/2009. The 
Czech infrastructure rankings (overall infrastructure: rank 51; port infrastructure: rank 61) 
are average by international standards. The country’s foreign market size (rank 26) is 
somewhat larger than its domestic market size (rank 40) which may result from regional 
trade within the EU. 
Czech manufacturing wages ($5.88 vs. $21.50) and compensation costs (primary metal 
manufacturing: $11.21 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: $9.44 vs. $26.15) are 
notably lower when compared to the United States. The large gap in labour costs might 
partially balance the overland and maritime transport costs involved in the steel industry’s 
upstream and downstream trade. However, the labour cost advantage may be 
counterbalanced to some extent or even reversed by rising fuel costs for overland and 
maritime transport. 
 
Conclusion 
The downturn in Czech steel exports to the U.S. is short but statistically significant. One 
reason for the rather short downturn in export levels to the U.S. may be low labour costs. 
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The disadvantage of iron ore imports involving overland transport and possibly long-distance 
maritime transport may be counterbalanced by coking coal abundance. 
 
6.2.1.5 Denmark 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Danish steel exports 
to the U.S. which lasts for one month. The decline (-7qmt) is statistically significant at 68% 
error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 17% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. This indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable for 
the steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The p-value (0.106) for the Granger causality test is nearly significant at the 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Denmark has no domestic coking coal production. Therefore, the coking coal required for 
steel production needs to be imported. Denmark is also a net importer of iron ore (2008: 
99tmt). 
Importing coking coal (Australia: 23,285km; U.S. East Coast: 7,191km) and iron ore 
(Australia: 18,964km; Brazil: 10,480km) from one of the main exporting countries involves 
long and/or very long upstream trade distances. In addition, exporting steel to the U.S. East 
Coast involves a long trade distance of 6,820km. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The industrialised country’s performance in the GCI of 2008/2009 (rank 3) is excellent 
despite its moderate market size (domestic market: rank 46; foreign markets: rank 44). 
Amongst other things, the Danish economy profits from an excellent overall (rank 7) and 
port infrastructure (rank 5). 
Manufacturing wages in Denmark are significantly higher compared to U.S. wages ($32.56 
vs. $21.50). Hourly compensation cost data are not available for Denmark but it can be 
assumed that compensation cost levels are also above U.S. standards due to the highly 
developed Danish welfare system.  
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Conclusion 
The reduction of Danish steel exports to the U.S. is short but statistically significant. On the 
one hand, the shortness of the downturn may be due to Denmark’s excellent infrastructure. 
Moreover, Denmark possibly has many high-value/high-quality steel products in its export 
portfolio which are less affected by increasing transport costs than low-value/low-quality 
products.  
On the other hand, several factors contribute to the statistical significance of the downturn. 
The main factors considered in the analysis are market size, which possibly limits the 
generation of economies of scale, high upstream and downstream transport costs, and a 
comparative disadvantage in labour costs relative to the United States. 
 
6.2.1.6 Estonia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock in the real oil price leads to a decline of Estonia’s steel 
exports to the U.S. that lasts for one month. The decline (-295qmt) is statistically significant 
at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 54% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. That is, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is very high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Estonia produces coking coal domestically (2008: 38tmt) and may additionally import 
coking coal from neighbouring Russia if necessary. No data are available for Estonian iron 
ore production, imports or exports. In case Estonia would have to import from one of the 
largest exporting countries, this would involve very long trade distances (Australia: 
19,816km; Brazil: 11,334km). However, neighbouring Russia is also a significant net 
exporter of iron ore. Finally, exporting steel products to the U.S. East Coast (7,819km) 
involves long-distance trade. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Estonia, which is in the transition phase from an industrialising to an industrialised country, 
has been ranked on position 32 in the GCI of 2008/2009. Estonia has a solid overall 
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infrastructure (rank 37) and a good port infrastructure (rank 20). On the other hand, the 
Baltic country has a considerable disadvantage due to its small domestic (rank 93) and 
foreign (rank 77) market size. 
Estonia has a comparative advantage in manufacturing wages over the U.S. ($5.66 vs. 
$21.50). No data are available for Estonian compensation costs, but it can be assumed that 
compensation costs are also considerably lower than in the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The decline in Estonia’s steel exports to the U.S. is short but statistically significant. In terms 
of factor endowments, coking coal and iron ore are either produced domestically or can be 
imported from neighbouring Russia. Therefore, Estonia may have an advantage regarding 
upstream trade costs when compared with many other EU members. Wage differences 
between Estonia and the U.S. may also help to balance increasing downstream transport 
costs.  
Apart from rising transport costs, the small market size may be one factor contributing to the 
short but significant downturn of steel exports to the United States. 
 
6.2.1.7 Finland 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Finnish steel exports 
to the U.S. that lasts for one month. The decline (-346qmt) is statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts 9.2% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. This indicates that the explanatory power of the oil price variable for 
the steel export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. This indicates the statistical usefulness or the 
predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Finland produces coking coal domestically (2008: 947tst) and is a net importer of iron ore 
(2008: 3,121tmt). 
Importing iron ore from one of the main exporting countries involves very long upstream 
trade distances (Australia: 19,824km; Brazil: 11,342km). In case of coking coal imports in 
addition to domestic production, trade distances would also be long or very long (Australia: 
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24,146km; U.S. East Coast: 8,199km). Finally, downstream trade distances for steel to the 
U.S. are also long (U.S. East Coast: 7,862km). Long trade distances pose a burden for 
upstream/downstream trade at high oil price levels.  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Finland is in the top ten of the GCI of 2008/2009 (rank 6) despite its moderate market size 
(domestic market: rank 50; foreign markets: rank 47). Amongst other things, the Finnish 
economy profits from an excellent overall infrastructure (rank 5) and port infrastructure 
(rank 6). 
Manufacturing wages in Finland are slightly higher than U.S. wages ($23.07 vs. $21.50). For 
hourly compensation costs, the difference is more distinctive (primary metal manufacturing: 
$44.30 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: $34.17 vs. $26.15). 
 
Conclusion 
The decline of Finland’s steel exports to the U.S. as a result of a one-standard deviation oil 
price shock is short and statistically insignificant. The Scandinavian country’s excellent 
infrastructure is certainly helpful for absorbing the impact of increasing maritime transport 
costs. On the other hand, Finland’s small market size and the relatively high compensation 
costs might impact the competitiveness of its steel industry. It is likely that the steel industry 
predominantly produces high-value/high-quality steel products which are less vulnerable to 
rising transport costs which is often the case in industrialised economies. This would then 
contribute to the steel industry’s ability to cope with an oil price shock. 
 
6.2.1.8 France 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of French steel exports 
to the U.S. which lasts for five months. The impulse response peak is reached two months 
after the shock at -1,311qmt. The peak impulse value is statistically significant at 68% error 
bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 16.9% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. This indicates a moderate relative importance of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
France produces coking coal domestically (2008: 4,947tst) and is a net importer of iron ore 
(2008: 18,232tmt). 
Importing iron ore from the main exporting countries involves long/very long upstream trade 
distances (Australia: 15,020km; Brazil: 8,978km). In case of coking coal imports in addition 
to domestic production, trade distances would also be long/very long (Australia: 19,340km; 
U.S. East Coast: 7,830km). Finally, steel downstream trade distances to the U.S. are also 
long (U.S. East Coast: 7,460km). These distances pose a burden for upstream/downstream 
trade at high oil price levels.  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
France is an industrialised country placed 16th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country has 
been ranked in the top ten in terms of overall infrastructure (rank 4), port infrastructure (rank 
10), domestic market size (rank 7), and foreign market size (rank 10). 
French manufacturing wages are slightly lower than U.S. manufacturing wages ($20.30 vs. 
$21.50). Hourly compensation costs in the French fabricated product manufacturing sector 
are higher when compared with the U.S. ($33.26 vs. $26.15). In the primary metal 
manufacturing sector the difference to the U.S. is even more pronounced ($42.31 vs. $ 
31.82).  
 
Conclusion 
The five-month decrease of French steel exports to the U.S. is partially statistically 
significant. The impact of trade distance costs in relation to high oil prices may be partially 
balanced by France’s excellent overall and port infrastructure and its considerable market 
size. On the other hand, the comparative disadvantage in terms of labour costs in relation to 
the U.S. has a negative influence on the competitiveness of the French steel industry in 
relation to the U.S. steel industry. Additionally, French steel exports to the U.S. are analysed 
per steel export category in section 6.4.2.2. 
 
6.2.1.9 Germany 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of German steel 
exports to the U.S. that lasts for one month. The decline (-809qmt) is statistically 
insignificant. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 12.8% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable which indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Although Germany produces coking coal domestically (2008: 9,085tst), it is one of the most 
significant coking coal importers worldwide (2008: 9Mt). Germany is also one of the largest 
net importers of iron ore (2008: 44,305tmt). 
Therefore, Germany faces considerable upstream trade distance costs for coking coal 
(Australia: 22,954km; U.S. East Coast: 7,145km) and iron ore imports (Australia: 18,633km; 
Brazil: 10,149km) from the largest exporting countries. Long downstream trade distances for 
steel exports to the U.S. (East Coast: 6,775km) are also significant. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Germany is an industrialised country placed 7th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is  
among the top five in the rankings for overall infrastructure (rank 3), port infrastructure (rank 
4), domestic market size (rank 5), and foreign market size (rank 3). 
Germany has a moderate comparative disadvantage against the U.S. with regard to 
manufacturing wages ($25.05 vs. $21.50) and a considerable comparative disadvantage 
when it comes to compensation costs (primary metal manufacturing: $55.09 vs. $31.82; 
fabricated product manufacturing: $41.17 vs. $26.15).  
 
Conclusion 
German steel exports to the U.S. decrease for one month as the result of an oil price shock. 
The short decrease is statistically insignificant. It seems that the German steel industry is 
able to absorb the impact of high ocean transport costs due to high oil price levels quite well 
despite its high labour costs. The resilience against rising transport costs may, amongst other 
things, be due to Germany’s excellent overall infrastructure and port infrastructure and its 
large market size. Additionally, German steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel 
export category in section 6.4.2.3. 
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6.2.1.10 Hungary 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Hungarian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for four months. The impulse response peak is reached three 
months after the shock at -169qmt. The impulse response value for the peak-period is 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 7.9% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable which indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable for 
the steel export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 10% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Hungary produces coking coal domestically (2008: 1,101tst) and is an iron ore net importer 
(2008: 1,900tmt). 
Because Hungary is landlocked, no direct maritime trade distances can be calculated. In case 
iron ore would be imported from one of the two largest iron ore exporters, Australia and 
Brazil, the imports would involve significant maritime and overland transport costs. This 
also accounts for downstream steel export trade distances to the United States. The trade 
distances (including maritime and overland transport) pose a burden for 
upstream/downstream trade at high oil price levels.  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Hungary is in the transition phase of becoming an industrialised country. It is placed 62nd in 
the GCI of 2008/2009. The country’s overall infrastructure is underdeveloped (rank 70) and 
its market size (domestic: rank 49; foreign: rank 33) is moderate. 
Hungary’s manufacturing wages are well below U.S. wages ($4.71 vs. $21.50). The same 
applies for hourly compensation costs (primary metal manufacturing: $11.68 vs. $31.82; 
fabricated product manufacturing: $6.98 vs. $26.15). 
 
Conclusion 
The partially statistically significant decline of steel exports from Hungary to the U.S. 
resulting from a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be limited by low labour costs. 
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On the other hand, the country is landlocked, has a comparatively weak infrastructure and a 
relatively small market size. These factors might contribute to the downturn. 
 
6.2.1.11 Ireland 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Irish steel exports 
to the U.S. that lasts for one month. The increase (155qmt) is statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 4.5% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. This means that the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is very low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Ireland does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used in the 
steel production process needs to be imported from overseas. Due to insufficient data 
availability it is unclear whether Ireland is a net importer or exporter of iron ore. 
Ireland faces considerable upstream trade distance costs for coking coal imports (Australia: 
22,155km; U.S. East Coast: 6,102km) and potentially considerable trade distance costs for 
iron ore (Australia: 17,835km; Brazil: 9,334km) if the raw materials are imported from the 
most significant exporters. The downstream trade distance costs to the U.S. are also 
considerable (East Coast: 5,730km). However, the trade distance for Irish steel exports to the 
U.S. is among the lowest for EU member countries. Only for Portugal, the distance of trade 
is marginally lower (5,672km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Ireland is an industrialised country placed 22nd in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is 
ranked average in terms of overall infrastructure (rank 64), port infrastructure (rank 64), 
domestic market size (rank 51), and above average in foreign market size (rank 35). 
Ireland has a moderate competitive disadvantage against the U.S. with regard to 
manufacturing wages ($24.76 vs. $21.50) and compensation costs (primary metal 
manufacturing: $32.75 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: $28.59 vs. $26.15). 
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Hence, there are no labour cost benefits that could balance the cost disadvantage of transport 
costs compared to the U.S. steel industry.  
 
Conclusion 
The ability of the Irish steel industry to absorb the impact of rising transport costs due to 
increasing oil prices despite average competitiveness in terms of infrastructure and market 
size and despite slightly higher labour costs compared to the U.S. is quite remarkable. Steel 
exports to the U.S. even increase slightly although the increase is short and statistically 
insignificant. 
The downstream distance of trade for Ireland is lower than for most other EU members. 
However, this difference stops short of explaining the resilience of the Irish steel industry 
against rising oil prices. The Irish steel industry’s performance could possibly be due to other 
softer factors. For example, Ireland and the U.S are both Anglophone nations and cultural 
affiliation (common Anglo-Saxon culture) may also play a role. 
 
6.2.1.12 Italy 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Italian steel exports 
to the U.S. which lasts for seven months. The maximum decrease occurs four months after 
the shock at -3,541qmt. The impulse response values for periods one, three (both at 68% 
error bands), four (95% error bands), five (68% error bands), six (90% error bands) and 
seven (68% error bands) are statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable contributes 21.9% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 5% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Although Italy produces coking coal domestically (2008: 4,943tst), it is one of the most 
significant importers of coking coal (2011: 5.6Mt). Moreover, Italy is one of the largest net 
importers of iron ore (2008: 16,313tmt).  
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Therefore, the Italian steel industry faces considerable upstream trade distance costs for 
coking coal (Australia: 19,079km; U.S. East Coast: 8,149km) and iron ore imports 
(Australia: 14,759km; Brazil: 9,297km). Downstream trade distance costs for steel exports to 
the U.S. (East Coast: 7,776km) are also significant. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Italy is an industrialised country placed 49th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is ranked 
in the top twenty in terms of domestic (rank 10) and foreign market size (rank 13). However, 
for an industrialised country, Italy’s infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 73; port 
infrastructure: rank 95) is dramatically underdeveloped. 
Italy has a solid comparative advantage against the U.S. with regard to manufacturing wages 
($17.80 vs. $21.50), is competitive in terms of compensation costs in the primary metal 
manufacturing sector ($33.17 vs. $31.82), and has a moderate comparative disadvantage 
regarding compensation costs in the fabricated product manufacturing sector ($31.63 vs. 
$26.15). 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant seven-month decrease of Italian steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be driven by long upstream and 
downstream trade distances. In addition, Italy’s infrastructure is underdeveloped and may 
further accelerate the vulnerability of its steel industry to rising oil prices. 
It seems that Italy’s relatively large market size cannot balance the above-mentioned 
negative factors. The country’s wage and compensation cost structure in the manufacturing 
sector also seems to fall short to contribute decisively to the competitiveness of its steel 
industry. Additionally, Italian steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel export category 
in section 6.4.2.4. 
 
6.2.1.13 Latvia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a four-month long decline of 
Latvian steel exports to the United States. The impulse response peak is reached two months 
after the shock at -643qmt. The impulse response values are statistically insignificant. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 3.7% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. In other words, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is very low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Latvia does not produce coking coal domestically. Coking coal imports may come from 
neighbouring Poland and/or nearby Russia which are both major exporters. Imports from the 
largest exporting countries, however, involve long/very long trade distances (Australia: 
24,032km; U.S. East Coast: 8,084km). Due to a lack of data, it is not clear whether the 
Latvian steel industry depends on iron ore imports. If iron ore is not imported from nearby 
net exporters Sweden and/or Russia but from one of the main exporting countries, imports 
involve very long trade distances (Australia: 19,711km; Brazil: 11,227km). The trade 
distance exemplarily calculated for Latvian steel exports to the U.S. East Coast is also long 
(7,711km).  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Latvia is in the transition phase from an industrialising country to an industrialised country 
and is placed 54th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is ranked average in terms of overall 
(rank 59) and port infrastructure (rank 52). Latvia’s market size (domestic market size: rank 
79; foreign market size: rank 80) is below average by international standards. 
No data are available for Latvian manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
However, it can be assumed that labour costs are similar to nearby Estonia which is in the 
same development phase. If so, the Latvian steel industry would profit from considerably 
lower labour costs in relation to the U.S. steel industry. 
 
Conclusion 
Latvia’s statistically insignificant decrease in steel exports to the U.S. resulting from a one-
standard deviation shock may amongst other things be fostered by a lack of market size. 
Should labour costs be below U.S. standards as can be expected, this could somewhat 
dampen the impact of rising oil prices. This also accounts for close raw material sourcing 
from Sweden or Russia which might contribute to the statistical insignificance of the 
downturn in steel exports to the United States. 
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6.2.1.14 Lithuania 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of Lithuanian steel 
exports to the U.S. that lasts for one month. The decrease (-38qmt) is statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 5.3% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Lithuania does not produce coking coal domestically. Coking coal imports may come from 
neighbouring Poland and/or Russia which are both major exporting countries. Imports from 
the largest exporting countries would involve long/very long trade distances (Australia:  
23,719km; U.S. East Coast: 7,790km). Due to a lack of data, it is not clear whether Lithuania 
depends on iron ore imports. If iron ore would not be imported from nearby net exporters 
Sweden and/or Russia but from one of the two largest exporting countries, very long trade 
distances would be involved (Australia: 19,398km; Brazil: 10,916km). The trade distance 
estimated for Lithuanian steel exports to the U.S. East Coast is long (7,419km).  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Lithuania is in the transition phase from an industrialising country to an industrialised 
country and is placed 44th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The performance of the country’s 
infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 47; port infrastructure: rank 43) is average by 
international standards. Its market size (domestic: rank 70; foreign: rank 69) is below 
average. 
No data are available for Lithuanian manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
However, it can be assumed that labour costs are similar to nearby Estonia which is in the 
same development phase. If so, the Lithuanian steel industry would have the comparative 
advantage of considerably lower labour costs in comparison with the U.S. steel industry. 
 
Conclusion 
The decline of Lithuanian steel exports to the U.S. is short but statistically significant. In 
terms of factor endowments, coking coal and iron ore may be imported from neighbouring 
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Russia or nearby Sweden. Therefore, Lithuania may have an advantage regarding upstream 
trade costs. Wage differences between Estonia and the U.S. may also help to balance 
increasing downstream transport costs.  
In the case of Lithuania, in addition to rising oil prices, relatively small market size may be 
one factor contributing to the short but statistically significant downturn of steel exports to 
the United States. 
 
6.2.1.15 Luxembourg 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A positive one-standard deviation oil price shock leads to a reduction of Luxembourg’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for five months. The impulse response peak is reached two 
months after the shock at -1,077qmt. The impulse response values for periods one and two 
are statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 16.3% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. This indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Luxembourg does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used in 
the steelmaking process needs to be imported. Figures on iron ore imports are only available 
for Belgium and Luxembourg combined (2008: 12,636tmt). Despite the fact that the vast 
majority of combined imports are consumed by Belgium, Luxembourg can also be 
considered as a net importer of iron ore. 
Luxembourg is landlocked. Therefore, no maritime trade distances can be estimated. 
Presumably, most coking coal and iron ore imports of Luxembourg shipped by sea arrive at 
the port of Antwerp, Belgium. Steel exports from Luxembourg to the U.S. are also likely to 
be shipped from Antwerp to a large extent. In addition to the significant ocean transport 
costs for Luxembourg’s trade at high oil prices, the burden of being landlocked (which 
involves overland shipments) poses another trade barrier for the country. 
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Competitiveness Analysis 
Luxembourg is an industrialised country placed 25th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country’s 
overall infrastructure (rank 14) is well developed. With regard to port infrastructure, 
Luxembourg is likely to profit from its proximity to the highly efficient ports of Antwerp and 
Rotterdam. However, Luxembourg faces disadvantages in terms of economies of scale due 
to its small domestic (rank 97) and average foreign (rank 56) market size. 
For Luxembourg, no data are available on wages and compensation costs. However, it can be 
assumed that industrialised Luxembourg has no significant advantage in labour costs when 
compared to the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The partially statistically significant five-month decrease of Luxembourg’s steel exports to 
the U.S. following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be driven by long upstream 
and downstream trade distances which involve overland transport. Moreover, the fact that 
the country has a disadvantage in terms of market size and possibly labour costs may also 
contribute to the decline of steel exports to the United States. 
 
6.2.1.16 Netherlands 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Dutch steel exports 
to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response peak is reached one month 
after the shock at -462qmt. The impulse response values are statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 25.6% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Hence, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 5% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
The Netherlands produce coking coal domestically (2008: 2,299tst) and are a net importer of 
iron ore (2008: 7,889tmt). 
Importing iron ore from one of the main exporting countries involves long/very long 
upstream trade distances (Australia: 18,176km; Brazil: 9,692km). In case of coking coal 
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imports in addition to domestic production trade distances would also be long/very long 
(Australia: 22,496km; U.S. East Coast: 6,841km). Steel downstream trade distances to the 
U.S. are also long (U.S. East Coast: 6,469km). Long trade distances pose a burden for 
upstream/downstream trade at high oil price levels.  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The Netherlands are an industrialised country placed 8th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The 
country is ranked in the top twenty in terms of infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 17; 
port infrastructure: rank 3) and market size (domestic: rank 20; foreign: rank 14). The 
excellent port infrastructure may be a significant advantage for Dutch oversea steel exports. 
Dutch manufacturing wages are slightly above U.S. wages ($22.65 vs. $21.50). No data are 
available for hourly compensation costs. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically insignificant two-month decrease of Dutch steel exports to the U.S. as a 
result of a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be driven by significant upstream and 
downstream trade distances. Thereby, the decrease remains statistically insignificant so that 
the impact on steel export figures remains limited. Some reasons for the insignificant 
estimate may be the Netherlands’ overall competitiveness and its excellent port 
infrastructure. Additionally, Dutch steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel export 
category in section 6.4.2.5. 
 
6.2.1.17 Poland 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Polish steel exports 
to the U.S. which lasts for three months. The impulse response peak is reached two months 
after the shock at -2,403qmt. The impulse values for periods one (68% error bands) and two 
(90% error bands) are statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 22.9% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable which indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Poland is a net exporter of coking coal and does therefore not rely on imports. However, the 
country is a net importer of iron ore (2008: 7,775tmt). Hence, the Polish steel industry faces 
considerable upstream trade distance costs for iron ore (Australia: 19,320km; Brazil: 
10,838km). Downstream trade distance costs for steel exports to the U.S. (East Coast: 
7,325km) are also long. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Poland is in the transition phase from an industrialising to an industrialised country and is 
placed 53rd in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is quite competitive in terms of domestic 
market size (rank 19), and foreign market size (rank 22). However, Poland’s overall 
infrastructure (rank 110) and port infrastructure (rank 119) are dramatically underdeveloped. 
Poland has a very significant comparative advantage over the U.S. in wage costs ($4.49 vs. 
$21.50) and compensation costs (primary metal manufacturing: $10.04 vs. $31.82; fabricated 
product manufacturing: $7.78 vs. $26.15). 
 
Conclusion 
The largely statistically significant three-month decrease of Polish steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be driven by long upstream and 
downstream trade distances. In addition, Poland’s overall infrastructure and port 
infrastructure are dramatically underdeveloped and may also contribute to the vulnerability 
of its steel industry to rising oil prices. 
Poland’s relatively large market size cannot balance the above-mentioned negative factors. 
The labour cost advantage of the East European country may have been counterbalanced by 
rising international transport costs in 2007/2008. 
 
6.2.1.18 Portugal 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Portuguese steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for three months. The impulse response peak is reached two 
months after the shock at -69qmt. The impulse values are statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 20.1% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. This indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is high. 
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Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Portugal does not produce coking coal domestically. Hence, the coking coal used for steel 
production needs to be imported. No data are available for Portuguese iron ore production, 
imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from one of the main exporting countries involves long/very long 
upstream trade distances (Australia: 20,466km; U.S. East Coast: 6,043km). In case of iron 
ore imports, trade distances would also be long/very long (Australia: 16,146km; Brazil: 
7,710km). Downstream trade distances to the U.S. for steel are moderate (U.S. East Coast: 
5,672km). Long trade distances pose a burden for upstream/downstream trade when oil 
prices are high. 
  
Competitiveness Analysis 
Portugal is an industrialised country placed 43rd in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country 
consists of a well-developed overall infrastructure (rank 23). Portuguese port infrastructure 
(rank 42) and market size (domestic: rank 39; foreign: rank 51) are rather average by 
international standards. 
Portugal has a significant comparative advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing wage costs 
($6.78 vs. $21.50). No data are available for hourly compensation costs. 
 
Conclusion 
Although Portugal’s steel exports decline for three months after a one-standard deviation 
shock in oil prices, the decline remains statistically insignificant. One reason for the 
insignificance of the decline may be a comparative advantage over the U.S. in terms of 
labour costs.  
 
6.2.1.19 Romania 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Romanian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month. The increase (579qmt) is statistically 
insignificant. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 13.4% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable which indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Although coking coal is mined in Romania, production levels seem to decrease over time 
(2005: 2,084tst; 2006: 1,973tst; 2007: 1,815tst; 2008: 1,254tst). Moreover, Romania is a 
significant importer of iron ore (2008: 4,446tmt). The Romanian steel industry faces very 
long upstream trade distance costs for iron ore (Australia: 13,844km; Brazil: 11,440km) and 
possibly for coking coal (Australia: 12,675km; U.S. East Coast: 10,292km) when the 
steelmaking raw materials are imported from the biggest exporters. Downstream trade 
distances for steel exports to the U.S. are also long (East Coast: 9,919km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Romania is an industrialising country placed 68th in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the 
country is competitive internationally in terms of market size (domestic: rank 36; foreign: 
rank 53), its infrastructure is underdeveloped (overall infrastructure: rank 117; port 
infrastructure: rank 102). 
Data for Romanian manufacturing wages and compensation costs are not available. 
However, labour costs are considered to be lower than U.S. labour costs. A comparative 
advantage in labour costs would reduce the impact of an oil price shock on Romania’s steel 
exports to the United States.  
 
Conclusion 
Explaining the ability of Romania’s steel industry to largely absorb the impact of rising 
international transport costs is challenging. To begin with, the increase in exports to the U.S. 
is short and statistically insignificant. The only parameters that potentially explain the steel 
industry’s performance are low labour costs (the level of which is not exactly known) and to 
a lesser extent the country’s market size. On the other hand, Romania’s underdeveloped 
infrastructure should have an adverse effect on steel exports. Maybe other factors than those 
considered also have an effect.  
It needs to be mentioned that, in contrast to the econometric results estimated for the vast 
majority of the other countries included in the analysis, the LM test results indicate that the 
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estimates for Romania may be subject to autocorrelation in the residuals. Because serial 
correlation could not be eliminated by including additional lags (for most samples, 
autocorrelation could be removed by adding additional lags; see section 5.2.5.2), the 
estimates for Romania may be biased and should therefore be treated with caution. 
 
6.2.1.20 Slovakia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Slovakian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for three months. The impulse response peak is reached in the 
first month after the shock at -46qmt. The impulse values are statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 8.5% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Slovakia produces coking coal domestically (2008: 1,743tst). Additional coking coal might 
be imported from the neighbouring net exporters Poland and Czech Republic. Slovakia is a 
net importer of iron ore (2007: 5,850tmt). 
Because Slovakia is landlocked, no direct maritime trade distances can be calculated. If 
necessary, coking coal can be imported regionally. Iron ore imports may require 
considerable maritime and overland transport distances, thereby counterbalancing domestic 
and regional coking coal availability. The burden of being landlocked may have an impact 
on steel exports to the U.S. due to the overland trade distances involved in addition to 
maritime trade distances. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Slovakia is in the transition phase from an industrialising country to an industrialised country 
and is placed 46th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country’s competitiveness in overall 
infrastructure (rank 65) and market size (domestic: rank 58; foreign: rank 46) is average by 
international standards. 
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Slovakia has a considerable comparative advantage over the U.S. in terms of manufacturing 
wages ($4.69 vs. $21.50) and hourly compensation costs (primary metal manufacturing: 
$14.15 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: $7.78 vs. $26.15). 
 
Conclusion 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, Slovakian steel exports decrease for 
three months. The statistically insignificant decline may, amongst other things, be due to the 
fact that the country is landlocked. Factors contributing to the statistical insignificance of the 
decline may be domestic and regional coking coal availability and low labour costs. 
 
6.2.1.21 Spain 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Spanish steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for three months. The impulse response peak is reached in the 
first month after the shock at -1,693qmt. The impulse response value for the first period is 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 12.5% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 10% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Spain produces coking coal domestically (2008: 2,916tst) and is a net importer of iron ore 
(2008: 6,329tmt). 
Importing iron ore from one of the main exporting countries involves long/very long 
upstream trade distances (Australia: 15,114km; Brazil: 8,641km). In case of coking coal 
imports in addition to domestic production, trade distances would also be long/very long 
(Australia:  19,435km; U.S. East Coast: 7,495km). Steel downstream trade distances to the 
U.S. are long by international standards (U.S. East Coast: 7,122km). These trade distances 
pose a burden for upstream/downstream trade at high oil prices. Nonetheless, trade distances 
between Spain and Brazil (iron ore imports) and between Spain and the U.S. (steel exports, 
coking coal imports) are considerably lower when compared to many other EU members. 
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Competitiveness Analysis 
Spain is an industrialised country placed 29th in the GCI of 2008/2009. In the market size 
rankings, the country is in the top twenty (domestic: rank 11; foreign: rank 19). The Spanish 
infrastructure is above average by international standards (overall infrastructure: rank 27; 
port infrastructure: rank 33). 
Spain has a considerable comparative advantage over the U.S. in terms of manufacturing 
wages ($13.48 vs. $26.15) and a moderate advantage in terms of compensation costs in the 
fabricated product manufacturing sector ($22.69 vs. $26.15). For the primary metal 
manufacturing sector, compensation cost differences are marginal ($32.11 vs. $31.82). 
 
Conclusion 
The partially statistically significant decline of Spanish steel exports to the U.S. following a 
one-standard deviation oil price shock may be facilitated by long upstream and downstream 
trade distances. The moderate labour cost advantage of the Spanish steel industry over the 
U.S. steel industry may have somewhat counterbalanced the impact of the oil price shock. 
Additionally, Spanish steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel export category in 
section 6.4.2.6. 
 
6.2.1.22 Sweden 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a negative response in Swedish 
steel exports to the U.S. which lasts for four months. The maximum decrease is reached in 
the first month after the shock at -896qmt. The impulse response value for the first period is 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 23.5% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Sweden produces coking coal domestically (2008: 1,296 tst) and is a significant net exporter 
of iron ore (2008: 17,546tmt) which gives the Swedish steel industry a comparative 
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advantage over industries located in resource-scarce countries. Downstream trade distances 
to the U.S. (East Coast: 6,844km) are a considerable cost factor due to maritime fuel costs.  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Sweden is an industrialised country placed 4th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The infrastructure of 
the Scandinavian country is well developed (overall infrastructure: rank 12; port 
infrastructure: rank 13). In terms of market size, the country’s rankings are above average 
(domestic: rank 32; foreign: rank 28). 
Sweden’s wage cost ($23.80 vs. $21.50) and compensation cost levels (primary metal 
manufacturing: $42.04 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: $34.19 vs. $26.15) are 
a significant cost factor for its steel industry.  
 
Conclusion 
Swedish steel exports to the U.S. decrease for four months as the result of an oil price shock. 
The decrease is partially statistically significant. The impact of trade distance costs may be 
partially balanced by Sweden’s well developed infrastructure and the domestically available 
steelmaking raw materials. However, Sweden has a comparative disadvantage against the 
U.S. in terms of labour costs which might contribute to the decline of steel exports to the 
United States. 
 
6.2.1.23 United Kingdom 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of the UK’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month. The marginal increase (65qmt) is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 9.4% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
  
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.2 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Country 
  338 108 
Trade Distance Analysis 
The UK produces coking coal domestically (2008: 4,804tst) but is also one of the largest 
coking coal importers (2008: 7Mt). The UK is also a significant net importer of iron ore 
(2008: 15,275tmt).  
Therefore, the steel industry in the UK faces considerable upstream trade distance costs for 
coking coal (Australia: 22,035km; U.S. East Coast: 6,156km) and iron ore imports 
(Australia: 17,983km; Brazil: 9,482km) if imports come from the main exporting countries. 
Downstream trade distances for steel exports to the U.S. (East Coast: 5,785km) are 
moderate. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The industrialised United Kingdom is placed 12th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The UK is 
ranked among the top ten nations in terms of market size (domestic: rank 6; foreign: rank 8). 
Moreover, the UK is ranked among the top thirty nations in terms of infrastructure (overall 
infrastructure: rank 24; port infrastructure: rank 30). 
The UK has a comparative disadvantage in labour costs when compared to the United States. 
However, the cost differences are not dramatic (manufacturing wages: $25.46 vs. $21.50; 
primary metal manufacturing compensation costs: $34.62 vs. $31.82; fabricated product 
manufacturing compensation costs: $31.96 vs. $26.15).  
 
Conclusion 
The ability of the UK’s steel industry to absorb the impact of rising oil prices is noteworthy 
although the increase is short and statistically insignificant. The solid infrastructure and 
possibly economies of scale due to market size may play a role in the steel industry’s 
resilience. Other soft factors such as common language84 and cultural affiliation (common 
Anglo-Saxon culture) may also be taken into account. 
 
6.2.1.24 Summary 
Steel exports of EU members to the U.S. decline following a one-standard deviation shock in 
the oil price variable with the exception of Ireland, Romania and the UK.  
In case of Romania, the estimates may be biased by autocorrelation and should therefore be 
viewed with caution. The question that remains is: What enables the steel industries of 
Ireland and the UK to absorb the oil price shock better than the other EU member countries? 
Two factors that distinguish both Ireland and the UK from the other countries are the soft 
factors common language and cultural affiliation. Another - though not decisive - factor may 
be that the calculated trade distances between Ireland/UK and the U.S. are shorter than for all 
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other EU countries with the exception of Portugal. It needs to be emphasised, however, that 
the increase in exports for both Ireland and the UK is short and statistically insignificant. 
For the twenty remaining EU member countries analysed, steel exports to the U.S. decline 
with varying intensity. Thereby, the trend of declining export figures holds for countries with 
different characteristics. The trend holds for Eurozone members and non-Eurozone 
members, industrialising and industrialised countries, large, mid-size and small economies, 
landlocked and non-landlocked countries and for countries from different geographic regions 
(e.g. Scandinavia, the Baltic States or the Benelux States). When the impulse response 
estimates are compared between countries of the same region, it turns out that the results are 
very similar for some countries and quite different between others. 
 
Example 1: Baltic States 
The country profiles of the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are quite similar. The 
three countries are all in the transition phase from an industrialising country to an 
industrialised country. Moreover, the countries have rather small economies, none of them is 
landlocked, and their upstream and downstream trade distances are very similar. In terms of 
competitiveness, their rankings in the GCI of 2008/2009 do not differ dramatically (Estonia: 
rank 32; Latvia: rank 54; Lithuania: rank 44).  
When the impulse response estimates for the Baltic States are compared, it turns out that the 
decrease of steel exports to the U.S. is short but statistically significant for Estonia and 
Lithuania. For Latvia, the decline is somewhat longer and statistically insignificant. All in 
all, the impulse response estimates do not differ dramatically. 
 
Example 2: Benelux States 
Comparing the impulse response estimates of the Benelux States Belgium and the 
Netherlands yields different results. As in the first example, the respective country profiles 
are similar. Both countries are industrialised, have mid-sized economies, are not landlocked 
and are facing similar upstream and downstream trade distances. In both countries, coking 
coal is produced domestically and both countries are net importers of iron ore. In the GCI 
ranking of 2008/2009, both countries are in the top twenty (Belgium: rank 19; Netherlands: 
rank 8) and in the rankings for the sub-criteria included in the analysis both countries 
perform quite similar (overall infrastructure: rank 15 (Belgium) vs. rank 17 (Netherlands); 
port infrastructure: rank 7 vs. rank 3; domestic market size: rank 28 vs. rank 20; foreign 
market size: rank 20 vs. rank 14). Finally, manufacturing wages are nearly identical ($22.88 
vs. $22.65).  
Nonetheless, the impulse responses for both countries are quite different. While Dutch steel 
exports to the U.S. only decline for two months following a one-standard deviation oil price 
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shock, Belgian exports decline for seven months. While the impulse responses for the 
Netherlands are statistically insignificant, the impulse responses for Belgium are largely 
statistically significant.  
Although the Netherlands perform better in the GCI ranking and are doing slightly better in 
most sub-categories considered, it is at least debatable whether those moderate differences in 
competitiveness can make up for the varying impulse response estimates. The identification 
of the factors behind the different impulse response estimates should be subject for future 
research. 
 
Recapitulatory, the findings for the EU member countries are largely in line with the 
hypothesis that oil price shocks or rising (maritime) fuel costs lead to a regionalisation of 
trade flows and to a reduction of trade distances in the global steel industry. Thereby, the EU 
steel industry is not only affected by increasing fuel costs for steel exports but also by 
increasing fuel costs for upstream trade. For example, the EU is a net importer of iron ore of 
which 98% are used for steelmaking (net imports in 2008: 138,651tmt). 
 
6.2.2 Other Europe 
Section 6.2.2 analyses the econometric estimates for Norway (6.2.2.1) and Switzerland 
(6.2.2.2). Section 6.2.2.3 concludes. 
  
 
  
Table 6.7 VEC Analysis - Other Europe 
1 -111.905
2 -337.358
3 -1,112.005 ***
4 -96.348
5 -80.690
1 54.624 *
2 109.627 ***
3 8.563
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
Switzerland 22.7 0.00
Country
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Norway 23.5  0.61
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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6.2.2.1 Norway 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Norwegian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for five months. The impulse response peak is reached three 
months after the shock at -1,112qmt. The impulse response value for period three is 
statistically significant at 95% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 23.5% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Norway does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for steel 
production needs to be imported. Norway is a net exporter of iron ore (2008: 463tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the main exporting countries involves long/very long trade 
distances (Australia: 23,437km; U.S. East Coast: 7,082km). The same applies for steel 
exports to the U.S. (East Coast: 6,278km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Norway is an industrialised country placed 15th in the GCI of 2008/2009. Norway’s port 
infrastructure (rank 12) is relatively better developed than its overall infrastructure (rank 28). 
Its market size (domestic: rank 44, foreign: rank 42) is above average. 
Data on Norwegian labour costs are only available for hourly compensation costs in the 
primary metal manufacturing sector where Norway’s steel industry faces a comparative 
disadvantage ($53.57 vs. $31.82). 
 
Conclusion 
Norway’s partially significant decline in steel exports to the U.S. following a one-standard 
deviation shock in the oil price variable may be facilitated by the long downstream trade 
distance between both countries. Long upstream trade distances for coking coal may in part 
be counterbalanced by domestic iron ore abundance. While the Norwegian steel industry 
may benefit from the country’s good port infrastructure, this benefit may be somewhat 
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counterbalanced by average competitiveness in overall infrastructure and market size. The 
decline of steel exports to the U.S. may be facilitated by the steel industry’s drastic labour 
cost disadvantage compared to the U.S. steel industry. 
 
6.2.2.2 Switzerland 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Swiss steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for three months. The impulse response peak is reached two 
months after the shock at 110qmt. The impulse response values for periods one (68% error 
bands) and two (95% error bands) are statistically significant.  
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, 22.7% of the forecast variation in steel exports to the U.S. 
can be attributed to innovations in oil prices. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil 
price variable for the steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Switzerland does not produce coking coal domestically. Hence, the coking coal used for 
steelmaking needs to be imported. Data availability regarding iron ore is limited for 
Switzerland. No data are available for Swiss iron ore production or exports. However, data 
on iron ore imports (2007: 8tmt; 2008: 6tmt) indicate that Switzerland is an iron ore net 
exporter or that net import volumes are very low. 
Because Switzerland is landlocked, no direct maritime trade distances can be calculated. 
Generally, being landlocked is regarded as a barrier to international trade in the literature. 
If Switzerland imports coking coal from the main exporting countries, imports include long 
trade distances which are split into maritime and overland trade distances and involve high 
transport costs, especially at high oil price levels. The same applies for iron ore imports. 
However, iron ore import volumes are rather low. Steel exports to the U.S. involve 
significant overland and maritime trade distances  
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Switzerland is an industrialised country and performs excellent in the GCI of 2008/2009 
(rank 2). Moreover, Switzerland’s overall infrastructure is the best worldwide (rank1). 
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Despite being landlocked, Switzerland is still in the top twenty with regard to port 
infrastructure (rank 17). The ranking for port infrastructure is probably a combination of an 
assessment of Swiss river ports and the proximity of highly efficient ports in neighbouring 
France. Switzerland’s market size is above average (domestic: rank 30; foreign: rank 37).  
The country has a comparative disadvantage in terms of manufacturing wages when 
compared to the U.S. ($28.17 vs. $21.50). No data are available for Swiss hourly 
compensation costs. 
 
Conclusion 
Recapitulatory, the largely statistically significant three-month increase in Swiss steel 
exports to the U.S. in response to a one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable is 
remarkable. The increase occurs despite the fact that Switzerland is landlocked and has a 
disadvantage when compared to the U.S. in terms of manufacturing wages.  
There are two explanatory approaches for the performance of the Swiss steel industry 
regarding exports to the United States. First, the industry profits from its excellent overall 
infrastructure in combination with Switzerland’s proximity to highly efficient ports in 
neighbouring France. Second, the country’s steel industry might profit from a specialisation 
on high-value/high-quality steel products which have a low relative share of transport costs 
to final selling prices when compared with low-value/low-quality steel products. 
 
6.2.2.3 Summary 
The impulse response estimates for the two non-EU members can be interpreted as follows: 
The impulse response estimate for Norway is by tendency in line with the estimates for the 
Scandinavian EU members. Steel exports to the U.S. decline for all Scandinavian countries 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock. Thereby, the impulse response values are 
partially significant for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The relative importance of the oil 
price variable for the steel export variables is also quite similar for Denmark (17.1%), 
Norway (23.5%), and Sweden (23.5%). The estimates for Finland, however, are somewhat 
different. The impulse response estimate is statistically insignificant and the variance 
decomposition estimate is significantly lower (9.2%) when compared to the estimates of the 
Scandinavian counterparts. 
When the impulse response results for Switzerland are compared with those for 
neighbouring Austria, the following conclusions can be drawn: Although the profiles for 
both countries are similar, the impulse response estimates are quite different. While the 
difference between the variance decomposition estimates is marginal (Austria: 22.8%; 
Switzerland: 22.7%), the largely statistically significant impulse response results are 
contradictory. 
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Thereby, the neighbouring countries are both landlocked and their steel industries are 
confronted with similar upstream and downstream trade distances. Moreover, the economies 
of both countries are industrialised and mid-sized with comparable market size (domestic 
market size: rank 34 (Austria) vs. rank 37 (Switzerland); foreign market size: rank 37 
(Austria) vs. rank 30 (Switzerland)). However, Switzerland is ahead in terms of overall 
competitiveness (Austria: rank 14; Switzerland: rank 2) and overall infrastructure (Austria: 
rank 6; Switzerland: rank 1). Although both countries have top rankings in terms of overall 
infrastructure, they depend on foreign seaports for exporting steel to the United States. While 
north Italian ports are logical candidates for Austrian steel exports due to their proximity, 
ports in southern France are logical candidates for Swiss exports. However, while French 
ports are very competitive internationally (rank 10), the contrary is true for Italian ports (rank 
95). Additionally, while the French overall infrastructure used for overland transport of 
Swiss steel exports is very competitive (rank 4), the Italian overall infrastructure is not 
competitive at all (rank 73). Therefore, one reason for the contradictory estimates of both 
countries may be differences in the efficiency of overland transport and port infrastructure.  
Finally, it would be interesting to compare the composition of Austrian and Swiss steel 
exports in terms of high- and low-value products which may be subject for further research. 
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6.2.3 C.I.S. 
Section 6.2.3 analyses the econometric estimates for the C.I.S. members Kazakhstan 
(6.2.3.1), Russia (6.2.3.2) and Ukraine (6.2.3.3). Section 6.2.3.4 concludes. 
  
 
6.2.3.1 Kazakhstan 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Kazakhstan’s steel 
exports to the U.S. that lasts for five months. The impulse response peak is reached five 
months after the shock at -1,755qmt. The impulse response values for periods one (95% 
error bands), two (90% error bands) and five (90% error bands) are statistically significant.  
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 42.8% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is very high. 
 
  
Table 6.8 VEC  Analysis - C.I.S. 
1 -1,503.452 ***
2 -1,703.763 **
3 -881.870
4 -402.249
5 -1,754.579 **
1 -2,465.667
2 -8,585.345
3 -14,485.740 *
4 -8,943.456
5 -5,543.078
6 -3,001.981
1 -1,251.252
2 -5,822.882 **
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Country
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
Kazakhstan 42.8 < 0.01
Russia 15.4 0.68
Ukraine 22.6 0.00
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.2 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Country 
  338 116 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Kazakhstan is one of the main coking coal exporters (2011: 1Mt) and is also a net exporter of 
iron ore (2008: 13,264tmt). 
No direct maritime trade distances can be calculated for Kazakhstan. Although the country is 
not entirely landlocked, access to the Caspian Sea does not provide the country with a direct 
ocean route to the United States. Therefore, exporting steel to the U.S. involves overland 
and/or river transport. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Kazakhstan is in the transition phase from a developing country to an industrialising country 
and is placed 66th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country’s domestic (rank 54) and foreign 
market size (rank 49) are average by international standards. Kazakhstan’s overall 
infrastructure (rank 71) is developed below average by international standards and its port 
infrastructure (rank 101) is significantly underdeveloped. 
No data are available for Kazakh labour costs. However, due to the fact that Kazakhstan is a 
developing country, labour costs are expected to be well below U.S. standards. 
 
Conclusion 
Although Kazakhstan’s steel industry profits from steelmaking raw material abundance, the 
country’s steel exports to the U.S. decline for five months following a one-standard deviation 
shock in the oil price variable. The decline is largely statistically significant.  
One reason for the significant decline may be the large downstream trade distance which 
involves overland and/or river transport. Moreover, Kazakhstan is not competitive 
internationally in terms of infrastructure. 
The estimates for Kazakhstan may be biased by autocorrelation which could not be removed 
by adding additional lags and therefore need to be interpreted with caution. 
 
6.2.3.2 Russia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Russia’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for six months. The impulse response peak is reached three 
months after the shock at -14,486qmt. The impulse response value for period three is 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable contributes 15.4% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Resource-rich Russia is one of the largest coking coal exporters worldwide (2008: 15Mt) and 
is also a significant net exporter of iron ore (2008: 12,878tmt). 
Steel export trade distances between Russia and the U.S. are as follows: If steel is exported 
from the Russian west coast to the U.S. East Coast, the trade distance involved is 8,100km. If 
steel is exported from the Russian east coast to the U.S. West Coast, the distance of trade is 
9,697km. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Russia is in the transition phase from an industrialising country to an industrialised country 
and is placed 51st in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is among the top ten countries in 
terms of domestic (rank 8) and foreign market size (rank 6). The quality of its overall (rank 
78) and port infrastructure (rank 76) is below average. 
No data are available for Russian labour costs. However, due to Russia’s stage of 
development labour costs are expected to be below U.S. standards. 
 
Conclusion 
Although the immediate downturn of Russian steel exports to the U.S. lasts for two quarters, 
it is only partially statistically significant. The downturn may be due to a combination of 
significant downstream trade distances, high oil prices, and the underdeveloped Russian 
infrastructure. On the other hand, the downturn may be limited by steelmaking raw material 
abundance, the possibility to generate economies of scale and a labour cost advantage over 
the United States. Additionally, Russian steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel 
export category in section 6.4.3.1. 
 
6.2.3.3 Ukraine 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Ukrainian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response peak is reached two 
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months after the shock at -5,823qmt. The impulse response value for period two is 
statistically significant at 90% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 22.6% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Ukraine produces coking coal domestically (2008: 21,539tst). Additional coking coal may be 
imported from net exporting neighbouring Russia and Poland. Moreover, the Ukraine is a net 
exporter of iron ore (2008: 19,919tmt). Therefore, the Ukrainian steel industry is in a 
favorable position with respect to steelmaking raw material abundance. 
Downstream trade distance costs to the U.S. East Coast (10,141km), however, are a 
considerable cost factor, especially at high oil price levels. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Ukraine is an industrialising country placed 72nd in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the 
country’s domestic (rank 29) and foreign market size (rank 37) are above average, the 
quality of its overall (rank 86) and port infrastructure (rank 87) is below average. 
No data are available for Ukrainian labour costs. However, due to the fact that Ukraine is an 
industrialising country, labour costs are expected to be below U.S. standards. 
 
Conclusion 
Although Ukraine’s steel industry profits from steelmaking raw material abundance, the 
country’s steel exports to the U.S. decline for two months following a one-standard deviation 
shock in the oil price variable. The decline is statistically significant and may be due to the 
very long downstream trade distance with the United States. The transport cost effect might 
be accelerated by underdeveloped infrastructure. The downturn in steel exports may be 
limited by solid market size and lower labour costs relative to the United States. 
Additionally, Ukrainian steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel export category in 
section 6.4.3.2. 
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6.2.3.4 Summary 
Steel exports to the U.S. decline in the three C.I.S. countries analysed following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock. Although there are differences in the length of the 
downturns, the impulse response estimates are at least partially statistically significant for all 
countries. 
The common trend in the impulse responses may be due to the similar profiles of the 
countries. Although their economies are in different stages of development, in terms of 
overall competitiveness, they are ranked in the middle section or lower middle section of the 
GCI of 2008/2009 (Kazakhstan: rank 66; Russia: rank 51; Kazakhstan: rank 72). Moreover, 
the infrastructure of the countries is relatively underdeveloped and downstream trade 
distances are large. The downturn in all C.I.S. states analysed may be dampened by steel 
making raw material abundance, lower labour costs relative to the U.S., and market size. 
The fact that Kazakhstan is most affected in terms of the statistical significance of the 
impulse estimates may be due to the country’s unfavorable geographical location which does 
not allow for direct maritime trade. However, the estimates for Kazakhstan may be biased by 
autocorrelation and therefore need to be interpreted with caution. 
Recapitulatory, the findings for the C.I.S. member countries are in line with the hypothesis 
that oil price shocks or rising (maritime) fuel costs lead to a regionalisation of trade flows 
and to a reduction of trade distances in the global steel industry. 
 
 
6.2.4 North America 
Section 6.2.4 analyses the econometric estimates for Canada (6.2.4.1), Costa Rica (6.2.4.2), 
the Dominican Republic (6.2.4.3), El Salvador (6.2.4.4), Guatemala (6.2.4.5), Honduras 
(6.2.4.6), Mexico (6.2.4.7), Panama (6.2.4.8), and Trinidad and Tobago (6.2.4.9). Section 
6.2.4.10 concludes. 
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Table 6.9 VEC Analysis – North America 
1 8,534.431 ***
2 2,488.029
3 6,254.213 *
4 3,350.379
5 315.480
Costa Rica 1 97.911 * 22.7 0.00
1 80.916
2 517.732 **
3 176.366
1 61.932
2 57.141
3 15.670
4 139.333 *
5 125.366
6 177.468 *
7 269.367 **
Guatemala 1 60.020 5.3 0.11
1 3.910
2 3.435
3 12.525 *
4 20.328 *
5 11.023
6 2.494
7 0.069
1 2,521.610
2 392.230
3 305.464
4 6,365.109
5 7,845.385 *
6 821.579
7 4,461.690
1 5.290
2 18.217
1 1,012.476 *
2 1.025
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Country
Time Period 
(months)
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
Canada 20.6 0.08
Dominican 
Republic
13.8 0.00
El Salvador 18.3 0.67
Honduras 7.3
Trinidad and 
Tobago
12.6 0.58
0.69
Mexico 14.5 0.53
Panama 14.3 0.00
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6.2.4.1 Canada 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Canadian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for five months. The impulse response peak is reached one 
month after the shock at 8,534qmt. The impulse response values for periods one (95% error 
bands) and three (68% error bands) are statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 20.6% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 10% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Canada is among the largest coking coal (2010: 27Mt) and iron ore (2008: 18,982tmt) net 
exporters worldwide. Therefore, the Canadian steel industry profits from steelmaking raw 
material abundance. 
Downstream trade distances for steel exports to the U.S. are comparatively short. 
Transporting steel from the Canadian west coast (Vancouver) to the U.S. West Coast (Long 
Beach) involves a short trade distance of 2,274km. Transporting steel from the Canadian east 
coast (Halifax) to the U.S. East Coast involves a very short trade distance of only 1,140km. 
Even steel exports from Canada’s east coast to the U.S. Gulf Coast (New Orleans) only 
involve a moderate trade distance (4,307km). Moreover, steel can be exported overland or 
via the Great Lakes. The multiple transport routes/options and the comparably short trade 
distances from Canada to the U.S. provide a considerable advantage over most countries 
exporting steel to the U.S., especially at high oil prices. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Canada is an industrialised country ranked 10th in the GCI of 2008/2009. Moreover, the 
country is in the top twenty in the rankings for overall infrastructure (rank 10), port 
infrastructure (rank 14), domestic market size (rank 13), and foreign market size (rank 15). 
With regard to labour costs, Canada is competitive in manufacturing wages ($22.40 vs. 
$21.50), has a moderate disadvantage in compensation costs in the fabricated product 
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manufacturing sector ($29.59 vs. $26.15), and a significant disadvantage in compensation 
costs in the primary metal manufacturing sector ($44.71 vs. $31.82). 
 
Conclusion 
Canada’s statistically significant increase of steel exports to the U.S. following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock is facilitated by steelmaking raw material abundance,  
short downstream trade distances, multiple transport routes/options, and a well-developed 
infrastructure. Moreover, Canada’s common border with the U.S., its NAFTA membership, 
common language and cultural affiliation should further increase the competitive position of 
the country’s steel industry when it comes to exports to the United States. Finally, Canada is 
competitive with the U.S. in terms of manufacturing wages and has only a marginal 
competitive labour cost disadvantage in the fabricated product manufacturing sector. Canada 
only has a labour cost disadvantage in the primary manufacturing sector. Additionally, 
Canadian steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel export category in section 6.4.4.1. 
 
6.2.4.2 Costa Rica 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Costa Rica’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month. The impulse response value (98qmt) is 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 22.7% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Costa Rica does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for 
steelmaking needs to be imported. No information is available for Costa Rica on iron ore 
production, imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. involves short trade distances if imports from the Gulf 
Coast arrive on Costa Rica’s east coast (2,495km). Importing iron ore from the second-
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largest exporting country Brazil, however, includes long-distance trade (7,791km). 
Alternatively, iron ore might also be imported from the net exporters Canada and the United 
States. It is unlikely that steelmaking raw materials are imported from remote Australia. 
Steel export trade distances to the U.S. Gulf Coast are short if exports are shipped from 
Costa Rica’s east coast (2,466km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Costa Rica is an industrialising country ranked 59th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country’s 
market size (domestic: rank 77; foreign: rank 75) is below average by international standards 
and its overall (rank 103) and port infrastructure (rank 128) are significantly underdeveloped. 
No data are available about Costa Rica’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation 
costs. However, it is expected that labour costs are lower in industrialising Costa Rica than in 
the industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant increase in Costa Rican steel exports to the U.S. following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock may be a combination of short upstream and downstream 
trade distances and low labour costs.  
In the competitiveness categories included in the analysis, Costa Rica performs below 
average by international standards. The low competitiveness in infrastructure and market 
size may prevent a more sustained increase of steel exports. 
 
6.2.4.3 Dominican Republic 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Dominican steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for three months. The impulse response peak is reached two 
months after the shock at 518qmt. The impulse response value for period two is statistically 
significant at 90% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 13.8% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. This indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is moderate. 
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Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
The Dominican Republic does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking 
coal used for steelmaking needs to be imported. No information is available for the 
Dominican Republic on iron ore production, imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. involves short trade distances (U.S. South Coast: 
3,071km; U.S. East Coast: 2,971km). Importing iron ore from the second-largest exporting 
country Brazil, however, includes a long trade distance (6,851km). Alternatively, iron ore 
might also be imported from the net exporters Canada and the United States. It is unlikely 
that steelmaking raw materials are imported from remote Australia. 
Steel export trade distances to the U.S. East Coast (3,061km) and Gulf Coast (3,042km) are 
short. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The Dominican Republic is an industrialising country ranked 98th in the GCI of 2008/2009. 
The Caribbean country is ranked below average in the sub-categories overall infrastructure 
(rank 75), port infrastructure (rank 74), domestic market size (rank 71) and foreign market 
size (rank 95). 
No data are available about the Dominic Republic’s manufacturing wages and hourly 
compensation costs. However, it is expected that labour costs are generally lower in the 
industrialising Dominican Republic than in the industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The increase in Dominican steel exports to the U.S. following a one-standard deviation oil 
price shock may be a combination of moderate upstream and short downstream trade 
distances and low labour costs.  
In the competitiveness categories included in the analysis, the Dominican Republic performs 
below average by international standards. 
It needs to be mentioned that the estimates for the Dominican Republic may be impacted by 
autocorrelation and should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
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6.2.4.4 El Salvador 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of El Salvador’s 
steel exports to the U.S. which lasts for seven months. The impulse response peak is reached 
seven months after the shock at 269qmt. The impulse response values for periods four (68% 
error bands), six (68% error bands), and seven (90% error bands) are statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 18.3% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable which indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
El Salvador does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for 
steel production needs to be imported. No information is available for El Salvador on iron 
ore production, imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. involves a moderate trade distance by international 
standards (U.S. South Coast: 4,450km). If iron ore imports are required, importing iron ore 
from the second-largest exporting country Brazil involves long-distance trade (9,488km). 
However, iron ore might also be imported from the U.S. or Canada. It is unlikely that 
steelmaking raw materials are imported from remote Australia. 
Steel export trade distances to the U.S. are moderate (U.S. West Coast: 4,054km; U.S. South 
Coast: 4,424km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
El Salvador is in the transition phase from a developing country to an industrialising country 
and is placed on position 79 in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is among the top 50 
nations in the overall infrastructure ranking (rank 48). Its rankings in terms of port 
infrastructure (rank 81), domestic market size (rank 76) and foreign market size (rank 95) are 
below average. 
No data are available about El Salvador’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation 
costs. However, it can be assumed that labour costs are lower in the developing country than 
in the industrialised United States. 
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Conclusion 
The partly statistically significant increase in El Salvadorian steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be a combination of moderate trade 
distances and low labour costs.  
In the competitiveness categories included in the analysis, El Salvador performs below 
average with the exception of overall infrastructure. 
 
6.2.4.5 Guatemala 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Guatemala’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month. The impulse response value is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 5.3% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. This indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable for 
the steel export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The Granger test results indicate that there is no Granger causality at the 1% 5% or 10% 
level. However, the p-value (0.11) for the GC test is almost significant at the 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Guatemala does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for 
steel production needs to be imported. No information is available for Guatemala on iron ore 
production, imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Guatemala’s east coast involves a short 
trade distance of 1,813km. Importing iron ore from the second-largest exporting country 
Brazil involves long-distance trade (8,734km). However, iron ore might also be imported 
from the U.S. or Canada. It is unlikely that steelmaking raw materials are imported from 
remote Australia. 
Steel export trade distances to the U.S. are very low by international standards if Guatemala 
exports steel from its east coast to the U.S. Gulf Coast (1,785km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Guatemala is in the transition phase from a developing country to an industrialising country 
and is placed 84th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is ranked average in the 
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competitiveness categories overall infrastructure (rank 63), port infrastructure (rank 63) and 
domestic market size (rank 68). The country performs below average in the foreign market 
size ranking (rank 96). 
No data are available about Guatemala’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation 
costs. However, it is likely that labour costs are lower in the developing country than in the 
industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The increase of Guatemala’s steel exports to the U.S. following a one-standard deviation oil 
price shock may be a combination of short/moderate upstream and downstream trade 
distances and low labour costs. However, the increase is short and statistically insignificant. 
This may, amongst other things, be due to the fact that in the competitiveness categories 
included in the analysis, Guatemala performs average or below average by international 
standards. 
 
6.2.4.6 Honduras 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Honduras’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for seven months. The impulse response peak is reached four 
months after the shock at 20qmt. The impulse response values for periods three and four are 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price contributes 7.3% of the volatility in the steel 
export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Honduras does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for 
steel production needs to be imported. No information is available for Honduras on iron ore 
production, imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Honduras’s east coast involves a very 
short trade distance of 1,859km. Importing iron ore from the second-largest exporting 
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country Brazil involves long-distance trade (8,468km). Alternatively, iron ore might also be 
imported from the U.S. or Canada. It is unlikely that steelmaking raw materials are imported 
from remote Australia. 
Steel export trade distances to the U.S. are very low if Honduras exports steel from its east 
coast to the U.S. Gulf Coast (1,833km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Honduras is a developing country placed 82nd in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the quality of 
the country’s overall infrastructure is below average (rank 72), the quality of its port 
infrastructure is above average (rank 36). The country’s domestic (rank 83) and foreign 
market size (rank 88) are ranked below average. 
No data are available for Honduras about manufacturing wages and hourly compensation 
costs. However, it is likely that labour costs are lower in the developing country than in the 
industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The partially statistically significant increase of Honduras’ steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be a combination of short upstream 
and downstream trade distances, solid port infrastructure, and low labour costs. 
It needs to be mentioned that the estimates for Honduras may be impacted by serial 
correlation and should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
 
6.2.4.7 Mexico 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Mexican steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for seven months. The impulse response peak is reached five 
months after the shock at 7,845qmt. The impulse response value for period five is 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 14.5% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Mexico produces coking coal domestically (2008: 2,286tst) and is a net importer of iron ore 
(2008; 1,923tmt). 
Importing iron ore from the second-largest iron ore exporter Brazil involves long-distance 
trade (9,871km). Therefore, it is possible that iron ore is also imported from the 
neighbouring United States. If coking coal needs to be imported, the distance of trade is very 
short when imports come from the U.S. Gulf Coast (1,591km). It is unlikely that significant 
amounts of coking coal or iron ore are imported from remote Australia. 
Downstream trade distances for steel exports to the U.S. are short/very short. Transporting 
steel from the Mexican west coast (Veracruz) to the U.S. West Coast (Long Beach) involves 
a short trade distance of 2,363km while transporting steel from the Mexican east coast 
(Manzanillo) to the U.S. Gulf Coast involves a very short trade distance of only 1,448km. 
Even steel exports from Mexico’s east coast to the U.S. East Coast (New York) only involve 
a short trade distance (3,866km). Moreover, steel can be exported to the U.S. by using 
overland transport. The multiple transport routes/options and the short trade distances from 
Mexico to the U.S. provide a considerable advantage over most countries exporting steel to 
the U.S., especially at high oil price levels. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Mexico is an industrialising country ranked 60th in the GCI of 2008/2009. Mexico is among 
the top twenty nations in terms of domestic (rank 12) and foreign market size (rank 16). The 
quality of Mexico’s overall (rank 76) and port infrastructure (rank 94) is below average by 
international standards. 
Mexico has a considerable comparative advantage over the U.S. in hourly compensation 
costs (primary metal manufacturing: $5.81 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: 
$3.39 vs. $26.15). No information is available about Mexican manufacturing wages but they 
are expected to be below U.S. manufacturing wages. 
 
Conclusion 
The partially statistically significant increase of Mexican steel exports to the U.S. may be 
due to short upstream and downstream trade distances, multiple transport routes/options, low 
labour costs, the common border with Maquiladoras operating in the border area, and the 
NAFTA membership. Additionally, Mexican steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel 
export category in section 6.4.4.2. 
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6.2.4.8 Panama 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Panama’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response peak is reached two 
months after the shock at 18qmt. The increase in steel exports is statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 14.3% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Panama does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for steel 
production needs to be imported. No information is available for Panama on iron ore 
production, imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. Gulf Coast involves a short trade distance of 2,741km if 
the imports arrive at Panama’s northern coast. If iron ore needs to be imported, imports from 
the second-largest exporting country Brazil involve long-distance trade (7,777km). However, 
iron ore might also be imported from the U.S. or Canada. It is unlikely that steelmaking raw 
materials are imported from remote Australia. 
Steel export trade distances to the U.S. are short if Panama exports steel from its northern 
coast to the U.S. Gulf Coast (2,713km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Panama is an industrialising country placed 58th in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the quality 
of its overall infrastructure is average (rank 54), Panama’s port infrastructure is well-
developed (rank 15). The country’s domestic market size (rank 73) is average by 
international standards. Its foreign market size is below average (rank 92). 
No data are available about Panama’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
However, it is expected that labour costs are lower in the industrialising country than in the 
industrialised United States. 
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Conclusion 
The statistically insignificant increase of Panama’s steel exports to the U.S. following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock may be a combination of moderate upstream and 
downstream trade distances, good port infrastructure, and low labour costs. The 
insignificance of the increase may, amongst other things, be due to underdeveloped overall 
infrastructure and the inabaility to generate economies of scale because of low market size.  
 
6.2.4.9 Trinidad and Tobago 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a positive response in Trinidad 
and Tobago’s steel exports to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response 
peak is reached one month after the shock at 1,012qmt. The impulse response value for 
period one is statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 12.6% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Trinidad and Tobago does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal 
used for steel production needs to be imported. The country also imports significant amounts 
of iron ore (2008: 4,252tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. East Coast involves short-distance trade (3,721km). 
Importing iron ore from the second-largest exporting country Brazil involves moderate-
distance trade (5,691km). Alternatively, iron ore might also be imported from the U.S. or 
Canada. It is unlikely that steelmaking raw materials are imported from remote Australia. 
Steel export trade distances to the U.S. are short if Trinidad and Tobago exports steel to the 
U.S. East Coast (3,955km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Trinidad and Tobago is placed 92nd in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the quality of the 
country’s overall infrastructure is average by international standards (rank 60) its port 
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infrastructure is underdeveloped (rank 89) and its domestic (rank 86) and foreign market size 
(rank 112) are quite small. 
No data are available about Trinidad and Tobago’s manufacturing wages and hourly 
compensation costs. It can be assumed that labour costs are lower in the industrialising 
country than in the industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant increase of Trinidad and Tobago’s steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be a combination of moderate 
upstream and downstream trade distances and low labour costs. 
A stronger increase of steel exports to the U.S. may, amongst other things, be hampered by 
underdeveloped infrastructure and low market size. 
 
6.2.4.10 Summary 
The steel export volumes to the U.S. of the nine North American countries all increase 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock. In seven of nine cases, the increase is 
statistically significant. Thereby, the upstream trade distances for the import of steelmaking 
raw materials and downstream trade distances for the export of steel products to the U.S. are 
mostly short or moderate. 
Comparing the impulse response estimates for both neighbouring countries of the U.S., 
Canada and Mexico reveals the following: Although the increase of Mexican steel exports to 
the U.S. lasts longer, the Canadian impulse response estimate consists of more statistically 
significant impulse response values. 
Both countries have common borders with the U.S., are NAFTA members, and are among 
the top twenty nations in terms of market size (domestic: rank 13 (Canada) vs. rank 12 
(Mexico); foreign: rank 15 (Canada) vs. rank 16 (Mexico).  
However, while industrialising Mexico has a significant comparative advantage over 
industrialised Canada in terms of labour costs (primary metal manufacturing: $5.81 vs. 
$44.71; fabricated product manufacturing: $3.39 vs. $29.59), Canada has advantages in 
terms of steelmaking raw material abundance, infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 10 
(Canada) vs. rank 76 (Mexico); port infrastructure: rank 14 (Canada) vs. rank 94 (Mexico)), 
and overall competitiveness (rank 10 (Canada) vs. rank 60 (Mexico)). 
It seems that Canada’s advantages in raw material abundance, infrastructure and overall 
competitiveness may outbalance Mexico’s comparative advantage of labour costs. 
Additionally, it would be interesting to compare the composition of exports (high-value vs. 
low-value products) of both countries to estimate whether the value of steel products 
exported does make a difference. 
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With regard to the other North American countries analysed, the following can be said: All 
countries other than Canada and Mexico (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago) are developing or industrialising 
countries with small economies. 
All countries are ranked average or below average in the competitiveness rankings used for 
analysis (overall competitiveness: rank 58-98; overall infrastructure: rank 54-103; port 
infrastructure: rank 63-128 [exceptions: Honduras: rank 36; Panama: rank 15]; domestic 
market size: rank 68-112; foreign market size: rank 73-96). However, it seems that the 
combination of low labour costs and short/medium upstream and downstream trade distances 
at high oil prices is strong enough to outbalance the rather low international competitiveness 
of the small North American economies. 
Recapitulatory, the findings for the North American countries included in the analysis are in 
line with the hypothesis that oil price shocks or rising (maritime) fuel costs lead to a 
regionalisation of trade flows and a reduction of trade distances in the global steel industry. 
 
6.2.5 South America 
Section 6.2.5 analyses the econometric estimates for Argentina (6.2.5.1), Brazil (6.2.5.2), 
Chile (6.2.5.3), Colombia (6.2.5.4), Ecuador (6.2.5.5), Peru (6.2.5.6), and Uruguay (6.2.5.7). 
Section 6.2.5.8 concludes. 
Table 6.10 VEC Analysis - South America 
Argentina 1 -387.090 7.9 0.10
Brazil 1 1,151.662 11.0 0.26
1 541.961
2 919.474
3 1,590.101
4 525.688
5 1,768.352 *
1 261.985 *
2 284.708 *
Ecuador 1 -6.116 10.6 0.66
Peru 1 7.936 17.8 0.87
1 -5.291
2 -11.868
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
Chile 5.0 0.83
Colombia 29.5 0.04
Uruguay 1.0 0.02
Country
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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6.2.5.1 Argentina 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Argentinian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (-387qmt). The decrease is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 7.9% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. This indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable for 
the steel export variable is low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The Granger test results indicate that there is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% 
level. However, the p-value (0.104) of the Granger causality test is nearly significant at the 
10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Argentina produces coking coal domestically (2008: 2,199tst). The South American country 
imports significant amounts of iron ore (2008: 7,176tmt). 
Importing iron ore from neighbouring Brazil involves short-distance trade (2,580km). 
Alternatively, overland transport could also be used for iron ore imports from Brazil. In case 
of coking coal imports, importing from the U.S. would involve very long-distance trade 
(11,258km). It is unlikely that significant amounts of steelmaking raw materials are imported 
from remote Australia. Steel export trade distances to the U.S. are very long if Argentina 
exports steel to the U.S. East Coast (11,352km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Argentina is an industrialising country placed 88th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is 
ranked above average in terms of domestic (rank 21) and foreign market size (rank 38) but 
its infrastructure is underdeveloped (overall infrastructure: rank 89; port infrastructure: rank 
92). 
Argentina has a comparative advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing wages ($5.47 vs. 
$21.50) and hourly compensation costs (primary metal manufacturing: $11.73 vs. $31.82; 
fabricated product manufacturing: $6.50 vs. $26.15). 
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Conclusion 
The short and statistically insignificant decline of Argentinian steel exports to the U.S. may, 
amongst other things, be due to long downstream trade distances and the country’s 
underdeveloped infrastructure. The decline may be limited by domestic coking coal 
production, short trade distances for iron ore imports, and low labour costs. 
 
6.2.5.2 Brazil 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Brazilian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (1,151qmt). The increase is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 11% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level.  
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Although Brazil produces coking coal domestically (2008: 9,133tst), the country is one of 
the largest importers of coking coal (2006: 19Mt). On the other hand, Brazil is the second-
largest exporter of iron ore worldwide. 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. East Coast involves moderate-distance trade if the port 
of destination is on Brazil’s northern coast (5,780km) and long-distance trade if the port of 
destination is on Brazil’s eastern coast (9,156km). Importing coking coal from Australia to 
Brazil`s east coast involves very long-distance trade (16,480km). 
Exporting steel to the U.S. involves moderate-distance trade if the port of departure is 
located on Brazil’s northern coastline and the port of arrival is located on the U.S. East Coast 
(5,876km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Brazil is an industrialising country placed 64th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is 
among the top ten nations in terms of domestic market size (rank 9) and quite competitive in 
terms of foreign market size (rank 23). Brazil’s infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 98; 
port infrastructure: rank 123) is severely underdeveloped. 
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The country has a comparative advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing wages ($3.81 vs. 
$21.50) and hourly compensation costs (primary metal manufacturing: $12.27 vs. $31.82; 
fabricated product manufacturing: $5.95 vs. $26.15). 
 
Conclusion 
The increase of Brazilian steel exports to the U.S. may be due to domestic iron ore 
availability, moderate upstream (coking coal) and downstream (steel exports to the U.S.) 
trade distances, low labour costs, and relatively large market size making possible economies 
of scale if the steel industry is not too fragmented. One factor contributing to the shortness 
and statistical insignificance of the increase may be the drastically underdeveloped 
infrastructure of the country. Additionally, Brazilian steel exports to the U.S. are analysed 
per steel export category in section 6.4.5. 
 
6.2.5.3 Chile 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Chile’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for five months. The impulse response peak is reached five 
months after the shock at 1,768qmt. The impulse response value for period five is 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 5% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Chile produces coking coal domestically (2008: 547tst) and is a significant exporter of iron 
ore (2008: 5,400tmt). In case additional coking coal needs to be imported, imports from the 
U.S. Gulf Coast involve long-distance trade (7,849km) and imports from Australia involve 
very long-distance trade (12,642km). Steel exports to the U.S. Gulf Coast involve long-
distance trade (7,756km). 
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Competitiveness Analysis 
Chile is in the transition phase from an industrialising to an industrialised country and is 
placed 28th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is among the top 50 nations in terms of 
domestic (rank 47) and foreign market size (rank 43) and is quite competitive in terms of 
overall (rank 29) and port infrastructure (rank 37). 
No data are available about Chile’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
However, it is likely that labour costs are lower in industrialising Chile than in the 
industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
Chile’s partially statistical significant increase in steel exports to the U.S. following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock may be fostered by relative domestic steelmaking raw 
material abundance, low labour costs, and overall competitiveness. 
 
6.2.5.4 Colombia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Colombian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response peak is reached two 
months after the shock at 285qmt. The impulse response values for periods one and two are 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 29.5% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. This means that the relative importance of the oil price variable for 
the steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 5% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Colombia produces coking coal domestically (2008: 547tst) and is one of the most 
significant exporters of coking coal (2010: 1Mt). No data are available for Colombian iron 
ore imports or exports. In 2008, Colombian iron ore production was 900tmt. By and large, 
the Colombian steel industry profits from steelmaking raw material abundance. 
In addition to domestic production, iron ore might be imported from neighbouring Brazil. 
This would involve long-distance trade if the iron ore would be transported by sea from 
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Brazil’s east coast (7,791km). Alternatively, imports from Brazil might be transported 
overland. Iron ore may also be imported from the United States.  
Exporting steel from Colombia to the U.S. involves short-distance trade if the steel products 
are exported to the U.S. Gulf Coast (2,763km) or to the U.S. East Coast (3,653km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Colombia is an industrialising country placed 74th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country is 
among the top 30 nations in terms of domestic market size (rank 30) and is ranked above 
average in terms of foreign market size (rank 54). Colombia’s infrastructure (overall 
infrastructure: rank 84; port infrastructure: rank 108) is underdeveloped. 
No data are available about Colombian manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
However, it is likely that labour costs are lower in industrialising Colombia than in the 
industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant increase of Colombian steel exports to the U.S. following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock is likely to be facilitated by steelmaking raw material 
abundance, short downstream trade distances and low labour costs. 
The significantly underdeveloped infrastructure may be one factor preventing a stronger 
increase of steel exports to the United States. 
 
6.2.5.5 Ecuador 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Ecuadorian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (-6qmt). The decrease is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 10.6% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Ecuador does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used in the 
steel production process needs to be imported. No information is available for Ecuador’s iron 
ore production, imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. Gulf Coast involves moderate trade distances 
(4,130km). Alternatively, coking coal might also be imported from neighbouring Colombia. 
Importing iron ore from the second-largest exporter Brazil involves long-distance trade 
(9,167km). Alternatively, iron ore might also be imported from the United States. It is rather 
unlikely that significant amounts of coking coal or iron ore are imported from remote 
Australia. 
Exporting steel from Ecuador to the U.S. involves a moderate trade distance if the steel 
products are exported to the U.S. Gulf Coast (4,104km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Ecuador is an industrialising country placed 104th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country’s 
market size (domestic: rank 59; foreign: rank 72) is average international standards. 
Ecuador’s overall (rank 105) and port infrastructure (rank 109) is significantly 
underdeveloped. 
No data are available about Ecuadorian manufacturing wages and hourly compensation 
costs. However, it is expected that labour costs are lower in industrialising Ecuador than in 
the industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
Ecuador’s short and statistically insignificant decrease of steel exports to the U.S. may be 
fostered by steelmaking resource scarcity, the country’s overall un-competitiveness, and the 
underdeveloped infrastructure. 
The decrease of steel exports may be relatively short and statistically insignificant because of 
short/moderate upstream and downstream trade distances and low labour costs. 
 
6.2.5.6 Peru 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Peru’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (8qmt). This increase in steel exports is 
statistically insignificant. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 17.8% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable which means that the relative importance of the oil price variable for 
the steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Peru does not produce coking coal domestically (Peru produced coking coal domestically 
until 2006 (53tst). However, Peru did not produce coking coal in 2007 and 2008.). Therefore, 
the coking coal used for steelmaking needs to be imported. Peru is a significant exporter of 
iron ore (2008: 7,200tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the U.S. Gulf Coast involves moderate trade distances 
(5,347km). Alternatively, coking coal might also be imported from neighbouring Colombia 
by sea or by using overland transport. It is rather unlikely that Peru imports significant 
amounts of coking coal from remote Australia. 
Exporting steel from Peru to the U.S. involves moderate-distance trade if the steel products 
are exported to the U.S. Gulf Coast (5,318km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Peru is an industrialising country placed 88th in the GCI of 2008/2009. While Peru’s overall 
(rank 113) and port infrastructure (rank 127) is dramatically underdeveloped, it consists of a 
solid domestic (rank 45) and foreign market size (rank 55). 
No data are available about Peru’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
However, it is expected that labour costs are lower in industrialising Peru than in the 
industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
Peru’s short increase in steel exports to the U.S. following a one-standard deviation oil price 
shock may be due to relative steelmaking raw material abundance, moderate upstream and 
downstream trade distances, low labour costs and solid market size. 
One reason contributing to the shortness and insignificance of the increase may be the 
country’s massively underdeveloped infrastructure. 
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6.2.5.7 Uruguay 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Uruguay’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The peak of the decline is reached after two 
months at -12qmt. The decline is statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 1% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is very low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 5% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Uruguay does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for 
steel production needs to be imported. No data are available for Uruguay on iron ore 
production, imports or exports.  
Importing coking coal from the U.S. East Coast (11,043km) or Australia (15,079km) 
involves very long trade distances while iron ore imports from neighbouring Brazil involves 
short-distance trade (2,365km). 
Exporting steel from Uruguay to the U.S. East Coast (11,138km) involves very long distance 
trade. 
 
Competitivenes Analysis  
Uruguay is an industrialising country placed 75th in the GCI of 2008/2009. While Uruguay’s 
overall (rank 66) and port infrastructure (rank 50) is ranked average, its market size is below 
average (domestic: rank 87; foreign: rank 94) by international standards. 
No data are available about Uruguay’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
It can be expected that labour costs are lower in industrialising Uruguay than in the 
industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The two-month decrease of steel exports from Uruguay to the U.S. following a one-standard 
deviation oil price shock may be due to very long upstream (coking coal) and downstream 
trade distances. The downturn may be comparatively short and statistically insignificant 
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because of low upstream trade distances for iron ore, low labour costs, and the country’s 
solid infrastructure. 
 
6.2.5.8 Summary 
The seven South American countries included in the analysis have the following in common: 
They are all industrialising countries, have a comparative advantage over the United States 
in terms of labour costs, and are not landlocked. 
At first view the impulse response estimates of the South American countries appear to be 
quite different. While the impulse responses estimates of four countries indicate increasing 
steel exports to the U.S., the estimates for three countries indicate decreasing steel exports. 
Thereby, none of the decreasing impulse response estimates is statistically significant, while 
the impulse response estimates indicating increasing steel exports are statistically significant 
for Colombia and Chile. 
The Colombian steel industry profits from steelmaking raw material abundance and the 
shortest downstream trade distance to the U.S. of all South American countries analysed. 
Chile’s steel industry also profits from steelmaking raw material abundance but - other than 
Colombia - faces long downstream trade distances to the United States. This disadvantage of 
long downstream trade distances seems to be counterbalanced by the outstanding overall 
competitiveness of its economy (rank 28) by South American standards. In terms of overall 
competitiveness the performance of the other South American countries is well below 
Chilean standards (ranks 64-104). In terms of overall (rank 29) and port infrastructure (rank 
37), Chile also performs significantly better than the other countries (overall infrastructure: 
ranks 66-113; port infrastructure: ranks 50-127). Chile’s competitiveness may contribute to 
the partially statistically significant increase of its steel exports to the United States. 
Besides Colombia and Chile, two other countries located on the South American west coast 
are analysed. Both Ecuador and Peru do not profit significantly from increasing oil prices in 
terms of steel exports to the United States. While Ecuador’s steel exports decrease 
marginally, Peru’s steel exports increase marginally. Both countries are not resource 
abundant and are less competitive (Ecuador: rank 104; Peru: rank 83) than Colombia (rank 
74) and Chile (rank: 28). More specifically, the infrastructure of Ecuador and Peru is also 
less competitive than the infrastructure of Chile and Colombia. It may be that for those 
reasons, Chile and Colombia profit from a shock in the oil price variable while Ecuador and 
Peru do not. 
Three countries are located on South America’s eastern coastline, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Uruguay. The impulse responses for the two large economies on the eastern coastline, 
Argentina and Brazil, have opposing trends. While steel exports from Brazil to the U.S. 
increase for one month following an oil price shock, steel exports from Argentina decrease 
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for one month. Thereby, both impulse response estimates are statistically insignificant. There 
are several reasons why the Brazilian steel industry may perform better than the Argentinian 
steel industry with regard to steel exports to the United States. First, Brazil has a favorable 
geographical position. Exporting steel from Brazil’s northern coast to the U.S. East Coast 
involves only moderate downstream trade distances while exporting from Brazil’s eastern 
coast involves long-distance trade. On the other hand, exporting from Argentina’s eastern 
coast to the U.S. involves very long-distance trade. At high oil price levels, transport 
distance can make the difference between increasing and decreasing export figures. Second, 
Brazil is better off than Argentina in terms of steelmaking raw material abundance. Third, 
Brazil performs better than Argentina in terms of overall competitiveness (rank 64 vs. rank 
88) and market size (domestic: rank 9 vs. rank 21; foreign: rank 23 vs. rank 38). Argentina 
performs better in terms of infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 89 vs. rank 98; port 
infrastructure: rank 92 vs. rank 123).  
For Uruguay, which is geographically located between Argentina and Brazil, the decline in 
steel exports to the U.S. is somewhat longer but also statistically insignificant. The country 
faces the same disadvantages as Argentina when compared to Brazil in terms of trade 
distance, raw material abundance, overall competitiveness, and market size. One possible 
reason for the longer downturn of Uruguay’s steel exports may be an edge of the Argentinian 
and Brazilian steel industries with regard to economies of scale. 
Recapitulatory, it seems that the steel industries of the South American countries 
geographically located at South America’s northern coast (Colombia, Brazil) profit from 
moderate export trade distances to the U.S. at high oil price levels while the countries located 
further down along South America’s east coast suffer from very long distance trade 
(Argentina, Uruguay). The steel industries of countries located on the northern part of South 
America’s west coast (Ecuador, Peru) seemingly neither profit nor suffer from rising oil 
prices. At the same time, the steel industry of Chile, which is located on the southern part of 
South America’s west coast, profits significantly, mainly due to its superior overall 
competitiveness in relation to the other South American countries. 
By and large, the findings for the South American countries included in the analysis are in 
line with the hypothesis that oil price shocks or rising maritime fuel costs lead to a 
regionalisation of trade flows and to a reduction of long-distance trade in the global steel 
industry.  
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6.2.6 Africa 
Section 6.2.6 analyses the econometric estimates for Algeria (6.2.6.1), Egypt (6.2.6.2) and  
South Africa (6.2.6.3). Section 6.2.6.4 concludes. 
 
6.2.6.1 Algeria 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Algerian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (-869qmt) and is statistically significant at 68% 
error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 21.8% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. This indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Algeria produces coking coal domestically (2008: 684tst). In addition to its domestic 
production (2008: 1,700tmt), the North African country requires additional imports of iron 
ore (2008: 213tst). 
Table 6.11 VEC Analysis - Africa 
 
Algeria 1 -869.301 * 21.8 0.28
Egypt 1 -2,675.453 * 27.8 0.16
1 -2,644.455 *
2 -837.055
3 -1,792.707 *
4 -1,714.865
5 -2,697.606 *
6 -1,060.836
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
South Africa 14.5 0.40
Country
Time Period 
(months)
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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Importing iron ore from one of the largest exporting countries involves long/very long-
distance trade (Australia: 14,820km; Brazil: 8,427km). Importing coking coal in addition to 
national production would also involve long/very long trade distances (Australia: 19,142km; 
U.S. East Coast: 7,280km). 
Exporting steel from Algeria to the U.S. East Coast also involves long-distance trade 
(6,907km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Algeria is an industrialising country placed 99th in the GCI of 2008/2009. While Algeria’s 
infrastructure is underdeveloped (overall infrastructure: rank 85; port infrastructure: rank 
103), its market size is above average (domestic: rank 52; foreign: rank 41). 
No data are available about Algeria’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
It is likely that labour costs are lower in industrialising Algeria than in the industrialised 
United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant downturn of Algerian steel exports to the U.S. following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock may be facilitated by long downstream trade distances and 
underdeveloped infrastructure. 
The long or very long trade distances involved in importing steelmaking raw materials can 
be balanced to a certain extent by domestic production. Finally, the decrease of steel exports 
might be confined by a comparative advantage in labour costs in relation to the United 
States. 
 
6.2.6.2 Egypt 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of Egyptian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (-2,675qmt) and is statistically significant at 
68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 27.8% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is high. 
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Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Egypt produces coking coal domestically (2008: 1,620tst). In addition to its domestic 
production (2008: 2,000tmt), Egypt requires additional iron ore imports (2008: 3,562tst). 
Importing iron ore from one of the largest exporting countries involves very long distance 
trade (Australia: 12,238km; Brazil: 11,045km). If coking coal imports would be necessary in 
addition to national production, long/very long trade distances (Australia: 16,559km; U.S. 
East Coast: 9,899km) would be involved. 
Exporting steel from Egypt to the U.S. also involves long-distance trade (U.S. East Coast: 
6,907km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Egypt is a developing country placed 81st in the GCI of 2008/2009. The Egyptian steel 
industry can resort to a solid infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 57; port 
infrastructure: rank 69) and the country’s market size is well above average (domestic: rank 
22; foreign: rank 36). 
No data are available about Egypt’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. It 
is expected that labour costs are lower in developing Egypt than in the industrialised United 
States. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant downturn of Egyptian steel exports to the U.S. following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock may be facilitated by long and very long upstream and 
downstream trade distances. 
The decrease of steel exports to the U.S. might be confined by a comparative labour cost 
advantage over the U.S., and by Egypt’s market size which is above average and might help 
to generate economies of scale if the national steel industry is not too fragmented. 
 
6.2.6.3 South Africa 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of South African steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for six months. The impulse response peak is reached five 
months after the shock at -2,698qmt. The impulse response values for periods one, three, and 
five are statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 14.5% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable which indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
South Africa is one of the largest exporters of coking coal (2008: 1Mt) and iron ore (2008: 
31,592tmt). Therefore, its steel industry has a comparative advantage due to raw material 
abundance. 
Exporting steel from South Africa to the U.S. East Coast involves very long distance trade 
(14,627km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
South Africa is an industrialising country placed on position 45 in the GCI of 2008/2009. 
The country is ranked in the top fifty in terms of overall (rank 46) and port infrastructure 
(rank 49). South Africa’s domestic (rank 22) and foreign market size (rank 36) is well above 
average. 
No data are available about South African manufacturing wages and hourly compensation 
costs. It can be assumed that labour costs are lower in the industrialising country than in the 
industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant downturn of South African steel exports to the U.S. in reaction to 
a one-standard deviation oil price shock lasts for six months. The main reason for the steel 
export reduction may be very long downstream trade distances between South Africa and the 
United States. 
It seems that South Africa’s competitiveness in infrastructure and market size and its 
comparative advantages due to steelmaking raw material abundance and low labour costs 
cannot counterbalance the negative impact of very long downstream trade distances at high 
oil price levels. Additionally, South African steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel 
export category in section 6.4.6. 
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6.2.6.4 Summary 
Steel export volumes to the U.S. decline for the three African countries included in the 
analysis as a reaction to a one-standard deviation oil price shock. The reduction in steel 
exports is statistically significant for any of the countries analysed. 
One of the main reasons for the declining steel export volumes seem to be long (Algeria, 
Egypt) and very long (South Africa) downstream trade distances.  
The findings for the African countries included in the analysis are in line with the hypothesis 
that oil price shocks or rising maritime fuel costs lead to a regionalisation of trade flows and 
to a reduction of trade distances in the global economy. 
 
6.2.7 Middle East 
Section 6.2.7 analyses the econometric estimates for Israel (6.2.7.1), Saudi Arabia (6.2.7.2),  
Turkey (6.2.7.3) and the United Arab Emirates (6.2.7.4). Section 6.2.7.5 concludes. 
 
6.2.7.1 Israel 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Israel’s steel exports 
to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response peak is reached one month 
after the shock at -481qmt. The impulse response values are statistically insignificant. 
Table 6.12 VEC Analysis - Middle East 
1 -481.493
2 -275.161
Saudi Arabia 1 -594.453 * 13.2 0.44
1 -8,277.603 *
2 -20,190.660 ***
3 -21,756.740 ***
4 -24,114.930 ***
5 -14,301.120 **
6 -10,558.410 *
7 -705.093
1 60.227
2 61.517
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
Israel 15.5 0.31
Turkey 38.1 0.38
United Arab 
Emirates
12.7 0.00
Time Period 
(months)
Country
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 15.5% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Israel does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used in the steel 
production process needs to be imported. No data are available for Israeli iron ore 
production, imports, or exports. 
Importing coking coal from one of the largest exporting countries involves very long trade 
distances (Australia: 16,611km; U.S. East Coast: 10,334km). If iron ore needs to be imported 
from one of the most significant exporting countries, the distance of trade would be very 
long as well (Australia: 12,290km; Brazil: 11,481km). 
Exporting steel from Israel to the U.S. involves long-distance trade (U.S. East Coast: 
9,961km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Israel is an industrialised country ranked 23rd in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country’s 
infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 42; port infrastructure: rank 53) and market size 
(domestic: rank 48; foreign: rank 50) are above average by international standards. 
Israel has a comparative advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing wages ($12.52 vs. 
$21.50) and hourly compensation costs (primary metal manufacturing: $13.20 vs. $31.82; 
fabricated product manufacturing: $12.38 vs. $26.15). 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically insignificant downturn of Israeli steel exports to the U.S. as a reaction to a 
one-standard deviation oil price shock lasts for two months and may be due to very long 
upstream and downstream trade distances.  
The statistical insignificance of the downturn may amongst other things be due to Israel’s 
comparative advantage in labour costs over the United States. 
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6.2.7.2 Saudi Arabia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Saudi Arabian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (-594qmt). The impulse response value is 
statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 13.2% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Saudi Arabia does not produce coking coal domestically. Hence, the coking coal used for 
steel production needs to be imported. Additionally, the Saudi Arabian steel industry also 
depends on iron ore imports (2008: 7,638tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the most significant exporting countries involves very long 
distance trade (Australia: 15,060km; U.S. East Coast: 11,445km). The same applies for iron 
ore imports from the main exporting countries (Australia: 10,740km; Brazil: 12,592km). 
Exporting steel products from Saudi Arabia to the U.S. East Coast involves very long trade 
distances as well (11,073km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Saudi Arabia is in the transition phase from a developing to an industrialising country. The 
country was placed 27th in GCI of 2008/2009. The quality of Saudi Arabia’s overall (rank 
38) and port infrastructure (rank 45) is above average. The country is among the top thirty 
nations in terms of domestic (rank 21) and foreign market size (rank 26). 
No data are available about Saudi Arabian manufacturing wages and hourly compensation 
costs. 
 
Conclusion 
The short statistically significant downturn of Saudi Arabian steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may amongst other things be due to very 
long upstream and downstream trade distances. 
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The impact of the oil price shock may be reduced by the country’s overall competitiveness, 
solid infrastructure, significant market size, and probably lower labour costs (no information 
is available for Saudi Arabian labour costs). 
 
6.2.7.3 Turkey 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decline of Turkish steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for seven months. The impulse response peak is reached four 
months after the shock at -24,115qmt. The impulse response values for periods one (68% 
error bands), two, three, four (95% error bands), five (90% error bands), and six (68% error 
bands) are statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 38.2% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is very high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Turkey produces coking coal domestically (2008: 4,382tst). At the same time, the country is 
one of the largest coking coal exporters worldwide (2010: 7Mt). Although Turkey produces 
iron ore domestically (2008: 3,700tmt), it needs to import significant amounts of iron ore 
(2008: 6,900tmt). 
Very long trade distances are involved when the main steelmaking raw materials coking coal 
(Australia: 17,813km; U.S. East Coast: 9,938km) and iron ore (Australia: 13,490km; Brazil: 
11,086km) are imported from the main exporters. 
Exporting steel products from Turkey to the U.S. East Coast involves long-distance trade 
(9,567km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Turkey is in the transition phase from an industrialising country to an industrialised country 
and is placed 63rd in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the Turkish economy is among the top 
fifteen economies in terms of domestic market size (rank 15) it is ranked 25th in terms of 
foreign market size. The quality of Turkey’s overall (rank 70) and port infrastructure (rank 
88) is below average by international standards. 
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No data are available about Turkish manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
However, it is likely that labour costs are lower in industrialising Turkey than in the 
industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant seven-month long reduction of Turkish steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be facilitated by very long upstream 
and long downstream trade distances and by Turkey’s underdeveloped port infrastructure. 
It seems that Turkey’s international competitiveness in market size and low labour costs stop 
short of counterbalancing the negative impacts of the interplay between rising oil prices, 
very long trade distances and underdeveloped port infrastructure. Additionally, Turkish steel 
exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel export category in section 6.4.7. 
 
6.2.7.4 United Arab Emirates 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of the United Arab 
Emirates’ (UAE) steel exports to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response 
peak is reached two months after the shock at 62qmt. The impulse response values are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 12.7% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
The UAE do not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for steel 
production needs to be imported. The UAE also imports iron ore for steel production (2008: 
300tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the main exporting countries involves very long distance trade 
(Australia: 13,736km; U.S. East Coast: 15,594km). Importing iron ore also involves 
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long/very long distance trade if imports come from the largest iron ore exporters Australia 
(8,945km) or Brazil (15,636km). 
Exporting steel products from the UAE to the U.S. East Coast also involves very long 
distance trade (15,316km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The UAE are industrialised and are placed 31st in the GCI of 2008/2009. While their 
domestic market size is rather average by international standards (rank 55), the UAE’s 
foreign market size (rank 32) is above average. Moreover, the infrastructure of the UAE is 
very well developed (overall infrastructure: rank 11; port infrastructure: rank 8). No data are 
available about the UAE’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation costs. 
 
Conclusion 
Steel export volumes from the UAE to the U.S. increase for two months following a one-
standard deviation shock in real oil prices. Very long upstream and downstream trade 
distances seem to be counterbalanced to a certain extent by the country’s very good 
infrastructure and its overall competitiveness by international standards. Maybe other factors 
not included in the analysis are also at play. For example, the composition of steel exports 
may play are role. Due to the fact that the UAE are industrialised and internationally 
competitive, the steel product mix of the UAE may be dominated by high-value products. 
The relative share of transport costs to final selling prices for high-value steel products may 
be relatively lower than for low-value products thus making high-value products less 
vulnerable to rising transport costs. 
 
6.2.7.5 Summary 
Steel exports to the U.S. decrease in three of four Middle Eastern countries included in the 
analysis (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) following a one-standard deviation oil price shock 
while export figures from the UAE increase marginally. 
The main reason for this trend may be long/very long upstream and downstream trade 
distances and steelmaking raw material scarcity. However, industrialised Israel and UAE are 
relatively less affected than industrialising Saudi Arabia and Turkey. While the impulse 
response estimates for Israel and the UAE are statistically insignificant, the downturn in 
Saudi Arabian and Turkish steel exports to the U.S. is statistically significant. 
One reason for the ability of Israel and the UAE to absorb an oil price shock in connection 
with very long distance trade relatively better than Saudi Arabia and Turkey may be the 
composition of steel exports. The composition of export products may be dominated by 
high-value steel products which should be relatively less affected by rising transport costs 
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than low-value steel products. On the other hand, a relatively high share of low-value steel 
products in Saudi Arabian and Turkish steel export portfolios might facilitate the reduction 
of steel exports to the United States. 
Turkish steel exports to the U.S. seem to be significantly more affected than Saudi Arabian 
export volumes. One reason for this may be the superior Saudi infrastructure in comparison 
with Turkey (overall infrastructure: rank 38 vs. rank 70; port infrastructure: rank 45 vs. rank 
88). However, additional factors may also play a role. 
By and large, the findings for the Middle Eastern countries included in the analysis are in 
line with the hypothesis that oil price shocks or rising maritime fuel costs lead to a 
regionalisation of trade flows and to a reduction of trade distances in the global steel 
industry. 
 
 
6.2.8 Asia 
Section 6.2.8 analyses the econometric estimates for China (6.2.8.1), Hong Kong (6.2.8.2),  
India (6.2.8.3), Indonesia (6.2.8.4), Japan (6.2.8.5), Malaysia (6.2.8.6), the Philippines 
(6.2.8.7), Singapore (6.2.8.8), South Korea (6.2.8.9), Taiwan (6.2.8.10), and Thailand 
(6.2.8.11). Section 6.2.8.12 concludes. 
 
Table 6.13 VEC Analysis - Asia 
1 -7,390.733 *
2 -10,899.180 **
3 -3,989.527
4 -8,208.049 *
5 -7,856.081
6 -1,499.027
1 -456.020 *
2 -108.687
3 -232.930
4 -7.064
1 -3,396.760 *
2 -1,602.996
3 -500.945
1 -339.700
2 -386.119
3 -654.063
China 7.1 0.00
Country
Time Period 
(months)
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
Hong Kong 5.7 0.42
India 12.0 0.23
Indonesia 29.1 0.10
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6.2.8.1 China 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Chinese steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for six months. The impulse response peak is reached two 
months after the shock at -10,899qmt. The impulse response values for periods one (68% 
error bands), two (90% error bands), and four (68% error bands) are statistically significant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 7.1% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 1% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
  
VEC Analysis - Asia (continued)
Japan 1 -752.057 28.8 0.37
Malaysia 1 5.821 12.4 0.02
Philippines 1 67.280 9.7 0.06
Singapore 1 183.126 3.3 0.06
1 -1,752.367
2 -764.120
1 -1,988.936
2 -1,071.379
3 -2,136.850
4 -3,918.874
1 -1,954.154
2 -722.793
3 -1,113.020
4 -293.480
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Country
Time Period 
(months)
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
South Korea 9.0 0.12
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
Taiwan 8.6 0.57
Thailand 6.6 0.41
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Although China produces large volumes of coking coal domestically (2008: 353,086tst), it 
has become a very significant net importer of coking coal in recent years. While China 
imported 1Mt in 2005, net imports increased to 7Mt in 2008 and to 38Mt in 2011. The 
country will become the largest importer of coking coal in the foreseeable future. China is 
already the largest importer of iron ore. In addition to its domestic production (2008: 
1,190,011tmt), China’s net imports amounted to 444,018tmt in 2008 with tendency to rise. 
Importing coking coal from one of the main exporting countries involves long-distance trade 
if imports come from Australia (8,721km) and very long distance trade if imports come from 
the U.S. South Coast (19,626km). Importing iron ore from one of the largest exporting 
countries involves long distance trade if imports come from Australia (6,354km) and very 
long-distance trade if imports come from Brazil (21,061km). Although the distance of trade 
between Australia and China is significantly smaller than between Brazil and China, the 
Chinese Republic also needs to import vast amounts of iron ore from Brazil to cover its 
enormous demand for iron ore imports. 
Exporting steel products from China to the U.S. involves very long trade distances (U.S. East 
Coast: 11,280km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
In 2008, China was in the transition phase from a developing to an industrialising country. 
The country is placed 30th in the GCI of 2008/2009. China has a considerable advantage in 
terms of market size (domestic: rank 2; foreign: rank 1). The quality of the country’s 
infrastructure, however, is only average by international standards (overall infrastructure: 
rank 58; port infrastructure: rank 54). 
China has a very significant comparative advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing wages 
($1.06 vs. $21.50). No data are available for Chinese hourly compensation costs. Chinese 
hourly compensation costs are expected to be significantly lower than U.S. compensation 
costs. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant six-month reduction of Chinese steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be facilitated by long/very long 
upstream (coking coal, iron ore) and very long downstream trade distances (steel). The 
Chinese infrastructure, which is rather average by international standards, is unlikely to 
contribute significantly to a reduction of the impact of rising oil prices. 
It seems that low labour costs and China’s market size cannot counterbalance the 
combination of an oil price shock and very large trade distances, especially when, as can be 
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expected for China, steel exports are dominated by low-value steel products which are more 
vulnerable to high transport cost levels than high-value products. The excursus below 
provides more insight into the reasons behind declining steel exports to the United States. 
Additionally, Chinese steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel export category in 
section 6.4.8.1. 
 
Excursus: U.S. Steel Industry vs. Chinese Steel Industry 
The U.S. and the Chinese steel industries are compared below to gain additional insight into 
the reasons for the statistically significant decline of Chinese steel exports to the U.S. 
following a shock in real oil prices (see 6.2.8.1, 6.4.8.1). 
 
U.S. and Chinese Steel Production and Exports 
China became the world’s largest steel producer in 1996 when production exceeded 100Mt 
for the first time. As can be seen in figure 6.1, Chinese steel output has continued to rise 
rapidly since then. The average annual growth rate of Chinese steel production was 18.5% 
between 2000 and 2009 and steel production reached 627Mt by 2010 which is equivalent to 
a relative share of 46.6% of world production.  
In 2006, China also became the largest steel exporting country with exports of 49Mt (an 
increase of 91% over 2005), an export rate of almost 1Mt per week. In 2008, about 10% of 
Chinese steel production was exported. While Chinese steel production continues to expand, 
U.S. steel production reached its peak in 1973 at 137Mt, fell below 100Mt in 2000 and stood 
Figure 6.1 China’s Crude Steel Production and Share of Global Production  
Source: World Steel Association 2011, cited by Hasanbeigi et al. 2011 
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at 98Mt in 2006 (Hasanbeigi et al. 2011; Price et al. 2001; WCI n.d.a; Zhang and Wang 
2010). 
Figure 6.2 shows the development of U.S. crude steel production and Chinese steel exports 
to the U.S. during the sample period. Chinese steel exports to the U.S. increase significantly 
between mid-2004 and early-2007 but then start to decline considerably.  
 
Table 6.14 shows the relative change of Chinese steel exports to the U.S. for the first three 
quarters of 2007/2008 on a year-over-year basis. In total, exports fall by 20.8% or one-fifth. 
 
Figure 6.2 U.S. Domestic Steel Production and Chinese Steel Exports to the U.S. 
Source: Author’s illustration (EViews®), data: U.S. Census 2010a; World Steel Association 2010 
Table 6.14 Chinese Steel Exports (in QMT) and U.S. Real GDP (in US$) 
Source: U.S. Census 2010a, E-forecasting 2012, Author’s calculations 
Chinese Steel Exports to the U.S. U.S. Real GDP
2007 2008
percentage 
change 2007 2008
percentage 
change
January 515,188 247,663 -51.9% 13,057 13,278 +1.7%
February 299,714 214,676 -28.4% 13,035 13,256 +1.6%
March 345,120 220,440 -36.1% 13,080 13,266 +1.4%
April 257,230 163,873 -36.3% 13,136 13,298 +1.2%
May 490,876 261,950 -46.6% 13,174 13,311 +1.0%
June 464,104 334,487 -27.9% 13,211 13,321 +0.8%
July 438,974 322,481 -26.5% 13,244 13,296 +0.4%
August 329,863 447,406 +35.6% 13,271 13,193 -0.6%
September 302,984 515,664 +70.2% 13,295 13,072 -1.7%
Total 3,444,053 2,728,640 -20.8% 118,500 119,291 +1.2%
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.2 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Country
  338 159 
Declining U.S. GDP growth rates are a logical candidate for explaining declining Chinese 
export volumes. Table 6.14 shows declining monthly growth rates on a year-over-year basis 
as the U.S. slowly plunges into recession due to the on-going mortgage crisis. 
At the same time, it is noteworthy that U.S. domestic steel production increases beginning in 
early 2007 parallel to declining import volumes from China (see figure 6.2). The increase of 
U.S. steel production on a year-over-year basis can clearly be seen in table 6.15 as U.S. steel 
production increases by 4% during the first 
three quarters. Moreover, for the first three 
quarters of 2008 Canadian steel exports to 
the U.S. were up 21.3% and Mexican steel 
exports to the U.S. were up 6.8% on a 
year-over–year basis (see table 6.16). This 
indicates that factors other than declining 
U.S. growth rates also played a role in the 
Chinese export decline.  
In this context, increasing oil prices 
combined with long-distance trade 
between China and the U.S. are a logical 
candidate. Figure 6.3 and figure 6.4 clearly 
show that decreasing Chinese steel exports to the U.S. and increasing U.S. domestic steel 
production between early 2007 and the third quarter of 2008 coincide with rising oil prices. 
There seems to be a shift in Chinese export and U.S. production volumes as average oil 
prices rise above $60. 
2007 2008
percentage 
change
January 7,543 8,652 +14.7%
February 7,634 8,215 +7.6%
March 8,327 8,598 +3.3%
April 8,214 8,376 +2.0%
May 8,521 8,733 +2.5%
June 8,240 8,373 +1.6%
July 8,274 8,517 +2.9%
August 8,336 8,668 +4.0%
September 7,960 7,842 -1.5%
Total 73,049 75,974 +4.0%
Table 6.15 U.S. Steel Production (in TMT) 
Source: World Steel Associaton 2010 
Figure 6.3 Oil Price (WTI) and Chinese Steel Exports 
Source: Authors illustration (EViews®), data: EIA 2011c, n.d.b; U.S. Census 2010a 
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Additional Factors  
There are factors other than oil prices, trade distance, and competitiveness (see section 
6.2.8.1) that might also have contributed to declining steel exports from China to the U.S. 
and increasing U.S. domestic steel production. These determinants are described below. 
 
  
Figure 6.4 Oil Price (WTI) and U.S. Steel Production 
Source: Author’s illustration, data: EIA 2011c, n.d.b, World Steel Associaton 2010 
Canadian Steel Exports to the U.S. Mexican Steel Exports to the U.S.
2007 2008
percentage 
change 2007 2008
percentage 
change
January 473,731 669,422 +41.3% 301,958 278,115 -7.9%
February 440,677 607,619 +37.9% 220,286 290,863 +32.0%
March 575,194 658,467 +14.5% 194,326 289,838 +49.1%
April 534,761 705,445 +31.9% 319,753 278,552 -12.9%
May 526,310 630,408 +19.8% 188,756 268,428 +42.2%
June 505,322 609,755 +20.7% 240,323 235,793 -1.9%
July 496,880 596,238 +20.0% 295,904 249,972 -15.5%
August 452,400 440,736 -2.6% 219,623 225,170 +2.5%
September 459,355 498,180 +8.5% 201,176 213,338 +6.0%
Total 4,464,630 5,416,270 +21.3% 2,182,105 2,330,069 +6.8%
Table 6.16 Canadian and Mexican Steel Exports to the U.S. (in QMT) 
Source: U.S. Census 2010a, Author’s calculations 
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Energy Intensity of Steel Industries 
Steel production is very energy intensive. Since energy makes up a significant share of steel 
production costs (20%-40% depending on the country where steel is produced), a reduction 
of energy intensity and subsequently reduced production costs improve the competitiveness  
of steel industries (World Steel Association 2008). 
Data compiled by the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) indicate that the energy 
intensity of the U.S. steel industry declined by 28% from 16.4 MBtu/ton to 11.8 MBtu/ton 
between 1990 and 2004 and by 15% between 2002 and 2006 (AISI 2008; EPA 2007). 
Although the energy intensity of Chinese steel production also declined considerably since 
the 1990s (Hasanbeigi et al. 2011), a study by the IEA (2010) finds that in 2007, the energy 
intensity of U.S. steel production was on average 3.7 GJ/ton below the energy intensity of 
Chinese steel production. The most comprehensive study directly comparing the energy 
intensity of the U.S. and Chinese steel industries in 2006 has been published by Hasanbeigi 
et al. (2011). The authors define energy intensity as energy use per unit of steel produced. 
They find that in 2006, the energy intensity of the U.S. steel industry (14.90 GJ/t) was 36% 
or one-third below the energy intensity of the Chinese steel industry (23.11 GJ/t). The 
following aspects explain the difference between both industries in terms of energy intensity: 
 
- Structure of Steel Manufacturing Sectors: There are two main steel production 
processes, primary steel production or basic oxygen furnace (BOF) and secondary 
steel production or electric arc furnace (EAF). The latter production process is 
significantly less energy intensive than the former production process. U.S. steel 
industry data from 2004 indicate that BOF steelmaking requires 18.99 MBtu/ton 
while EAF steelmaking requires only 5.01 MBtu/ton (EPA 2007; Price et al. 2001; 
WCA n.d.d; WCI n.d.a). While the relative share of energy efficient EAF 
steelmaking in the U.S. steel industry increased from 47% in 2000 to 58.1% in 2008 
(the last year of the sample period), the relative share in the Chinese steel industry 
declined from 15.9% in 2000 to 9.1% in 2008. Figure 6.5 shows that the relative 
share of U.S. EAF production is significantly above the world average (2008: 
30.6%), whereas the relative share of Chinese EAF production is well below average 
(Hasanbeigi et al. 2011).  
- Fuel Shares: Relative fuel shares also have an impact on the production cost 
structure of steel industries. For example, natural gas, which is comparatively cheap 
in the U.S., has a relative share of 34.5% in the U.S. steel industry`s energy use, 
while the relative share of the Chinese steel industry is only 0.45% (Hasanbeigi et al. 
2011). 
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- Product Mix: The respective steel product mix is another key variable for the energy 
intensity of steel industries because of varying energy requirements in the 
rolling/casting/finishing processes. Differences in the product mix of both steel 
industries may therefore also play a role in the energy intensity gap (Hasanbeigi et 
al. 2011). 
- Scale of equipment: The average capacity of steel production plants also plays a role 
for the energy intensity of production sites. For example, the average capacity of 
American blast furnaces is bigger than the average capacity of Chinese blast 
furnaces. Large blast furnaces are by tendency less energy intensive than small 
furnaces (Hasanbeigi et al. 2011).  
- Sector Penetration of Energy-Efficient Technologies: Developing countries often use 
outdated technology for steel production (Price et al. 2001; World Steel Association 
2008). Although China gradually replaces outdated technology, it can be assumed 
that the penetration of energy-efficient technologies in the U.S. steel industry is 
stronger when compared with the Chinese steel industry (Hasanbeigi et al. 2011). 
- Energy-Related Subsidies: Many developing countries, among them China, use 
energy-related subsidies to increase the competitiveness of energy-intensive 
industries, thereby ensuring energy-access below the cost of supply. In 2005, China 
spent $25 billion for energy-subsidies. These subsidies are an incentive to waste 
energy and to increase energy consumption (Pellényi et al. 2008). Tang et al. (2010) 
find that the improvement of energy-efficiency in China slowed down between 2002 
and 2007, especially in the industrial sector. They attribute the decline to a lack of 
incentives to reduce energy consumption and indicate that the surge in Chinese steel 
Figure 6.5 Share of EAF in Total Steel Production in China and the U.S. and  
World Average Values 
Source: World Steel Association 2009, cited by Hasanbeigi et al. 2011 
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production in previous years is to a significant extent due to energy-related subsidies 
because they have led to a competitive advantage. The authors conclude that the 
policy of generating economic growth via energy subsidies is not sustainable and 
manageable in the long run. 
 
Steelmaking Raw Materials 
One of the main challenges faced by the global steel industry revolves around the availability 
of raw materials (OECD 2012). Therefore, steelmaking raw material abundance is a 
significant comparative advantage for a country’s steel industry while net importers face a 
comparative disadvantage, especially at high oil prices due to rising upstream transport costs 
(Pellényi et al. 2008; World Steel Association 2008). For instance, Beverelli (2010) finds 
that a 10% increase in oil prices leads to an increase of iron ore freight rates between 8.9% 
and 10.5% (see section 2.3). The main raw materials used in the steel production process are 
listed in table 6.1. 
The U.S. is a net exporter of the two main steelmaking raw materials coking coal85 and iron 
ore while China has become a net importer of both raw materials in recent years86 with 
tendency to rise. The tendency can be clearly seen for the example of coking coal (see table 
6.17). 
Moreover, China is by far the largest iron ore producer worldwide. Nonetheless, China has 
become a net importer of iron ore in the mid-1990s and already accounted for 58.8% of 
global iron ore imports in 2010 with tendency to rise (see figure 6.6). 
In 2011, Chinese iron ore imports were up 11% and already accounted for 61.4% of total 
imports followed by Europe (11.9%), Japan (11.5%), South Korea (5.8%), and Taiwan 
(1.8%). This is due to the fact that China is the world’s largest steel producer (98% of the 
iron ore produced is used for steelmaking) and that the average iron ore content of the ore 
mined in China is rather low (OECD. 2012).  
Chinese iron ore imports mainly come from Australia, Brazil and India while coking coal is 
mainly imported from Australia but also from the United States. 
Table 6.17 Chinese Coking Coal Net Imports (in Mt) 
Source: Author’s calculations; data see tables 6.2 and 6.3  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
n.a. n.a. 351 5 3 7
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While China is resource 
abundant in terms of 
silicon, tin, molybdenum 
and tungsten, it needs to 
import significant 
volumes of steel scrap 
from the U.S., 
manganese from South 
Africa, Australia, Gabon 
and Brazil, chromium 
from South Africa, 
Turkey, Kazakhstan and 
India, nickel from 
Indonesia and the 
Philippines, and zinc 
from South America and Australia for steel production which creates large upstream trade 
costs at high oil prices. 
Besides iron ore and coking coal, the U.S. is also self-sufficient in terms of vanadium, zinc, 
molybdenum, and tungsten while chromium is imported for steel production from 
neighbouring Canada. Silicon also needs to be imported (OECD 2012). Summing up, the 
U.S. steel industry has a comparative advantage over the Chinese steel industry in terms of 
steelmaking raw material abundance87.  
Between January 2007 and August 2008, the price of U.S. imports from China rose by 7% in 
a sharp departure from earlier trends. In order to understand the forces behind the increase, 
Amiti and Davis (2009) construct an import index for the time period between December 
2003 and August 2008, and use highly disaggregated data to track price movements for 
different product types. Between late 2003 and the end of 2006, the price index falls from 
100 to 97 but then rises to 103.8 between early 2007 and August 2008, an increase of 6.8%. 
In 2007, consumer and capital goods accounted for 85% of U.S. imports from China while 
industrial supplies such as steel accounted for 15%. Amiti and Davis analyse the trends in 
import prices for the end-use categories and find that the largest increases in U.S. import 
prices occurred in the industrial supplies category while the increases in consumer and 
capital import prices were rather modest. The authors also find that the price increase in the 
industrial supplies category is mainly due to rising prices for intermediate inputs and 
commodities such as iron ore and coking coal. The reasons for the price increase of 
(steelmaking) raw materials may be a combination of increasing mining costs, increasing 
transport costs, and increasing demand. Amiti and Davis conclude that rising commodity 
Figure 6.6 Chinese Imports (Iron Ore, Coking Coal) and 
Steel Production 
Source:OECD 2011  
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input prices were the main factor behind the price increase of U.S. imports from China while 
shifts in exchange rates (appreciation of the Chinese Renminbi against the U.S. Dollar) and 
rising Chinese wages only played a minor role. 
China’s dependence on the import of steelmaking raw materials is expected to increase, 
albeit at a slower pace than in recent years. Parallely, China increasingly relies on 
restrictions for steelmaking raw materials to direct domestic supply to its steel industry in 
order to reduce steelmaking production costs. For example, China imposes export duties on 
iron ore (tariff rate: 10%), coke (40%) and coking coal (10%), steel scrap (40%), manganese 
(15%), zinc (30%), tin (20%), molybdenum (15%), and tungsten (20%) to protect its 
interests. Moreover, China imposes quantitative export restrictions or export quota on coke, 
coking coal, manganese, zinc, tin, molybdenum, and tungsten. The U.S., on the other hand, 
does not impose any export restraints on steelmaking raw materials due to a constitutional 
prohibition on the use of export duties (OECD 2012).  
Tang et al. (2010) argue that it will be increasingly difficult and impractical for China to 
control raw material prices as a result of increasing import dependence. 
 
Directional Trade Imbalances 
Trade balances are an essential determinant of maritime transport costs (Kumar and 
Hoffmann 2002: 42; Wilsmeier and Martinez-Zarzoso 2010). Directional trade imbalances 
can significantly increase transport costs (Clark et al. 2002). Large bilateral trade imbalances 
between countries cause vessels to run fully loaded on the outward trip but at a fraction of 
total capacity on the return voyage (Hummels 2009). Therefore, minimising empty 
nonrevenue miles and days is key (Bardi et al. 2006: 248) because directional trade 
imbalances reduce the possibility to split fixed costs over two journeys (Behar and Venables 
2010). A balanced load eliminates the empty backhaul costs a vessel must account for in the 
initial loaded move and enables the vessel to spread a round-trip’s costs over two commodity 
moves instead of one (Bardi et al. 2006: 404).  
Bulk flows are, however, dominantly directional (inward or outward) (Rodrigue and Browne 
2008: 159) instead of bi-directional (inward and outward). This actually means that the 
variable costs (including fuel costs) for the return of a bulk carrier transporting iron ore, 
coking coal or steel need to be included into the fuel bill in many cases. 
For instance, a significant imbalance exists between Asian-U.S. and U.S.-Asian trade. In 
2007, Asia-United States cargo flows exceeded those in the reverse direction by 10.5 million 
TEUs up from 10.3 million TEUs in 2006 and 8 million TEUs in 2005 (UNCTAD 2008). 
Therefore, the cost of shipping from Asia has risen sharply in recent years relative to the 
costs of shipping to Asia (Golub and Tomasik 2008). Excess of supply means that Asian 
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exporters regularly end up paying more than 50% of extra charge in transportation costs 
compared to suppliers in the United States (Clark et al. 2002). 
 
Restructuring of U.S. Steel Industry 
In the early 2000s, the U.S. steel industry was in a state of crisis with 65,000 jobs lost 
between 1991 and 2001 (Ikenson 2006; Merkel and Lovik 2003). In March 2002, the Bush 
Administration reacted and announced temporary safeguards to protect the U.S. steel 
industry from import competition (The White House 2002). However, the punitive tariffs of 
up to 30% were lifted in December 2003 (The White House 2003) to avert a looming trade 
war (Tran 2003). 
All in all, subsidising and protectionism of the U.S. steel industry, which dates back until the 
1960s, could not prevent its decline until the early 2000s. As a result of protection, the 
industry suffered from overcapacity because bankruptcies or market exits of unprofitable 
steel companies were prevented artificially (Ikenson 2002; Merkel and Lovik 2003).  
However, since the early 2000s the industry has gone through a process of restructuring and 
consolidation (EPA 2007; Price et al. 2001) which Ikenson (2006: 1) describes as follows: 
“What was, as recently as 2002, a fragmented, perennially money-losing, capital-starved 
industry that relied on government for subsidised loans, protection from creditors, and 
insulation from foreign competition has become one of America’s strongest, most profitable, 
and most promising manufacturing industries.” 
Due to the high fixed cost nature of steel production, steel producing companies have to sell 
large volumes of steel to cover fixed costs and even larger sales are necessary to achieve 
profitability. For instance, in 2000, 27 producers of hot-rolled steel operated 35 mills with a 
total production capacity of 81 million metric tons. In 2006, the remaining 14 producers 
operated 29 mills with a total capacity of 73mt. Parallel to a decline in overall capacity, 
capacity per firm increased by 69% and the number of the mills per company increased by 
63%. The concentration of production is also evident in view of market shares. While the top 
three U.S. producers of hot-rolled steel had a home market share of 36% in 2000, the market 
share of the top three companies was 61% in 2005. Similar trends have also occurred for the 
top three producers of cold-rolled steel (market share in 2000: 47%; 2005: 70%), rebar 
(2000: 45%; 2005: 80%), and tin plate (2000: 60%; 2005: 100%). There are similar patterns 
for every major steel product category (Ikenson 2006). 
Increased market concentration facilitates economies of scale as fixed costs or the average 
unit cost of production decrease. Moreover, it is easier for companies to control output in 
accordance with changes in demand (Ikenson 2002). Declining fixed costs, strengthened 
financial viability, increasing labour productivity and the industries return to profitability 
(average operating profits of 10.3% between 2004 and 2006 up from 0.1% between 2000 and 
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2003) led to an increase of the Dow Jones Steel Stock Index of 400% between December 
2002 and November 2006 (EPA 2007; Ikenson 2006). Additionally, the strong increase of 
EAF production also played a vital role in the resurgence of the American steel industry 
(Ikenson 2002) As Ikenson (2006: 2) puts it, “in the span of just a few years, everything has 
changed for the U.S. steel industry.”  
On the contrary, although the Chinese steel industry already included 85 key medium and 
large sized enterprises in 2006 with a total crude steel production of 349Mt (Hasanbeigi et al. 
2011), until recently it remains comparatively fragmented (OECD 2012). 
 
Labour Costs 
China has a comparative advantage over the U.S. in terms of labour costs. However, wage 
costs increased at an average of 14% in previous years. While U.S. wages were forty-fold 
above Chinese wages in 1995, they are actually only eight-fold above Chinese wages 
(Stocker 2013b). While the industrialisation process is likely to further increase labour costs 
in the nearer future, demographics may also increasingly play a role in the development of 
Chinese wages. The Chinese statistical office recently announced that in 2012 the number of 
the population of working age declined for the first time by 3.45 million from 69.8% to 
69.2% of the total population. This trend will become stronger between 2015 and 2020 and is 
likely to keep upward pressure on Chinese wages (Stocker 2013a). In addition to rising oil 
prices/transport costs, rising Chinese labour costs may further decrease or even reverse the 
total cost advantage Chinese steel producers have over U.S. steel producers. According to 
Rubin and Tal (2008), in 2008 U.S. steel producers already had a slim temporary advantage 
in the average cost of producing and shipping a ton of hot-rolled steel sheet over Chinese 
producers. 
 
China’s Role in Global Production Networks and the Chinese Steel Industry 
The Chinese economy has benefitted significantly from the vertical specialisation process in 
which multinational companies slice up their value chains and offshore labour-intensive 
production steps to low wage countries (Ma and Van Assche 2011). China has endorsed this 
trend by setting up an export-promotion program in the mid-1980s where companies are 
granted duty exemptions on imported raw materials and other inputs when they are solely 
used for export purposes. Amongst others, many companies from industrialised East Asian 
countries have taken advantage of the program and sliced up their value chains so that 
labour-intensive production steps are undertaken in China before the finished products are 
exported to Western countries (Ma and Van Assche 2009, 2010; Ma et al. 2009), a 
phenomenon that has become known as the East Asian Trade Model. 
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When it comes to the extent of vertical specialisation in the Chinese steel industry, the value 
of imported inputs in the value of exports for the steel processing industry was 59% in 1997 
and already 69% in 2002 (Dean et al. 2007). A recent OECD study (2012: 36) also refers to 
the “large share that intermediate inputs account for in steel industry output.” However, with 
about one hour and a half of labour time per ton of steel produced, steel production is not 
particularly labour intensive (Rubin and Tal 2008) which somewhat limits China’s 
comparative labour cost advantage over the U.S. steel industry. 
As can be seen in table 6.18, the relative share of Chinese processing imports (intermediate 
products, raw materials) from East Asia has increased from 68.8% in 1997 to 76.1% in 2007. 
At the same time, the relative share of processing imports from geographically distant non-
Asian OECD countries (1997: 23.8%; 2007: 18.1%) and the rest of the world (1997: 7.3%; 
2007: 5.8%) has declined.  
However, contrary to other industries, the Chinese steel industry increasingly needs to source 
from geographically distant countries so that longer upstream trade distances are involved 
than for most other industries. Therefore, the strategy of sourcing inputs from nearby 
countries before using them to manufacture products which are exported to geographically 
distant locations does not apply for the Chinese steel industry. In this context Ma and Van 
Assche (2011) find that the longer the import distance of inputs, the less attractive China 
becomes for long-distance exports of processed products as upstream and downstream trade 
and/or transport costs add up. 
Unadjusted
1997 2002 2007 2007
East Asia 68.8 73.3 76.1 86.6
Hong Kong  -  -  - 47.1
Japan 26.9 26.5 23.7 10.6
South Korea 15.0 14.1 15.7 10.8
Singapore 3.2 3.4 4.3 2.9
Taiwan 16.9 19.0 20.3 9.6
Malaysia 2.2 3.9 4.5 1.5
Thailand 2.0 2.8 2.8 1.3
Philippines 0.2 1.7 3.5 2.1
Vietnam 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
Indonesia 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.4
Macau 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.2
Non-Asian OECD 23.8 21.8 18.1 9.3
United States 10.4 9.1 7.7 3.9
EU - 19 9.0 9.8 7.9 4.1
Canada 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.5
Australia 2.7 1.3 0.8 0.4
Other OECD 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.4
Rest of the World 7.3 4.9 5.8 4.1
Adjusted for Hong Kong Transshipments
Table 6.18 Share of China's Processing Imports by Country of Origin, 2007 (in %) 
Source: Ma and Van Assche 2011: 132 
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Ma et al. (2009; 2010) find that Chinese processing export volumes are negatively affected 
by increasing import and export distance. Due to the fact that processing exports make up a 
significant share of Chinese steel exports, upstream as well as downstream trade costs for 
steel exports to the U.S. may have an adverse effect on export volumes when oil prices are 
high. For China Ma et al. estimate an average import distance for intermediate products/raw 
materials of 3,283 miles or 5,283km. The calculated distance for the imports of coking coal 
(imports from Australia: 8,721km; U.S. Gulf Coast: 19,626km) and iron ore (Australia: 
6,354km; Brazil: 21,061km) are therefore significantly above average. The calculated 
downstream trade distance for steel exports to the U.S. West Coast (11,280km) is also 
significantly above the average export distance for Chinese processing exports of 3,854 
miles or 6,202km. 
 
Conclusion 
The in-depth analysis of the development of Chinese steel exports to the and U.S. domestic 
steel production during the sample period, the differences in terms of energy-efficiency 
between the Chinese and the U.S. steel industry, the different structure of both steel 
industries, the development of labour costs in China and the United States, and the role of 
China and its steel industry in global production networks provide further insight into the 
underlying factors of the reduction of Chinese steel exports to the U.S. following a shock in 
real oil prices described in sections 6.2.8.1 and 6.4.8.1. 
 
6.2.8.2 Hong Kong 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of Hong Kong’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for four months. The impulse response peak is reached one 
month after the shock at -456qmt. The impulse value for period one is statistically significant 
at 68% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 5.7% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality for the whole model at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Hong Kong does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for 
steel production needs to be imported. No information is available about Hong Kong’s iron 
ore production, imports, or exports. 
Until the early 2000s, Hong Kong could import coking coal from nearby China. However, 
China has become one of the largest net importers of coking coal in recent years. Therefore, 
Hong Kong increasingly needs to source from more distant locations. The same applies for 
possible iron ore imports. 
Importing coking coal from the main exporting countries involves long/very long distance 
trade (Australia: 8,601km; U.S. South Coast: 19,626km). While importing iron ore only 
involves a moderate trade distance when imports come from Australia (5,410km), the trade 
distance with Brazil (21,061km) is very long. 
Exporting steel products from Hong Kong to the U.S. West Coast also involves very long 
distance trade (12,534km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Hong Kong is an industrialised country placed 11th in the GCI of 2008/2009. Hong Kong’s 
economy profits from the country’s excellent overall (rank 8) and port infrastructure (rank 2) 
and its foreign market size (rank 7). Its domestic market size is significantly smaller (rank 
38). No data are available for Hong Kong’s manufacturing wages and hourly compensation 
costs.  
 
Conclusion 
The partially statistically significant reduction of Hong Kong’s steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock is facilitated by significant upstream and 
downstream trade distances. 
Hong Kong’s strong overall competitiveness and its excellent infrastructure might help to 
reduce the impact of oil price shocks. 
 
6.2.8.3 India 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of Indian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for three months. The impulse response peak is reached one 
month after the shock at -3,397qmt. The impulse response value for period one is statistically 
significant at 68% error bands. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 12% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
India produces coking coal domestically (2008: 13,910tst). However, the country needs to 
import vast amounts of coking coal (2008: 29Mt) to cover demand. On the other hand, India 
is one of the largest net exporters of iron ore (2008: 100,800tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the main exporting countries involves very long distance trade 
(Australia: 11,866km; U.S. East Coast: 15,888km). Exporting steel products from India to 
the U.S. East Coast also involves very long distance trade (15,516km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
India is a developing country placed 50th in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the country is very 
competitive in terms of domestic (rank 4) and foreign market size (rank 5), its infrastructure 
is underdeveloped (overall infrastructure: rank 90; port infrastructure: rank 93). 
India has a very significant comparative advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing wages 
($1.17 vs. $21.50). No data are available for Indian hourly compensation costs. However, 
Indian compensation costs are also likely to be significantly lower than U.S. compensation 
costs. 
 
Conclusion 
The partially statistically significant three-month reduction of Indian steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock may be facilitated by very long upstream 
(coking coal) and downstream trade distances (steel) and India’s underdeveloped 
infrastructure. 
It seems that iron ore abundance, low labour costs and India’s huge market size cannot 
completely counterbalance the impact of an oil price shock in combination with very long 
trade distances and underdeveloped infrastructure. 
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6.2.8.4 Indonesia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of Indonesian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for three months. The impulse response peak is reached three 
months after the shock at -654 qmt. The impulse values are statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 29.1% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is large. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. However, the p-value (0.103) for 
the Granger causality test is nearly statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
In 2008, Indonesia was one of the largest coking coal exporters (30Mt) and a net importer of 
iron ore (2008: 1,300tmt). Importing iron ore from Australia (2,730km) involves short-
distance trade. Resource-abundance in terms of coking coal and short-distance trade for iron 
ore imports puts Indonesia in a good position in view of steelmaking raw material 
availability.  
Exporting steel products from Indonesia to the U.S. West Coast involves very long distance 
trade (15,516km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Indonesia is a developing country placed 55th in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the country is 
quite competitive in terms of domestic (rank 16) and foreign market size (rank 24), its 
overall infrastructure (rank 96) and its port infrastructure (rank 104) are underdeveloped. 
No data are available for Indonesian labour costs. However, it can be expected that 
developing Indonesia has a labour cost advantage over the industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The reduction of Indonesian steel exports to the U.S. following a one-standard deviation oil 
price shock lasts for three months and may be fostered very long downstream trade distances  
and Indonesia’s significantly underdeveloped infrastructure. 
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It seems that coking coal abundance, short trade distances for iron ore imports, low labour 
costs and significant market size reduce the impact of an oil price shock so that the reduction 
of steel exports to the U.S. remains statistically insignificant. 
 
6.2.8.5 Japan 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of Japanese steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (-752qmt). The impulse response value is 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price contributes about 28.8% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable which indicates that the relative importance of the oil price variable for 
the steel export variable is large. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Although Japan produces coking coal domestically (2008: 40,290tst), it is one of the largest 
importers of coking coal (2008: 58Mt). Japan is also a net importer of iron ore (2008: 
140,351tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the two largest exporting countries involves long-distance trade 
in case of Australia (8,236km) and very long distance trade in case of the U.S. (Gulf Coast: 
17,872km). Importing iron ore from the main exporting countries also involves long/very 
long distance trade (Australia: 7,119km; Brazil: 22,494km). Exporting Japanese steel to the 
U.S. involves long-distance trade (9,524km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Japan is an industrialised country placed 9th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country has a 
significant competitive edge in market size (domestic: rank 4; foreign: rank 5) and consists 
of a well-developed infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 16; port infrastructure: rank 
25). 
Japan has a comparative advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing wages ($13.45 vs. 
$21.50), is competitive in primary manufacturing compensation costs ($32.41 vs. $31.82), 
and has a comparative advantage in fabricated product manufacturing compensation costs 
($20.83 vs. $26.15). 
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Conclusion 
The reduction of Japanese steel exports to the U.S. following a one-standard deviation oil 
price shock may be facilitated by long upstream and downstream trade distances. The 
decrease may remain short and statistically insignificant due to a moderate labour cost 
advantage of Japan over the U.S., Japan’s good infrastructure and its significant market size. 
Moreover, the composition of steel exports may be dominated by high-value steel products 
which are less vulnerable to rising transport costs than low-value steel products. 
The estimates for Japan may be biased by serial correlation (autocorrelation could not be 
eliminated by adding additional lags) and therefore need to be interpreted with caution. 
Additionally, Japanese steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel export category in 
section 6.4.8.2. 
 
6.2.8.6 Malaysia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Malaysia’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (6qmt) and is statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 12.4% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is moderate. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis  
There is Granger causality at the 5% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Malaysia does not produce coking coal domestically. Hence, the coking coal used for steel 
production needs to be imported. Malaysia is a net importer of iron ore (2008: 2,143tmt). 
Importing coking coal from Australia involves long-distance trade (8,236km) while 
importing iron ore from Australia involves short-distance trade (3,708km). The reason for 
the different trade distances is that coking coal and iron ore are mined in different regions 
within Australia. It is unlikely that significant volumes of coking coal are imported from the 
distant United States (U.S. South Coast: 19,416km) or that significant volumes of iron ore 
are imported from distant Brazil (16,707km). 
Exporting steel products from Malaysia to the U.S. West Coast involves very long trade 
distances (15,241km). 
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Competitiveness Analysis 
Malaysia is an industrialising country placed 21st in the GCI of 2008/2009. Malaysia is 
ranked in the top twenty in the overall infrastructure (rank 19), port infrastructure (rank 16), 
and foreign market size (rank 17) rankings. Moreover, the country is ranked on position 35 
in the domestic market size ranking. All in all, Malaysia is very competitive according to the 
competitiveness rankings used for the analysis. 
No information is available on Malaysian labour costs but it can be assumed that labour costs 
in industrialising Malaysia are lower than in the industrialised United States. 
 
Conclusion 
The marginal and statistically insignificant increase of Malaysian steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock despite significant upstream and very long 
downstream trade distances may result from the country’s good overall competitiveness, 
good infrastructure, solid market size, and an assumed labour cost advantage over the United 
States. 
However, it needs to be considered that the estimates for Malaysia may be biased by 
autocorrelation (serial correlation could not be eliminated by adding additional lags). 
Therefore, the estimates need to be interpreted with caution. 
 
6.2.8.7 Philippines 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of the Philippine’s 
steel exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (67qmt) and is statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 9.7% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 10% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
The Philippines do not produce coking coal domestically. Hence, the coking coal used for 
steel production needs to be imported. Moreover, the country depends on imports of iron ore 
(2008: 2,700tmt). 
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Importing coking coal from Australia involves long-distance trade (7,515km) while 
importing iron ore from Australia involves moderate trade distances (4,348km). The reason 
for the different trade distances is that coking coal and iron ore are mined in different regions 
within Australia. It is unlikely that significant volumes of coking coal are imported from the 
distant United States (U.S. South Coast: 21,070km) or that significant volumes of iron ore 
are imported from distant Brazil (19,253km). 
Exporting steel products from the Philippines to the U.S. West Coast involves very long 
trade distances (12,723km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The Philippines are a developing country placed 71st in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the 
country’s market size is above average (domestic: rank 33; foreign: rank 40) by international 
standards, its infrastructure is significantly underdeveloped (overall infrastructure: rank 94; 
port infrastructure: rank 100). 
The Philippines have a very significant comparative advantage over the U.S. in 
manufacturing wages ($1.19 vs. $21.50) and hourly compensation costs (primary metal 
manufacturing: $1.66 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: $1.16 vs. $26.15). 
 
Conclusion 
The increase of the Philippines’s steel exports to the U.S. following a one-standard deviation 
oil price shock despite significant upstream and very long downstream trade distances, below 
average overall competitiveness, and significantly underdeveloped infrastructure is 
surprising. 
Although the Philippines are competitive in terms of market size and have a very significant 
labour cost advantage over the U.S., a negative impact of the oil price shock had been 
expected. However, the increase in steel exports to the U.S. remains short, marginal, and 
statistically insignificant. 
 
6.2.8.8 Singapore 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to an increase of Singapore’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (183qmt) and is statistically insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 3.3% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is very low. 
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Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality at the 10% level. The GC test result confirms the statistical 
usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Singapore does not produce coking coal domestically. Hence, the coking coal used for steel 
production needs to be imported. No information is available about the country’s domestic 
iron ore production, imports or exports. 
Importing coking coal from Australia involves long-distance trade (7,978km) while 
importing iron ore from Australia would involve short-distance trade (3,365km). The reason 
for the different trade distances is that coking coal and iron ore are mined in different regions 
within Australia. It is unlikely that significant volumes of coking coal are imported from the 
distant United States (U.S. South Coast: 19,648km) or that significant volumes of iron ore 
are imported from distant Brazil (16,937km). 
Exporting steel from Singapore to the U.S. West Coast involves very long trade distances 
(14,897km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Singapore is an industrialised country that has been placed 5th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The 
country’s economy benefits from an excellent infrastructure (overall infrastructure: rank 2; 
port infrastructure: rank 1) and is very competitive in terms of foreign market size (rank 11). 
Singapore’s domestic market size (rank 53) is rather average by international standards. 
Singapore has a significant comparative advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing wages 
($10.45 vs. $21.50) and hourly compensation costs (fabricated product manufacturing: 
$12.15 vs. $26.15). No information is available about compensation costs in the primary 
metal manufacturing sector. 
 
Conclusion 
The short and statistically insignificant increase of Singapore’s steel exports to the U.S. 
following a one-standard deviation oil price shock despite long upstream trade distances for 
coking coal and very long downstream trade distances for steel exports to the U.S. may be 
due to Singapore’s short import trade distances for iron ore, its excellent infrastructure 
including the best port infrastructure worldwide, significant labour cost advantages over the 
U.S., and significant foreign market size. 
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6.2.8.9 South Korea 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of South Korean 
steel exports to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response peak is reached 
one month after the shock at -1,752qmt. The impulse response values are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 9% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Although South Korea produces coking coal domestically (2008: 11,967tst), it is one of the 
largest coking coal importers (2008: 24Mt). Moreover, South Korea produces only marginal 
volumes of iron ore (2008: 400tmt). Hence, iron ore needs to be imported (2008: 49,452tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the major exporting countries involves long trade distances in 
case of Australia (8,710km) and very long trade distances in case of the U.S. (Gulf Coast: 
18,692km). Similarly, importing iron ore imports from the major exporting countries 
involves long/very long distance trade (Australia: 6,867km; Brazil: 21,680km). 
Exporting steel products from South Korea to the U.S. West Coast also involves very long 
trade distances (10,345km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
South Korea is an industrialised country placed 13th in the GCI of 2008/2009. South Korea 
has a well-developed overall infrastructure (rank 14) and a solid port infrastructure (rank 29). 
Moreover, the country among the top fifteen countries in terms of domestic (rank 14) and 
foreign market size (rank 9). 
South Korea has a comparative advantage over the U.S. in hourly compensation costs 
(primary metal manufacturing: $21.40 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: $14.35 
vs. $26.15). No information is available about South Korean manufacturing wages. 
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Conclusion 
The statistically insignificant reduction of South Korean steel exports to the U.S. following a 
one-standard deviation oil price shock lasts for two months and may be fostered by long/very 
long upstream trade distances for coking coal and iron ore and very long downstream trade 
distances for steel. The impact of the oil price shock may be counterbalanced to a certain 
extent by good infrastructure, relatively large market size and a labour cost advantage over 
the United States. Additionally, South Korean steel exports to the U.S. are analysed per steel 
export category in section 6.4.8.3. 
 
6.2.8.10 Taiwan 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of Taiwanese steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for four months. The impulse response peak is reached four 
months after the shock at -3,919qmt. The impulse response values are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 8.6% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Although Taiwan produces coking coal domestically (2008: 4,664tst), it is one of the largest 
coking coal importers (2008: 6Mt). Moreover, Taiwan imports large volumes of iron ore 
(2008: 15,571tmt). 
Importing coking coal from the main exporting countries involves long trade distances in 
case of Australia (8,143km) and very long trade distances in case of the U.S. (Gulf Coast: 
19,989km). Importing iron ore from the major exporters involves moderate trade distances in 
case of Australia (5,612km) and very long distance trade in case of Brazil (20,368km). 
Exporting steel products from Taiwan to the U.S. West Coast involves very long trade 
distances (11,641km). 
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Competitiveness Analysis 
Taiwan is in the transition phase from an industrialising to an industrialised country and is 
placed 17th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The infrastructure of the country is well developed 
(overall infrastructure: rank 22; port infrastructure: rank 18) by international standards and 
the country is among the top twenty nations in terms of market size (domestic: rank 18; 
foreign: rank 13). 
Taiwan has a comparative advantage over the U.S. in hourly compensation costs (primary 
metal manufacturing: $10.69 vs. $31.82; fabricated product manufacturing: $6.28 vs. 
$26.15). No information is available about Taiwanese manufacturing wages. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically insignificant reduction of Taiwanese steel exports to the U.S. following a 
one-standard deviation oil price shock lasts for four months and may be facilitated by 
long/very long upstream trade distances for coking coal and very long downstream trade 
distances for steel exports to the United States. 
The impact of the oil price shock may be counterbalanced to a certain extent by the country’s 
overall competitiveness, good infrastructure, relatively large market size and a significant 
labour cost advantage over the United States. Additionally, Taiwanese steel exports to the 
U.S. are analysed per steel export category in section 6.4.8.4. 
 
6.2.8.11 Thailand 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of Thailand’s steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for four months. The impulse response peak is reached one 
month after the shock at -1,954qmt. The impulse response values are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 6.6% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality for the whole model at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Thailand does not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking coal used for 
steel production needs to be imported. Thailand produces iron ore domestically (2008: 
1,600tmt). No information is available about the country’s iron ore imports and exports. 
Upstream trade distances for Thailand’s steel industry are as follows if raw materials are 
sourced from the main exporting countries: Long-distance trade is involved if coking coal is 
imported from Australia (9,266km) and very long distance trade is involved if coking coal is 
imported from the U.S. East Coast (21,185km). In case additional iron ore needs to be 
imported, sourcing from Australia involves moderate trade distances (4,650km). It is likely 
that the majority of iron ore is imported from Australia since importing from distant Brazil 
would involve very long trade distances (18,474km). 
Exporting steel products from Thailand to the U.S. West Coast involves very long trade 
distances (15,099km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Thailand is an industrialising country placed 34th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The infrastructure 
of the country is above average by international standards (overall infrastructure: rank 35; 
port infrastructure: rank 48). Moreover, Thailand’s economy profits from its relatively large 
market size (domestic: rank 23; foreign: rank 18). 
No information is available about Thailand’s labour cost levels. However, it can be assumed 
that the industrialising country has a comparative advantage over the industrialised U.S. in 
terms of labour costs. 
 
Conclusion 
The reduction of Thailand’s steel exports to the U.S. following a one-standard deviation oil 
price shock lasts for four months and may be facilitated by long/very long upstream trade 
distances for coking coal and very long downstream trade distances for steel exports to the 
United States. 
The impact of the oil price shock may be counterbalanced to a certain extent by the country’s 
solid infrastructure, relatively large market size and an assumed labour cost advantage over 
the United States. The above-listed factors may be part of the explanation why the impulse 
response values are statistically insignificant. 
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6.2.8.12 Summary 
The Asian countries included in the analysis can be separated into three groups: 
- Group One: The first group consists of countries whose steel exports to the United 
States decline following a one-standard deviation oil price shock. Thereby, the 
reduction of steel exports to the U.S. is statistically significant (China, Hong Kong, 
India).  
- Group Two: For the countries in the second group, steel export volumes to the U.S. 
decline but the impulse responses are statistically insignificant (Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand).  
- Group Three: For the countries in the third group, steel exports to the U.S. increase 
but the increase is statistically insignificant (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore). 
 
Group One 
It is noteworthy that China and India, the countries with the largest populations worldwide 
and the current drivers of global economic growth, are among the Asian nations whose 
export volumes to the U.S. are most adversely affected by a shock in the oil price variable. 
Comparing China and India based on the criteria used in the analysis shows, that the profile 
of both countries is quite similar:  
- Both China and India are developing countries. Although China has an edge over 
India in terms of overall competitiveness, both countries are ranked among the top 
fifty countries in the GCI of 2008/2009 (China: rank 30; India: rank 50).  
- China and India are ranked among the top five nations in terms of domestic (China: 
rank 2; India: rank 4) and foreign market size (China: rank 1; India: rank 5). An edge 
in market size may help to generate economies of scale. However, economies of 
scale can only be materialised if an industry is consolidated, not too fragmented.  
- China and India have a very significant comparative advantage over the United 
States in terms of manufacturing wages (China: $1.06; India: $1.17; U.S.: $21.50). 
 
However, it seems that the factors described above cannot completely counterbalance the 
impact of an oil price shock on steel export volumes to the U.S., amongst other things due to 
the factors described below: 
- Both countries are among the largest coking coal importers whose steel industries 
may be adversely affected by very long upstream trade distances.  
- India has an edge over China in terms of iron ore abundance. While India belongs to 
the largest net exporters of iron ore, China is the largest net importer of iron ore. 
This difference in steelmaking raw material abundance may be one reason why the 
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impact on Chinese steel export volumes to the U.S. is stronger than the impact on 
Indian export volumes. 
- Both nations face very long downstream trade distances for steel exports to the 
United States. 
- Both China and India have relative weaknesses in terms of infrastructure. The lack 
of competitiveness in overall infrastructure (China: rank 58; India: rank 90) and port 
infrastructure (China: rank 54; India: rank 93) may add to the impact of high oil 
prices in combination with very long distance trade. Thereby, India should be even 
more affected than China due to its underdeveloped infrastructure. 
Summing up, it seems that the advantages of the Chinese and Indian steel industries in 
labour costs and market size are outbalanced by the negative impacts of the oil price shock. 
Thereby, the decomposition of exports may also play a role if the export portfolio of both 
countries is dominated by low-value steel products which are overproportionally affected by 
rising oil prices or transport costs. The excursus ‘U.S. Steel Industry vs. Chinese Steel 
Industry’ provides further insight into the reasons for China’s decreasing steel exports 
following an oil price shock. 
Although industrialised Hong Kong is performing significantly better than developing China 
and India in terms of overall competitiveness and infrastructure, is competitive with regard 
to market size, and probably benefits from a more favourable composition of steel exports in 
comparison with China and India, the effect of large trade distances and an oil price shock 
also leads to statistically significant declining steel export volumes to the United States. 
 
Group Two 
The second group includes industrialised Japan and the Tiger States South Korea and 
Taiwan. The three countries are among the top twenty nations with regard to overall 
competitiveness (Japan: rank 9; South Korea: rank 13; Taiwan: rank 17), domestic market 
size (Japan: rank 3; South Korea: rank 14; Taiwan: rank 18), and foreign market size (Japan: 
rank 4; South Korea: rank 9; Taiwan: rank 13), and among the top thirty nations in terms of 
overall infrastructure (Japan: rank 16; South Korea: rank 18; Taiwan: rank 22) and port 
infrastructure (Japan: rank 25; South Korea: rank 29; Taiwan: rank 18). Moreover, the three 
countries have a moderate (Japan) or significant (South Korea, Taiwan) labour cost 
advantage over the United States. Although the steel export figures of these countries to the 
U.S. decline in reaction to the one-standard deviation oil price shock, the decline is 
statistically insignificant. The competitiveness of those countries may help easing the impact 
of the oil price shock.  
In view of Japan, it needs to be mentioned that results may be biased by serial correlation 
and therefore need to be interpreted with caution. 
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Industrialising Thailand is part of group two because the decline of Taiwanese steel exports 
to the U.S. is also statistically insignificant. Although the Taiwanese steel industry is 
confronted with long upstream trade distances for coking coal and very long downstream 
trade distances for steel, it profits from moderate upstream trade distances for iron ore when 
imports come from Australia. Moreover, the country is ranked among the top twenty nations 
in all competitiveness sub-categories included in the analysis which may help easing the 
impact of the oil price shock. 
Developing Indonesia completes the list of countries in group two. It seems that the 
statistical insignificance of the steel export decline has less to do with competitiveness and 
may rather be due to the country’s steelmaking raw material abundance. As a consequence, 
the Indonesian steel industry does not face international upstream trade costs, at least for 
coking coal and iron ore. Therefore, the industry can only be impacted by rising oil prices 
through the downstream transport cost channel. 
 
Group Three 
Group three consists of the developing Philippines, industrialising Malaysia, and 
industrialised Singapore. The impulse responses of the countries included are characterised 
by a short and statistically insignificant immediate reaction to a one-standard deviation oil 
price shock. Thereby, it is remarkable that the economies of three countries whose steel 
industries seem to be able to absorb the impact rising oil prices are at different stages of 
development. 
The listing of the Philippines in group three comes at a surprise. The only factor that might 
potentially explain the resilience of the country’s steel industry may be a very significant 
labour cost advantage over the United States.  
In the case of Malaysia, the reasons for the ability of the steel industry to absorb rising 
transport costs despite significant upstream and downstream trade distances are more 
obvious as the country’s economy is very competitive by international standards (rank 21). 
Moreover, Malaysia is ranked among the top twenty nations in three sub-criteria also 
included in the analysis (overall infrastructure: rank 19; port infrastructure: rank 16; 
domestic market size: rank 17) and is expected to have a labour cost advantage over the 
United States. However, it needs to be emphasised that the results for Malaysia may be 
biased by autocorrelation. Therefore, the estimates should be treated with caution. 
Finally, the reasons for the resilience of Singapore’s steel industry against rising transport 
costs is most obvious. The economy of the Tiger state is on position five in terms of overall 
competitiveness and profits from the best port infrastructure worldwide, the second-best 
overall infrastructure, a large foreign market size (rank 11), a significant labour cost 
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advantage over the U.S., and possibly from a favorable composition of exported steel 
products. 
By and large, the findings for the Asian countries included in the analysis are in line with the 
hypothesis that oil price shocks or rising maritime fuel costs lead to a regionalisation of trade 
flows and to a reduction of trade distances in the global economy. This especially applies for 
China, Hong Kong, and India and to a somewhat lesser extent for Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
 
6.2.9 Oceania  
Section 6.2.9 analyses the econometric estimates for Australia (6.2.9.1) and New Zealand  
(6.2.9.2). 
 
6.2.9.1 Australia 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a reduction of Australian steel 
exports to the U.S. which lasts for one month (-5,826qmt) and is statistically significant at 
90% error bands. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 41.7% of the volatility in 
the steel export variable. Therefore, the relative importance of the oil price variable for the 
steel export variable is very high. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
  
Australia 1 -5,826 ** 41.7 0.46
1 -47
2 -745 *
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®®)
New Zealand 9.4 0.37
Country
Time Period 
(months)
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
Table 6.19 VEC Analysis - Oceania 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Australia is the largest exporter of coking coal (2008: 137Mt) and iron ore (2008: 
308,931tmt). Hence, the Australian steel industry profits from steelmaking raw material 
abundance. 
Exporting steel products from Australia to the U.S. West Coast involves very long trade 
distances (13,930km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
Australia is an industrialised country placed 18th in the GCI of 2008/2009. The country’s 
overall infrastructure is well developed (rank 25) and the quality of its port infrastructure is 
above average by international standards (rank 41). Australia is among the top twenty 
nations in terms of domestic market size (rank 17). Its foreign market size is somewhat 
smaller (rank 34). 
Australia has a slight labour cost disadvantage compared to the U.S. in manufacturing wages 
($23.90 vs. $21.50), a moderate disadvantage in compensation costs in the fabricated 
manufacturing sector ($30.59 vs. $26.15), and a significant disadvantage in compensation 
costs in the primary metal manufacturing sector ($38.34 vs. $31.82). 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant reduction of Australia’s steel exports to the U.S. following a one-
standard deviation oil price shock may be due to very long downstream trade distances and 
may be facilitated by a comparative disadvantage in labour costs in comparison with the 
United States.The downturn in steel exports to the U.S. is rather short-termed. This may 
especially be due to Australia’s domestic steelmaking raw material abundance and to a lesser 
extent to its solid infrastructure and market size. Additionally, Australian steel exports to the 
U.S. are analysed per steel export category in section 6.4.9. 
 
6.2.9.2 New Zealand 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to a decrease of New Zealand’s 
steel exports to the U.S. which lasts for two months. The impulse response peak is reached 
two months after the shock at -744qmt. The impulse response value for the second month 
after the shock is statistically significant at 68% error bands. 
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Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Fifteen months after the shock, the oil price variable accounts for 9.4% of the volatility in the 
steel export variable. Therefore, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is rather low. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
New Zealand is a significant exporter of coking coal (2010: 2Mt). The country produces iron 
ore domestically (2008: 2,300tmt) and exports a significant amount of its domestic 
production (2008: 500tmt). Therefore, although no data are available for exports it can be 
assumed that New Zealand does not depend on iron ore imports. 
Exporting steel products from New Zealand to the U.S. West Coast involves very long trade 
distances (12,169km). 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
New Zealand is an industrialised country placed 24th in the GCI of 2008/2009. While the 
quality of the country’s overall infrastructure is fair average by international standards (rank 
50), its port infrastructure is well developed (rank 23). New Zealand’s market size is rather 
average by international standards (domestic: rank 57; foreign: rank 71). 
The country has a moderate comparative advantage in manufacturing wages over the U.S. 
($15.95 vs. $21.50). No information is available about the country’s hourly compensation 
costs. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistically significant reduction of New Zealand’s steel exports to the U.S. following a 
one-standard deviation oil price shock may be due to very long downstream trade distances 
The downturn in steel exports to the U.S. is rather short. This may especially be due to New 
Zealand’s steelmaking raw material abundance and to a lesser extent to its solid 
infrastructure and market size and a moderate manufacturing cost advantage over the United 
States. 
 
6.2.9.3 Summary 
A one-standard deviation shock in oil prices leads to a reduction of steel imports to the U.S. 
for both Oceanian countries included in the analysis. The reduction is rather short but 
statistically significant in both cases. 
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The decreasing steel exports to the U.S. are likely to be facilitated by very long downstream 
trade distances/transport costs. The decrease in steel exports might be limited by steelmaking 
raw material abundance in Australia and New Zealand and by the overall competitiveness of 
both countries. Soft factors such as common language and cultural affiliation may also play a 
role. 
The findings for the Oceanian countries included in the analysis are in line with the 
hypothesis that oil price shocks or rising maritime fuel costs lead to a regionalisation of trade 
flows and to a reduction of trade distances in the global steel industry. 
 
 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Region 6.3
In section 6.3, the estimates for the steel export countries from Europe (6.3.1), the C.I.S. 
(6.3.2), North America (6.3.3), South America (6.3.4), Africa (6.3.5), the Middle East 
(6.3.6), Asia (6.3.7), and Oceania (6.3.8) are summarised and analysed statistically. Section 
6.3.9 concludes. 
 
6.3.1 Europe 
6.3.1.1 European Union 
The study includes 23 of 27 EU members. The VEC model estimates (IRF, VD) the GC test, 
the upstream and downstream steel trade distances, and the competitiveness rankings for 
those EU countries can be summarised as follows: 
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports to the 
U.S. in 20 of the 23 EU member countries surveyed and to increasing steel exports in 3 
countries. The immediate decline for the 23 EU members lasts for an average of 2.9 months. 
The average decline for the 20 countries with declining export figures is 3.5 months while 
the average increase for the 3 countries (Ireland, Romania, UK) with increasing export 
figures is 1 month. 26 of the 72 estimated single impulse response values are statistically 
significant (68% error bands: 18; 90% error bands: 5; 95% error bands: 3), a relative share of 
36.1%. Thereby, all statistically significant single impulse response values can be attributed 
to countries with decreasing steel export figures. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is very low for 3 
countries, low for 6 countries, medium for 5 countries, high for 7 countries, and very high 
for 2 countries. The average relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variables of the 23 EU members is 17.5% (medium), 18.7% (medium) for the 20 members 
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with decreasing export figures, and 9.1% (low) for the 3 members with increasing export 
figures.  
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 17.5 %; steel import value: 10.8%; exchange rates: 9.1%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7.3%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 13 of 23 
or for 56.5% of the EU members analysed. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 8 of 23 countries, (1% level: 3; 5% level: 3; 10% 
level: 2), a relative share of 34.8%. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Five of the 23 EU-member states are landlocked and 18 are not landlocked. The shortest 
steel export trade routes to the U.S. for all 18 countries with an own seaport infrastructure 
are trade routes between Europe and the U.S. East Coast. The average trade distance between 
the EU and the U.S. is 6,834km (calculated on the basis of the shortest trade route between 
each EU member and the U.S.). Thereby, the calculated trade distances for EU-member 
countries to the U.S. East Coast are between 5,672km (Portugal) and 9,919km (Romania).  
The EU is a significant net importer of iron ore. In 2008, the EU imported 138,651tmt of 
iron ore. None of the top five iron ore exporting countries (Australia, Brazil, India, South 
Africa, Ukraine) accounting for 82.5% of worldwide iron ore exports in 2011 is a member of 
the EU. 
Regarding coking coal, no net import/export figures can be calculated due to a lack of data 
availability. However, in 2011 only two EU members were among the largest coking coal 
exporters (Czech Republic: 2.1Mt; Poland: 1.7Mt). At the same time, three EU-members 
were among the largest coking coal importers (Germany: 9Mt; Italy: 5.6Mt; UK: 6Mt). It can 
be assumed that significant upstream trade distances are involved when supplying EU 
member countries with iron ore and coking coal to meet their demand. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The average rank of the 23 EU-members in the GCI of 2008/2009 is position 30 (of 134). 
Moreover, the average rank is 41 for overall infrastructure, 43 for port infrastructure, 41 for 
domestic market size, and 37 for foreign market size. 
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.3 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Region
  338 190 
In terms of labour costs, data for manufacturing wages are available for 18 of the 23 
countries. Thereby, manufacturing wages are lower than in the U.S. in 10 of the 18 countries 
and higher in 8 countries. Data for hourly compensation costs in the primary metal 
manufacturing sector are available for 14 of 23 countries. Compensation costs are lower than 
in the U.S. in 4 of those countries and higher in 10 countries. Data for hourly compensation 
costs in the fabricated product manufacturing sector are available for 13 countries. 
Compensation costs are lower than in the U.S. in 5 of those countries and higher in 8 
countries. While a small majority of EU countries is competitive or has a comparative 
advantage in manufacturing wages in relation to the U.S., the majority of EU countries face 
higher compensation costs than the United States (see table 6.20 and table 6.21). 
Comparing average manufacturing wages for EU members with U.S. manufacturing wages 
shows that average manufacturing wages in the EU are about $6 lower than in the U.S. 
($15.13 vs. $21.50). Wage differences are more pronounced between industrialising EU 
countries and the U.S. ($4.89 vs. $21.50) and less pronounced between industrialised EU 
countries and the U.S. ($18.06 vs. $21.50).  
Comparing average hourly compensation costs in EU countries with the U.S. compensation 
costs shows that average compensation cost levels are slightly higher for EU members in the 
primary metal manufacturing sector ($32.86 vs. $31.82) and slightly lower in the fabricated 
Ø min. max. Ø min. max. Ø min. max.
Total 15.13 4.49  - 32.56 32.86 10.04  - 55.09 25.20 6.98  - 41.17
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
6.98  - 7.96
Industrialised 
Countries
18.06 5.88  - 32.56 38.56 11.21  - 55.09 30.49 9.44  - 41.17
11.96 10.04  - 14.15 7.57
Manufacturing Wages     
(in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Industrialising 
Countries
4.89 4.49  - 5.66
Source: Author's calculations; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011 
Table 6.20 Labour Costs - European Union 
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in $)
Hourly Compensation Costs (in $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
21.50 31.82 26.15United States
Table 6.21 Wages 2007 - United States 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011 
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product manufacturing sector ($25.20 vs. $26.15). Discriminating between industrialising 
and industrialised EU members reveals that on average, industrialising members have a 
comparative advantage over the U.S. (primary metal manufacturing: $11.96 vs. $31.82; 
fabricated metal manufacturing: $7.57 vs. $26.15). On the other hand industrialised members 
face a comparative disadvantage (primary metal manufacturing: $38.56 vs. $31.82; 
fabricated metal manufacturing sector: $30.49 vs. $26.15). 
It can be assumed that industrialising EU countries primarily compete based on production 
costs while industrialised EU countries primarily compete based on quality. 
 
6.3.1.2 Other Europe 
The study includes two European countries which are not members of the EU, Norway and 
Switzerland.  
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports to the 
U.S. in the case of Norway and to increasing steel exports to the U.S. for Switzerland. The 
immediate decline for both countries lasts for an average of 1 month. Three of the 8 single 
impulse response values are statistically significant (68% error bands: 1; 95% error bands: 
2), a relative share of 37.5%. Thereby, one statistically significant impulse response value is 
negative (Norway) and two significant impulse response values are positive (Switzerland). 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
In terms of the relative importance of a one-standard deviation oil price shock to the 
volatility of steel exports from other European countries (non-EU members) to the U.S., 
fifteen months after the oil price shock the relative  importance is high for Norway and 
Switzerland. 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 23.3%; steel import value: 20%; exchange rates: 4.4%; 
U.S. real GDP: 3.8%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is Granger causality for Switzerland at the 1% level. There is no Granger causality in 
the case of Norway. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
Because Switzerland is landlocked, steel export trade distances to the U.S. can only be 
calculated for Norway (U.S. East Coast: 6,278km).  
Both European non-EU member countries are net importers of iron ore. In 2008, combined 
iron ore net imports were 1,943tmt. 
Norway and Switzerland do not produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the coking 
coal used for steel production needs to be imported. It can be assumed that considerable 
upstream trade distances are involved when supplying Norway and Switzerland with iron ore 
and coking coal to meet their demand. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The average ranking for Switzerland and Norway in the GCI of 2008/2009 is position 9 (of 
134). Moreover, the average ranking is 15 for overall infrastructure and for port 
infrastructure, 41 for domestic market size, and 36 for foreign market size. 
The only labour cost figures available are hourly compensation costs in the primary metal 
manufacturing sector for Norway ($53.57; U.S.: $31.82) and manufacturing wages for 
Switzerland ($28.17; U.S.: $21.50). Both figures indicate a comparative disadvantage of 
Norway and Switzerland when compared to the United States. 
 
6.3.1.3 Further Analysis 
European countries make up the largest share of countries included in the study. Altogether, 
25 European countries, 23 EU-members and 2 non-EU members, are analysed. 
On average, European economies are quite competitive by international standards. 
Comparing the average competitiveness of the European countries with the average 
competitiveness of the other regions shows that Europe is only 6th of 8 in the domestic 
market size ranking (average rank: 41) but 4 th in the foreign market size ranking (average 
rank: 37) and 2nd in the rankings for overall competitiveness (average rank: 28), overall 
infrastructure (average rank: 39), and port infrastructure (average rank: 40). 
Nonetheless, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 21 of 25 European countries following a 
one-standard deviation oil price shock. On average, exports to the U.S. decrease for a period 
of 2.7 months. There are a couple of possible reasons for this:  
First, although the average distance of trade calculated is below average (6,805km vs. 
8,164km), it falls into the long-distance trade category. The role of trade distances for 
European steel industries is essential because Europe is poor in natural resources. Therefore, 
large amounts of steelmaking raw materials such as iron ore and coking coal need to be 
imported, thereby making necessary long-distance upstream trade. As a consequence, most 
European steel industries are punished twice by increasing transport costs, first for the 
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import of raw materials from distant resource-rich countries such as Australia or Brazil, and 
second by increasing transport costs for the export of steel to the United States. 
Second, six European countries are landlocked which further increases upstream and 
downstream  transport costs due to expensive overland transport. Only European landlocked 
countries are able to export significant amounts of steel to the United States (A notable 
exception is Kazakhstan which is semi-landlocked because the Caspian Sea is not directly 
connected to other oceans.). Steel exports to the U.S. decrease in all European landlocked 
countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia) following an oil price 
shock with the exception of Switzerland. 
Third, European welfare states implicate high labour cost levels. The labour cost structure in 
Europe is above average for industrialising economies primarily competing based on price 
and for industrialised countries primarily competing based on quality. For example, Poland, 
which is in the transition phase to an industrialised country, has a comparative disadvantage 
in labour costs against U.S. neighbour Mexico (hourly compensation costs primary metal 
manufacturing: $10.04 vs. $5.81; hourly compensation costs fabricated metal manufacturing: 
$7.78 vs. $3.39). Likewise, many industrialised European countries have a comparative 
disadvantage in labour costs when compared to industrialised U.S. neighbour Canada.  
Fourth, the European countries face disadvantages compared to the U.S. neighbours Canada 
and Mexico in terms of cultural affiliation, common language (with the exception of Ireland 
and the UK), and common borders.  
Due to the reasons outlined above, it is reasonable to link the decreasing steel export figures 
to rising oil prices/transport costs in connection with trade distance and geographic location 
and to Europe’s labour cost structure. 
When it comes to the four European countries where steel exports to the U.S. increase, 
Ireland and the UK may profit from cultural affiliation and common language while 
landlocked Switzerland may profit from its excellent overall competitiveness (rank 2 of 134) 
and overall infrastructure (rank 1). Finally, the estimates for Romania may be biased by 
serial correlation. The increase in export figures for the four countries is statistically 
insignificant with the exception of Switzerland. 
 
6.3.2 C.I.S. 
The study includes three C.I.S. countries, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine.  
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports to the 
U.S. in the three C.I.S. countries analysed. The immediate decline lasts for an average of 4.3 
months. Five of the 13 single impulse response values estimated are statistically significant 
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(68% error bands: 1; 90% error bands: 3; 95% error bands: 1), a relative share of 38.4%. All 
statistically significant single impulse values are negative. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
In terms of the relative importance of a one-standard deviation oil price shock to the 
volatility of steel exports from C.I.S. countries to the U.S., fifteen months after the oil price 
shock the relative  importance is moderate for Russia, high for Ukraine, and very high for 
Kazakhstan. The average relative importance for the three nations is 26.9% (high). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 26.9 %; steel import value: 7.8%; exchange rates: 8.4%; 
U.S. real GDP: 14.1%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 2 of 3 
C.I.S. countries analysed. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test result confirms the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 2 of 3 countries at the 1% level. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Of the three C.I.S states included in the analysis, one is effectively landlocked (Kazakhstan 
has only access to the Caspian Sea which is not directly linked to other oceans.). For Russia 
and Ukraine, the shortest steel export trade route to the U.S. is the trade route between each 
country and the U.S. East Coast. The average trade distance between the C.I.S. region and 
the U.S. is 9,121km (calculated on the basis of the shortest trade route between each C.I.S. 
country and the U.S.). Thereby, the trade distance is 8,100km for Russia and 10,141km for 
the Ukraine. 
The C.I.S. region is a net exporter of iron ore (net exports in 2008: 46,053tmt). In this 
context, Ukraine is among the top five iron ore exporters (3% of global exports or 34.1mmt 
in 2011). 
Kazakhstan (exports in 2011: 1Mt) and Russia (exports in 2011: 14Mt) are among the main 
coking coal exporters and Ukraine is producing coking coal domestically. 
Therefore, the region is largely self-sufficient regarding coking coal and iron ore which gives 
the region a comparative advantage. 
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Competitiveness Analysis 
The average ranking of the three C.I.S. countries in the GCI of 2008/2009 is position 63 (of 
134). Moreover, the average rank is 78 for overall infrastructure, 88 for port infrastructure, 
30 for domestic market size, and 31 for foreign market size. No labour cost data are available 
for the three C.I.S. countries. 
 
Further Analysis 
The average competitiveness of the C.I.S. countries analysed is below average relative to the 
average competitiveness of the other regions with the exception of market size where the 
average of the surveyed countries from the region is 2nd of 8 in both categories (average rank 
domestic market size: 30; average rank foreign market size: 31). In terms of overall 
competitiveness, the region is 5th of 8 (average rank: 63) and 7th of 8 in the rankings for 
overall infrastructure (average rank: 78) and port infrastructure (average rank: 88). 
Steel exports to the U.S. decrease for the three countries from the region following an oil 
price shock. Thereby, the average downturn (-4.3 months) is the longest of all regions. Five 
of 13 or 38.4% of the impulse response values are statistically significant. All 13 values are 
negative. Moreover, the average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be 
explained by volatility in the oil price variable (23.6%) is significantly above average 
(16.1%) which also indicates the importance of oil prices/transport costs for steel exports to 
the United States. 
The distance of trade seems to be a significant determinant of the declining export figures. 
Although the steel industries of the countries surveyed do not depend on iron ore and coking 
coal imports from distant locations and are hence not affected by long-distance upstream 
transport costs, the average downstream trade distance estimated (9,121km) is above average 
(8,164km). The effect of downstream trade distances might be accelerated by the region’s 
underdeveloped (port) infrastructure. In the case of Kazakhstan, whose steel industry is the 
most affected in the region, the fact that the country is ‘semi-landlocked’ may also play a 
role. Kazakhstan is only connected directly to the Caspian Sea which is not directly 
connected to other oceans so that direct ocean transport from Kazakhstan to the U.S. is not 
possible. 
 
6.3.3 North America 
The study includes nine North American countries. The VEC-model estimates (IRF, VD, 
GC), the upstream and downstream trade distances, and the competitiveness rankings for 
those countries can be summarised as follows: 
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Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports to the 
U.S. in none of the North American countries surveyed. Instead, steel export figures increase 
for the 9 countries analysed. The immediate increase for the countries surveyed lasts for an 
average of 3.9 months. 11 of the 35 single impulse response values are statistically 
significant (68% error bands: 8; 90% error bands: 2; 95% error bands: 1), a relative share of 
31.4%. All statistically significant impulse response values can be attributed to countries 
with increasing steel export figures. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is very low for 1 
country, low for 2 countries, medium for 4 countries, high for 2 countries, and very high for 
none of the countries. 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 14.4 %; steel import value: 12.4%; exchange rates: 
10.6%; U.S. real GDP: 6.5%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory 
power of all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 4 of 
9 or 44.4% of the North American countries analysed. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test result confirms the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 4 of 9 countries, (1% level: 3; 10% level: 1), a 
relative share of 44.4%. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
None of the nine North American countries is landlocked. The shortest sea trade routes 
between the countries analysed and the United States are trade routes to the U.S. West Coast 
in one case, trade routes to the U.S. East Coast in two cases, and trade routes to the U.S. Gulf 
Coast in six cases. The average trade distance between the North American states and the 
U.S. is 2,492km (calculated on the basis of the shortest trade route between each exporting 
country and the U.S.). Thereby, trade distances are between 1,140km (Canada) and 4,054km 
(El Salvador).  
North America is a net exporter of iron ore. In 2008, North American iron ore net exports 
were 14,376tmt. No net import/export figures can be calculated for coking coal due to a lack 
of data available. However, in 2011 Canada (28Mt) and the United States (63Mt) accounted 
for 33% of worldwide coking coal exports. Hence, it can be assumed that the region has a 
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comparative advantage in steelmaking raw material abundance in addition to the advantage 
of the short trade distances for exporting steel to the United States. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The average rank of the 9 North American countries in the GCI of 2008/2009 is position 69 
(of 134). Moreover, the average ranks calculated are rank 62 for overall infrastructure, 66 for 
port infrastructure, 67 for domestic market size, and 70 for foreign market size. 
Labour cost figures are only available for Canada (manufacturing wages: $22.40; hourly 
compensation costs primary metal manufacturing: $44.71; hourly compensation costs 
fabricated product manufacturing: $29.59) and Mexico (hourly compensation costs primary 
metal manufacturing: $5.81; hourly compensation costs fabricated product manufacturing: 
$3.39). Due to the fact that the remaining countries from the region analysed are all 
developing or industrialising countries, it can be assumed that their labour cost levels are 
similar to Mexican labour costs which would give all countries but Canada a comparative 
advantage over the U.S. in terms of labour costs. 
 
Further Analysis 
The average competitiveness of the North American countries surveyed is below average by 
international standards. When comparing the average competitiveness of the North American 
countries with the average competitiveness calculated for the countries from the other 
regions, North America is 6th of 8 in the overall competitiveness ranking (average rank: 69), 
5th in overall (average rank: 62) and port infrastructure rankings (average rank: 66), and 8th in 
the domestic (average rank: 67) and foreign market size rankings (average rank: 70). That is, 
the region is underperforming in relation to most other regions. The picture is even more 
clear when Canada is excluded (8th of 8 in overall competitiveness (average rank: 77), 
domestic (average rank: 74) and foreign market size (average rank: 77); 7 th in overall 
infrastructure (average rank: 69); 5th in the category of port infrastructure (average rank: 
73)). 
However, despite the region’s relative inability to compete internationally in the rankings 
selected for analysis, steel exports to the U.S. increase for all 9 countries following an oil 
price shock. On average, exports to the U.S. increase for a period of 3.9 months. Since the 
increase is certainly not a result of the region’s relative competitiveness, distance of trade is 
a logical candidate for explaining the rising steel export volumes. The average trade distance 
calculated for steel exports from all 64 countries to the U.S. is 8,164km. The average trade 
distance for the 9 North American countries, however, is only 2,492km. This figure is about 
70% below the average trade distance and by far the lowest average trade distance of all 
regions. 
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It can be assumed that the steel industry of industrialised Canada primarily competes based 
on quality and therefore increases its export figures to the neighbouring U.S. at the cost of 
steel industries of more distant industrialised countries also primarily competing based on 
quality. At the same time, it can be assumed that the 8 remaining developing and 
industrialising North American countries, for example Mexico, primarily compete based on 
price and therefore increase their export market share at the expense of steel industries of 
more distant developing and industrialising countries which also primarily compete based on 
price.  
A major component of production costs are labour costs which are often the main reason to 
import from abroad. In 2008, manufacturing wages paid in China were at $1.06 while hourly 
compensation costs in Mexico were at $5.81 in the primary metal manufacturing sector and 
at $3.39 in the fabricated manufacturing sector. If one adds the additional expenses included 
in the hourly compensation cost ratio to Chinese manufacturing wages (Unfortunately, no 
data on manufacturing wages  are available for Mexico and no data on compensation costs 
are available for China so that the figures cannot be compared directly.), the small labour 
cost margin (For instance, the difference between Chinese manufacturing wages and 
Mexican compensation costs in the fabricated product manufacturing sector is only $2.33.) 
between China and Mexico shrinks even more. As both countries primarily compete based 
on price, the relatively small labour cost advantage of China over Mexico may be neutralised 
or even reversed at high oil price levels due to the substantial differences in trade distance 
with the United States. 
The situation for steel industries competing primarily based on quality may be similar. In 
case the Canadian steel industry is able to produce the same qualities of steel as the German 
steel industry, why should the United States import from relatively distant Germany where 
labour costs are above Canadian labour costs (manufacturing wages: $25.05 vs. $22.40; 
compensation costs primary metal manufacturing: $55.09 vs. $44.71; compensation costs 
fabricated product manufacturing: $41.17 vs. $29.59), not to mention the considerably higher 
downstream costs for imports from Germany at high oil price levels? Similar labour cost 
differences exist between Canada and other European Countries such as Belgium, Finland, 
or Sweden. 
In case of Canada and Mexico, additional factors such as the NAFTA membership, common 
borders, Maquiladoras (Mexico), cultural affiliation (Canada) or common language (Canada) 
may add to the advantage of short-distance transport. 
Presumably for these reasons, Canadian steel exports to the U.S. were up 21.3% on a year-
over-year basis for the first three quarters of 2008, while steel exports from Mexico to the 
U.S. were up 6.8% for the same time period. 
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Summing up, the steel industries of the North American countries included in the analysis 
clearly benefit from an oil price shock (allegedly at the expense of the steel industries of 
more distant countries with a similar structure) when it comes to exports to the United States.  
 
6.3.4 South America 
The study includes 7 South American countries. The VEC model estimates (IRF, VD, GC), 
the upstream and downstream steel trade distances, and the competitiveness rankings for 
those countries can be summarised as follows: 
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation oil price shock leads to increasing steel exports to the U.S. in 4 of 
the 7 countries surveyed and to decreasing steel exports in 3 countries. The immediate 
increase for the 7 South American countries lasts for an average of 0.7 months. The average 
decrease for the 3 countries (Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay) with declining export figures is 
1.3 months while the average increase for the 4 countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru) 
with increasing export figures is 2.3 months. Three of the 13 single impulse response values 
are statistically significant at 68% error bands, a relative share of 23.1%. Thereby, all 
statistically significant impulse response values can be attributed to countries with increasing 
steel export figures. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is very low for 2 
countries, low for 1 country, medium for 3 countries, high for 1 country, and very high for 
none of the countries. The average relative importance for the South American countries is 
11.8% (medium), 15.8% (medium) for the 4 countries with increasing export figures and 
6.5% (low) for the 3 countries with decreasing export figures. 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 11.8 %; steel import value: 11.5%; exchange rates: 6.8%; 
U.S. real GDP: 2.9%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 3 of 7 or 
42.9% of the South American countries analysed. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test result confirms the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 2 of 7 countries at the 5% level, a relative share of 
28.6%. 
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Trade Distance Analysis 
None of the 7 South American countries included in the analysis is landlocked. The shortest 
sea trade routes between the countries analysed and the U.S. include trade routes to the U.S. 
West Coast in 4 cases and trade routes to the U.S. East Coast in 3 cases. The average steel 
export trade distance between the South American states and the U.S. is 6,901km (calculated 
on the basis of the shortest trade route between each exporting country and the U.S.). 
Thereby, the trade distances calculated are between 2,763km (Colombia) and 11,352km 
(Argentina). The region can be split along trade distances. The South American countries 
located in the north of the region benefit from short or moderate trade distances to the U.S. 
(the trade distances estimated for Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are between 2,763km 
and 5,876km). Trade distances for countries in the south of the region are long or very long 
(the trade distances calculated for Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are between 7,756km and 
11,352km). 
South America is a very significant net exporter of iron ore. In 2008, iron ore net exports 
from South America were 291,901tmt. This figure is mainly due to Brazil which is the 
second-largest exporter of iron ore and accounted for 30.2% of total iron ore exports in 2011. 
No net import/export figures can be calculated for coking coal due to a lack of data available. 
However, Colombia is the only significant South American coking coal exporter (1Mt in 
2010) and Brazil is one of the most significant coking coal importers (12Mt in 2010). It can 
therefore be assumed that the region is a net importer of coking coal. Hence, South America 
is only partially resource abundant when it comes to steel making raw materials. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The average ranking of the South American countries analysed in the GCI of 2008/2009 is 
position 74 (of 134). Moreover, the average ranks are 83 for overall infrastructure, 92 for 
port infrastructure, 43 for domestic market size, and 54 for foreign market size. 
Labour cost figures are only available for Argentina (manufacturing wages: $5.47; hourly 
compensation costs primary metal manufacturing: $11.73; hourly compensation costs 
fabricated product manufacturing: $6.50) and Brazil (manufacturing wages: $3.81; hourly 
compensation costs primary metal manufacturing: $12.27; hourly compensation costs 
fabricated product manufacturing: $5.95). Both countries have a significant labour cost 
advantage over the United States. Due to the fact that the countries from the region are all 
industrialising countries, it can be assumed that the steel industries of the other countries 
analysed also profit from a labour cost advantage over the United States. 
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Further Analysis 
On average, the South American countries analysed are even less competitive than the North 
American countries. When comparing their average competitiveness with the average 
competitiveness estimated for the other regions, South America is 7th of 8 in overall 
competitiveness (average rank: 74) and foreign market size (average rank: 54), and 8 th of 8 in 
overall infrastructure (average rank: 83), port infrastructure (average rank: 92), and domestic 
market size (average rank: 43). In other words, compared to the other regions the region is 
relatively un-competitive. 
Nonetheless, following an oil price shock steel exports to the U.S. increase in 4 of 7 
countries surveyed. On average, exports increase by 0.7 months so that the balance of the 
region is slightly positive.  
In terms of the effects of the oil price shock on the steel industries of the respective 
countries, the South American landmass can be effectively divided into two parts. That is, 
the geographical shape of the region is such that some of the countries profit, while others do 
not. On the one hand, steel exports to the U.S. either increase (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru) 
or only decrease marginally (Ecuador) in counties located on the northern coast or on the 
western coast of the region. On the other hand, the export volumes of countries located on 
the eastern coast (Argentina, Uruguay) decrease although the decrease is statistically 
insignificant. Again, the distance of trade is an obvious determining factor. Trade distances 
between the northern (Brazil: 5,876km; Colombia: 2,763km) and western coast (Chile: 
7,756km; Ecuador: 4,104km; Peru: 5,318km) and the United States are shorter when 
compared with trade distances between countries on the eastern coastline (Argentina: 
11,352km; Uruguay: 11,138km) and the United States. Trade distances from Chile to the 
U.S. are also quite long, but the country seems to compensate the distance effect by its 
competitiveness which is significantly above South American standards. 
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6.3.5 Africa 
The study includes three African countries, Algeria, Egypt and South Africa.  
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports for the 
three African countries. The immediate decline lasts for an average of 2.7 months. Five of 
the 8 single impulse response values are statistically significant at 68% error bands, a relative 
share of 62.5%. All statistically significant single impulse response values are negative. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is medium for 
South Africa and high for Algeria and Egypt. 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 21.4%; steel import value: 9.3%; exchange rates: 17.8%; 
U.S. real GDP: 3.2%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 2 of 3 
African countries analysed. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test result confirms the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for none of the countries. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
None of the African countries is landlocked. The shortest steel export trade route to the U.S. 
is the trade route between the African states and the U.S. East Coast. The average trade 
distance estimated is 10,353km (calculated on the basis of the shortest trade route between 
each country and the U.S.). Thereby, trade distances are between 6,907km (Algeria) and 
14,627km (South Africa).  
The African continent is a net exporter of iron ore (net exports in 2008: 36,263tmt). In this 
context, South Africa is among the top five iron ore exporters (4.5% of global exports in 
2011). Moreover, South Africa (exports in 2011: 1Mt) is among the largest coking coal 
exporters and Algeria and Egypt produce coking coal domestically. Therefore, the countries 
analysed are self-sufficient to a certain extent with regard to steelmaking raw materials. 
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Competitiveness Analysis 
The average rank of the three African countries in the GCI of 2008/2009 is position 75 (of 
134). Moreover, the average ranks are 63 for overall infrastructure, 74 for port infrastructure, 
33 for domestic market size, and 39 for foreign market size. No labour cost data are available 
for the African countries analysed. 
 
Further Analysis 
The average competitiveness of the African countries analysed is below average for most 
competitive categories. Their overall competitiveness relative to the average competitiveness 
of the other regions is 8th of 8 (average rank: 75). Moreover, the relative competitiveness of 
the African countries is 6th of 8 for overall infrastructure (average rank: 63) and port 
infrastructure (average rank: 74), 3rd of 8 for domestic market size (average rank: 33), and 5th 
of 8 for foreign market size (average rank: 39). 
Steel export volumes to the U.S. decrease for all African countries surveyed in reaction to a 
one-standard deviation oil price shock. The average length of the downturn is 2.7 months. 
Thereby, 5 of 8 or 62.5% of the impulse response values (the impulse response values are all 
negative) are statistically significant which is above the average of 34.5%. 
The African countries analysed produce the main steelmaking raw materials domestically to 
a certain extent (Algeria, Egypt) or are self-sufficient (South Africa). The calculated 
downstream trade differences for steel exports to the U.S. are quite different for Algeria 
(6,907km), Egypt (9,526km), and South Africa (14,627km) so that using the average 
(10,353km) for interpretation purposes would be misleading. However, as a tendency, the 
longer the downstream trade distances for the African countries, the stronger the downturn of 
steel exports to the United States. While the impact on the Algerian steel industry is weakest, 
the impact on the South African steel industry is strongest. Thereby, the downturn is at least 
partially statistically significant for all countries. 
 
6.3.6 Middle East 
The study includes 4 countries from the Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the 
United Arab Emirates.  
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports to the 
U.S. in 3 of the 4 Middle Eastern countries surveyed and to increasing steel exports in 1 
country (UAE). The immediate average decline for the countries analysed lasts for an 
average of 2 months. The average decline for the 3 countries with declining export figures is 
3.3 months. The average increase of the UAE’s steel exports lasts for 2 months. Seven of the 
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12 single impulse response values included in the analysis are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 3; 90% error bands: 1; 95% error bands: 3), a relative share of 58.3%. Thereby, 
all statistically significant impulse response values can be attributed to countries with 
decreasing steel export figures. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is medium for 3 
countries and very high for 1 country (Turkey). The average relative importance for the 4 
countries is 19.9% (medium), 22.3% (high) for the 3 countries with decreasing export 
figures, and 12.7% (medium) for the UAE.  
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 19.9 %; steel import value: 14.4%; exchange rates: 
10.7%; U.S. real GDP: 9.3%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory 
power of all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 2 of 
4 countries analysed. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test result confirms the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 1 of 4 countries at the 1% level, a relative share of 
25%. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
None of the 4 Middle Eastern countries surveyed is landlocked. The shortest steel export 
trade route to the U.S. is the trade route between the Middle Eastern nations and the U.S. 
East Coast. The average trade distance between the region and the U.S. is 11,479km 
(calculated on the basis of the shortest trade route between each country and the U.S.). 
Thereby, the trade distances are between 9,567km (Turkey) and 15,316km (UAE).  
The region is a net importer of iron ore (net imports in 2008: 21,946tmt). While no Middle 
Eastern country is among the main coking coal exporters, Turkey is one of the main 
importers of coking coal (imports in 2011: 4.6Mt). Apart from Turkey, none of the Middle 
Eastern countries surveyed produces coking coal domestically. Summing up, the region 
needs to import steelmaking raw materials to a large extent which involves long upstream 
trade distances. 
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Competitiveness Analysis 
The average rank of the 4 countries in the GCI of 2008/2009 is position 36 (of 134). 
Moreover, the average ranks are 40 for overall infrastructure, 60 for port infrastructure, 35 
for domestic market size, and 33 for foreign market size. Labour cost data are only available 
for Israel which has a comparative advantage over the U.S. in all labour cost categories 
(manufacturing wages: $12.52 vs. $21.50; hourly compensation costs primary metal 
manufacturing: $13.20 vs. $31.82; hourly compensation costs fabricated product 
manufacturing: $12.38 vs. $26.15). 
 
Further Analysis 
The average competitiveness of the Middle Eastern countries analysed can be described as 
solid average. The average competitiveness estimated for the 4 countries is 4th of 8 in overall 
competitiveness (average rank: 36), port infrastructure (average rank: 60) and domestic 
market size (average rank: 35) and 3rd of 8 in overall infrastructure (average rank: 40) and 
foreign market size (average rank: 33). 
Despite the solid average competitiveness of the countries surveyed, steel exports to the U.S. 
decrease for 3 of 4 countries following an oil price shock. Thereby, the increase of steel 
exports from the UAE to the U.S. remains statistically insignificant. The average length of 
the downturn of steel exports lasts for 2 months. Seven of 12 impulse response values are 
statistically significant (the significant values are all negative) which is a relative share of 
58.3%. The relative share is well above average (34.5%). 
Due to the fact that there is virtually no production of coking coal or iron ore in the region, 
the most significant steelmaking raw materials need to be imported to a large extent from 
distant countries such as Australia or Brazil, which involves very long distance trade. In 
addition, the calculated average downstream trade distance from the Middle Eastern 
countries to the U.S. is 11,479km and therefore 28.9% above average (8,164km). Again, the 
interplay of long trade distances and rising oil prices explains the estimated downturn of 
steel exports from the region to the U.S. to a significant extent. 
 
6.3.7 Asia 
The study includes 11 Asian countries. The VEC model estimates (IRF, VD, GC), the 
upstream and downstream steel trade distances, and the competitiveness rankings for those 
countries can be summarised as follows: 
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports to the 
U.S. in 8 of the 11 Asian countries surveyed and to increasing steel exports in 3 countries. 
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The immediate decline for the Asian countries lasts for an average of 2.7 months. The 
average decline for the 8 countries with declining export figures is 3.4 months while the 
average for the 3 countries (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore) with increasing export figures 
is 1 month. Of the 30 single impulse values included in the analysis, 5 are statistically 
significant (68% error bands: 4; 90% error bands: 1), a relative share of 16.7%. Thereby, all 
statistically significant single impulse response values can be attributed to countries with 
decreasing steel export figures. 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is very low for 1 
country, low for 6 countries, medium for 2 countries, high for 2 countries, and very high for 
none of the countries. The average relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable of the 11 countries is 12% (medium), 13.3% (medium) for the 8 countries 
with decreasing export figures, and 8.4% (low) for the 3 countries with increasing export 
figures. 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 12 %; steel import value: 10.4%; exchange rates: 8.4%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6.4%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 4 of 11 or 
36.4% of the Asian countries analysed. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test result confirms the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 4 of 11 countries, (1% level: 1; 5% level: 1; 10% 
level: 2), a relative share of 36.4%. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
None of the 11 countries surveyed is landlocked. The shortest steel export trade route to the 
U.S. for 10 of the countries is the trade route between Asia and the U.S. West Coast. In one 
case (India), the shortest trade route is between the Indian subcontinent and the U.S. East 
Coast. The average trade distance between Asia and the U.S. is 13,092km (calculated on the 
basis of the shortest trade route between each country and the U.S.). Thereby, the trade 
distances for Asian countries are between 9,524km (Japan) and 15,516km (India).  
Asia is a significant net importer of iron ore. Although India is among the top five iron ore 
exporters worldwide, Asian iron ore net imports were at 555,766tmt in 2008. Regarding 
coking coal, no net import/export figures can be calculated due to a lack of data availability. 
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However, while Mongolia is one of the main coking coal exporters (20Mt in 2011), China 
(38Mt in 2011), India (19Mt in 2011), Japan (54Mt in 2011), South Korea (32Mt in 2011), 
and Taiwan (4Mt in 2011) are among the main coking coal importers. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that significant upstream trade distances are involved when supplying Asian 
countries with iron ore and coking coal to meet their demand. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The average rank of the countries from the region surveyed in the GCI of 2008/2009 is 
position 29 (of 134). Moreover, the average ranks are 42 for overall infrastructure, 45 for 
port infrastructure, 22 for domestic market size, and 14 for foreign market size.  
Labour cost data are only published for some of the countries surveyed. The manufacturing 
wages available (China: $1.06; India: $1.17; Japan: $13.45; Philippines: $1.19; Singapore: 
$10.45) are well below U.S. standards ($21.50). The same accounts for hourly compensation 
costs in the primary metal manufacturing sector (U.S.: $31.82 vs. Philippines: $1.66, South 
Korea: $21.40, Taiwan: $10.69) with the exception of Japan ($32.41) and for hourly 
compensation costs in the fabricated product manufacturing sector (U.S.: $26.15 vs. Japan: 
$20.83, Philippines: $1.16, Singapore: $12.17, South Korea: $14.35, Taiwan: $6.28). 
 
Further Analysis 
On average, Asian economies are quite competitive by international standards. Comparing 
the average economic competitiveness of the Asian countries analysed with the average 
competitiveness of other regions shows that Asia is 3rd of 8 in overall competitiveness 
(average rank: 29) slightly behind Europe (average rank: 28), 4th in terms of overall 
infrastructure (average rank: 42), 3rd in port infrastructure (average rank: 45), and 1st in 
domestic (average rank: 22) and foreign market size (average rank: 14). 
Despite Asia’s competitiveness, steel exports from Asia to the U.S. decrease for 8 of 11 
countries analysed. At first glance, the average decline of Asian exports to the U.S. is equal 
to the average decline of the European countries included in the analysis. On average, 
exports to the U.S. decline for 2.7 months in both regions. However, while about one third or 
36.3% of the single impulse response values are statistically significant (27 of 29 significant 
values are negative) in case of Europe, only one sixth or 16.7% of the impulse response 
values are statistically significant (all statistically significant impulse values are negative) in 
case of Asia. Moreover, the relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that can be 
attributed to the volatility in the oil price variable is lower for Asia than for Europe (12% vs. 
17.1%). 
Thereby, the average distance of trade between the Asian countries and the U.S. is 
significantly longer than the average trade distance between European countries and the 
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United States. While the average steel trade distance calculated is 6,805km for Europe, it is 
13,092km for Asia, which is a relative difference of 48%. Furthermore, Asia also depends on 
iron ore and coking coal imports from other regions which implicates long upstream trade 
distances/transport costs. 
The difference in the relative share of statistically significant impulse response values and 
the relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be attributed to variation in the oil 
price variable may be due to the following reasons: First, the labour cost structure of most 
Asian countries is below the labour cost structure of most European countries. For example, 
industrialised Japan’s labour cost structure is well below that of France (manufacturing 
wages: $13.45 vs. $20.30; hourly compensation costs primary metal manufacturing: $32.41 
vs. $42.31; hourly compensation costs fabricated product manufacturing: $20.83 vs. $33.26). 
Other industrialised European countries such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany or 
Sweden face similar comparative disadvantages in terms of labour costs when compared to 
industrialised Asian countries such as Japan, Singapore, or South Korea. Second, none of the 
Asian countries analysed is landlocked contrary to a number of European countries which 
face additional transport costs for relatively cost intensive overland transport.  
Although European steel industries seem to be relatively more impacted by an oil price 
shock than Asian steel industries, steel exports also decline for the majority of Asian 
countries analysed. The increase of exports in the 3 Asian countries (Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore), however remains short and statistically insignificant. It is noteworthy and quite 
surprising that the steel industries of the largest Asian economies, China and India, are 
among the Asian countries that are most affected by a shock in oil prices. 
 
6.3.8 Oceania 
The Study includes two countries from Oceania, Australia and New Zealand.  
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports to the 
U.S. for both countries. The immediate decline lasts for an average of 1.5 months. Two of 
the three single impulse response values included in the analysis are statistically significant 
(68% error bands: 1; 90% error bands: 1), a relative share of 66.7%.  
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is rather low for 
New Zealand and very high for Australia. 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 25.5 %; steel import value: 6.6%; exchange rates: 3.8%; 
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U.S. real GDP: 5.1%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for both 
Oceanian countries analysed. 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
There is no Granger causality for for Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Trade Distance Analysis 
Australia and New Zealand are not landlocked. The shortest steel export trade routes to the 
U.S. for both countries are the trade routes between Oceania and the U.S. West Coast. The 
average trade distance between Oceania and the U.S. is 13,050km (calculated on the basis of 
the shortest trade route between each country and the U.S.). Thereby, the trade distance is 
somewhat shorter for New Zealand (12,169km) than for Australia (13,930km). 
Oceania is the largest iron ore net exporting region (net exports in 2008: 304,782tst) mainly 
due to Australia which is the most significant iron ore exporter worldwide (38% of global 
iron ore exports in 2011). Additionally, Australia is also the largest coking coal exporter 
worldwide (140Mt in 2011) while New Zealand is among the largest exporters of coking 
coal (2.1Mt in 2011). Therefore, Oceania is resource abundant with regard to the two main 
steel making raw materials. 
 
Competitiveness Analysis 
The average rank of the countries from the region surveyed in the GCI of 2008/2009 is 
position 29 (of 134). Moreover, the average ranks are 42 for overall infrastructure, 45 for 
port infrastructure, 22 for domestic market size, and 14 for foreign market size.  
Australia’s labour cost structure is similar to that of the United States. New Zealand has a 
moderate competitive edge over the U.S. in terms of manufacturing wages ($15.95 vs. 
$21.50). 
 
Further Analysis 
The average competitiveness of the two Oceanian countries is 5th of 8 for domestic market 
size (average rank: 37), 6th of 8 in foreign market size (average rank: 53), and 1st of 8 in 
overall competitiveness (average rank: 21), overall infrastructure (average rank: 38), and port 
infrastructure (average rank: 32). 
Steel export volumes to the U.S. decrease for both Australia and New Zealand following a 
one-standard deviation oil price shock. The average length of the downturn lasts for 1.5 
months. Thereby, two thirds or 2 of 3 impulse response values are statistically significant 
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which is well above the average of 34.5% and the highest relative share for all regions. In 
addition, the average relative share of the volatility in the steel export variable that can be 
explained by variations in the oil price variable is the largest of all regions (25.5%) and well 
above average (16.1%). 
Both Australia and New Zealand are self-sufficient with regard to the main steel making raw 
materials and therefore have a comparative advantage because their steel industries are not 
affected by upstream trade distance costs from distant countries. However, the average steel 
trade distance calculated for both countries (13,050km) is only marginally lower than the 
average calculated for Asia (13,092km) which faces the longest average downstream trade 
distance of all regions. The average trade distance for Oceania is 37.4% above the average of 
8,164km. When compared to Asia (-2.7 months), the average decrease in steel exports (-1.5 
months) is somewhat shorter which may be due to the regions self-sufficiency in steelmaking 
raw materials.  
Summing up, the evidence suggests that the interplay between rising oil prices and very long 
distance trade is an important determinant of steel export volumes from Oceania to the 
United States. 
 
6.3.9 Conclusion 
Tables 6.21-6.24 summarise the main evaluation criteria used in the analysis in section 6.3. 
Table 6.22 shows the average position of the regions in the competitiveness rankings. As 
already described above, these averages have been calculated based on the rankings of the 
countries from each region which have been included in the analysis by steel export country 
(see 6.2).  
 
Source: Author's calculations; Schwab and Porter 2008 
Europe 28 39 40 41 37
C:I.S. 63 78 88 30 31
North America 69 62 66 67 70
South America 74 83 92 43 54
Africa 75 63 74 33 39
Middle East 36 40 60 35 33
Asia 29 42 45 22 14
Oceania 21 38 32 37 53
Ø Foreign 
Market Size
Region Ø GCI
Ø Overall 
Infrastructure
Ø Port 
Infrastructure
Ø Domestic 
Market Size
Table 6.22 Average Competitiveness of Regions 
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Table 6.23 gives an overview of the number of landlocked and non-landlocked countries for 
each region. It turns out that 57 of the 64 most significant steel exporters to the U.S. are not 
landlocked. This indicates the burden of being landlocked for international trade. 
Table 6.24 shows the number of countries included for each region, the number of countries 
where steel exports to the U.S. increase/decrease following a one-standard deviation oil price 
shock, and the average length of the increase/decrease for each region. On average, steel 
exports to the U.S. increase for North and South America and decrease for Africa, Asia, the 
C.I.S., Europe, the Middle East, and Oceania. Thereby, it becomes evident that the distance 
of trade is a significant determinant of trade patterns in the global steel industry and that the 
industry’s trade patterns shift following a shock in real oil prices.  
Table 6.23 Landlocked and Non-landlocked Countries per Region 
Source: Author's calculations 
Europe 25 6 19
C.I.S. 3 1 2
North America 9 0 9
South America 7 0 7
Africa 3 0 3
Middle East 4 0 4
Asia 11 0 11
Oceania 2 0 2
Total 64 7 57
Region Landlocked
Non-
landlocked
Number of 
Countries
Table 6.24 Increasing Exports vs. Decreasing Exports by Region 
Source: Author's calculations 
Europe 25 4 21 -2.7
C.I.S. 3 0 3 -4.3
North America 9 9 0 3.9
South America 7 4 3 0.7
Africa 3 0 3 -2.7
Middle East 4 1 3 -2.0
Asia 11 3 8 -2.7
Oceania 2 0 2 -1.5
Region
Number of 
Countries
Countries with 
Increasing 
Export Figures
Countries with 
Decreasing 
Export Figures
Average of Impulse 
Response Estimates 
(in months)
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Table 6.25 shows the average steel trade distance with the U.S. for each region, the 
minimal/maximal trade distance calculated for the countries from each region, and the 
nearest U.S. coast(s) for each region.  
The North American countries profit from the lowest average trade distance with the U.S. 
(average trade distance: 2,492km; average increase of steel exports: 3.9 months). South 
American exports to the U.S. also increase, albeit at a lower level (0.7 months). The average 
South American trade distance (6,901km) is below the average of 8,164km. However, if one 
calculates the average trade distance for South American countries whose steel industries 
profit (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru)/are adversely affected (Argentina, Peru, Uruguay) by 
the oil price shock, the importance of distance becomes even clearer. While the trade 
distance for those countries which profit is well below the average trade distance (5,428km 
vs. 8.164km), the trade distance of the countries whose industries are adversely affected is 
above average (8,864km vs. 8.164km). 
Average calculated trade distances for the adversely affected regions are well above the 
average trade distance with the exception of Europe (6,805km) where factors other than 
distance also contribute to the average decline of 2.7 months (see 6.3.1.3). 
Finally, table 6.26 shows the average explanatory power of the explanatory variables for the 
steel export variable for the countries from each region and table 6.27 shows the number of 
countries in each region where the oil price variable explains the largest (rank 1), second-
largest (rank 2) , third-largest (rank 3) and fourth-largest (rank 4) share of variation in the 
steel export variable in relation to the other explanatory variables.  
 
  
Europe 6,805 5,672  - 9,919 East Coast (19x)
C.I.S. 9,121 8,100  - 10,141 East Coast (2x)
North America 2,492 1,140  - 4,054 East Coast (2x), Gulf Coast (6x), West Coast (1x)
South America 6,901 2,763  - 11,352 East Coast (3x), Gulf Coast (4x)
Africa 10,353 6,907  - 14,627 East Coast (3x)
Middle East 11,479 9,567  - 15,316 East Coast (4x)
Asia 13,092 9,524  - 15,516 East Coast (1x), West Coast (10x)
Oceania 13,050 12,169  - 13,930 West Coast (2x)
Average 8,164 1,140  - 15,516 East Coast (34x), Gulf Coast (10x), West Coast (13x)
"nearest" U.S. Coasts
Ø Trade 
Distance
min./max.    
Trade Distance
Table 6.25 Steel Trade Distances to the U.S. (in km) 
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator) 
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It turns out that the oil price variable accounts for most of the variation in the steel export 
variable for all regions analysed. Thereby, the average explanatory power of the oil price 
variable for each region is either moderate (Europe, North America, South America, Middle 
East, Asia) or high (C.I.S., Africa). 
 
 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Category 6.4
After the analysis of the econometric estimates by exporting country (see 6.2) and region 
(see 6.3), the estimates for steel product categories for 18 selected countries exporting steel 
to the U.S. are analysed. The countries and steel categories chosen and the analytic 
procedure applied are described first (6.4.1) followed by the analysis of the selected 
countries (6.4.2 – 6.4.9). Finally, the findings from the analysis are summarised (6.4.10). 
 
OIL VALUE EXRA RGDP
Europe 17.9 11.6 8.7 7.0
C.I.S. 26.9 7.8 8.4 14.1
North America 14.4 12.4 10.6 6.5
South America 11.8 11.5 6.8 2.9
Africa 21.4 9.3 17.8 3.2
Middle East 19.9 14.4 10.7 9.3
Asia 12.0 10.4 8.4 6.4
Oceania 25.5 6.6 3.8 5.1
Table 6.26 Average Explanatory Power of the Explanatory 
Variables (in%) 
Source: Author's calculations  
abs. in % abs. in % abs. in % abs. in %
Europe 14 56.0 9 36.0 1 4.0 1 4.0
C.I.S. 2 66.7 1 33.3  -  -  -  -
North America 4 44.4 4 44.4 1 11.1  -  -
South America 3 42.9 1 14.2 3 42.9  -  -
Africa 2 66.7 1 33.3  -  -  -  -
Middle East 2 50.0 2 50.0  -  -  -  -
Asia 4 36.4 4 36.4 2 18.2 1 9.1
Oceania 2 100.0  -  -  -  -  -  -
Total 33 51.6 22 34.4 7 10.9 2 3.1
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
Table 6.27 Ranks of the Oil Price Variable 
 
Source: Author's calculations  
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6.4.1 Selected Countries/Steel Product Categories and Analytic 
Procedure 
Section 6.4.1 first describes the countries and steel categories analysed (6.4.1.1) and then 
describes the analytic procedure applied (6.4.1.2) 
 
6.4.1.1 Selected Countries and 
Steel Product Categories 
Among the 18 countries selected for analysis 
by steel export category are 14 of the top 15 
steel exporting countries88 in 2008 (World 
Steel Association 2010, see table 6.28). 
Additionally, Canada (7,440tmt), Mexico 
(5,993tmt), South Africa (2,188tmt) and 
Australia (1,421tmt) have been selected. 
Therefore, at least one country from each 
world region has been included in the analysis 
by category (see table 6.29). In 2008, the 18 
countries selected accounted for 75.8% of 
global steel exports.  
Export volumes to the U.S. are analysed for 
the 36 steel product categories listed in table 
6.30. 
 
 
  
China 56,304
Japan 36,923
Ukraine 28,648
Germany 28,639
Russia 28,429
Belgium 21,235
South Korea 19,718
Turkey 18,535
Italy 18,040
France 17,125
United States (excluded) 11,963
Taiwan 10,038
Netherlands 10,029
Spain 9,456
Brazil 9,152
Country
Steel Exports 
(in TMT)
Table 6.28 Top Steel Exporters 2008 
Source: World Steel Association 2010 
Region Selected Countries
Europe Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain
C.I.S. Russia, Ukraine
North America Canada, Mexico
South America Brazil
Africa South Africa
Middle East Turkey
Asia China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
Oceania Australia
Table 6.29 Selected Steel Exporting Countries 
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6.4.1.2 Analytic Procedure 
The analytic procedure applied for each steel exporting country is as follows: 
 
Analytical Structure 
1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
6. Conclusion 
 
1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The first section reviews how many of the 36 categories listed in table 6.30 have been 
included in the analysis and then lists the categories that have been excluded. For each 
excluded category, the reason for the preclusion is described. 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
The analysis in the impulse response section addresses the following questions: 
1. For how many categories do steel exports increase/decrease following a one-standard 
deviation oil price shock? 
Table 6.30 Steel Product Categories 
 
Source: U.S. Census 2007 
1A Ingots And Steel For Castings 1,555 21A Mechanical Tubing 1,000
1B Blooms, Billets and Slabs 392 21B Pressure Tubing 1,560
3 Wire Rods 444 21CD Stainless Pipe & Tubing 4,744
4 Structural Shapes Heavy 516 21E Pipe & Tubing Nonclassified 2,109
5 Steel Piling 719 22A Structural Pipe & Tube 685
6A Plate Cut Lengths 757 22B Pipe For Piling 640
6B Plates In Coils 509 23 Wire Drawn 1,015
7 Rails Standard 581 28 Black Plate 665
8 Rails All Other 660 29 Tin Plate 651
9 Railroad Accessories 722 29A Tin Free Steel 714
14 Bars – Hot Rolled 647 31 Sheets Hot Rolled 426
14A Bars – Light Shaped 598 32 Sheets Cold Rolled 812
15 Bars – Reinforcing 365 33A Sheets & Strips Galv Hot Dipped 635
16 Bars – Cold Finished 1,565 33B Sheets & Strips Galv Electrolyt 690
17 Tool Steel 1,853 34 Sheets & Strips All Other Metal 787
18 Standard Pipe 640 35 Sheets & Strips – Electrical 1,072
19 Oil Country Goods 922 36 Strip –Hot Rolled 625
20/20A-C* Line Pipe 731 37 Strip –Cold Rolled 1,920
*20
20A Line Pipe > 16 Inches In Diameter; from January 2001
20B Line Pipe ≤ 16 Inches In Diameter; from January 2001
20C Line Pipe – Not Specified; from January 2001
Ref.-Code Ref.-Code Category
Average Unit 
Price (in U.S. $)
Average Unit Price 
(in U.S. $)
Line Pipe until December 2000
Category
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2. What is the average immediate increase/decline of steel exports to the U.S. in reaction to 
the oil price shock for all categories analysed, for the categories with increasing steel export 
volumes, and for the categories with decreasing export volumes? 
3. How many of the impulse response values are statistically significant? How many 
positive/negative impulse response values are statistically significant? 
4. For how many of the categories are the estimates (at least partially) statistically 
significant? For how many categories with positive/negative impulse responses are the 
estimates statistically significant? 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The analysis in the variance decomposition section addresses the following questions: 
1. What is the average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to 
variation in the oil price variable? 
2. How large is the relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that can be 
explained by variation in the oil price variable? How is the explanatory power of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable distributed among the single steel product categories? In 
other words, for how many of the categories is the relative share very low (0% ≤ very low < 
5%), low (5% ≤ low < 10%), moderate (10% ≤ moderate < 20%), high (20% ≤ high < 30%), 
or very high (very high > 30%)?  
3. How large is the average explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable compared to the average explanatory power of the other explanatory variables? 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The analysis in the Granger causality section addresses the following questions: 
1. For how many samples analysed does the oil price variable Granger cause the steel export 
variable at the 1%, 5% or 10% level? 
2. What is the relative share of samples where the oil price variable Granger causes the steel 
export variable?  
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
In the price pattern analysis section, the steel product categories are split up into low-value 
and high-value categories to analyse whether the impact of an oil price shock on steel 
exports to the U.S. is more significant for low-value steel exports than for high-value steel 
exports.  
Economic theory suggests that an oil price shock leads to higher transport costs for all steel 
exporters to the U.S. irrespective of their geographic location. However, the impact of rising 
transport costs on exporters grows with increasing trade distance so that remote exporters are 
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affected overproportionally (Gangnes et al. 2011 a, b; Kousnetzoff et al. 2008; Mirza and 
Zitouna 2008). As a consequence, steel exporters geographically close to the U.S. should 
increase their export share at the cost of remote exporters once oil prices/transport costs 
reach a certain level. Thereby, according to economic theory, for geographically remote 
exporters the adverse effect of rising transport costs on low-value steel exports should be 
stronger than the adverse effect on high-value steel exports because the share of transport 
costs to final selling prices should, by tendency, be larger for low-value steel than for high-
value steel. That is, it should be relatively easier for steel exporters geographically close to 
the U.S to increase their market share at the cost of geographically remote exporters in low-
value steel segments than in high-value steel segments. 
In order to be able to investigate whether the impact (in a positive sense for geographically 
close exporters/in a negative sense for geographically remote exporters) of rising transport 
costs is stronger for low-value steel exports than for high-value steel exports, it is necessary 
to separate the steel product categories into high- and low-value categories. This 
classification of steel product categories is based on the average unit price (AUP) per 
category. The AUPs for the categories have been calculated as follows: 
The U.S. Census Bureau publishes AUPs for monthly U.S. steel imports per category (The 
AUP is calculated by dividing the monthly total U.S. steel import value by the monthly total 
steel imports in quantity metric tons.). In order to calculate the AUP for the sample period 
for each category, the monthly AUPs from November 1998 to September 2008 have been 
summed up. The sum has then been divided by the number of months/observations in the 
sample period (119 months/observations). 
Based on the calculated AUPs, the steel product categories have then been subdivided into 
two groups, a low-value group, and a high-value group. The low-value group contains steel 
product categories with an AUP below $1,500. Steel product groups with an AUP above 
$1,500 were assigned to the high-value product group. 
The AUP range in the low-value group is between $365 and $1,072. The group consists of 
29 categories. The AUP range in the high-value product group is between $1,555 and $4,744 
and consists of 7 categories (see table 6.94). That is, about 80% of the categories have been 
assigned to the low-value group and about 20% have been assigned to the high-value product 
group. One can clearly see the gap between the largest AUP in the low-value group and the 
smallest AUP in the high-value group ($1,072 vs. $1,555). The significant price gap between 
both groups increases the probability to detect price patterns. 
The analysis in the price pattern section addresses the following questions: 
1. For how many low-value/high-value steel product categories have significant volumes of 
steel been exported from the exporting country to the U.S. during the sample period? 
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Explanation: If the share of product groups where significant volumes of steel have been 
exported during the sample period from a steel exporting country to the U.S. is relatively 
larger for the high-value product group than for the low-value product group, this may 
indicate that it is relatively more profitable to export high-value steel, especially when long 
trade distances are involved (Of course, the volume of steel exported per category is an 
additional indicator for the profitableness of exports.). 
 
2. In how many low-value/high-value categories do steel export values increase/decrease 
following a one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable?  
Explanation: If the relative share of low-value categories for which steel exports from a 
geographically distant country decrease following an oil price shock is larger than the 
relative share of high-value categories with negative impulse response estimates, this may 
suggest that the negative effect of rising oil prices/transport costs is stronger for low-value 
steel exports than high-value steel products. If the relative share of low-value categories for 
which steel exports from a geographically proximal country increase following an oil price 
shock is larger than the relative share of high-value categories with positive impulse 
response estimates, this may suggest that the positive effect is stronger for low-value steel 
exports than for high-value exports. This would suggest that countries geographically close 
to the U.S. can especially increase their market share for low-value steel exports at the cost 
of more remote exporting countries. 
 
3. How long is the average increase/decrease of steel exports in the low-value/high-value 
categories following a one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable? 
Explanation: If the average decline of steel exports from a geographically distant country to 
the U.S. lasts longer for low-value exports than for high-value exports, this may indicate that 
the adverse effect of the oil price shock is stronger for low-value exports than for high-value 
exports. If the average increase of steel exports from a geographically close country to the 
U.S. lasts longer for low-value exports than for high-value exports, this may indicate that 
geographically proximate countries can especially increase their low-value steel exports at 
the cost of distant countries.  
 
4. How many of the low-value/high-value impulse response estimates are statistically 
significant?  
Explanation: If the relative share of statistically significant negative impulse response 
estimates for geographically distant countries is larger for low-value steel exports to the U.S. 
than for high-value steel exports, this suggests that the negative effect of an oil price shock is 
stronger for long-distance, low-value exports than for long-distance, high-value exports. If 
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the relative share of statistically significant positive impulse response estimates for 
geographically close countries is larger for low-value steel exports to the U.S. than for high-
value exports, this may indicate that countries geographically close to the U.S. can especially 
increase their low-value steel export volumes at the cost of geographically remote countries. 
This would suggest that low-value steel exports from geographically distant exporting 
countries are more vulnerable than high-value steel exports. 
 
5. How large is the average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be 
attributed to variation in the oil price variable for the low-value/high-value steel product 
categories? 
Explanation: If the average relative volatility in the steel export variable that is due to 
variation in the oil price variable is larger for low-value exports from geographically 
distant/close countries than for high-value exports, this may suggest that the impact of the 
volatility in the oil price variable on the steel export variable is stronger for low-value steel 
exports than for high-value steel exports. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Section 6 summarises the results obtained in sections 1 to 5 and concludes. 
 
  
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.4 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Category
  338 220 
6.4.2 Europe 
For Europe, Belgium (6.4.2.1), France (6.4.2.2), Germany (6.4.2.3), Italy (6.4.2.4), the 
Netherlands (6.4.2.5), and Spain (6.4.2.6) have been selected for the analysis of steel exports 
to the U.S. per steel product category. 
 
6.4.2.1  Belgium 
 
  
1A 1 -2.235 2.3 0.24
1B 1 877.819 * 9.4 0.56
1 -120.333
2 -136.444
1 -2.785
2 -4.444
3 -21.143 *
4 -5.064
1 -10.001
2 -275.541 ***
3 -60.004
6B 1 -34.036 16.7 0.73
1 -4.193
2 -1.707
3 -4.420
4 -4.719
5 -7.258 **
6 -0.748
7 -4.439 *
8 1 -1.714 3.8 0.08
14 1 35.970 * 3.8 0.75
14A 1 -6.908 * 38.9 0.06
15 1 -7.280 9.5 0.80
1 -6.596
2 -1.881
1 -2.531
2 -11.368 *
3 -5.613
18 1 13.090 21.5 0.00
19 1 2.660 * 2.6 0.36
1 -5.085
2 -1.331
3 -7.976 *
4 -1.443
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
3 10.2 0.81
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
4 6.4 0.61
6A 18.3 0.18
7 12.1 0.33
16 3.8 0.19
17 7.2 0.89
20 3.7 0.18
Table 6.31 VEC Analysis - Belgium 
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VEC Analysis - Belgium (continued)
21A 1 -2.293 4.4 0.47
1 -1.121 *
2 -3.542 ***
3 -1.544 *
21CD 1 -1.372 6.9 0.75
1 1.806
2 1.821
1 -7.155
2 -22.787 *
28 1 24.398 19.9 0.87
1 -116.986 *
2 -48.434
3 -124.781 *
4 -131.149 *
1 -4.956
2 -13.462
3 -1.995
4 -38.045 *
1 -269.513
2 -712.771 *
3 -90.958
1 -6.668
2 -988.699
1 -72.738
2 -168.032 *
3 -298.235 ***
4 -73.708
5 -89.073
1 -32.697
2 -20.415
1 -19.001
2 -2.586
1 -3.696
2 -11.128 **
3 -7.215
4 -3.543
5 -5.843
1 0.808 *
2 0.521
37 1 -0.034 44.3 0.00
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
21B 8.7 0.07
21E 1.0 0.31
23 20.8 0.64
29 12.4 0.55
29A 5.5 0.68
31 5.7 0.39
32 4.0 0.78
33A 10.1 0.17
33B 24.5 0.60
34 27.8 0.64
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
35 10.6 0.69
36 45.1 0.00
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Belgium includes 32 of 36 categories. Four 
categories have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 9, 22b 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 5 
- VEC matrix not positive definite: 22a 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Belgium to the U.S. in 25 of the 32 steel product categories analysed (78.1%) and to 
increasing exports in 7 of the 32 categories (21.9%).  
The average immediate decline for the 32 categories lasts for 1.8 months. The average 
decline for the 25 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 2.6 months and the 
average increase for the 7 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1.3 months. 
23 of the 74 impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 31.1%), 18 
at 68% error bands, 2 at 90% error bands, and 3 at 95% error bands. 19 of the 65 negative 
impulse response values (relative share: 29.2%) are statistically significant (68% error bands: 
14; 90% error bands: 2; 95% error bands: 3) and 4 of the 9 positive impulse response values 
(relative share: 44.4%) are also statistically significant at 68% error bands. This means that 
82.6% of the statistically significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 17 of 32 categories (relative share: 53.1%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 13 of 25 or 52% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 4 of 7 or 57.1% of the categories with positive 
estimates are statistically significant. This means that 76.5% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 13.2% (moderate) for all categories included, 12.7% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 14.8% (moderate) for the categories 
with positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 9 of the 25 categories (28.1%), low for 8 categories 
(25%), moderate for 8 categories (25%), high for 4 categories (12.5%), and very high for 3 
categories (9.4%). 
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Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 13.2 %; steel import value: 9%; exchange rates: 6.9%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of all 
explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 14 of 32 
or 43.8% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 6 of 32 categories (1% level: 3; 10% level: 3), a 
relative share of 18.8%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Belgium exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 25 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (86.2%) and in 7 of 7 high-value categories (100%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 19 
of 25 low-value steel product categories (76%) and in 6 of 7 high-value categories (85.7%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 1.9 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 1.3 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 15 of 25 low-value steel 
product categories (60%) and for 2 of 7 high-value categories (28.6%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 13.9% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 10.6% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Belgium to the U.S. for 78.1% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to 
the U.S. decline for 1.8 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 82.6% of the statistically significant values 
are negative. Moreover, 76.5% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (25%), high (12.5%), or very 
high (9.4%) for a strong minority of the categories analysed (46.9%) and serves as an 
indicator for the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
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variable. Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to 
variation in the oil price variable is 13.2% (moderate) for all categories analysed. 
Summing up, there is strong evidence that Belgian steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock. By tendency, the results are in line with the findings for total 
Belgian steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.1.2. Moreover, the variance decomposition 
estimates provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade 
volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
 
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Belgium to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (100%) than for low-value exports (86.2%). 
- The average decline of steel exports from Belgium to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (1.9 months) than for high-value exports (1.3 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (60%) than for high-value categories (28.6%). This might 
indicate that low-value exports to the U.S. are more affected by oil price shocks than 
high-value exports. 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (13.9%) than for high-value categories 
(10.6%) which might indicate that low-value categories are relatively more affected 
by oil price shocks. 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from Belgium to the U.S. decline for 85.7% of the high-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 76% of the low-value categories. 
The majority of the estimates indicate that low-value steel exports from Belgium to the U.S. 
are more affected by oil price shocks than high-value exports. 
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6.4.2.2 France 
1 -86.946
2 -430.454 **
3 -129.767
4 -425.333 *
5 -150.403
6 -176.278
1 -274.318 *
2 -139.117
4 1 -4.446 14.7 0.51
1 -39.872
2 -28.751
1 -374.960 *
2 -279.912
3 -118.654
4 -58.253
1 236.709 *
2 53.949
14 1 -12.914 24.0 0.29
1 -0.090
2 -1.235 ***
3 -0.520
4 -1.202 **
5 -0.114
16 1 50.234 1.7 < 0.10
1 -74.519 *
2 -8.023
3 -35.757
4 -19.977
1 -27.084 *
2 -6.580
1 113.775
2 113.187
20 1 178.083 * 16.3 0.36
1 -15.459
2 -34.204
3 -10.233
4 -41.694 *
5 -47.684 *
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1B 27.7 0.04
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
3 37.5 0.34
6A 3.4 0.39
6B 5.3 0.25
7 12.6 0.69
14A 11.0 0.60
17 7.0 0.79
18 4.3 0.04
19 4.7 0.76
21A 14.2 0.69
Table 6.32 VEC Analysis - France 
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 VEC Analysis - France (continued)
21B 1 7.113 7.0 0.93
1 -15.565
2 -11.288
1 -0.504 *
2 -0.072
3 -0.374 *
4 -0.626 **
1 -1.897
2 -8.031
23 1 -13.644 10.3 0.89
1 54.394 *
2 45.505
3 11.915
4 13.467
1 -145.098
2 -188.784 *
1 -21.289
2 -94.655
31 1 -1,094.911 * 4.6 0.74
32 1 -204.371 12.9
2 -76.173
3 -34.588
4 -295.593 **
5 -200.636
6 -142.919
7 -1.596
1 -38.766
2 -36.316
34 1 7.317 12.2 0.97
1 12.263
2 56.364 ***
3 22.337
4 13.778
36 1 3.840 3.3 0.38
37 1 -6.702 4.2 0.85
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
21CD 23.1 0.24
21E 22.8 0.00
22A 4.3 0.23
28 9.5 0.00
29 22.3 0.42
35 5.9 0.52
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
29A 26.2 0.51
0.89
33A 23.1 0.00
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for France includes 29 of 36 categories. Seven categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 9 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 1a, 5, 15, 22b, 
33b 
- VEC matrix not positive definite: 8 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
France to the U.S. in 20 of the 29 product categories analysed (69%) and to increasing 
exports in  9 categories (31%).  
The average immediate decline for the 29 categories lasts for 1.3 months. The average 
decline for the 20 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 2.8 months while the 
average increase for the 9 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 2.1 months. 
20 of the 75 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
26.7%), 15 at 68% error bands, 3 at 90% error bands, and 2 at 95% error bands. 16 of the 56 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 28.6%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 12; 90% error bands: 3; 95% error bands: 1) and 4 of the 19 positive impulse 
response values (relative share: 21.1%) are also statistically significant (68% error bands: 3; 
95% error bands: 1). This means that 80% of the statistically significant impulse response 
values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 15 of 29 categories (relative share: 51.7%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 11 of 20 or 55% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 4 of 9 or 44.4% of the categories with positive 
estimates are also statistically significant. This means that 73.3% of the statistically 
significant impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 13% (moderate) for all categories included, 15.1% (moderate) for the 
categories with negative impulse responses, and 8.1% (low) for the categories with positive 
impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 8 of the 29 categories (27.6%), low for 5 categories 
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(17.2%), moderate for 8 categories (27.6%), high for 7 categories (24.1%), and very high for 
1 category (3.4%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 13%; steel import value: 9.1%; exchange rates: 6.7%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of all 
explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 15 of 29 
or 51.7% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 6 of 29 categories (1% level: 3; 5% level: 2; 10% 
level: 1), a relative share of 20.7%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, France exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 23 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (79.3%) and in 6 of 7 high-value categories (85.7%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 16 
of 23 low-value steel product categories (69.6%) and in 4 of 6 high value categories (66.7%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 1.3 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 1.5 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 13 of 23 low-value steel 
product categories (56.5%) and for 2 of 6 high-value categories (33.3%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 13.5% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 11% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from France to the U.S. for 69% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to the 
U.S. decline for 1.3 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 80% of the statistically significant values 
are negative. Moreover, 73.3% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (27.6%), high (24.1%), or very 
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high (3.4%) for the majority of the categories analysed (55.1%) which serves as an indicator 
for the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 13% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that French steel exports to the U.S. are negatively impacted 
by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total French steel exports to 
the U.S. in section 6.2.1.8. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates provide 
evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from France to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (85.7%) than for low-value exports (79.3%). 
- While export volumes from France to the U.S. decline for 69.6% of the low-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 66.7% of high-value categories. 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (56.5%) than for high-value categories (33.3%). This might 
indicate that low-value exports to the U.S. are more affected by oil price shocks than 
high-value exports. 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (13.5%) than for high-value categories 
(11%) which might indicate that low-value categories are relatively more affected by 
oil price shocks. 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- The average decline of steel exports from France to the U.S. lasts longer for high-
value exports (1.5 months) than for low-value exports (1.3 months). 
The majority of the estimates indicate that low-value steel exports from France to the U.S. 
are more affected by oil price shocks than high-value exports. 
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6.4.2.3 Germany 
 
 
  
1 -12.434
2 -10.422
1B 1 -1,443.896 * 30.8 0.64
1 425.467
2 822.027
1 -412.130 *
2 -51.049
5 1 -10.821 12.5 0.16
6A 1 -125.452 4.6 0.37
1 -579.659 ***
2 -107.729
3 -362.957 *
4 -223.947
5 -194.442
1 -5.153
2 -9.788
3 -22.724
4 -55.701 *
5 -44.572
6 -75.622 *
7 -33.145
8 -78.001 *
9 -46.950
10 -7.694
8 1 -4.652 5.9 0.30
9 1 -5.252 * 17.6 0.59
14 1 -115.294 28.1 0.72
14A 1 16.367 9.6 0.13
15 1 243.360 5.3 0.36
1 -90.611 *
2 -87.353 *
3 -60.864
4 -9.945
5 -23.146
16 58.0 0.49
6B 12.9 0.72
7 14.9 0.00
3 4.6 0.61
4 25.6 0.06
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1A 14.7 0.15
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
Table 6.33 VEC Analysis - Germany 
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VEC Analysis - Germany (continued)
1 -21.090
2 -64.993 *
3 -162.250 ***
4 -71.133 *
5 -79.773 *
6 -30.676
7 -14.527
8 -10.403
1 -39.001
2 -0.878
3 -9.890
19 1 -51.301 7.2 0.74
1 -541.053
2 -515.989
3 -192.460
4 -2,366.176
5 -2,422.772
6 -3,131.298 ***
7 -2,984.154
8 -1,679.059
1 -2.089
2 -20.621
21B 1 -18.731 12.9 0.49
1 9.139
2 1.648
1 -1.089
2 -4.202
3 -4.602
4 -6.560 *
5 -4.623
6 -2.067
7 -0.754
8 -0.460
1 -17.621
2 -9.111
3 -31.868 *
23 1 -19.783 17.3 0.12
28 1 35.493 * 7.4 0.93
21E 3.9 0.52
22A 36.1 0.52
21A 5.6 0.78
21CD 2.7 < 0.01
18 1.8 0.19
20 14.2 0.00
17 17.5 0.14
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Germany includes 35 of 36 categories. One category 
(22b) has been excluded from the analysis because in this category there have been exports 
to the U.S. in less than ten months during the sample period. 
 
  
VEC Analysis - Germany (continued)
29 1 -238.652 1.0 0.15
29A 1 78.027 11.2 0.80
31 1 -120.893 5.4 0.31
1 -67.269
2 -49.496
1 -363.641
2 -81.614
3 -71.607
4 -23.201
1 -167.621
2 -56.318
1 -33.910 ***
2 -6.102
3 -23.870 *
1 -56.572
2 -14.043
3 -65.329
4 -78.196
5 -38.736
1 -61.230 ***
2 -72.957 ***
3 -16.680
4 -15.522
5 -1.848
1 -1.685
2 -57.847
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
37 2.3 0.45
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
35 28.2 0.04
36 20.7 0.01
33B 6.0 0.38
34 28.3 0.20
32 4.7 0.71
33A 2.9 0.75
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Germany to the U.S. in 29 of the 35 product categories analysed (82.9%) and to increasing 
exports in 6 categories (17.1%).  
The average immediate decline for the 35 categories lasts for 2.3 months. The average 
decline for the 29 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 3.1 months while the 
average increase for the 6 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1.3 months. 
22 of the 98 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
22.4%), 16 at 68% error bands and 6 at 95% error bands. 21 of the 90 negative impulse 
response values (relative share: 23.3%) are statistically significant (68% error bands: 15; 
95% error bands: 6), and 1 of the 8 positive impulse response values (relative share: 21.1%) 
is also statistically significant at 68% error bands. This means that 95.5% of the statistically 
significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 13 of 35 categories (relative share: 37.1%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 12 of 29 or 41.4% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 1 of 6 or 16.7% of the categories with positive 
estimates are statistically significant. This means that 92.3% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 13.8% (moderate) for all categories included, 15.2% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 6.8% (low) for the categories with 
positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 9 of the 35 categories (25.7%), low for 8 categories 
(22.9%), moderate for 10 categories (28.6%), high for 5 categories (14.3%), and very high 
for 3 categories (8.6%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 13.8%; steel import value: 8.8%; exchange rates: 6.6%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7.2%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 14 of 35 
or 40% of the categories analysed. 
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4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 6 of 35 categories (1% level: 3; 5% level: 2; 10% 
level: 1), a relative share of 17.1%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Germany exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 28 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (96.6%) and in 7 of 7 high-value categories (100%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 23 
of 28 low-value steel product categories (82.1%) and in 6 of 7 high-value categories 
(85.7%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 2.1 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 2.9 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 10 of 28 low-value steel 
product categories (35.7%) and for 3 of 7 high-value categories (42.9%). 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 13.2% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 16% 
(moderate) for the high value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Germany to the U.S. for 82.9% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to 
the U.S. decline for 2.3 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 95.5% of the statistically significant values 
are negative. Moreover, 92.3% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (28.6%), high (14.3%), or very 
high (8.6%) for a small majority of the categories analysed (51.5%) which serves as an 
indicator for the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable. Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to 
variation in the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 13.8% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that German steel exports to the U.S. are negatively impacted 
by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total German steel exports 
to the U.S. in section 6.2.1.9. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates provide 
evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.4 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Category
  338 235 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Germany to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (100%) than for low-value exports (96.6%). 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from Germany to the U.S. decline for 85.7% of the high-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 82.1% of low-value categories. 
- The average decline of steel exports from Germany to the U.S. lasts longer for high-
value exports (2.9 months) than for low-value exports (2.1 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
high-value categories (42.9%) than for low-value categories (35.7%).  
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for high-value categories (16%) than for low-value categories 
(13.2%). 
The majority of the estimates contradict the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted 
more by oil price shocks than high-value steel trade. 
 
6.4.2.4 Italy 
 
 
  
1 -121.059 ***
2 -78.139 *
3 -20.619
4 -7.348
5 -13.234
6 -38.174
1B 1 1,290.756 * 57.2 0.00
1 -391.825
2 -71.004
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1A 21.9 0.61
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
3 27.6 0.79
Table 6.34 VEC Analysis - Italy 
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VEC Analysis - Italy (continued)
1 -64.803
2 -261.657
3 -659.335 *
4 -246.941
5 -350.342
6 -214.713
6A 1 -197.434 *** 31.7 0.11
6B 1 -34.310 13.7 0.00
7 1 -4.087 1.8 0.00
1 -7.544
2 -124.475 *
3 -112.829
4 -41.308
5 -80.199
6 -1.909
1 -10.414
2 -27.886 *
3 -27.156 *
1 -281.454
2 -440.171 *
3 -44.282
4 -302.705
5 -66.947
6 -24.365
7 -269.813
8 -551.966 *
9 -410.961
10 -545.252
11 -262.405
1 -31.591
2 -3.551
3 -2.427
4 -39.448
5 -58.103 *
6 -20.067
7 -88.104 ***
17 1 7.132 20.2 0.00
1 -4.727
2 -19.946
3 -5.596
4 -3.606
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
4 15.6 < 0.01
14 3.2 0.60
14A 19.1 0.89
15 7.9 < 0.01
16 9.3 0.45
18 41.1 0.17
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VEC Analysis - Italy (continued)
19 1 26.769 ** 36.9 0.45
1 -411.229
2 -269.627
3 -1,410.720 ***
4 -680.891
5 -944.059 *
6 -1,335.018 ***
7 -502.652
8 -167.915
9 -86.534
10 -760.773 *
21A 1 -23.777 24.9 0.03
1 -17.705
2 -8.800
3 -34.935 *
4 -26.785 *
5 -3.546
21CD 1 -32.000 ** 52.8 0.01
1 -0.934
2 -1.135
3 -0.687
4 -0.938
5 -0.651
6 -0.545
1 -4.210
2 -18.001 ***
3 -6.972
4 -14.006 ***
5 -7.350 *
6 -7.543 *
7 -8.401 *
1 -4.486
2 -31.406
3 -19.363
4 -2.597
31 1 -161.986 23.8 0.61
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
20 17.3 0.00
21B 3.1 0.35
21E 2.3 0.82
22A 35.9 0.21
23 3.8 0.32
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Italy includes 28 of 36 categories. Eight categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 29, 29a 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 5, 8, 9, 22b, 28, 
33b 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Italy to the U.S. in 24 of the 28 steel product categories analysed (85.7%) and to increasing 
exports in 4 categories (14.3%).  
The average immediate decline for the 28 categories lasts for 3.3 months. The average 
decline for the 24 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 4 months while the 
average increase for the 4 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1 month. 
29 of the 100 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
29%), 19 at 68% error bands, 3 at 90% error bands, and 7 at 95% error bands. 27 of the 96 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 28.1%) are statistically significant (68% 
VEC Analysis - Italy (continued)
1 -283.454
2 -171.645
3 -364.702
4 -67.609
1 -43.630
2 -69.312
3 -85.369
34 1 -20.126 * 20.6 0.70
1 -7.988
2 -26.821
1 -2.500 *
2 -2.332 *
3 -4.693 **
37 1 4.412 3.3 0.64
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
32 1.1 0.69
33A 2.1 0.07
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
35 7.4 0.63
36 17.2 0.02
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error bands: 18; 90% error bands: 2; 95% error bands: 7) and 2 of the 4 positive impulse 
response values (relative share: 50%) are also statistically significant (68% error bands: 1; 
90% error bands: 1). This means that 93.1% of the statistically significant impulse response 
values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 15 of 28 categories (relative share: 53.6%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 13 of 24 or 54.2% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 2 of 4 or 50% of the categories with positive 
estimates are statistically significant. This means that 86.7% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 18.7% (moderate) for all categories included, 16.9% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 29.4% (high) for the categories with 
positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 8 of the 28 categories (28.6%), low for 3 categories 
(10.7%), moderate for 5 categories (17.9%), high for 6 categories (21.4%), and very high for 
6 categories (21.4%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 18.7%; steel import value: 13.5%; exchange rates: 7%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7.2%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 14 of 28 
or 50% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 11 of 28 categories (1% level: 7; 5% level: 3; 10% 
level: 1), a relative share of 39.4%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Italy exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 21 of 29 
low-value steel product categories (72.4%) and in 7 of 7 high-value categories (100%). 
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Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 19 
of 21 low-value steel product categories (90.5%) and in 5 of 7 high-value categories 
(71.4%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 3.3 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 3.8 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 11 of 21 low-value steel 
product categories (52.4%) and for 4 of 7 high-value categories (57.1%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 19.5% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 16.1% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Italy to the U.S. for 85.7% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to the 
U.S. decline for 3.3 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 93.1% of the statistically significant values 
are negative. Moreover, 86.7% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (17.9%), high (21.4%), or very 
high (21.4%) for a significant majority of the categories analysed (60.7%). This is an 
indicator for the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable. Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to 
variation in the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 18.7% (moderate). 
Recapitulatory, there is evidence that Italian steel exports to the U.S. are negatively impacted 
by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Italian steel exports to 
the U.S. in section 6.2.1.12. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates provide 
evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Italy to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for high-
value exports (100%) than for low-value exports (72.4%). 
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- While export volumes from Italy to the U.S. decline for 90.5% of the low-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 71.4% of high-value categories. 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (19.5%) than for high-value categories 
(16.1%). 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- The average decline of steel exports from Italy to the U.S. lasts longer for high-value 
exports (3.8 months) than for low-value exports (3.3 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
high-value categories (57.1%) than for low-value categories (52.4%).  
The estimates provide mixed evidence. Therefore, no definite statement can be made 
regarding possible price patterns. By tendency, the evidence found that supports the 
hypothesis of price patterns is somewhat stronger than the evidence contradicting the 
hypothesis. 
 
6.4.2.5 Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
  
1B 1 -409.434 * 31.1 0.65
3 1 -11.330 7.3 0.67
1 5.050
2 4.630
6A 1 -0.529 22.8 0.09
1 -247.250
2 -472.807 *
14 1 -18.722 15.8 0.06
14A 1 -2.061 25.2 0.00
16 1 -4.075 *** 13.7 0.19
1 -6.245
2 -16.408
3 -12.609
4 -3.801
5 -25.622 *
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
4 19.0 0.49
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
6B 53.2 0.00
17 20.5 0.02
Table 6.35 VEC Analysis - Netherlands 
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VEC Analysis - Netherlands (continued)
18 1 -41.545 * 14.8 0.01
19 1 1.590 26.7 0.11
20 1 21.513 0.3 0.24
21A 1 -1.495 5.8 0.02
21B 1 -18.975 * 27.0 0.02
1 -0.159
2 -1.273
1 -0.011
2 -0.071
1 -0.460
2 -0.804 *
3 -0.315
4 -1.383 ***
5 -0.645 *
1 -0.534
2 -7.827 *
3 -10.880 **
4 -6.497 *
5 -3.760
28 1 -15.926 6.8 0.69
1 -538.103 ***
2 -1,034.693 ***
3 -644.400 ***
1 94.487
2 79.437
3 30.878
31 1 -602.005 3.9 0.36
1 -188.091
2 -8.200
33A 1 -38.599 39.4 0.29
1 3.106
2 23.149 **
3 9.105
4 10.199
5 0.468
6 2.710
1 -1.347
2 -0.944
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
21CD 3.7 0.77
21E 12.1 0.25
22A 16.3 0.43
23 7.7 0.30
29 16.2 0.00
29A 4.7 0.67
37 17.8 0.39
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
32 11.1 0.49
34 4.3 0.53
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for the Netherlands includes 26 of 36 categories. 10 
categories (1a, 5, 7, 8, 9, 15, 22b, 33b, 35, 36) have been excluded from the analysis because 
steel products from these categories were exported to the U.S. in less than ten months during 
the sample period. 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from the 
Netherlands to the U.S. in 21 of the 26 steel product categories analysed (80.8%) and to 
increasing exports in 5 categories (19.2%).  
The average immediate decline for the 26 categories lasts for 1 month. The average decline 
for the 21 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 1.9 months while the average 
increase for the 5 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 2.6 months. 
16 of the 53 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
30.2%), 9 at 68% error bands, 2 at 90% error bands, and 5 at 95% error bands. 15 of the 40 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 37.5%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 9; 90% error bands: 1; 95% error bands: 5) and 1 of the 13 positive impulse 
response values (relative share: 7.7%) is statistically significant at 90% error bands. This 
means that 93.8% of the statistically significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 10 of 26 categories (relative share: 38.5%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 9 of 21 or 42.9% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 1 of 5 or 20% of the categories with positive 
estimates are statistically significant. This means that 90% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 16.4% (moderate) for all categories included, 17.7% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 11% (moderate) for the categories with 
positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 5 of the 26 categories (19.2%), low for 4 categories 
(15.4%), moderate for 9 categories (34.6%), high for 5 categories (19.2%), and very high for 
3 categories (11.5%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 16.4%; steel import value: 10.9%; exchange rates: 5.9%; 
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U.S. real GDP: 5.8%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 13 of 26 
or 50% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 9 of 26 categories (1% level: 3; 5% level: 4; 10% 
level: 2), a relative share of 34.6%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, the Netherlands exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. 
in 20 of 29 low-value steel product categories (69%) and in 6 of 7 high-value categories 
(85.7%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 15 
of 20 low-value steel product categories (75%) and in 6 of 6 high-value categories (100%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 0.7 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 2.2 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 7 of 20 low-value steel 
product categories (35%) and for 3 of 6 high-value categories (50%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 16.6% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 15.8% 
(moderate) for the high value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from the Netherlands to the U.S. for 80.8% of the categories analysed. On average, steel 
exports to the U.S. decline for 1 month. When it comes to the relative share of positive and 
negative statistically significant impulse response values, 93.8% of the statistically 
significant values are negative. Moreover, 90% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (34.6%), high (19.2%), or very 
high (11.5%) for two thirds of the categories analysed (65.3%). This is an indicator for the 
significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. The 
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average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in the oil price 
variable for all categories analysed is 16.4% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that Dutch steel exports to the U.S. are negatively impacted 
by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Dutch steel exports to 
the U.S. in section 6.2.1.16. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates provide 
evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from the Netherlands to the U.S. during the sample period is 
larger for high-value exports (85.7%) than for low-value exports (69%). 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (16.6%) than for high-value categories 
(15.8%). 
The following findings contradict the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from the Netherlands to the U.S. decline for 100% of the 
high-value categories, export volumes decline for only 75% of low-value categories. 
- The average decline of steel exports from the Netherlands to the U.S. lasts longer for 
high-value exports (2.2 months) than for low-value exports (0.7 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
high-value categories (50%) than for low-value categories (35%).  
The averages of the estimates provide mixed evidence so that no definite statement can be 
made with regard to possible price patterns. By tendency, the evidence found that contradicts 
the hypothesis of price patterns is somewhat stronger than the evidence supporting the 
hypothesis. 
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6.4.2.6 Spain 
 
1B 1 -193.741 3.2 0.28
3 1 364.641 2.2 0.60
1 -1,748.329 ***
2 -1,009.866
3 -193.854
4 -484.956
5 -273.975
1 9.973 *
2 7.053
1 -30.768
2 -65.104 *
3 -21.901
7 1 -52.442 * 2.5 0.56
8 1 12.863 1.6 0.40
1 -302.794 *
2 -4.189
1 2.136
2 3.775
1 -62.087 *
2 -41.809
1 -16.673 *
2 -1.173
3 -26.215 **
4 -1.030
5 -9.699
6 -12.089
1 84.354
2 19.699
1 -24.923
2 -135.048
1 9.944
2 3.656
1 -0.570
2 -75.997
3 -47.030
1 -12.440 *
2 -9.240
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
4 6.9 0.03
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
6A 9.0 0.04
6B 8.3 0.48
14 14.0 0.62
14A 9.3 < 0.01
16 27.8 0.00
17 24.6 0.78
18 12.2 0.84
19 16.4 0.60
20 40.3 0.00
21A 6.4 0.88
21B 35.6 0.13
Table 6.36 VEC Analysis - Spain 
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VEC Analysis - Spain (continued)
21CD 1 -6.983 17.0 0.64
21E 1 -0.193 9.7 0.00
1 -1.885 *
2 -1.188
3 -2.437 *
4 -1.599
5 -2.221 *
6 -0.044
1 -3.737
2 -10.939
3 -29.006 **
4 -9.488
5 -23.033 *
6 -2.767
1 -24.612
2 -8.995
3 -81.847 *
4 -120.127 ***
1 -35.067
2 -177.656 *
3 -452.147 ***
4 -76.900
5 -17.607
32 1 -9.584 14.9 0.02
1 -240.307 ***
2 -363.882 ***
3 -261.484 ***
4 -234.264 **
5 -180.579 *
6 -127.067
7 -132.921
1 -7.533
2 -28.238
1 -0.416
2 -0.671
37 1 -2.134 12.7 0.87
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
23 14.0 0.40
22A 11.9 0.30
29 14.6 0.04
31 4.3 0.31
34 12.7 0.00
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
33A 40.6 0.03
33B 6.6 0.61
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Spain includes 27 of 36 categories. Nine categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 1a, 5, 9, 15, 22b, 28, 29a, 35 
- category sample includes one or more I(2) variables: 36 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Spain to the U.S. in 21 of the 27 steel product categories analysed (77.8%) and to increasing 
exports in 6 categories (22.2%).  
The average immediate decline for the 27 categories lasts for 2 months. The average decline 
for the 21 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 3 months while the average 
increase for the 6 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1.7 months. 
23 of the 73 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
31.5%), 11 at 68% error bands, 3 at 90% error bands, and 6 at 95% error bands. 22 of the 40 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 34.9%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 13; 90% error bands: 3; 95% error bands: 6) and 1 of the 10 positive impulse 
response values (relative share: 10%) is also statistically significant at 90% error bands. This 
means that 95.6% of the statistically significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 13 of 27 categories (relative share: 48.1%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 12 of 21 or 57.1% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 1 of 6 or 16.7% of the categories with positive 
estimates are statistically significant. This means that 92.3% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 14.1% (moderate) for all categories included, 14.5% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 12.4% (moderate) for the categories 
with positive impulse responses. 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is very low for 5 
of the 26 categories (18.5%), low for 7 categories (25.9%), moderate for 10 categories 
(37%), high for 2 categories (7.4%), and very high for 3 categories (11.1%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 14.1%; steel import value: 12.7%; exchange rates: 5.8%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6.4%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
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all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 11 of 27 
or 40.7% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 10 of 27 categories (1% level: 5; 5% level: 5), a 
relative share of 37%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Spain exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 21 of 29 
low-value steel product categories (72.4%) and in 6 of 7 high-value categories (85.7%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 15 
of 21 low-value steel product categories (71.4%) and in 6 of 6 high-value categories (100%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 1.9 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 2.2 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 9 of 21 low-value steel 
product categories (42.9%) and for 3 of 6 high-value categories (50%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 12% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 21.2% (high) for 
the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Spain to the U.S. for 77.8% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to the 
U.S. decline for 2 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 95.6% of the statistically significant values 
are negative. Moreover, 92.3% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (37%), high (7.4%), or very 
high (11.1%) for the majority of the categories analysed (55.5%) which is an indicator for 
the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 14.1% (moderate). 
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Summing up, there is evidence that Spanish steel exports to the U.S. are negatively impacted 
by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Spanish steel exports 
to the U.S. in section 6.2.1.21. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates provide 
evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Spain to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (85.7%) than for low-value exports (72.4%). 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from Spain to the U.S. decline for 100% of the high-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 71.4% of the low-value categories. 
- The average decline of steel exports from Spain to the U.S. lasts longer for high-
value exports (2.2 months) than for low-value exports (1.9 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
high-value categories (50%) than for low-value categories (42.9%).  
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for high-value categories (21.2%) than for low-value categories 
(12%). 
The majority of the estimates contradict the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted 
more by oil price shocks than high-value steel trade. 
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6.4.3 C.I.S. 
For the C.I.S., Russia (6.4.3.1) and the Ukraine (6.4.3.2) have been selected for the analysis 
of steel exports to the U.S. per steel product category. 
 
6.4.3.1 Russia 
1 -3,886.820
2 -6,317.588
3 -8,687.294 *
4 -5,875.417
5 -3,967.387
6 -659.105
1 -145.463 *
2 -91.741
3 -340.016 ***
4 -75.127
1 -14.555
2 -94.093
3 -567.544 *
1 -253.940
2 -290.684
6B 1 770.150 21.0 < 0.01
1 -227.669
2 -89.674
3 -104.261
4 -147.712
5 -248.456
6 -266.737 *
7 -176.061
8 -161.909
1 -28.717
2 -30.200
16 1 -357.355 ** 19.0 0.00
1 -35.370
2 -82.539 ***
3 -70.005 **
4 -9.905
5 -4.302
18 1 -34.830 19.1 0.62
15 4.2 0.32
17 22.9 0.00
6A 4.5 0.74
14 12.1 0.19
3 36.1 0.00
4 7.7 0.27
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1B 6.8 0.66
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
Table 6.37 VEC Analysis - Russia 
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VEC Analysis - Russia (continued)
1 -170.431
2 -46.064
3 -387.822 **
4 -253.906 *
5 -564.533 ***
6 -499.609 **
7 -167.003
20 1 -57.088 3.9 0.39
1 -98.704 **
2 -16.380
3 -217.732 ***
4 -85.208 *
5 -101.671 *
6 -269.485 ***
7 -126.028 **
8 -0.935
23 1 -12.521 5.8 0.47
31 1 1,253.302 6.4 0.45
1 -1,060.719
2 -1,596.476
3 -27.192
33A 1 -28.185 11.4 0.00
1 -77.394
2 -127.490 *
3 -307.037 ***
4 -35.784
5 -13.847
6 -91.122
7 -27.801
37 1 -11.856 * 2.1 0.00
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
32 3.4 0.63
35 7.0 0.21
19 26.9 0.04
21A 33.8 0.00
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Russia includes 19 of 36 categories. 15 categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 5, 8, 9, 22b, 29, 34 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 1a, 7, 14a, 21b, 
21cd, 21e, 22a, 28, 29a, 33b, 36 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Russia to the U.S. in 17 of the 19 steel product categories analysed (89.5%) and to increasing 
exports in the remaining 2 categories (10.5%).  
The average immediate decline for the 19 categories lasts for 3.1 months. The average 
decline for the 17 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 3.6 months while the 
average increase for the 2 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1 month. 
21 of the 63 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
33.3%), 9 at 68% error bands, 6 at 90% error bands, and 6 at 95% error bands. 21 of the 61 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 34.4%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 9; 90% error bands: 6; 95% error bands: 6), and none of the 2 positive impulse 
response values is statistically significant. This means that 100% of the statistically 
significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 10 of 19 categories (relative share: 52.6%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 10 of 17 or 58.8% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while none of the 2 categories with positive estimates is 
statistically significant. This means that 100% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 13.4% (moderate) for all categories included, 13.3% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 13.7% (moderate) for the categories 
with positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 5 of the 19 categories (26.3%), low for 5 categories 
(26.3%), moderate for 4 categories (21.1%), high for 3 categories (15.8%), and very high for 
2 categories (10.5%). 
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Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 13.4%; steel import value: 16.7%; exchange rates: 10.5%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6%) shows that the oil price variable has the second-largest explanatory 
power of all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 6 of 
19 or 31.6% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 8 of 19 categories (1% level: 7; 5% level: 1), a 
relative share of 42.1%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Russia exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 16 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (55.1%) and in 3 of 7 high-value categories (42.9%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 14 
of 16 low-value steel product categories (87.5%) and in 3 of 3 high value categories (100%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 3.3 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 2.3 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 7 of 16 low-value steel 
product categories (43.8%) and for 3 of 3 high-value categories (100%). 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 13.1% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 14.7% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Russia to the U.S. for 89.5% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to the 
U.S. decline for 3.1 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 100% of the statistically significant values 
are negative. Therefore, 100% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (21.1%), high (15.8%), or very 
high (10.5%) for a strong minority of the categories analysed (47.4%) which serves as an 
indicator for the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
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variable. Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to 
variation in the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 13.4% (moderate). 
Recapitulatory, there is evidence that Russian steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock to a significant extent. The results are in line with the findings 
for total Russian steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.3.2. Moreover, the variance 
decomposition estimates provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for 
steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The average decline of steel exports from Russia to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (3.3 months) than for high-value exports (2.3 months). 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Russia to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
low-value exports (55.1%) than for high-value exports (42.9%). 
- While export volumes from Russia to the U.S. decline for 100% of the high-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 87.5% of the low-value categories. 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
high-value categories (100%) than for low-value categories (43.8%).  
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for high-value categories (14.7%) than for low-value categories 
(13.1%). 
The majority of the estimates contradict the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted 
more by oil price shocks than high-value steel trade. 
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6.4.3.2 Ukraine 
 
 
1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Ukraine includes 15 of 36 categories. 21 categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 5, 7, 9, 22b, 28, 29, 29a, 33b, 34, 35 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 1a, 8, 14a, 15, 
19, 20, 21e, 23, 33a, 36, 37 
 
1B 1 225.757 13.3 0.05
1 -2.947 10.1 0.00
2 -74.833
1 1.064 10.3 < 0.01
2 0.525
3 0.183
1 -1,319.266 * 23.6 0.09
2 -1,443.991 *
1 -20.798 0.3 0.74
2 -27.492
14 1 -245.621 ** 13.6 0.86
16 1 -269.796 * 11.1 0.00
17 1 -3.684 7.0 0.49
1 -111.414 ** 1.1 0.44
2 -30.828
21A 1 3.506 5.4 0.68
1 -18.770 10.8 0.90
2 -11.467
21CD 1 -1.168 19.5 0.00
1 -15.225 2.2 0.49
2 -20.456
31 1 -150.715 0.6 0.29
32 1 -6.854 33.4 0.02
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
3
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
4
6A
6B
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
18
21B
22A
Table 6.38 VEC Analysis - Ukraine 
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.4 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Category 
  338 257 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from the 
Ukraine to the U.S. in 12 of the 15 steel product categories analysed (80%) and to increasing 
exports in the remaining 3 categories (20%).  
The average immediate decline for the 15 categories lasts for 0.9 months. The average 
decline for the 12 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 1.5 months while the 
average increase for the 3 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1.7 months. 
Five of the 23 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
21.7%), 3 at 68% error bands and 2 at 90% error bands. Five of the 18 negative impulse 
response values (relative share: 27.8%) are statistically significant (68% error bands: 3; 90% 
error bands: 2), and none of the 5 positive impulse response values is statistically significant. 
This means that 100% of the statistically significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 4 of 15 categories (relative share: 26.7%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 4 of 12 or 33.3% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while none of the 3 categories with positive estimates is 
statistically significant. This means that 100% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 10.8% (moderate) for all categories included, 11.1% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 9.7% (low) for the categories with 
positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 4 of the 15 categories (26.7%), low for 2 categories 
(13.3%), moderate for 7 categories (46.7%), high for 1 category (6.7%), and very high for 1 
category (6.7%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 10.8%; steel import value: 12.1%; exchange rates: 7.7%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7.7%) shows that the oil price variable has the second-largest explanatory 
power of all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 3 of 
15 or 20% of the categories analysed. 
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4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 7 of 15 categories (1% level: 4; 5% level: 1; 10% 
level: 2), a relative share of 46.7%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Ukraine exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 11 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (37.9%) and in 4 of 7 high-value categories (57.1%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 8 of 
11 low-value steel product categories (72.7%) and in 4 of 4 high value categories (100%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 0.7 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 1.3 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 3 of 11 low-value steel 
product categories (27.3%) and for 1 of 4 high-value categories (25%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 10.4% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 12.1% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Ukraine to the U.S. for 80% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to the 
U.S. decline for 0.9 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 100% of the statistically significant values 
are negative. Moreover, 100% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (40%), high (6.7%), or very 
high (6.7%) for the majority of the categories analysed (53.4%) which serves as an indicator 
for the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 10.8% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that Ukrainian steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock to a significant extent. The results are in line with the findings 
for total Ukrainian steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.3.3. Moreover, the variance 
decomposition estimates provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for 
steel trade volumes, although the average explanatory power the oil price variable has for the 
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steel export variable is somewhat lower than for most of the other countries included in the 
analysis. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Ukraine to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (57.1%) than for low-value exports (37.9%). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (27.2%) than for high-value categories (25%).  
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from the Ukraine to the U.S. decline for 100% of the high-
value categories, export volumes decline for only 72.7% of the low-value categories. 
- The average decline of steel exports from the Ukraine to the U.S. lasts longer for 
high-value exports (1.3 months) than for low-value exports (0.7 months). 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for high-value categories (12.1%) than for low-value categories 
(10.4%). 
 
The estimates obtained provide mixed evidence. Therefore, no definite statement can be 
made with regard to possible price patterns. By tendency, the evidence found that contradicts 
the hypothesis of price patterns is somewhat stronger than the evidence supporting the 
hypothesis. 
It needs to be mentioned that some Ukrainian estimates may be biased by autocorrelation. 
These estimates need to be interpreted very conservatively. 
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6.4.4 North America 
For North America, Canada (6.4.4.1) and Mexico (6.4.4.2) have been selected for the 
analysis of steel exports to the U.S. by steel product category. 
 
6.4.4.1 Canada 
 
1 59.491 *
2 24.751
1 2,397.878 *
2 304.996
3 3,757.515 **
4 3,569.199 *
5 1,629.989 *
6 4,373.584 **
7 3,696.790 *
8 4,246.018 *
9 7,156.999 ***
10 1,164.984
11 22.803
12 1,726.722
1 334.194
2 334.273
3 33.378
4 364.510
5 919.145 ***
6 839.341 *
7 1,447.325 ***
8 1,060.781 *
9 1,351.424 **
10 1,023.121 *
11 663.861
12 347.164
13 135.960
1 227.315
2 83.682
1 27.599
2 47.469
3 42.004
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1A 12.6 < 0.05
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
1B 23.0 0.00
3 15.1 0.88
4 0.6 0.66
5 2.5  0.26
Table 6.39 VEC Analysis - Canada 
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VEC Analysis - Canada (continued)
1 856.212 ***
2 687.717 **
3 496.424 *
4 580.186 *
5 172.211
1 913.477 *
2 589.643
3 338.839
4 11.804
1 24.224
2 11.493
8 1 -2.830 49.0 0.04
1 5.236
2 27.387
3 61.677 *
4 3.128
14 1 668.122 * 33.8 0.31
1 274.919 *
2 52.806
15 1 42.841 10.8 0.28
1 50.497
2 15.350
1 8.701
2 10.566
3 13.811
4 12.482
5 5.898
1 109.288
2 791.224 **
3 1,015.859 ***
4 879.163 *
5 734.125 *
6 443.472
1 663.846 ***
2 541.566 ***
3 491.446 ***
4 375.384 *
5 445.551 **
20 1 1,121.197 * 20.5 0.07
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
6A 18.7 0.03
6B 8.8 0.80
7 1.4 0.68
9 27.6 0.50
14A 20.7 0.00
16 18.1 0.02
17 3.3 0.24
18 25.4 0.09
19 65.9 0.04
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.4 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Category 
  338 262 
 
VEC Analysis - Canada (continued)
1 114.619
2 56.259
3 55.035
1 17.856
2 5.192
21CD 1 -13.077 9.5 0.15
1 11.139
2 29.105 *
3 64.899 ***
4 20.543
5 37.777 *
6 34.693 *
7 2.634
8 30.794 *
9 11.698
1 69.346
2 610.990 ***
3 487.339 **
4 42.976
1 115.764
2 122.379
3 182.894 *
4 35.814
5 205.345 *
6 189.669 *
7 174.896 *
8 65.686
1 11.455
2 4.398
29 1 -631.039 *** 16.8 0.00
1 172.910 **
2 47.336
1 1,315.296 *
2 914.014
3 367.181
4 76.723
1 167.159
2 826.065 ***
3 299.906
4 294.444
5 528.800 *
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
21A 1.6 0.49
21B 12.5 0.00
21E 28.2 0.43
22A 23.9 0.00
22B 11.6 0.29
28 0.6 0.66
29A 2.5 0.61
31 4.6 0.05
32 38.3 < 0.01
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Canada includes 35 of 36 categories. One category 
(23) has been excluded from the analysis because it contains two I(2) variables. 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to increasing steel exports from 
Canada to the U.S. in 31 of the 35 steel product categories analysed (88.6%) and to 
decreasing exports in the remaining 4 categories (11.4%).  
The average immediate increase for the 35 categories lasts for 3.3 months. The average 
increase for the 31 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 3.8 months while the 
average decrease for the 4 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 1.3 months. 
53 of the 124 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
42.7%), 33 at 68% error bands, 8 at 90% error bands, and 12 at 95% error bands. 52 of the 
119 positive impulse response values (relative share: 43.7%) are statistically significant 
(68% error bands: 33; 90% error bands: 8; 95% error bands: 11), and 1 of the 5 negative 
impulse response values (relative share: 20%) is also statistically significant at 95% error 
bands. This means that 98.1% of the statistically significant impulse response values are 
positive. 
VEC Analysis - Canada (continued)
1 168.469
2 470.928 *
3 661.285 *
4 823.565 *
5 1,000.791 *
1 -32.080
2 -11.805
34 1 21.735 5.9 0.81
35 1 1.036 6.2 0.21
36 1 15.264 3.8 0.58
1 2.589
2 33.099
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
37 1.7 0.09
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
33A 32.0 0.18
33B 2.0 0.24
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The impulse response estimates for 19 of 35 categories (relative share: 54.3%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 18 of 31 or 58.1% of the categories with positive 
estimates are statistically significant while 1 of 4 (or 25%) of the categories with negative 
estimates is statistically significant. This means that 94.7% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are positive. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 16% (moderate) for all categories included, 15.6% (moderate) for the 
categories with positive impulse responses, and 19.3% (moderate) for the categories with 
negative impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 11 of the 35 categories (31.4%), low for 4 categories 
11.4%), moderate for 8 categories (22.9%), high for 7 categories (20%), and very high for 5 
categories (14.3%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 16%; steel import value: 12.3%; exchange rates: 9.6%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7.4%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 12 of 35 
or 34.3% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 15 of 35 categories (1% level: 6; 5% level: 5; 10% 
level: 4), a relative share of 42.9%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Canada exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 28 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (96.6%) and in 7 of 7 high-value categories (100%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. increase in 26 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (89.7%) and in 6 of 7 high-value categories (85.7%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories increase for 3.4 months and 
exports in high-value categories increase for 3 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 17 of 28 low-value steel 
product categories (60.7%) and for 2 of 7 high-value categories (28.6%) 
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The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 16.9% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 12.3% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to increasing export volumes 
from Canada to the U.S. for 88.6% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to 
the U.S. increase for 3.3 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 98.1% of the statistically significant values 
are positive. Moreover, 94.7% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
also positive. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (22.9%), high (20%), or very 
high (14.3%) for the majority of the categories analysed (57.2%). This is an indicator for the 
significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. Thereby, 
the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in the oil 
price variable for all categories analysed is 16% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that Canadian steel exports to the U.S. are positively 
impacted by an oil price shock to a significant extent. The results are in line with the findings 
for total Canadian steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.4.1. Moreover, the variance 
decomposition estimates provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for 
steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Canada to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (100%) than for low-value exports (96.6%). 
- While export volumes from Canada to the U.S. increase for 89.7% of the low-value 
categories, export volumes increase for only 85.7% of the high-value categories 
(low-value products should profit overproportionally). 
- The average increase of steel exports from Canada to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (3.4 months) than for high-value exports (3 months) (low-value 
products should profit overproportionally). 
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- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (60.7%) than for high-value categories (28.6%) (low-value 
products should profit overproportionally). 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (16.9%) than for high-value categories 
(12.3%). 
The estimates support the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted more by oil price 
shocks than high-value steel trade. 
 
6.4.4.2 Mexico 
1 30.111
2 22.970
3 7.059
1 484.035
2 4,728.556 *
1 324.007
2 1,532.540 ***
3 158.108
4 843.548 *
1 251.755 ***
2 14.183
3 163.947 **
6A 1 0.791 32.0 0.00
1 -334.121 *
2 -282.270
1 0.067
2 0.057
3 0.158
4 0.134
5 0.261 *
6 0.126
7 0.046
9 1 1.926 10.8 0.12
1 161.709 *
2 3.795
3 45.385
4 72.002
4 25.5 0.06
6B 8.1 0.16
8 14.9 0.09
14 3.4 0.72
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1A 29.6 0.37
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
1B 11.2 0.71
3 43.8 0.31
Table 6.40 VEC Analysis - Mexico 
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.4 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Category 
  338 267 
 
 
VEC Analysis - Mexico (continued)
1 239.468 *
2 151.729
3 260.475 *
4 315.491 *
5 427.388 *
6 355.204 *
7 213.858
15 1 1,655.167 *** 5.0 0.08
16 1 -3.206 16.4 0.44
1 -3.089 *
2 -1.303
1 99.618
2 237.332 **
3 28.001
1 773.390 ***
2 639.169 **
3 776.000 **
4 1,186.865 ***
5 652.993 *
6 321.576
1 199.136
2 333.094 *
3 168.699
4 84.498
21B 1 -5.762 18.0 0.00
1 5.141 *
2 2.842
3 6.324 **
4 6.620 **
5 6.422 **
6 2.928
7 2.180
8 0.752
1 7.731
2 3.163
3 3.645
1 112.729 *
2 159.682 **
14A 9.7 0.60
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
17 21.1 0.15
18 2.6 0.78
20 45.1 0.00
21A 10.2 0.16
21CD 10.9 0.38
21E 7.5 0.64
22A 8.0 0.14
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VEC Analysis - Mexico (continued)
1 -11.457 ***
2 -9.523 ***
3 -13.752 ***
4 -11.308 ***
5 -3.972
6 -7.473 *
1 142.117 *
2 223.551 **
3 379.744 ***
4 82.379
5 119.181
1 6.777
2 3.884
29 1 1.713 21.7 < 0.1
1 -596.501
2 -1,442.106 *
3 -1,575.888 *
4 -1,945.791 *
5 -1,169.320
1 317.390
2 486.254
3 493.472
4 69.258
5 195.901
6 418.248
1 56.499
2 135.666
1 1.502
2 1.023
3 3.573
4 7.876 *
5 2.593
6 5.991
7 13.801 ***
8 8.821 *
9 1.343
1 -374.417 *
2 -342.234 *
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
22B 13.4 < 0.01
23 52.4 0.00
28 5.6 0.89
31 12.0 0.01
33A 12.8 0.64
32 2.7 0.62
33B 12.9 0.00
34 3.4 0.27
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Mexico includes 32 of 36 categories. Four categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 5, 7, 29a 
- category sample includes one or more I(2) variables: 19 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to increasing steel exports from 
Mexico to the U.S. in 24 of the 32 steel product categories analysed (75%) and to decreasing 
exports in the remaining 8 categories (25%).  
The average immediate increase for the 32 categories lasts for 2.2 months. The average 
increase for the 24 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 3.8 months while the 
average decrease for the 8 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 2.5 months. 
50 of the 111 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
45%), 28 at 68% error bands, 10 at 90% error bands, and 12 at 95% error bands. 38 of the 91 
positive impulse response values (relative share: 41.8%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 20; 90% error bands: 10; 95% error bands: 8), and 12 of the 20 negative impulse 
response values (relative share: 60%) are also statistically significant (68% error bands: 8; 
95% error bands: 4). This means that 76% of the statistically significant impulse response 
values are positive. 
The impulse response estimates for 21 of 32 categories (relative share: 59.4%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 16 of 24 or 66.7% of the categories with positive 
VEC Analysis - Mexico (continued)
1 3.144
2 7.446 **
3 6.215 *
36 1 -9.582 18.1 0.16
1 60.250 *
2 40.078 *
3 78.434 ***
4 41.582 *
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
37 26.1 0.37
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
35 25.9 0.00
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estimates are statistically significant while 5 of 8 or 62.5% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant. This means that 76.2% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are positive. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 16.9% (moderate) for all categories included, 17.9% (moderate) for 
the categories with positive impulse responses, and 13.8% (moderate) for the categories with 
negative impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 4 of the 35 categories (12.5%), low for 6 categories 
(18.8%), moderate for 12 categories (37.5%), high for 6 categories (18.8%), and very high 
for 4 categories (12.5%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 16.9%; steel import value: 12.7%; exchange rates: 7.2%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6.2%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 18 of 32 
or 56.3% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 12 of 32 categories (1% level: 7; 5% level: 1; 10% 
level: 4), a relative share of 37.5%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Mexico exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 25 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (86.2%) and in 7 of 7 high-value categories (100%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. increase in 20 of 
25 low-value steel product categories (75%) and in 4 of 7 high value categories (57.1%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories increase for 2.3 months and 
exports in high-value categories increase for 2 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 17 of 25 low-value steel 
product categories (68%) and for 3 of 7 high-value categories (42.9%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 16.4% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 18.4% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
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6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to increasing steel export 
volumes from Mexico to the U.S. for 75% of the categories analysed. On average, steel 
exports to the U.S. increase for 2.2 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive 
and negative statistically significant impulse response values, 76% of the statistically 
significant values are positive. Moreover, 76.2% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are also positive. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (37.5%), high (18.8%), or very 
high (12.5%) for two-thirds of the categories analysed (68.8%) which is an indicator for the 
significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. Thereby, 
the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in the oil 
price variable for all categories analysed is 16.9% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that Mexican steel exports to the U.S. are positively impacted 
by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Mexican steel exports 
to the U.S. in section 6.2.4.7. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates provide 
evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Mexico to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (100%) than for low-value exports (86.2%). 
- While export volumes from Mexico to the U.S. increase for 75% of the low-value 
categories, export volumes increase for only 57.1% of the high-value categories. 
- The average increase of steel exports from Mexico to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (2.3 months) than for high-value exports (2 months).  
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (68%) than for high-value categories (42.9%). 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for high-value categories (18.4%) than for low-value categories 
(16.4%).  
The majority of the estimates support the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted 
more by oil price shocks than high-value steel trade. 
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6.4.5 South America (Brazil) 
For South America, Brazil has been selected for the analysis of steel exports to the U.S. by 
steel product category. 
 
 
  
1 98.149
2 19.250
1B 1 2,349.430 30.7 0.66
1 682.640 *
2 934.369 *
4 1 -418.274 * 26.8 0.00
1 21.793
2 202.522 *
1 51.266 *
2 116.883 ***
3 8.417
4 22.446
5 148.025 ***
6 38.932
9 1 1.389 * 8.8 0.00
1 9.806
2 10.348
14A 1 25.611 12.6 < 0.01
15 1 -86.339 0.9 0.52
1 22.905 **
2 6.388
3 18.719 **
4 15.810 **
5 10.335 *
1 48.123 ***
2 13.192
3 24.952 *
4 20.947 *
5 14.490
18 1 -75.905 *** 20.6 0.22
19 1 39.220 10.7 0.48
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1A 22.8 0.25
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
3 13.1 0.67
6A 4.3 0.00
6B 22.6 0.00
14 9.7 0.19
16 4.3 0.49
17 29.2 0.00
Table 6.41 VEC Analysis - Brazil 
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VEC Analysis - Brazil (continued)
20 1 9.879 11.9 0.00
21A 1 161.337 *** 19.9 0.00
21B 1 -20.449 * 5.8 0.88
1 5.974 *
2 2.874
21E 1 0.095 1.3 0.00
1 26.811 *
2 43.819 *
3 19.928
4 44.781 *
5 15.997
23 1 96.325 **
2 50.495
3 27.779
28 1 -5.102 12.8 0.00
1 56.423
2 251.943 *
3 195.047
29A 1 -21.772 * 3.6 0.64
31 1 143.171 0.1 0.57
33A 1 -3,012.083 *** 5.9 0.03
33B 1 61.075 10.5 0.35
1 123.802
2 308.471
3 434.834 **
1 -3.156 *
2 -4.422 *
1 4.059
2 24.461 *
3 1.163
4 23.344 *
5 3.392
37 1 -25.846 4.3 0.28
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
34 14.3 0.20
21CD 26.3 0.29
22A 1.9 0.00
5.6 0.16
29 14.5 0.65
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
35 11.7 0.00
36 13.6 0.68
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Brazil includes 31 of 36 categories. Five categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 5, 7 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 8, 22b, 32 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to increasing steel exports from 
Brazil to the U.S. in 22 of the 31 steel product categories analysed (71%) and to decreasing 
exports in 9 categories (29%).  
The average immediate increase for the 31 categories lasts for 1.4 months. The average 
increase for the 22 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 2.5 months while the 
average decrease for the 9 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 1.1 months. 
31 of the 64 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
48.4%), 20 at 68% error bands, 5 at 90% error bands, and 6 at 95% error bands. 24 of the 54 
positive impulse response values (relative share: 44.4%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 15; 90% error bands: 5; 95% error bands: 4), and 7 of the 10 negative impulse 
response values (relative share: 70%) are also statistically significant (68% error bands: 5; 
95% error bands: 2). This means that 77.4% of the statistically significant impulse response 
values are positive. 
The impulse response estimates for 19 of 31 categories (relative share: 61.3%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 13 of 22 or 59.1% of the categories with positive 
estimates are statistically significant while 6 of 9 or 66.7% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant. This means that 68.4% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are positive. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 12.3% (moderate) for all categories included, 13.1% (moderate) for 
the categories with positive impulse responses, and 10.3% (moderate) for the categories with 
negative impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 8 of the 31 categories (25.8%), low for 5 categories 
(16.1%), moderate for 11 categories (35.5%), high for 6 categories (19.4%), and very high 
for 1 category (3.2%). 
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Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 12.3%; steel import value: 14.1%; exchange rates: 6.4%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7.9%) shows that the oil price variable has the second-largest explanatory 
power of all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 11 
of 31 or 35.5% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 13 of 31 categories (1% level: 12; 5% level: 1), a 
relative share of 41.9%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Brazil exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 24 of 29 
low-value steel product categories (82.7%) and in 7 of 7 high-value categories (100%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. increase in 17 of 
24 low-value steel product categories (70.8%) and in 5 of 7 high value categories (71.4%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories increase for 1.9 months and 
exports in high-value categories increase for 1.6 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 15 of 24 low-value steel 
product categories (62.5%) and for 4 of 7 high-value categories (57.1%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 12% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 13.4% 
(moderate) for the high value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to increasing export volumes 
from Brazil to the U.S. for 71% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to the 
U.S. increase for 1.4 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 77.4% of the statistically significant values 
are positive. Moreover, 68.4% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
also positive. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (35.5%), high (19.4%), or very 
high (3.2%) for the majority of the categories analysed (58.1%) which is an indicator for the 
significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. Thereby, 
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the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in the oil 
price variable for all categories analysed is 12.3% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that Brazilian steel exports to the U.S. are positively 
impacted by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Brazilian 
steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.5.2. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates 
provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Brazil to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (100%) than for low-value exports (82.7%). 
- The average increase of steel exports from Brazil to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (1.9 months) than for high-value exports (1.6 months).  
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (62.5%) than for high-value categories (57.1%). 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from Brazil to the U.S. increase for 71.4% of the high-value 
categories, export volumes increase for only 70.8% of the low-value categories.  
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for high-value categories (13.4%) than for low-value categories 
(12%). 
The estimates provide mixed evidence. Therefore, no definite statement can be made with 
regard to possible price patterns. By tendency, the evidence found that supports the 
hypothesis of price patterns is somewhat stronger than the evidence contradicting the 
hypothesis. 
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6.4.6 Africa (South Africa) 
For Africa, South Africa has been selected for the analysis of steel exports to the U.S. by 
steel product category. 
 
 
  
Table 6.42 VEC Analysis – South Africa 
1B 1 -35.356 9.6 0.69
1 -108.543
2 -1.459
4 1 222.548
2 502.480 **
6A 1 -73.392 5.4 0.62
6B 1 91.686 1.3 0.89
1 -93.409
2 -60.871
3 -119.298
16 1 -4.886 7.5 0.80
18 1 -128.219 * 10.3 0.22
1 -227.864 ***
2 -48.664
3 -12.077
20 1 -82.781 7.23 0.71
21A 1 -15.206 19.3 0.60
1 -0.569
2 -7.314
1 -6.145
2 -0.267
22A 1 -9.805 * 15.1 0.06
22B 1 -12.298 1.3 0.30
1 -16.983
2 -38.772
1 -334.104
2 -56.604
1 -559.950 *
2 -646.078 *
23 38.0 0.33
31 7.3 0.65
32 16.8 0.02
0.84
21E 3.0 0.71
19 20.3 0.51
21CD 2.2
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
3 12.0 0.69
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
21.9 0.27
14 1.6 0.80
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for South Africa includes 20 of 36 categories. 16 
categories have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 7, 8, 29, 29a, 33b, 34, 35 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 1a, 5, 9, 14a, 
15, 17, 21b, 28, 36 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
South Africa to the U.S. in 18 of the 20 steel product categories analysed (90%) and to 
increasing exports in 2 categories (10%).  
The average immediate decline for the 20 categories lasts for 1.6 months. The average 
decline for the 18 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 1.9 months while the 
average increase for the 2 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1.5 months. 
Seven of the 37 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
18.9%), 5 at 68% error bands, 1 at 90% error bands, and 1 at 95% error bands. Six of the 34 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 17.6%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 5; 95% error bands: 1), and 1 of 3 or 33.3% of the positive impulse response 
values is statistically significant. This means that 85.7% of the statistically significant 
impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 6 of 20 categories (relative share: 30%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
VEC Analysis - South Africa (continued)
1 -85.178
2 -387.774
3 -335.519
4 -187.419
5 -81.340
6 -32.325
7 -12.650
37 1 -1.734 * 36.2 0.27
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
33A 1.7 0.79
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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negative impulse response estimates, 5 of 18 or 27.8% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically also significant while 1 of the 2 categories with positive estimates 
(relative share: 50%) is statistically significant. This means that 83.3% of the statistically 
significant impulse response estimates are also negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 11.9% (moderate) for all categories included, 11.6% (moderate) for 
the categories with positive impulse responses, and 12% (moderate) for the categories with 
negative impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 6 of the 20 categories (30%), low for 5 categories 
(25%), moderate for 5 categories (25%), high for 2 categories (10%), and very high for 2 
categories (10%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 11.9%; steel import value: 9.8%; exchange rates: 7.2%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6.2%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 10 of 20 
or 50% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 2 of 20 categories, 1 at the 5% level and 1 at the 
10% level, a relative share of 10%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, South Africa exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 
16 of 29 low-value steel product categories (55.2%) and in 4 of 7 high-value categories 
(57.1%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 14 
of 16 low-value steel product categories (87.5%) and in 4 of 4 high value categories (100%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 1.6 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 1.5 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 5 of 16 low-value steel 
product categories (31.3%) and for 1 of 4 high-value categories (25%) 
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The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 11.8% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 12.3% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from South Africa to the U.S. for 90% of the categories analysed. On average, the steel 
exports to the U.S. decline for 1.6 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive 
and negative statistically significant impulse response values, 85.7% of the statistically 
significant values are negative. Moreover, 83.3% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (25%), high (10%), or very 
high (10%) for a strong minority of the categories analysed (45%) which is an indicator for 
the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. 
Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 11.9% (moderate). 
Recapitulatory, there is evidence that South African steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total South 
African steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.6.3. Moreover, the variance decomposition 
estimates provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade 
volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from South Africa to the U.S. during the sample period is larger 
for high-value exports (57.1%) than for low-value exports (55.2%). 
- The average decline of steel exports from South Africa to the U.S. lasts longer for 
low-value exports (1.6 months) than for high-value exports (1.5 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (31.3%) than for high-value categories (25%).  
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from South Africa to the U.S. decline for 100% of the high-
value categories, export volumes decline for only 87.5% of the low-value categories. 
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- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for high-value categories (12.3%) than for low-value categories 
(11.8%). 
The estimates provide mixed evidence. Therefore, no definite statement can be made with 
regard to possible price patterns. By tendency, the evidence found that supports the 
hypothesis of price patterns is somewhat stronger than the evidence contradicting the 
hypothesis. 
 
6.4.7 Middle East (Turkey) 
For the Middle East, Turkey has been selected for the analysis of steel exports to the U.S. by 
steel product category. 
 
 
  
1 -951.638 *
2 -101.633
1 -488.319
2 -42.909
3 -1,562.088
4 -1,532.036
1 -55.260
2 -118.417 *
3 -3.845
6A 1 -55.990 * 14.1 0.40
1 -2,904.966 ***
2 -6,478.917 ***
3 -6,950.641 ***
4 -7,102.454 ***
5 -1,570.272
14 1 285.504 7.7 0.25
1 32.737
2 1.718
1 -1,641.575
2 -4,944.177 *
3 -2,071.761
4 -2,000.815
15 24.1 0.63
6B 54.1 < 0.01
14A 4.2 0.45
3 7.9 0.60
4 14.2 0.81
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1B 20.0 0.06
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
Table 6.43 VEC Analysis - Turkey 
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VEC Analysis - Turkey (continued)
16 1 5.773 7.6 0.66
1 5.599
2 4.801
18 1 153.021 9.7 0.38
1 -100.054
2 -103.301
3 -475.354 **
4 -7.829
5 -16.137
6 -524.882 **
7 -230.925
8 -241.046
21A 1 105.433 12.2 0.28
1 -0.118
2 -0.120
1 -0.446
2 -2.057 *
1 -84.239
2 -94.394
3 -361.920 *
4 -312.302
5 -97.187
23 1 -1.519 37.2 0.04
1 -1,860.744 *
2 -730.705
32 1 -191.689 9.8 0.72
1 -124.050
2 -277.775
3 -121.877
4 -175.755
36 1 -8.207 12.8 0.87
1 -1.241 ***
2 -1.632 ***
3 -1.437 ***
4 -0.116
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
37 15.5 < 0.01
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
31 6.7 0.24
33A 14.1 0.76
21CD 6.0 0.04
22A 2.9 0.48
19 16.5 0.64
21B 4.0 0.45
17 12.6 0.47
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Turkey includes 22 of 36 categories. 14 categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 5, 7, 8, 9, 21e, 22b, 33b, 35 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 1a, 28, 29, 29a, 
34 
- VEC matrix not positive definite: 20 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Turkey to the U.S. in 16 of the 22 steel product categories analysed (72.7%) and to 
increasing exports in 6 of the 22 categories (27.3%).  
The average immediate decline for the 22 categories lasts for 1.9 months. The average 
decline for the 16 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 3.1 months while the 
average increase for the 6 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1.3 months. 
16 of the 58 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
27.6%), 7 at 68% error bands, 2 at 90% error bands, and 7 at 95% error bands. 16 of the 50 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 32%) are statistically significant (68% error 
bands: 7; 90% error bands: 2; 95% error bands: 7), and none of the 8 positive impulse 
response values is statistically significant. This means that 100% of the statistically 
significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 10 of 22 categories (relative share: 45.5%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 10 of 16 or 62.5% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while none of the 6 categories with positive estimates is 
statistically significant. This means that 100% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 14.3% (moderate) for all categories included, 16.3% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 9% (low) for the categories with positive 
impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 3 of the 22 categories (13.6%), low for 7 categories 
(31.8%), moderate for 8 categories (36.4%), high for 2 categories (9.1%), and very high for 2 
categories (9.1%). 
6 Analysis II: Econometric Analysis of U.S. Steel Imports 
6.4 Analysis of Steel Exports to the U.S. by Category 
  338 284 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 14.3%; steel import value: 13.7%; exchange rates: 7.8%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6.5%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 9 of 22 or 
40.9% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 5 of 22 categories (1% level: 2; 5% level: 2; 10% 
level: 1), a relative share of 22.7%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Turkey exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 17 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (58.6%) and in 5 of 7 high-value categories (71.4%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 13 
of 17 low-value steel product categories (76.4%) and in 3 of 5 high-value categories (60%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 2.1 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 1 month. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 8 of 17 low-value steel 
product categories (47.1%) and for 2 of 5 high-value categories (40%). 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 15.8% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 9.1% (low) for 
the high value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Turkey to the U.S. for 72.3% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to 
the U.S. decline for 1.9 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 100% of the statistically significant impulse 
response values and impulse response estimates are negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (36.4%), high (9.1%), or very 
high (9.1%) for the majority of the categories analysed (54.6%) which is an indicator for the 
significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. Thereby, 
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the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in the oil 
price variable for all categories analysed is 14.3% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is strong evidence that Turkish steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Turkish steel 
exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.7.3. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates 
provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Turkey to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (71.4%) than for low-value exports (58.6%). 
- While export volumes from Turkey to the U.S. decline for 76.4% of the low-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 60% of the high-value categories. 
- The average decline of steel exports from Turkey to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (2.1 months) than for high-value exports (1 month). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (47.1%) than for high-value categories (40%).  
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (12.3%) than for high-value categories 
(9.1%). 
The estimates support the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted more by oil price 
shocks than high-value steel trade. 
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6.4.8 Asia 
For Asia, China (6.4.8.1), Japan (6.4.8.2), South Korea (6.4.8.3), and Taiwan (6.4.8.4) have 
been selected for the analysis of steel exports to the U.S. by steel product category. 
 
6.4.8.1 China 
 
 
  
1 -0.683
2 -1.368 *
3 -1.425 *
4 -4.005 ***
5 -1.649 *
6 -1.880 **
1B 1 -492.778 14.9 0.54
1 -4,803.740 *
2 -5,000.146 *
3 -2,518.214
4 -3,269.433
5 -2,140.371
1 -549.913 *
2 -133.884
3 -150.150
4 -1,555.393 ***
5 -336.251
6 -764.395 **
7 -675.844 *
8 -441.436
1 -0.373
2 -0.374
3 -0.168
6A 1 -623.852 * 9.6 0.68
6B 1 -83.784 0.2 0.68
1 -9.449
2 -13.472 *
8 1 -321.443 *** 24.1 0.00
2 -171.735 *
9 1 -2.905 15.6 0.00
5 16.9 0.66
7 6.1 0.00
3 9.3 0.32
4 33.5 0.46
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1A 17.8 < 0.01
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
Table 6.44 VEC Analysis - China 
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VEC Analysis - China (continued)
1 -135.180 ***
2 -173.826 ***
3 -150.895 ***
4 -173.085 ***
5 -154.069 ***
6 -0.835
1 -186.793
2 -246.307
3 -418.274
4 -695.445
1 -174.029 ***
2 -155.888 ***
3 -164.274 ***
17 1 -12.899 8.5 0.87
18 1 442.402 8.6 0.70
1 -999.475 **
2 -1,270.831 ***
1 -161.467
2 -642.468 **
3 -593.868 *
4 -656.531 *
5 -511.236 *
6 -447.418
7 -299.971
8 -188.753
9 -30.800
1 -25.033
2 -11.306
21CD 1 8.475 1.2  0.00
21E 1 3.799 2.9 0.40
2 8.248
1 -53.417
2 -180.112 *
3 -260.139 *
4 -69.335
5 -230.791 *
6 -163.150
7 -38.086
8 -26.929
22B 1 -37.066 * 10.4 0.00
23 1 -165.754 * 40.1 < 0.05
22A 16.1 0.00
21A 4.7 0.52
21B 38.0 0.00
16 43.8 0.05
20 19.1  0.00
14A 36.4 0.00
15 3.4 0.00
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for China includes 32 of 36 categories. Four categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 29a 
- category sample includes one or more I(2) variables: 14, 19 
- VEC matrix not positive definite: 34 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
China to the U.S. in 28 of the 32 steel product categories analysed (87.5%) and to increasing 
exports in 4 of the 32 categories (12.5%).  
VEC Analysis - China (continued)
1 -11.932
2 -20.702
1 -0.605
2 -121.789 *
3 -74.316
4 -83.932
5 -46.363
6 -13.343
31 1 -204.158 1.2 0.14
1 -1,105.519 *
2 -409.123
1 -742.969
2 -386.439
1 -27.574
2 -3.877
1 -9.792
2 -14.101
36 1 3.014 18.6 0.00
37 1 -7.780 2.9 0.00
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
35 6.9 0.02
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
33A 17.8 0.51
33B 3.0 0.45
29 10.5 0.72
32 2.8 0.47
28 1.2 0.81
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
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The average immediate decline for the 32 categories lasts for 2.5 months. The average 
decline for the 28 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 3 months while the 
average increase for the 4 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1.3 months. 
36 of the 90 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 40%), 
20 at 68% error bands, 4 at 90% error bands, and 12 at 95% error bands. 36 of the 85 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 42.4%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 20; 90% error bands: 4; 95% error bands: 12), and none of the 5 positive 
impulse response values is statistically significant. This means that 100% of the statistically 
significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 15 of 32 categories (relative share: 46.9%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 15 of 28 or 53.6% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while none of the 5 categories with positive estimates 
are statistically significant. This means that 100% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 13.9% (moderate) for all categories included, 14.8% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 7.8% (low) for the categories with 
positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 10 of the 32 categories (31.3%), low for 6 categories 
(18.8%), moderate for 10 categories (31.3%), high for 1 category (3.1%), and very high for 5 
categories (15.6%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 13.9%; steel import value: 16%; exchange rates: 10.4%; 
U.S. real GDP: 4.7%) shows that the oil price variable has the second-largest explanatory 
power of all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 10 
of 32 or 31.3% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 16 of 32 categories (1% level: 13; 5% level: 2; 10% 
level: 1), a relative share of 50%. 
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5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, China exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 25 of 29 
low-value steel product categories (86.2%) and in 7 of 7 high-value categories (100%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 23 
of 25 low-value steel product categories (92%) and in 5 of 7 high-value categories (71.4%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 2.8 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 1.4 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 12 of 25 low-value steel 
product categories (48%) and for 2 of 7 high-value categories (28.6%). 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 13.2% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 16.5% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from China to the U.S. for 87.5% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports to the 
U.S. decline for 2.5 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 100% of the statistically significant values 
and the statistically significant impulse response estimates are negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (31.3%), high (3.1%), or very 
high (15.6%) for half of the categories analysed (50%). This is an indicator for the 
significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable. Thereby, 
the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in the oil 
price variable for all categories analysed is 13.9% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that Chinese steel exports to the U.S. are negatively impacted 
by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Chinese steel exports 
to the U.S. in section 6.2.8.1. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates provide 
evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from China to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (100%) than for low-value exports (86.2%). 
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- While export volumes from China to the U.S. decline for 92% of the low-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 71.4% of the high-value categories. 
- The average decline of steel exports from China to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (2.8 months) than for high-value exports (1.4 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (48%) than for high-value categories (28.6%).  
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for high-value categories (16.5%) than for low-value categories 
(13.2%). 
The majority of the estimates support the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted 
more by oil price shocks than high-value steel trade. 
 
6.4.8.2 Japan 
 
 
  
Table 6.45 VEC Analysis - Japan 
1A 1 -38.972 ** 2.3 0.00
1 -2,197.656 **
2 -2,938.717 *
1 400.992 *
2 326.523 *
3 469.595 **
4 1 116.492 5.2 0.03
5 1 19.669 *** 25.3 0.00
1 -25.041
2 -3.201
3 -220.321 *
4 -258.150 *
7 1 -216.517 18.5 < 0.05
1 18.623
2 25.940 *
14 1 3.539 6.3 0.31
1 -12.192
2 -63.231
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1B 15.6 0.28
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
3 10.9 0.49
6A 6.8 0.89
8 31.7 0.30
14A 10.2 0.08
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VEC Analysis - Japan (continued)
15 1 1,170.285 0.7 0.30
1 -7.068
2 -3.902
3 -7.020
1 -37.790
2 -53.105
1 -95.245
2 -185.069 *
3 -202.740 *
4 -221.691 *
5 -176.544
1 -277.254 *
2 -269.243 *
1 354.208
2 1,516.131 **
3 483.137
4 862.533
1 -3.023
2 -69.353
3 -0.416
1 28.181 *
2 104.702 ***
3 40.952 *
1 -37.332
2 -37.069
3 -70.062 *
4 -5.217
1 22.631 *
2 23.650 *
22A 1 53.156 5.4 0.31
1 -10.970
2 -6.498
3 -2.361
4 -43.357
5 -17.375
23 1 -2.950 17.3 0.79
28 1 -118.265 16.3 0.67
29 1 152.732 * 38.8 0.82
1 -6.635
2 -175.929 *
3 -123.629
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
16 5.7 0.88
17 29.9 0.05
18 9.6 0.00
19 15.8 0.27
20 3.0 0.26
21A 5.7 0.61
21B 11.0 < 0.01
21CD 23.2 0.86
21E 14.4 0.00
22B 2.4 0.19
29A 10.4 0.00
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Japan includes 34 of 36 categories. Two categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 9 
- VEC matrix is near singular matrix: 6b. 
VEC Analysis - Japan (continued)
1 -147.649
2 -75.187
3 -148.911
4 -248.255 *
5 -46.001
1 -461.446 *
2 -62.783
3 -480.054
4 -278.498
33A 1 529.913 *** 15.5 0.00
1 -13.254
2 -2.445
1 -56.564 *
2 -50.087 *
3 -20.417
4 -64.139 *
5 -10.171
1 -116.820
2 -28.290
3 -164.197 *
4 -89.150
5 -205.849 ***
6 -59.489
1 -11.439 *
2 -5.766
1 -19.920 *
2 -17.417 *
3 -32.087 **
4 -14.601
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
31 7.1 0.19
32 21.2 0.06
33B 50.8 0.00
34 39.0 0.13
35 8.3 0.37
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
36 24.0 0.01
37 14.2 < 0.01
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2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Japan to the U.S. in 22 of the 34 steel product categories analysed (64.7%) and to increasing 
exports in 12 of the 32 categories (35.3%).  
The average immediate decline for the 34 categories lasts for 1.4 months. The average 
decline for the 22 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 3.1 months while the 
average increase for the 12 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 1.7 months. 
36 of the 87 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
41.4%), 27 at 68% error bands, 5 at 90% error bands, and 4 at 95% error bands. 23 of the 67 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 34.3%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 19; 90% error bands: 3; 95% error bands: 1), and 13 of the 20 positive impulse 
response values are also statistically significant (65%). This means that 63.9% of the 
statistically significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 21 of 34 categories (relative share: 61.8%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 13 of 22 or 59.1% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 8 of 12 or 75% of the categories with positive 
estimates are statistically significant. This means that 61.9% of the statistically significant 
impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 15.4% (moderate) for all categories included, 16.1% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 14% (moderate) for the categories with 
positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 4 of the 34 categories (11.8%), low for 9 categories 
(26.5%), moderate for 12 categories (35.3%), high for 5 categories (14.7%), and very high 
for 4 categories (11.8%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 15.4%; steel import value: 13.2%; exchange rates: 9.8%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6.5%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 15 of 34 
or 44.1% of the categories analysed. 
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4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 15 of 34 categories (1% level: 9; 5% level: 3; 10% 
level: 3), a relative share of 44.1%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Japan exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 27 of 29 
low-value steel product categories (93.1%) and in 7 of 7 high-value categories (100%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 17 
of 27 low-value steel product categories (63%) and in 5 of 7 high-value categories (71.4%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 1.4 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 1 month. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 15 of 27 low-value steel 
product categories (55.6%) and for 5 of 7 high-value categories (71.4%). 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 15.6% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 14.4% 
(moderate) for the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Japan to the U.S. for 64.7% of the categories analysed. On average, the steel exports to 
the U.S. decline for 1.4 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and negative 
statistically significant impulse response values, 63.9% of the statistically significant values 
are negative. Moreover, 61.9% of the statistically significant impulse response estimates are 
also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (35.3%), high (14.7%), or very 
high (11.8%) for a significant majority of the categories analysed (61.8%) which is an 
indicator for the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable. Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to 
variation in the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 15.4% (moderate). 
Recapitulatory, there is evidence that Japanese steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Japanese 
steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.8.5. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates 
provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
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Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Japan to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (100%) than for low-value exports (93.1%). 
- The average decline of steel exports from Japan to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (1.4 months) than for high-value exports (1 month). 
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (15.6%) than for high-value categories 
(14.4%). 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from Japan to the U.S. decline for 71.4% of the high-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 63% of the low-value categories. 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
high-value categories (71.4%) than for low-value categories (55.6%).  
The estimates provide mixed evidence so that no definite statement can be made with regard 
to possible price patterns. By tendency, the evidence found that supports the hypothesis of 
price patterns is somewhat stronger than the evidence contradicting the hypothesis. 
 
6.4.8.3 South Korea 
1B 1 4.690 3.0 0.00
3 1 -1.513 5.5 0.17
4 1 13.778 27.5 0.00
6A 1 -48.602 4.1 0.07
1 -6.949 *
2 -0.791
7 1 -0.727 26.2 0.00
1 0.508
2 0.560
3 1.101
4 1.543 *
5 0.828
6 0.174
7 0.151
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
6B 11.5 0.00
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
8 7.2 0.00
Table 6.46 VEC Analysis – South Korea 
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VEC Analysis - South Korea (continued)
14 1 -15.664 4.9 0.00
14A 1 -29.573 9.3 0.00
1 -8.900
2 -15.586 *
1 -200.018
2 -71.296
1 -80.188 17.9
2 -137.238 *
20 1 -11.148 10.3 0.46
21A 1 83.358 * 4.9 0.15
21B 1 -2.341 1.4 0.70
21CD 1 17.775 1.9 0.65
21E 1 -0.168 1.6 < 0.01
1 -12.436
2 -62.885
1 -36.947
2 -2.982
1 -15.435
2 -53.683
31 1 8.821 4.5 0.00
1 -126.495
2 -381.743
1 -3.248
2 -156.482 ***
1 -24.907
2 -23.011
34 1 -11.099 37.7 0.00
2 -65.276
1 -2.146
2 -5.797
1 -1.573 5.7 0.13
2 -0.814
1 -9.303
2 -21.485 *
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
22A 33.4 0.00
16 25.7 0.00
18 5.1 0.00
19 0.00
22B 1.1 0.69
29 3.3 < 0.1
32 1.5 0.25
33A 18.7 0.00
33B 11.6 0.00
35 19.9 0.00
36
37 10.6 0.29
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for South Korea includes 28 of 36 categories. Eight 
categories have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 9 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 1a, 5, 15, 17, 
23, 28, 29a 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
South Korea to the U.S. in 22 of the 28 steel product categories analysed (78.6%) and to 
increasing exports in the remaining 6 categories (21.4%).  
The average immediate decline for the 28 categories lasts for 0.9 months. The average 
decline for the 22 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 1.6 months while the 
average increase for the 6 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 2 months. 
Seven of the 47 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
14.9%), 6 at 68% error bands and 1 at 95% error bands. Five of the 36 negative impulse 
response values (relative share: 13.9%) are statistically significant (68% error bands: 4; 95% 
error bands: 1), and 2 of the 11 positive impulse response values are statistically significant 
(16.7%). This means that 71.4% of the statistically significant impulse response values are 
negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 7 of 28 categories (relative share: 25%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 5 of 22 or 22.7% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 2 of 6 or 33.3% of the categories with positive 
estimates are also statistically significant. This means that 71.4% of the statistically 
significant impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 11.3% (moderate) for all categories included, 12.1% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 8.2% (low) for the categories with 
positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 11 of the 28 categories (39.3%), low for 5 categories 
(17.9%), moderate for 7 categories (25%), high for 3 categories (10.7%), and very high for 2 
categories (7.1%). 
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Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 11.3%; steel import value: 14.4%; exchange rates: 16.7%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6.9%) shows that the oil price variable has the third-largest explanatory 
power of all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 6 of 
28 or 21.4% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 19 of 28 categories (1% level: 17; 10% level: 2), a 
relative share of 67.8%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, South Korea exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 
23 of 29 low-value steel product categories (79.3%) and in 5 of 7 high-value categories 
(71.4%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 18 
of 23 low-value steel product categories (78.3%) and in 4 of 5 high-value categories (80%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 0.8 months and for 1 
month in high-value categories. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 5 of 23 low-value steel 
product categories (21.7%) and for 2 of 5 high-value categories (40%). 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 11.9% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 8.2% (low) for 
the high value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from South Korea to the U.S. for 78.6% of the categories analysed. On average, steel exports 
to the U.S. decline for 0.9 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and 
negative statistically significant impulse response values, 71.4% of the statistically 
significant values are negative. Moreover, 71.4% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (25%), high (10.7%), or very 
high (7.1%) for a strong minority of the categories analysed (42.8%) which serves as an 
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indicator for the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable. Thereby, the average share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to 
variation in the oil price variable for all categories analysed is 11.3% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that South Korean steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total South 
Korean steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.8.9. Moreover, the variance decomposition 
estimates provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade 
volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (11.9%) than for high-value categories 
(8.2%). 
The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from South Korea to the U.S. during the sample period is larger 
for low-value exports (79.3%) than for high-value exports (71.4%). 
- While export volumes from South Korea to the U.S. decline for 80% of the high-
value categories, export volumes decline for only 78.3% of the low-value categories. 
- The average decline of steel exports from South Korea to the U.S. lasts longer for 
high-value exports (1 month) than for low-value exports (0.8 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
high-value categories (40%) than for low-value categories (21.7%).  
The majority of the estimates contradict the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted 
more by oil price shocks than high-value steel trade. 
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6.4.8.4 Taiwan 
1A 1 -0.179 1.7 0.76
1B 1 2.032 17.7 0.00
1 -43.325 *
2 -28.081
3 -57.267 *
4 -55.403 *
5 -85.486 ***
6 -67.075 *
7 -38.254
8 -18.260
9 -4.800
1 -27.240
2 -153.827 *
3 -70.188
4 -140.747
5 -359.724 **
6 -130.861
7 -64.169
8 -305.106 *
9 -150.953
10 -208.132
11 -182.148
1 25.869
2 109.689 ***
3 79.759 *
4 61.438
5 49.653
6 27.539
7 2.808
6B 1 -43.369 0.6 0.72
1 -0.014 *
2 -0.013
3 -0.013 *
4 -0.004
5 -0.008
6 -0.003
1 -2.609
2 -15.862 *
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
3 24.7 0.14
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
4 10.9 0.00
6A 6.0 0.71
0.00
7 7.6 0.00
14 10.1
Table 6.47 VEC Analysis - Taiwan 
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VEC Analysis - Taiwan (continued)
1 1.505 **
2 0.423
3 1.288 **
4 0.461
16 1 -39.933 * 6.6 0.75
17 1 -0.309 2.2 0.00
18 1 -61.167 * 16.1 0.00
1 -0.097
2 -0.098
20 1 -22.304 22.6 0.38
1 -0.968
2 -2.256
3 -0.578
4 -4.405 *
5 -0.216
1 -1.571
2 -2.080
3 -21.012
1 -0.551 *
2 -0.391
3 -0.092
4 -0.294
5 -0.038
1 0.267
2 1.168
3 0.259
4 0.132
23 1 -1.850 1.1 0.17
29 1 -33.098 * 4.4 0.18
1 95.559
2 125.677
3 87.011
4 100.123
1 -88.713
2 -118.737
3 -108.873
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
14A 5.7 0.44
19 17.1 0.00
21A 9.5 0.00
21CD 25.0  0.18
21E 2.0 0.08
22A 2.4 0.00
31 5.2 0.00
32 0.4 0.49
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Taiwan includes 27 of 36 categories. Nine categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 9, 22b, 35 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 5, 8, 15, 21b, 
28, 29a 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Taiwan to the U.S. in 20 of the 27 steel product categories analysed (74.1%) and to 
increasing exports in the remaining 7 categories (25.9%).  
The average immediate decline for the 27 categories lasts for 1.5 months. The average 
decline for the 20 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 3.1 months and the 
average increase for the 7 categories with increasing export volumes also lasts for 3.1 
months. 
24 of the 84 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
28.6%), 19 at 68% error bands, 3 at 90% error bands, and 2 at 95% error bands. 20 of the 62 
negative impulse response values (relative share: 32.6%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 18; 90% error bands: 1; 95% error bands: 1), and 4 of the 22 positive impulse 
response values (relative share: 18.2%) are also statistically significant (68% error bands: 1; 
VEC Analysis - Taiwan (continued)
1 -183.668 *
2 -150.594
3 -48.363
4 -278.515 *
5 -180.511
33B 1 26.801 2.4 0.27
34 1 71.296 5.3 0.05
36 1 -12.748 * 6.3 0.01
1 -2.444
2 -7.605 *
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
37 12.8 0.01
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
33A 3.8 0.00
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90% error bands: 2; 95% error bands: 1). This means that 83.3% of the statistically 
significant impulse response values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 14 of 27 categories (relative share: 51.9%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 12 of 20 or 60% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 2 of 7 or 28.6% of the categories with positive 
estimates are also statistically significant. This means that 85.7% of the statistically 
significant impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 8.5% (low) for all categories included, 9.3% (low) for the categories 
with negative impulse responses, and 6.4% (low) for the categories with positive impulse 
responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 10 of the 27 categories (37%), low for 8 categories 
(29.6%), moderate for 6 categories (22.2%), high for 3 categories (11.1%), and very high for 
none of the categories. 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 8.5%; steel import value: 12%; exchange rates: 8.8%; 
U.S. real GDP: 6.6%) shows that the oil price variable has the third-largest explanatory 
power of all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 4 of 
27 or 14.8% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 15 of 27 categories (1% level: 11; 5% level: 2; 10% 
level: 2), a relative share of 55.6%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Taiwan exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 21 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (72.4%) and in 6 of 7 high-value categories (85.7%). 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 14 
of 21 low-value steel product categories (66.7%) and in 6 of 6 high-value categories (100%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 1.3 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 2.3 months. 
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The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 11 of 21 low-value steel 
product categories (52.3%) and for 3 of 6 high-value categories (50%) 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 8.5% (low) for the low-value categories and 8.4% (low) for the 
high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Taiwan to the U.S. for 74.1% of the categories analysed. On average, the steel exports 
to the U.S. decline for 1.5 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and 
negative statistically significant impulse response values, 83.3% of the statistically 
significant values are negative. Moreover, 85.7% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (22.2%), high (11.1%), or very 
high (0%) for a minority of the categories analysed (33.3%). Thereby, the average share of 
volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in the oil price variable for all 
categories analysed is 8.5% (low). 
Summing up, there is evidence that Taiwanese steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Taiwanese 
steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.8.10. The explanatory power of the oil price variable 
for the steel export variable, however, is significantly lower when compared to the 
explanatory power of the oil price variable for most of the other countries analysed. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Taiwan to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (85.7%) than for low-value exports (72.4%). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (52.3%) than for high-value categories (50%).  
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (8.5%) than for high-value categories 
(8.4%). 
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The following findings provide evidence against the hypothesis: 
- While export volumes from Taiwan to the U.S. decline for 100% of the high-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 66.7% of the low-value categories. 
- The average decline of steel exports from Taiwan to the U.S. lasts longer for high-
value exports (2.3 months) than for low-value exports (1.3 months). 
The estimates provide mixed evidence. Therefore, no definite statement can be made with 
regard to possible price patterns. By tendency, the evidence found that supports the 
hypothesis of price patterns is somewhat stronger than the evidence contradicting the 
hypothesis. 
 
6.4.9 Oceania (Australia) 
For Oceania, Australia has been selected for the analysis of steel exports to the U.S. by steel 
product category. 
 
 
1 -1.292
2 -1.077
1 -1,980.946
2 -3,915.251 *
3 -4,039.481 *
4 -989.651
5 -3,067.655
6 -3,054.337
7 -1,075.151
8 -1,076.445
9 -2,484.631
10 -4,404.834 *
11 -2,671.549
1  1.184
2  0.110
3  1.339
4  1.219
1 -365.297 *
2 -101.724
1  258.630 **
2  257.196 *
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
1A 2.2 0.60
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
1B 12.8 0.73
4 1.3 0.00
6A 1.8 0.13
6B 4.8 0.07
Table 6.48 VEC Analysis - Australia 
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VEC Analysis - Australia (continued)
1 -36.898 *
2 -3.892
3 -24.613
1 -0.228
2 -1.081 *
3 -0.654
1 -8.127
2 -16.269 *
3 -8.282
4 -6.341
5 -0.083
6 -5.359
7 -4.828
16 1 23.211 * 4.3 0.21
17 1 5.685 2.5 0.70
18 1 -0.664 3.2 < 0.01
1 -3.595 *
2 -4.851 *
3 -4.089 *
4 -2.861
5 -3.136
1 -8.607 *
2 -6.766
3 -10.588 *
1 -0.446
2 -0.765 *
3 -0.413
21E 1 0.219 0.6 0.16
22A 1 3.305 6.0 0.91
1 -14.565 *
2 -1.242
3 -13.002 *
1 185.793 *
2 91.121
29 1 -15.855 * 57.9 0.00
29A 1 -0.496 * 17.4 0.00
31 1 -2,231.790 * 11.2 0.23
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
9 20.0 0.78
14 42.8 0.45
15 1.0 0.79
19 5.9 0.87
21A 26.9 0.05
21CD 19.7 0.24
23 16.6 < 0.01
28 10.4 0.00
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1. Included and Excluded Steel Product Categories 
The steel product category analysis for Australia includes 25 of 36 categories. 11 categories 
have been excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 
- no exports to the U.S. during the sample period: 21b 
- exports to the U.S. during the sample period in less than ten months: 3, 5, 7, 8, 14a, 
20, 22b, 33b, 35 
- category sample includes one or more I(2) variables: 33a 
 
2. Impulse Response Analysis 
A one-standard deviation shock to the real oil price leads to decreasing steel exports from 
Australia to the U.S. in 17 of the 25 steel product categories analysed (68%) and to 
increasing exports in 8 categories (32%).  
The average immediate decline for the 25 categories lasts for 1.4 months. The average 
decline for the 17 categories with decreasing export volumes lasts for 3.2 months while the 
average increase for the 8 categories with increasing export volumes lasts for 2.3 months. 
29 of the 72 single impulse response values are statistically significant (relative share: 
40.3%), 23 at 68% error bands, 2 at 90% error bands, and 4 at 95% error bands. 24 of the 54 
VEC Analysis - Australia (continued)
1 -352.949 *
2 -749.150 ***
3 -1,068.786 ***
4 -142.979
1 -7.410 ***
2 -9.185 ***
1 -12.363 **
2 -2.957
1 7.387
2 13.058 *
3 7.254
4 7.580
5 6.950
6 8.867
* statistically significant at 68% error bands
** statistically significant at 90% error bands
*** statistically significant at 95% error bands
Product 
Category
Variance 
Decomposition   
(after 15 months, 
in %)
Granger Causality           
(p-value)
Time Period 
(months)
Impulse Responses 
(to 1 s.d.shock,        
in qmt)
32 45.9 0.00
34 5.0 0.73
Source: 
Author's calculations (EViews®)
36 11.4 < 0.01
37 13.5 0.79
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negative impulse response values (relative share: 44.4%) are statistically significant (68% 
error bands: 19; 90% error bands: 1; 95% error bands: 4) and 5 of the 18 positive impulse 
response values (relative share: 27.8%) are also statistically significant (68% error bands: 4; 
90% error bands: 1). This means that 82.8% of the statistically significant impulse response 
values are negative. 
The impulse response estimates for 19 of 25 categories (relative share: 76%) are (at least 
partially) statistically significant. When discriminating between categories with positive and 
negative impulse response estimates, 15 of 17 or 88.2% of the categories with negative 
estimates are statistically significant while 4 of 8 or 50% of the categories with positive 
estimates are also statistically significant. This means that 78.9% of the statistically 
significant impulse response estimates are negative. 
 
3. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The average relative share of volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in 
the oil price variable is 13.8% (moderate) for all categories included, 17.7% (moderate) for 
the categories with negative impulse responses, and 5.4% (low) for the categories with 
positive impulse responses. 
The average relative variation in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is very low for 10 of the 25 categories (40%), low for 2 categories 
(8%), moderate for 9 categories (36%), high for 1 category (4%), and very high for 3 
categories (12%). 
Comparing the average relative importance of the explanatory variables to the volatility of 
the steel export variable (oil price: 13.8%; steel import value: 10.8%; exchange rates: 5.7%; 
U.S. real GDP: 7.3%) shows that the oil price variable has the largest explanatory power of 
all explanatory variables. To put it differently, the oil price variable explains most of the 
variation in the steel export variable relative to the other explanatory variables for 10 of 25 
or 40% of the categories analysed. 
 
4. Granger Causality Analysis 
The GC test results confirm the statistical usefulness or the predictive value of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable for 10 of 25 categories (1% level: 8; 10% level: 2), a 
relative share of 40%. 
 
5. Price Pattern Analysis 
During the sample period, Australia exported significant volumes of steel to the U.S. in 19 of 
29 low-value steel product categories (65.5%) and in 6 of 7 high-value categories (85.7%). 
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Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease in 15 
of 19 low-value steel product categories (79%) and in 2 of 6 high-value categories (33.3%). 
On average, exports in low-value steel product categories decrease for 2.3 months and 
exports in high-value categories decline for 0.7 months. 
The impulse response estimates are statistically significant for 16 of 19 low-value steel 
product categories (84.2%) and for 3 of 6 high-value categories (50%). 
The average relative volatility in the steel export variable that can be explained by variation 
in the oil price variable is 15.9% (moderate) for the low-value categories and 7.1% (low) for 
the high-value categories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
A one-standard deviation shock in the oil price variable leads to decreasing export volumes 
from Australia to the U.S. for 68% of the categories analysed. On average, the steel exports 
to the U.S. decline for 1.4 months. When it comes to the relative share of positive and 
negative statistically significant impulse response values, 82.8% of the statistically 
significant values are negative. Moreover, 78.9% of the statistically significant impulse 
response estimates are also negative. 
For the categories analysed, the average relative variation in the steel export variable that can 
be attributed to volatility in the oil price variable is moderate (36%), high (4%), or very high 
(12%) for the majority of the categories analysed (52%). Thereby, the average share of 
volatility in the steel export variable that is due to variation in the oil price variable for all 
categories analysed is 13.8% (moderate). 
Summing up, there is evidence that Australian steel exports to the U.S. are negatively 
impacted by an oil price shock. The results are in line with the findings for total Australian 
steel exports to the U.S. in section 6.2.9.1. Moreover, the variance decomposition estimates 
provide evidence for the explanatory power oil prices can have for steel trade volumes. 
 
Price Patterns 
The following findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that oil price shocks have a 
stronger impact on low-value steel trade than on high-value steel trade:  
- The relative share of steel product categories for which significant volumes of steel 
have been exported from Australia to the U.S. during the sample period is larger for 
high-value exports (85.7%) than for low-value exports (65.5%). 
- While export volumes from Australia to the U.S. decline for 79% of the low-value 
categories, export volumes decline for only 33.3% of the high-value categories. 
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- The average decline of steel exports from Australia to the U.S. lasts longer for low-
value exports (2.3 months) than for high-value exports (0.7 months). 
- The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is higher for 
low-value categories (84.2%) than for high-value categories (50%).  
- On average, the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable is higher for low-value categories (15.9%) than for high-value categories 
(7.1%). 
The estimates support the hypothesis that low-value steel trade is impacted more by oil price 
shocks than high-value steel trade. 
 
6.4.10 Summary 
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
In addition to the analysis in sections 6.2 (steel exports by country) and 6.3 (steel exports by 
region), the analysis in section 6.4 (steel exports by category) provides further evidence that 
an oil price shock leads to decreasing export volumes to the U.S. for geographically distant 
countries and to increasing export volumes for geographically close countries. 
Following a one-standard deviation oil price shock, steel exports decrease for a majority of 
the steel product categories analysed for the countries from Europe (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain), the C.I.S. (Russia, Ukraine), Africa (South Africa), the 
Middle East (Turkey), Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), and Oceania (Australia).  
As can be seen in table 6.49 for the above-mentioned countries the relative share of 
categories with negative impulse response estimates is between 64.7% (Japan) and 90% 
(South Africa) [column 1], the average decline of steel imports to the U.S. lasts for a time 
period between 0.9 months (South Korea, Ukraine) and 3.3 months (Italy) [column 2 ], the 
relative share of negative statistically significant single impulse response values is between 
63.9% (Japan) and 100% (China, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine) [column 3], the relative share of 
negative statistically significant impulse response estimates is between 61.9% (Japan) and 
100% (China, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine) [column 4], the relative share of categories analysed 
for which the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is 
moderate, high, or very high is between 33.3% (Taiwan) and 65.3% (Netherlands) [column 
5], and the average relative importance of the oil price variable for the steel export variable is 
between 8.5% (Taiwan) and 18.7% (Italy) [column 6]. 
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At the same time, steel exports from North- (Canada, Mexico) and South America (Brazil) to 
the U.S. increase for a significant majority of the steel product categories analysed.  
As can be seen in table 6.50 the relative share of categories with positive impulse response 
estimates for the three above-mentioned countries is between 71% (Brazil) and 86.6% 
(Canada) [column 1], the average increase of steel imports to the U.S. lasts for a time period 
between 1.4 months (Brazil) and 3.3 months (Canada) [column 2], the relative share of 
positive statistically significant single impulse response values is between 77.4% (Brazil) 
Belgium 78.1 1.8 82.6 76.5 46.9 13.2
France 69.0 1.3 80.0 73.3 55.1 13.0
Germany 82.9 2.3 95.5 92.3 51.5 13.8
Italy 85.7 3.3 93.1 86.7 60.7 18.7
Netherlands 80.8 1.0 93.8 90.0 65.3 16.4
Spain 77.8 2.0 95.6 92.3 55.5 14.1
Russia 89.5 3.1 100.0 100.0 47.4 13.4
Ukraine 80.0 0.9 100.0 100.0 53.4 9.5
South Africa 90.0 1.6 85.7 83.3 45.0 11.9
Turkey 72.3 1.9 100.0 100.0 54.6 14.3
China 87.5 2.5 100.0 100.0 50.0 13.9
Japan 64.7 1.4 63.9 61.9 61.8 11.3
South Korea 78.6 0.9 71.4 71.4 42.8 11.3
Taiwan 74.1 1.5 83.3 85.7 33.3 8.5
Australia 68.0 1.4 82.8 78.9 52.0 13.8
Statistically 
Significant 
Negative IR Values                 
(in %)
Statistically 
Significant 
Negative IR 
Estimates (in %)
Moderate, High, 
Very High VD 
Estimates              
(in %)
Average 
Explanatory 
Power of Oil Price 
Variable (in %)
Oceania
Europe
C.I.S.
Africa
Middle East
Asia
Categories with 
Decreasing 
Export Volumes              
(in %)
Average 
Decrease of Steel 
Exports to the 
U.S.                     
(in months)
Region / 
Country
Table 6.49 Statistical Analysis of Impulse Response and Variance Decomposition  
Estimates 
Source: Author's calculations 
Source: Author's calculations 
Canada 86.6 3.3 98.1 94.7 57.2 16.0
Mexico 75.0 2.2 76.0 76.2 68.8 16.9
Brazil 71.0 1.4 77.4 68.4 58.1 12.3
Average 
Explanatory 
Power of Oil Price 
Variable (in %)
Region / 
Country
North America
South America
Categories with 
Increasing Export 
Volumes              
(in %)
Average Increase 
of Steel Exports 
to the U.S.               
(in months)
Statistically 
Significant Positive 
IR Values                 
(in %)
Statistically 
Significant 
Positive IR 
Estimates (in %)
Moderate, High, 
Very High VD 
Estimates              
(in %)
Table 6.50 Statistical Analysis of Impulse Response and Variance Decomposition  
 Estimates 
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and 98.1% (Canada) [column 3], the relative share of positive statistically significant 
impulse response estimates is between 68.4% (Brazil) and 94.7% (Canada) [column 4], the 
relative share of categories analysed for which the explanatory power of the oil price 
variable for the steel export variable is moderate, high, or very high is between 57.2% 
(Canada) and 68.8% (Mexico) [column 5], and the average relative importance of the oil 
price variable for the steel export variable is between 12.3% (Brazil) and 16.9% (Mexico) 
[column 6]. 
Finally, table 6.51 shows that on average, the oil price variable explains the largest share of 
variation in the steel export variable of all explanatory variables for 12 of 18 countries, the 
second-largest share for 4 countries (Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, China), and the third-largest 
share for 2 countries (South Korea, Taiwan).  
 
OIL VALUE EXRA RGDP
Europe
Belgium 13.2 9.0 6.9 7.0
France 13.0 9.1 6.7 7.0
Germany 13.8 8.8 6.6 7.2
Italy 18.7 13.5 7.0 7.2
Netherlands 16.4 10.9 5.9 5.8
Spain 14.1 12.7 5.8 6.4
C.I.S.
Russia 13.4 16.7 10.5 6.0
Ukraine 10.8 12.1 7.7 7.7
North America
Canada 16.0 12.3 9.6 7.4
Mexico 16.9 12.7 7.2 6.2
South America
Brazil 12.3 14.1 6.4 7.9
Africa
South Africa 11.9 9.8 7.2 6.2
Middle East
Turkey 14.3 13.7 7.8 6.5
Asia
China 13.9 16.0 10.4 4.7
Japan 15.4 13.2 9.8 6.5
South Korea 11.3 14.4 16.7 6.9
Taiwan 8.5 12.0 8.8 6.6
Oceania
Australia 13.8 10.8 5.7 7.3
Table 6.51 Average Explanatory Power of the Explanatory Variables (in%) 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Moreover, table 6.52 shows that for 12 of 18 countries, the oil price variable explains most 
of the variation in the steel export variable for a significant minority or the majority of the 
categories (= rank 1). 
Although the average of the impulse response and variance decomposition estimates by 
category cannot be compared directly with the estimates for aggregated steel exports by 
country (for example, some categories with large export volumes may impact the estimates 
for the total exports by country overproportionally), the trends in the analysis per category 
are by tendency in line with the estimates of the analysis by country for all countries 
included in the analysis by category (see 6.2). 
 
abs. in % abs. in % abs. in % abs. in %
Europe
Belgium 14 43.8 9 28.1 7 21.9 2 6.3
France 15 51.7 6 20.7 4 13.8 4 13.8
Germany 14 40.0 12 34.3 7 20.0 2 5.7
Italy 14 50.0 6 21.4 5 17.9 3 10.7
Netherlands 13 50.0 9 34.6 3 11.5 1 3.8
Spain 11 40.7 11 40.7 3 11.1 2 7.4
C.I.S.
Russia 6 31.6 8 42.1 4 21.1 1 5.3
Ukraine 3 20.0 7 46.7 3 20.0 2 13.3
North America
Canada 12 34.3 8 22.9 11 31.4 4 11.4
Mexico 18 56.3 9 28.1 4 12.5 1 3.1
South America
Brazil 11 35.5 11 35.5 7 22.6 2 6.4
Africa
South Africa 10 50.0 3 15.0 5 25.0 2 10.0
Middle East
Turkey 9 40.9 9 40.9 3 13.6 1 4.5
Asia
China 10 31.3 11 34.4 8 25.0 3 9.4
Japan 15 44.1 8 23.5 8 23.5 3 8.8
South Korea 6 21.4 7 25.0 9 32.1 6 21.4
Taiwan 4 14.8 7 26.0 8 29.6 8 29.6
Oceania
Australia 10 40.0 6 24.0 5 20.0 4 16.0
Total 195 39.2 147 29.6 104 20.9 51 10.3
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
Table 6.52 Ranks of the Oil Price Variable 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Price Patterns 
In addition to the analysis of the impulse response and variance decomposition estimates by 
category, the analysis in section 6.4 also focuses on the question whether low-value steel 
exports to the U.S. are overproportionally affected by rising oil prices/transport costs when 
compared with high-value steel exports due to the higher share of transport costs to final 
selling prices. In this context, a set of evaluation criteria is applied in the price pattern 
section in the above analysis. The results of the analysis are summarised in table 6.53. 
 
For the steel industries of 16 of the 18 countries (88.9%) included in the analysis, the relative 
share of high-value steel product categories where significant volumes of steel are exported 
to the U.S. is larger than the relative share of high-value categories [see column 1]. Of 
course, total volumes of high- and low-value steel exports also need to be taken into 
consideration. However, the relative share of categories with significant export volumes still 
may be an indicator that high-value steel exports to the U.S. during the sample period may 
have been relatively more attractive than low-value exports, especially for geographically 
distant countries. 
Belgium  +  -  +  +  +  +
France  +  +  -  +  +  +
Germany  +  -  -  -  -  -
Italy  +  +  -  -  + mixed evidence, tendency:  +
Netherlands  +  -  -  -  + mixed evidence, tendency:  -
Spain  +  -  -  -  -  -
Russia  -  -  +  -  -  -
Ukraine  +  -  -  +  - mixed evidence, tendency:  -
Canada  +  +  +  +  +  +
Mexico  +  +  +  +  -  +
Brazil  +  -  +  +  - mixed evidence, tendency:  +
South Africa  +  -  +  +  - mixed evidence, tendency:  +
Turkey  +  +  +  +  +  +
China  +  +  +  +  -  +
Japan  +  -  +  -  + mixed evidence, tendency:  +
South Korea  -  -  -  -  +  -
Taiwan  +  -  -  +  + mixed evidence, tendency:  +
Australia  +  +  +  +  +  +
Total  +: 16, -: 2  +: 7, -: 11  +: 10, -: 8  +: 11, -: 7  +: 10, -: 8  +: 7, -: 4, mixed: 5+, 2-
Hypothesis accepted: + Hypothesis rejected: -
Higher Average 
Explanatory Power 
of Oil Prices for 
Low-Value 
Categories
Supports/Contradiction of 
Hypotheses
Middle East
Asia
Oceania
Europe
C.I.S.
North America
South America
Africa
Higher Relative 
Share of 
Increasing, 
Decreasing Exports 
in Low-Value 
Categories
Higher Relative 
Share of Significant 
Export Volumes in 
Low-Value 
Categories
Longer Average 
Decline/Increase of 
Exports in Low-
Value Categories
Higher Relative 
Share of 
Statstically 
Significant IR-
Estimates in Low-
Value Categories
Region / 
Country
Table 6.53 Evaluation Criteria for Price Pattern Analysis 
Source: Author's evaluation 
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The relative share of categories where steel exports to the U.S. decrease following an oil 
price shock is larger for the low-value group than for the high-value group for 5 of 15 
countries whose steel industries are negatively affected. Moreover, the relative share of 
categories where steel exports increase following an oil price shock is larger for the low-
value group than for the high-value group in 2 of 3 countries (Brazil, Canada, Mexico) 
whose steel industries are positively affected. In other words, low-value steel exports to the 
U.S. are overproportionally affected relative to high-value steel exports in 7 of 18 countries 
(38.9%) [see column 2]. 
The average decline of steel exports to the U.S. lasts longer for the low-value group than for 
the high-value group for 7 of 15 countries whose steel industries are negatively affected by 
the shock in the oil price variable. Moreover, the average increase of steel exports to the U.S. 
lasts longer for the low-value group than for the high-value group for the 3 countries whose 
steel industries are positively affected by the shock in the oil price variable. In total, in 10 of 
18 cases (55.6%) the effect caused by the oil price shock lasts longer for low-value steel 
exports [see column 3]. 
The relative share of statistically significant impulse response estimates is larger for low-
value categories than for high-value categories for 11 of 18 countries analysed (61.1%) [see 
column 4]. This may indicate that the impact of the shock in the oil price variable on low-
value steel exports is more pronounced than the impact of the shock in the oil price variable 
on high-value steel exports. 
The explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export variables of low-value 
steel exports is larger than for high-value steel exports for the steel exports of 10 of 18 
countries analysed (55.6%) [see column 5]. The fact that the explanatory power of the oil 
price variable is stronger in the context of low-value steel exports to the U.S. for a majority 
of the countries analysed indicates that low-value exports are overproportionally affected by 
rising oil prices when compared to high-value exports. 
Summing up, the majority of the estimates indicate that low-value steel exports to the U.S. 
are overproportionally affected by oil price shocks for 4 of 5 evaluation criteria.  
For 7 of 18 countries, a significant majority or all evaluation criteria estimates support the 
hypothesis that low-value steel exports to the U.S. are over-proportionally affected by oil 
price shocks. For 4 of 18 countries, a significant majority or all evaluation criteria estimates 
provide evidence against the hypothesis. The evidence for the remaining 7 countries is mixed 
so that no clear tendency can be identified. However, in 5 of 7 cases, the evidence found that 
supports the hypothesis of price patterns is somewhat stronger than the evidence 
contradicting the hypothesis. Therefore, there is clear evidence for price patterns for 7 of 18 
countries (38.9%) and a tendency that supports the assumption of price patterns exists in 5 of 
18 cases (27.8%). On the other hand, there is clear evidence against price patterns in 4 of 18 
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cases (22.2%) and a tendency that against the assumption of price patterns in 2 of 18 cases 
(11.1%) [see column 6]. 
Recapitulatory, although the analysis of the evidence in the price pattern sections provides 
mixed evidence and the evaluation criteria provide only a first insight into possible price 
patterns, the majority of the estimates (66.7%) rather indicate that low-value steel exports to 
the U.S. are more affected by rising oil prices than high-value steel exports due to the higher 
share of transport costs to final selling prices and therefore indicate the existence of price 
patterns. 
 
 Conclusion 6.5
Sections 6.2 to 6.4 analyse the impact of a one-standard deviation oil price shock on steel 
export volumes to the U.S. of geographically close and distant countries (total exports and 
exports by category) and regions. At large, the analyses of the impulse response estimates 
from a national (see section 6.2, 6.4) and a regional perspective (see 6.3) show an adverse 
effect of the oil price shock on the export volumes of steel industries from geographically 
distant countries/regions and a positive effect on the export volumes of steel industries in 
countries/regions geographically close to the United States. Although the one-standard 
deviation oil price shock is only an approximation to reality (For instance, there is usually a 
time lag between the occurrence of an oil price shock and its economic impact for several 
reasons such as existing supply contracts. Research suggests that usually, the bulk of impacts 
are felt four quarters after the initial oil price increase (Donovan et al. 2008).), the analysis 
provides valuable insights into the impact of oil price shocks on trade volumes and trade 
patterns of a key industry. Moreover, the majority of the variance decomposition estimates 
indicate the significant explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel export 
variable. Finally, there is initial evidence for the existence of price patterns for steel exports 
to the United States. The findings are in line with economic theory about the role of distance 
and prices in international trade. 
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7 Analysis III: The Future Shape of the World Economy – 
Globalisation and/or Regionalisation?  
Given the findings of the econometric analysis, the following questions come to mind: Can 
the findings in chapter 6 be generalised? Will the process of globalisation towards economic 
globalism continue? Will the process be reversed into a de-globalisation process towards 
regionalisation? Or will some industries remain globalised while others become increasingly 
regionalised? What are the prospects for the shape of the future global economy? 
In order to address these questions, chapter 7 puts the findings of the econometric analysis 
into a wider context by describing the forces behind trade globalisation and by analysing 
how peak oil or rising oil prices affect trade globalisation through the transport cost channel. 
Thereby, the focus is on vertical specialisation, the composition of world trade and 
international commodity price convergence/dispersion. Moreover, the relationship between 
economic globalisation and regionalisation and the lessons that can be learned from the 
history of globalisation are also described. 
In this context, section 7.1 analyses the interdependencies between international transport 
costs, vertical specialisation and trade globalisation. Section 7.2 then describes the 
relationship between international transport costs, the composition of world trade and trade 
globalisation. Section 7.3 focuses on the link between international transport costs, 
commodity price convergence/dispersion and trade globalisation. Section 7.4 analyses the 
relationship between economic globalisation and regionalisation. Finally, section 7.5 links 
the findings in chapter 6 with the history of economic globalisation and section 7.6 
concludes. 
 
 The Link between International Transport Costs, Vertical 7.1
Specialisation and Trade Globalisation 
There are three preconditions for vertical specialisation89 to take place (see figure 7.1):  
 
1. Goods are produced in multiple, sequential stages. 
2. Two or more countries provide value added in the production sequence of the good. 
3. At least one country uses imported goods in its stage of the production process, and 
some of the output needs to be exported (Yi 2003)90. 
 
Vertical specialisation involves the growing interconnectedness of production within a 
sequential vertical trading chain that stretches across multiple countries. Thereby, some 
industries in the respective countries are specialised in particular stages of the production 
process.  
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For example, prior to vertical specialisation taking shape, U.S. steel was used in U.S. farm 
equipment production, with some of the equipment exported to other countries. In an 
increasingly globalised world, however, Japanese or Chinese steel is exported to Mexico 
where it is stamped and pressed. Finally, the processed steel is exported to the U.S. where it 
is used for farm equipment manufacturing. Some of the equipment is then sold in the 
domestic market while the rest is exported to other countries. As a result, the amount of trade 
and transport involved in producing a tractor and getting it to its final destination has grown 
substantially (Yi 2003). 
As indicated in the above example, production sharing among countries leads to an increase 
of international trade volumes (Dean et al. 2007; Hummels 2009; Krugman 1995) due to a 
multiplier effect91 (Bourguignon et al. 2002; UNCTAD 2009). Recent empirical research 
shows that vertical specialisation has contributed about 30% to total trade growth between 
1970 and 2000 (Hummels et al. 1998, 2001; Yi 2003). In the late 1990s, already 30% of 
international trade in manufactures could be attributed to trade in intermediate products with 
tendency to rise (Bird and Rajan 2001; Bourguignon et al. 2002; Yeats 1998).  
The multiplier effect also leads to a multiplication of transport costs (Gangnes et al. 2011a) 
and increasing demand for maritime transport (Hesse and Rodrigue 2004). As trade in 
merchandise and intermediate products grows, so does demand for ocean transport services 
which are an integral part of the global logistics chain (Kumar and Hoffmann 2002: 58).  
Thereby, the distance of trade and ton-mile trade figures92 also increase because vast 
quantities of raw materials, semi-finished and finished goods need to be transported over 
long distances within global production networks (MacKinnon et al. 2008: 17). Hence, one 
major reason for the growth of long-distance trade is that different stages of production 
processes for commodities are now performed at several (often widely scattered) locations 
Figure 7.1 Vertical Specialisation 
Author’s illustration, see Yi 2003 
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around the globe (Scholte 2008). This trend goes hand in hand with increasing time 
sensitivity in world trade (MacKinnon et al.: 17; UNCTAD 2009).  
Vertical specialisation is based on comparative advantage (Dicken 1998; Hesse and 
Rodrigue 2004; Hummels 2007b; Hummels et al. 2001) which is exploited within the 
vertical chain of a good’s production (Bourguignon et al. 2002). Comparative advantages are 
usually based on cheap labour, the supply of low-cost natural resources, or geographical 
location93 (Guerrero de Lizardi and Padilla-Pérez 2010). Thereby, differences in labour costs 
use to be the most important factor94 (Hesse and Rodrigue 2004; Wilsmeier and Martinez-
Zarzoso 2010). The vertical disintegration of production has developed mainly, though not 
exclusively, through the location of labour intensive stages in the production process at low-
wage manufacturing platforms95 (Scholte 2005: 107) from where semi-finished products are 
shipped to yet other locations for further work (Krugman 1995). 
Due to the large share of imported inputs, the export value of goods produced by industries 
with a significant extent of vertical specialisation is often substantially larger than the value 
added (Krugman 1995). As Krugman (1995: 336) puts it, “because of the growing vertical 
disintegration of industry the value added by a given manufacturing facility is likely to be 
only a small fraction of the value of its shipments; and thus the labor share of that value 
added is also a small fraction of costs, which are dominated by the cost of intermediate 
inputs.”96 
For exports including only a small share of value added, however, the penalty of higher 
transport costs is especially burdensome (Limao and Venables 2001; Ma and Van Assche 
2010; Radelet and Sachs 1998). The reason for this is that the share of transport costs in the 
final value of the good increases because the value of the final good not only includes the 
transportation costs from its origin to its destination (downstream transport costs), but also 
the transportation costs for all the components or raw materials which have been purchased 
internationally (upstream transport costs) (Kumar and Hoffmann 2002: 43). 
Therefore, the trade of commodities with a high share of value added by the import of 
intermediate goods significantly depends on low transport costs. More precisely, this kind of 
commodity trade is the result of low transport costs (Lundgren 1996).  
Prior to the dramatic increase of oil prices and the resulting high international transport costs 
during 2007/2008, many economists regarded transport costs as a component of minor 
importance for international trade97. Behar and Venables (2010: 16), however, note that the 
benefits of improved transport technology, reduced journey time and comparatively low 
transport costs have important implications for the composition of international trade, 
thereby enabling previously untradeable goods to be traded and production processes to be 
fragmented. Stopford (2009: 63) also emphasises that the transport cost variable is essential 
for international trade as the business philosophy of internationally fractured manufacturing 
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depends on cheap transport. Therefore, transportation costs must be treated as an integral 
part of the dispersed production process (Pedersen 2001: 86). 
Hence, what happens to vertical specialisation based globalisation in case of a persistent 
increase of transport costs? As a result of the multiplier-effect, global production networks 
based on vertical specialisation are more sensitive to rising transport costs than regular trade 
(Yi 2003; Ma and Van Assche 2010). In many labour-intensive manufacture export 
industries, export profit margins are rather thin and the share of imported inputs constitutes a 
large proportion of total output value. In those industries, even moderate changes in shipping 
costs can make a difference between profitability and loss in exports (Radelet and Sachs 
1998).  At the height of the oil price crisis in 2008, experts acknowledged that rising fuel 
costs were threatening to outweigh labour savings achieved by vertical specialisation 
(Murphy 2008).98  
 Generally, in competitive worldwide markets significantly rising transportation costs have 
to be compensated either by wage cost reductions or cost reductions somewhere else in the 
production process to enable firms to remain competitive. High ad valorem transportation 
costs matter less for high-value products than for low-value products. In case high transport 
cost levels foster regionalisation, low-value manufactured products such as clothing, textiles, 
plastic toys or steel are likely to be more affected than high-value products (UNCTAD 
2008). 
 
 The Link between International Transport Costs, the Composition 7.2
of World Trade and Trade Globalisation 
Transport costs are an important factor for the composition of international trade (Behar and 
Venables 2010: 1; Sampson and Yeats 1977). Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, 
declining transport costs shaped the geography of world trade. As a consequence, previously 
non-tradable commodities became tradable (Behar and Venables 2010: 16; Rodrigue 2009) 
and the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods increased (Ravn and Mazzenga 
2004). This resulted in growing international trade with competing goods contrary to 
previous decades when international trade mainly consisted of non-competing goods 
(O’Rourke and Williamson 2002).  
Shrinking transport costs in all transportation modes and growing transport mode availability 
(especially air transport) also led to an increase in the speed of transport (Hummels 1999b). 
Increasing long-distance trade of non-traditional agricultural exports like fresh vegetables or 
cut flowers from geographical remote regions (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa) are the most 
obvious examples for increasing transport speed and growing mobility of goods (Behar and 
Venables 2010: 16; Bordo et al. 1999; Hummels 1999b; 2007a; b; Keohane and Nye 2000). 
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Between 2000 and 2008, however, rapidly increasing transport costs put the sustainability of 
such trade into doubt because high cost levels led to a slowdown in the global mobility of 
goods. Kousnetzoff et al. (2008) find that the 7.5 fold increase of oil prices between 1998 
and 2008 resulted in an average growth of 6.1% in the relative cost of air transport compared 
to ocean transport. As a consequence, the proportion of goods transported by air decreased 
by 12.3% for the benefit of ocean transport. Simultaneously, ocean transport speed also 
declined due to rising fuel costs. The substitution effect found by Kousnetzoff et al. is also 
reflected by the composition of ocean transport cargo. Maritime transport is generally 
associated with the carriage of high-volume, low-value goods. In recent years, however, the 
share of low-volume, high-value goods has grown over-proportionally (UNCTAD 2008).  
At the same time, Jacks et al. (2008a, b) suggest that long-distance ocean trade of goods with 
low value-to-weight and low value-to-freight cost ratios such as iron ore, coking coal and 
steel products also have been impacted99. At 2008 ocean transport cost levels, they indicate a 
slowdown in ‘back-and-forth-trade’ of such goods which are transport cost intensive. 
The overproportional effect rising transport costs have on low-value products can be seen in 
figure 7.2 which shows the demand curves of two different commodities.  
 
On the one hand, the high-value commodity has a steeply sloping demand curve implying 
price inelasticity. The low-value commodity, on the other hand, has a gradual slope, 
implying price elasticity. When the price for transport increases from P1 to P2, only a small 
decrease (Q1 to Q2) is observed for  the high-value product, while for the same increase in 
transport costs, a large decrease can be observed for the low-value product (Bardi et al. 2006: 
271). 
Figure 7.2 Influence of Value and Demand Elasticity on Price  
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Kousnetzoff et al. (2008) analyse the relationship between oil price variation and the 
development of the composition of international trade during the 2000s. They find that on 
average, a 1% increase in transportation costs per ton leads to an increase in the value per ton 
of exported goods of about 1%. The authors also estimate that a 1% increase in oil prices 
leads to a 0.015% increase in the per ton value of exported goods. Therefore, the 7.5 fold 
increase of oil prices during the 1998 to 2008 period led to an increase of the per-ton value 
of goods exported to the U.S. by 3.1%. 
 
 The Link between International Transport Costs, Commodity Price 7.3
Convergence/Dispersion and Trade Globalisation 
The power of international trade to promote economic convergence between nations is 
viewed as one of the most venerable tenets of classical and neoclassical economics (Sachs 
and Warner 1995). There are different kinds of economic convergence, for instance factor 
price or income convergence and commodity price convergence which are linked to each 
other (Bourguignon et al. 2002; O’Rourke et al. 1996). Heckscher and Ohlin argued that 
commodity price convergence induces factor price convergence. According to Heckscher-
Ohlin trade theory, significant global economic events first have an impact on relative 
commodity prices followed by an impact on relative incomes and factor prices (O’Rourke 
and Williamson 1999: 57; 2004). 
The natural benchmark for a hypothetical perfectly integrated global economy100 is that 
markets for goods, services and factors of production are perfectly integrated (Rodrik 2000). 
The above description is based on the law of one price (Bordo et al. 1999; Bradford and 
Lawrence 2004; Scholte 2005: 57). 
For the dissertation topic commodity price convergence is of primary importance. 
Commodity price convergence can be defined as “the proposition that identical goods sold in 
competitive markets should cost the same everywhere when prices are expressed in terms of 
the same currency” (Sawyer and Sprinkle 2009: 365). Since economic globalisation can be 
described as the process towards economic globalism, it is closely linked with the process of 
commodity price convergence. Findlay and O’Rourke (2001) point out that commodity 
market integration implies that commodity prices should converge over time. Convergence 
of commodity prices will then, other things being equal, lead to increasing international trade 
volumes. In other words, as commodity prices converge, the globalisation of trade flows 
increases (Ben-David 1996; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999: 214; Sachs and Warner 1995).  
Therefore, commodity market integration expressed by commodity price 
conversion/dispersion is widely accepted as the best measure of international market 
integration where price gaps reflect the relevant costs of doing trade between markets 
(Findlay and O’Rourke 2001).  
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Bergin and Glick (2007) measure the degree of global commodity price convergence 
between 1990 and 2005. The authors use data on prices for 101 tradable commodities in 108 
cities in 70 countries for their analysis. They find a U-shaped pattern of commodity price 
convergence/dispersion for several sub-groupings of countries, selected regions, and selected 
commodity groups. Prices converge from 1990 to 1997 and then disperse from 1998 to 2005. 
Bergin and Glick also find that this time-varying pattern coincides remarkably well with oil 
price fluctuations (in other words: rising oil prices in the second half of the sample period 
reversed some of the convergence gains in the first half of the sample) and that high oil 
prices have an influence on price dispersion by increasing price wedges with growing 
distance. The results indicate that rising oil prices (the oil price variable is highly significant) 
have an impact on global price dispersion via the transport cost channel and that the rising 
price of oil during the 2000s led to an increase of the sensitivity of distance to trade. 
The study of Bergin and Glick indicates that in addition to the impact on vertical 
specialisation and the composition of world trade, rising oil prices during the 2000s also had 
a negative impact on commodity price convergence, thereby affecting trade globalisation. 
 
 Globalisation and Regionalisation 7.4
Irrespective of peak oil and its impact on trade globalisation, regionalisation is a trend that 
has increasingly taken place parallel to globalisation since the 1980s (MacKinnon et al. 
2008: 17). A trend towards regionalisation has become manifested in regional entities or 
regional integration agreements particularly in Europe (EU), the Americas (NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR) and Asia (ASEAN, APEC). In the early 2000s, the WTO notified a total of 
114 regional trade agreements with almost 60% of world trade taking place within such 
agreements101 (Bardi et al. 2006: 234; Bourguignon et al. 2002; Henderson 1992). In the 
recent past, regional trade has been growing (even) faster than inter-regional trade (Kumar 
and Hoffmann 2002: 45). 
The difference between regionalisation and globalisation can be described as follows: On the 
one hand, globalisation refers to trans-continental and trans-regional networks, trade and 
financial flows, and interconnectedness. On the other hand, regionalisation refers to the 
intensification of patterns of interconnectedness and integration between states that have 
common borders and/or are geographically proximate. While trade flows and financial flows 
between the major economic blocks (Europe, North America, Asia Pacific) constitute 
economic globalisation, such flows within these blocks are referred to as regionalisation 
(McGrew 2008: 20).102  
There are three alternative views on the relationship between regionalisation and 
globalisation (Bourguignon et al. 2002; Mirza and Zitouna 2009): 
1. Regionalisation is a defence against or a brake upon globalisation. 
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2. Regionalisation is just one form of globalisation, maybe even a particularly strong form. 
3. Regionalisation is a stepping-stone on the path towards multilateralism and thus an active 
agent of globalisation. 
Regionalisation and globalisation do not necessarily contradict each other. In the recent past, 
regionalisation has rather accompanied globalisation (Frankel 1998; Gamble and Payne 
1996; Scholte 2005: 77; 2008), thereby accentuating the increasing importance of regions as 
economic units within a globalising economy relative to the post-war model of integrated 
national economies (MacKinnon et al. 2008: 17). Therefore, regionalisation is one of the 
dominant features of global trade (Rodrigue 2009). However, the econometric evidence in 
chapter 6 indicates that, at least in the steel industry, regionalisation can also come at the cost 
of trade globalisation. 
 
 The Two Waves of Globalisation  7.5
Section 7.5 links the findings in chapter 6 to the history of globalisation and describes the 
lessons the past may hold for the future of trade globalisation. The section proceeds as 
follows: Section 7.5.1 describes the chronology and periodisation of the economic 
globalisation process. Section 7.5.2 then outlines the role of international transport costs in 
the globalisation process over time. Section 7.5.3 describes the early twentieth century 
globalisation backlash. 
 
7.5.1 The Chronology and Periodisation of Globalisation – Recent 
Phenomenon, Long-Term Upward Trend or Cyclical Process? 
There are three different approaches regarding the chronology of economic globalisation. 
The first approach characterises economic globalisation as a recent phenomenon that can be 
traced back to the 1960s (Scholte 2005: 2). Back then, largely independent national 
economic networks began to interconnect, a process that eventually culminated in the current 
global interdependent economic network (Castells 1993; 1996; Chase-Dunn et al. 2000; 
Sklair 1995). Contrary to proponents of this approach such as Drucker (1989) and King and 
Schneider (1991), most researchers in this field emphasise that the beginning of the 
economic globalisation process can be predated significantly.103  
Some experts trace back globalisation to ancient history (Frank and Gills 1993). Yet other 
historians like Bentley (1996) refer to the late 15th century as the start of global economic 
history (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996; O’Rourke and Williamson 2002). Most experts, 
however, backdate the beginning of the economic globalisation process to the nineteenth 
century (Henderson 1992; Keohane and Nye 2000; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; 2004; 
Scholte 2005: 15). The second and the third approach to the chronology of globalisation both 
take up this stance.  
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The second approach characterises economic globalisation as a linear long-term upward 
trend from local to regional to national to international to global integration (Chase-Dunn et 
al. 2000). Advocats of this account like Robertson (1992) view the evolution of global 
economic integration in linear terms (Scholte 2005: 2). 
The third approach describes economic globalisation as a cyclical process. From this 
perspective, the trend towards greater global economic integration is not monotonic. 
Contrariwise, globalisation is periodically interrupted by shocks like wars, economic 
depressions or political responses to the distributional effects of globalisation itself (Chase-
Dunn et al. 2000; Findlay and O’Rourke 2001; Scholte 2008). A review of the respective 
literature (e.g. Artis and Okubo 2009; Baldwin and Martin 1999; Bird and Rajan 2001; 
Bordo et al. 1999; Bourguignon et al. 2002; Chase-Dunn et al. 2000; Estevadeordal et al. 
2003; Findlay and O’Rourke 2001; Jacks et al. 2010; Krugman 1995; McGrew 2008; 
O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; Sachs and Warner 1995; Srinivasan 2002) yields that the 
third approach to the history of the globalisation process, which refers to multiple waves of 
globalisation, is most commonly accepted.  
According to Artis and Okubo (2009: 91) “it has been commonly accepted that two waves of 
globalisation can be detected – one situated before World War І, and the other commencing 
at some point … after World War ІІ to the current period.”104 The first wave of globalisation, 
also referred to as ‘belle epoque’, lasted from 1870 to 1914 and was superseded by the so 
called ‘dark middle ages’105 (1915-1959). This period was then superseded by the second 
wave of globalisation (‘twentieth century renaissance’) which lasts from 1960 until the 
present (Artis and Okubo 2009; Baldwin and Martin: 1999; Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 
1996).  
 
7.5.2 The Role of Transport Costs in the History of Trade Globalisation 
The first wave of global economic integration was to a significant extent caused by 
decreasing trade barriers. In this context, section 7.5.2 describes the importance of 
international transport costs for triggering the first globalisation wave and compares the role 
transport costs played in the first phase of globalisation with their role during the second 
phase of the globalisation process. 
Why is this analysis important? According to Scholte (2005: 121), “in order to anticipate 
possible future causes of globalization and to shape those processes in desired directions, it is 
necessary to understand the forces that have generated the development and brought it to its 
present position. Viable explanation provides grounds for sound prediction, prescription and 
action.” In particular, it is necassary to take up a comparative perspective because in 
contemporary globalisation debates many economists “treat the phenomenon as if it is 
unique to our time, seemingly unaware of how directly the first great globalization boom 
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speaks to the second. A conversation between the two is long overdue.” (O’Rourke and 
Williamson 1999: 4). 
During much of the nineteenth century and particularly during the first wave of 
globalisation, a significant and persistent decline in transport costs was taking place 
(Estevadeordal et al. 2003: 366) mainly due to technical innovations and investments in 
infrastructure (Baldwin and Martin 1999; Bourguignon et al. 2002).106  
The robust decline of transport costs during this central episode of global economic history 
(Estevadeordal et al. 2003: 370) comprehended overland and maritime transport costs 
(Bordo et al. 1999; Findlay and O’Rourke 2001; Jacks et al. 2008b). Research on the first 
wave of globalisation has tracked freight rates reasonably well (Jacks et al. 2006). 
Estevadeordal et al. (2003) estimate a decline in general freight rates by roughly 30% 
between 1870 and 1913. Especially maritime freight rates fell considerably. The North 
freight rate index (North 1958) fell by 41% in real terms between 1870 and 1910 and the 
British index (Harley 1988) dropped by 70% in real terms between 1840 and 1910 
(Bourguignon et al. 2002; O’Rourke and Williamson 2002). Both indexes cover ocean 
freight rates for the Atlantic economy and show a steady fall of ocean transport costs of 
about 1.5-2% per annum (Jacks et al. 2010: 128; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999: 35). 
According to Jacks and Pendakur (2008), maritime freight rates fell by 50% between 1870 
and 1913. For instance, the price of transporting a bushel of wheat from New York to 
Liverpool was halved between 1830 and 1880 and was halved again between 1880 and 1914 
(Baldwin and Martin 1999).  
The reduction of international ocean freight rates was not limited to the Atlantic economy. 
Between 1870 and 1914, ocean transport costs also declined substantially on routes 
involving the Black Sea and for Asian trade routes (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002). 
Thereby, real freight rates fell most for core-periphery trade or rather long-distance trade 
(Chase-Dunn et al. 2000; Jacks et al. 2010; McGrew 2008: 4; Sachs and Warner 1995). 
Therefore, falling transport costs were a major force for the integration of world markets 
(Bordo et al. 1999). Table 7.1 shows that transport cost reductions were most significant for 
bulk trade commodities (Baldwin and Martin 1999). 
As indicated above, 
international transport 
cost reductions helped to 
overcome space and to 
reduce time of delivery 
(Jacks et al. 2006; 2010) 
and thus had a profound 
% of Production costs 1830 1850 1880 1910
Wheat 79 76 41 27.5
Bar Iron 92 71 33 19
Manuf'd Iron Goods 27 21 10 6
Cotton Thread 11 8.5 3.5 2.5
Cotton Textile 9.5 8 4.5 2
Note: Figures for Hypothetical 800 km Shipment.
Table 7.1 Transport Costs, 1830-1910 
Source: Bairoch 1989: 56-7, cited by Baldwin and Martin 1999 
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impact on international trade integration (Bourguignon et al. 2002). According to O’Rourke 
and Williamson (1999: 29) “all of the commodity market integration was due to the fall in 
transport costs between markets, and none was due to more liberal trade policy.” In this 
context, Jacks et al. (2010: 136) argue that “rising tariffs partially offset declining freight 
rates” and Estevadeordal et al. (2003: 392) presume that the rise in international trade 
between 1870 and 1914 “would have been considerably ironed out if transport had remained 
steady. By this reckoning, transport costs have great power to explain the trade boom and 
bust.”107 As a result, “the spectacular transport revolution that took place across the 
nineteenth century … generated an equally spectacular convergence in commodity prices.” 
(O’Rourke and Williamson 1999: 3) 
During the second wave of globalisation, maritime shipping costs began to decline in the 
1960s108, increased between 1973 and 1985, then decreased until the early 2000s albeit at a 
slower rate than previously, and then increased again during the 2000s (Artis and Okubo 
2009; Baldwin and Martin 1999; Bordo et al. 1999; Bourguignon et al. 2002; Findlay and 
O’Rourke 2001; Hummels 2001). 
While declining international transport costs were the main driver of the first wave of 
globalisation, they may now contribute to a slowdown or partial reverse of trade 
globalisation (see econometric analysis in chapter 6). 
 
7.5.3 The Early Twentieth Century Globalisation Backlash 
World War I brought the first phase of economic globalisation to an abrupt end and was 
tantamount with a discontinuous break with the previous four decades.109 However, there 
were already signs of a possible globalisation backlash prior to 1914 (Findlay and O’Rourke 
2001). In fact, the globalising economy, prosperous and increasingly integrated as it was, 
already contained significant flaws (James 2002: 6) and there were precedent signs for the 
globalisation backlash and for the de-globalisation process that started in 1914 (O’Rourke 
and Williamson 1999: 117, 186). Essentially, the main flaws were the result of increasing 
demand for trade protection throughout the industrialising world especially during the 1880-
1895 period, and a growing hostility towards immigration in certain countries due to 
increasing inequality in income distribution (Bourguignon et al. 2002; James 2002: 6). The 
main political responses were the imposition of tariffs on primary and manufactured 
commodities, and a gradual escalation in immigration restriction (O’Rourke and Williamson 
1999: 94). Despite innovations in transportation technology and information and 
communication technology, the process of trade integration eventually slowed down. After 
1914 and especially during the interwar period, the control of both trade and factor flows 
was further tightened (Williamson 1999), thereby accelerating the already initiated de-
globalisation process. Furthermore, the collapse of international financial and commodity 
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markets (Bordo et al. 1999; Jacks et al. 2008b) during the ‘dark middle ages’ (1914-1945) 
was fostered by multiple financial, political and military shocks (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 
1996; Henderson 1992). In this context, especially the ‘triple whammy’ of World War I 
(1914-1918), the Great Depression110 (1929 to mid-1930) and World War II (1939-1945) 
contributed to the reverse of economic globalisation (Bird and Rajan 2001; Estevadeordal et 
al. 2003; Scholte 2005: 117). 
International trade levels reached a high point in 1913 which was not surpassed again until 
the 1970s (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996; Bordo et al. 1999; Krugman 1995). For many 
countries such as Australia, Switzerland and the UK, 1913 export levels were still unattained 
as late as 1973 (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999: 30) and some countries achieved trade 
levels comparable to those in the first globalisation period as late as in the mid-1990s (Jacks 
et al. 2008a). 
A noteworthy parallel between the first and second wave of globalisation seems to be the 
mind-set of many with regard to the persistence of the economic globalisation process 
towards increasing economic globalism. A few years after the end of the first globalisation 
period, Keynes (1919: 10) noted that many people regarded the process of globalisation “as 
normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any 
deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous and avoidable.” This view is probably also shared 
by many when it comes to the current globalisation process. According to Sutcliffe and Glyn 
(2003: 3), nowadays “almost everybody seems to believe that globalization is happening at a 
headlong pace, and is the defining characteristic of contemporary capitalism. Some like it, 
others see it as the source of all evil. But most see it as both unprecedented and 
irresistible.”111 In reference to this zeitgeist, O’Rourke and Williamson (1999: 286) point out 
that especially “politicians, journalists, and market analysts have a tendency to extrapolate 
the immediate past into the indefinite future, and such thinking suggests that the world is 
irreversibly headed toward ever greater levels of economic integration. The historical record 
suggests the contrary.” According to O’Rourke and Williamson (1999: 93), history reveals 
that economic globalisation can plant the seeds of its own destruction. Towards the end of 
the first wave, globalisation undermined itself politically (Bourguignon et al. 2002: 31), 
thereby destroying the globalisation achievements made in three decades, between 1914 and 
1945 (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999: 2). 
In view of the dissertation topic, it is important to recognise the fact that the evolution of 
globalisation is not necessarily linear112 and that a globalisation backlash is not only possible 
in theory but has already occurred in the past. Scholte (2005: 119) suggests that the 
exhaustion of natural resources such as crude oil or climate change may put a brake on 
globalisation in the long and maybe even in the medium term. And Keohane and Nye (2000: 
118) stress that following cataclysmic events, trends towards global economic intergation 
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can be set back or even reversed as happened in earlier phases of globalisation. Finally, Bird 
and Rajan (2001: 16) emphasise that another ‘globalisation backlash’ cannot be discounted 
out of hand. 
Sometimes looking at history can draw lessons for the present (Estevadeordal et al. 2003). 
So what about current trade globalisation? Is it possible that history repeats itself to the effect 
that globalisation undermines itself again? In case the maximum of conventional oil 
production has been reached, will rising oil prices lead to a regionalisation of international 
trade at the cost of long-distance trade? If so, the analysis in chapter 6 indicates that trade 
flows of bulky goods with comparatively low value-to-weight ratios such as steel will be 
among the most affected. 
 
 Summary 7.6
The following causal chain shows how peak oil affects trade globalisation (see figure 7.3). 
Peak oil leads to rising oil prices which then lead to increasing fuel costs. Increasing fuel 
costs lead to rising international transport costs. Rising international transport costs lead to 
less vertical specialisation, especially when the locations in a given vertical specialisation 
network are widely scattered. Moreover, surging international transport costs influence the 
composition of world trade in a way that previously non-tradeable goods from 
geographically remote countries which became tradeable due to declining transport costs in 
recent decades may become non-tradeable again. Spiraling international transport costs also 
lead to commodity price dispersion rather than commodity price convergence.  
The reduction of vertical specialisation, the changing composition of international trade and 
commodity price dispersion contribute to an increase of regional trade at the cost of long-
distance trade. As a consequence, trade globalisation is (at least partially) reversed. 
In coming years, trade globalisation may not just be accompanied by regionalisation as in 
recent decades. On the contrary, increasing regionalisation may also come at the cost of trade 
globalisation or long-distance trade, at least in the most vulnerable industries. 
Source: Author’s illustration 
Figure 7.3 Chain of Causation 
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In this context, the history of economic globalisation, which shows that the process of 
globalisation is not necessarily linear and that the immediate past and the present cannot be 
extrapolated into the indefinite future, should be kept in mind. 
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8 Outlook and Policy Recommendations 
Chapter 8 provides an outlook (8.1) and policy recommendations (8.2). 
 
 
 Outlook 8.1
Between 1999 and 2008, oil prices increased rapidly at an annualised rate of 20.6% (Ma and 
Van Assche 2010). At the height of the oil price spike, prices increased from $50 to $147 
between January 2007 and July 2008. In 2008, oil prices increased by 67% within six months 
(McNally and Levi 2011). By any measure, the oil price increase during the 2000s qualifies 
as one of the largest on the record (Hamilton 2009).  
Historical oil price shocks were primarily due to temporary disruptions of oil production as a 
result of geopolitical events (OECD/ITF 2008). The last period of rising oil prices, however, 
was mainly due to the following factors (Donovan et al. 2008; Hamilton 2009; Kendall 2008; 
Pellényi et al. 2008): 
 
- increasing oil demand of developing countries (particularly China and India) fuelled 
by subsidies which insulate consumers 
- decreasing oil production from conventional sources 
- increasing replacement of decreasing conventional production by unconventional oil 
supply leading to higher production costs 
- limited spare capacity 
- a failure of total production (conventional and unconventional) to increase between 
2005 and 2007 
 
The above-listed factors and a greater concentration of oil reserves in a shrinking number of 
countries are going to continue to fundamentally change the energy landscape in coming 
years (Gangnes et al. 2011a; Kendall 2008). In its latest projection, the IEA estimates that in 
2035, average oil prices will be at $125 in year-2011 dollars (the estimate is $140 if Iraq 
does not manage to increase production significantly) and at $215 in nominal terms (IEA 
2012). Moreover, the majority of more short-termed projections expect average oil prices to 
exceed $90 by 2015 and $100 by 2020 with further increases thereafter (Gangnes et al. 
2011a). 
In addition to high average price levels, oil price movements are expected to be increasingly 
characterised by sharp spikes and troughs (OECD/ITF 2008; Sentance 2009). The first 
boom-and-bust cycle of this kind might have occurred between 2007 and 2011. As already 
described above, between January 2007 and July 2008, oil prices increased from $50 to more 
than $140 only to crash to just over $30 by the end of 2008. In early 2011, oil already sold 
for $120 again (Gangnes et al. 2011a; McNally and Levi 2011). According to McNally and 
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Levi (2011), “the world will be stuck with wild price swings for the foreseeable future. 
Already, the consequences for economics and geopolitics are stark. Big shifts in oil prices 
complicate economic decisions. Companies in many sectors avoid investing in new facilities 
and equipment that may be profitable at low oil prices but are useless if prices soar.” 
Among the industries most affected may be energy- and transport-intensive industries such 
as the chemical, industrial machinery, non-metallic, basic metal (e.g. iron, steel, non-ferrous 
metals such as copper or zinc), cement, rubber, paper, fertiliser, apparel, footwear, toy, 
furniture, agriculture/food (e.g. fruits, vegetables, sea food, cut flowers), and of course the 
transport industry (Gangnes et al. 2011a; Pellényi et al. 2008; Rubin and Tal 2008). 
Especially the most affected industries need to develop strategies to adapt to the changing 
energy environment as best as they can (McNally and Levi 2011). One such strategy would 
be the restructuring of global supply chains, if existing, into regional supply chains to reduce 
transport distances and transport costs (Rugman et al. 2009).  
There is a positive feedback loop between transport growth and economic growth because 
the mobility of goods, services and people enables economic activity to increasingly take 
place (Kendall 2008). Thereby, the transportation sector is the most exposed part of an 
economy to oil prices (OECD/ITF 2008) with 50% of worldwide crude oil output converted 
into transportation fuel and 95% of the primary energy consumed in transportation derived 
from crude oil (Beverelli 2010; Kendall 2008). However, fuel substitution in the transport 
sector is inherently very limited and a transition towards alternative fuels may take decades 
rather than years (McNally and Levi 2011; OECD/ITF 2008; Pellényi et al. 2008).113  
Increasing transport costs, which in many cases already surpass tariffs as a barrier to 
international trade (Beverelli 2010), may seriously test the sustainability of the current global 
logistical organisation in coming years (Braithwaite 2008). 
The European Commission already plans to re-industrialise the European continent. Until 
2020, the relative share of industrial production to GDP shall increase from 15% to 20%. 
The European Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship Tanjani calls for a ‘third 
industrial revolution’ in Europe (Eder 2012). France already has a Ministry for Re-
Industrialisation (Wüpper 2013). The U.S. might also regain some of its industrial power. 
While industrial production in the U.S. became less significant in recent decades, the weak 
U.S. Dollar and increasing productivity may have initiated a re-industrialisation process. 
Experts expect that between two and three million additional jobs will be created in 
industrial production and that increasing domestic production will lead to decreasing U.S. 
imports in coming years (Stocker 2013b). Thereby, increasing international transport costs 
may foster the realignment of worldwide industrial production. 
According to Hall et al. (2006: 1401) “improvements in transport technologies, the massive 
enlargement of infrastructure and falling transport costs, not least thanks to cheap oil, 
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changed the role of transport in the second half of the 20th century. Paradoxically, these 
improvements were very effective in putting transport out of consideration in economic 
geography.” The role of transport costs for economic geography, however, may have 
changed in recent years.  
Economic globalisation consists of three factors, increasing global financial flows, 
increasing global movement of people, and increasing global trade. At the time of this 
writing, the stability of the international financial system is tested seriously and in Western 
countries, resistance against the free movement of people is on the rise. 1913 was the last 
year before the first wave of globalisation started to crumble. One-hundred years later, what 
will 2013 and coming years hold for the second wave of globalisation? The consequences of 
peak oil for international trade volumes (at least for some industries such as the worldwide 
steel industry) may reveal that another element of economic globalisation is built on shaky 
ground. 
 
 Policy Recommendations 8.2
In reference to the findings of the dissertation, the following policy recommendations are put 
forward.  
Countries following an export-oriented growth strategy should implement trade-cost 
reducing policies (Ma and Van Assche 2010) to remain competitive not only regionally but 
also in global markets.  
First and foremost, such policies should focus on increasing the competitiveness in the 
freight market. When it comes to maritime transport, customs procedures can be simpliefied 
to reduce transit times, port infrastructure can be improved via private and public 
investments, port duties can be reduced, and the fuel efficiency of the shipping fleet can be 
improved. Similar policies shoud be adopted to improve the infrastructure of airports and the 
fuel efficiency of cargo planes. With regard to domestic transportation, the road, waterway 
and railway infrastructure of a given country should also be strengthened and the fuel 
efficieny of trucks and trains should also be improved. These measures should be adopted to 
reduce the impact domestic and international transport costs have on final selling prices 
(Guerrero de Lizardi and Padilla-Pérez 2010).  
In the context of transport cost reductions, another option would be the reduction of 
upstream trade distances where possible via a sourcing policy with a focus on more 
proximate sourcing partners. 
Parallel to transportation costs, a country adopting a trade-cost reduction policy should also 
focus on further tariff reductions. Both tariffs and transport costs act as a global tax (Mirza 
and Zitouna 2009). Therefore, the reduction of tariffs would have the potential to ease the 
impact of rising transport costs on long-distance trade. In this context, the beginning 
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negotiations of the European Union and the United States about a free-trade zone come to 
mind. 
Second, a strategy to improve international competitiveness via the reduction of production 
costs for manufactured products may be considered. Lutz and Meyer (2009) find that 
improving international competitiveness may help to reduce the negative impact of oil prices 
on international trade. The competitiveness of an economy can be improved by a reduction 
of labor costs, the education of highly qualified human resources and/or an increase in labor 
productivity. Moreover, the energy efficiency of an economy may also be improved to 
increase international competitiveness. This does not only account for the transport sector 
but also for the generation and use of electricity. 
In case the above described measures do not help to sustain the long-distance trade volumes 
of a given country, an alternative strategy that may be adopted is to initiate measures that 
help to increase regional trade to compensate the reduction of long-distance trade. 
By no means, should long-distance trade be subsidised. If market forces make impossible the 
preservation of long-distance trade and vertical specialisation in its current form no subsidies 
should be used to artificially maintain trade globalisation. From an economic perspective 
trade globalisation can be justified as long as it is economically viable. However, 
globalisation should not become an end in itself. That is, global trade flows should not be 
preserved artificially for ideological reasons in order to create the ‘global village’. When it 
comes to trade globalisation, one should also keep in mind the adverse ecological costs of 
long-distance trade. In this context, high oil prices following peak oil can be viewed as a tax 
on pollution (Mirza and Zitouna 2008) and an increase of regional trade flows at the cost of 
long-distance trade should be appreciated. 
If international trade increasingly regionalises in coming years, this will create a window of 
opportunity for countries geographically proximate to economic powerhouses such as the 
U.S. and Western Europe (Guerrero de Lizardi and Padilla-Perez 2010). In that regard, 
countries from Central America, the Caribbean or Eastern Europe come to mind. Countries 
from these regions may increasingly capitalise on a regionalisation of trade flows, especially 
if a re-industrialisation process of the U.S. and Western European countries would 
materialise as indicated above (see 8.1). 
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9 Conclusion 
The dissertation evaluates the impact of peak oil on the geography of international trade by 
analysing steel exports to the United States. The hypothesis tested is that peak oil involves 
rising oil prices and international transport costs which will eventually lead to an increasing 
regionalisation of international trade flows at the cost of long-distance trade. 
Despite the importance of the link between persisting high oil price levels and the geography 
of world trade, so far remarkably little research has been conducted for that matter. 
Particularly, there is a gap in the literature with regard to the impact of high oil price levels 
during the 1998-2008 period on international trade volumes at the industry level. The 
dissertation contributes to filling that gap. At the time of this writing, no other study has 
analysed the impact of high oil prices during the 2000s on the trade flows of an industry. The 
dissertation therefore provides new insight about the impact of high oil prices through the 
(ocean) transport cost channel on international trade flows in the steel industry. 
The worldwide steel industry is a logical candidate for analysis. Steel production involves 
long-distance upstream trade in steelmaking raw materials with a low value-to-weight ratio 
such as coking coal and iron ore for steelmaking companies in many countries and long-
distance downstream trade for steel. Steel is also a commodity with a comparatively low 
value-to-weight ratio. Therefore, at high oil price levels the relative share of transport costs 
to final selling prices is overproportionally high for both the upstream trade of coking coal 
and iron ore and the downstream trade of steel so that long-distance trade of steel may be 
impacted via the ocean transport cost channel. Moreover, steel is an essential input for most 
manufacturing activities and for infrastructure development and therefore is a key ingredient 
for economic growth. 
The VEC model is used to analyse the impact of a shock in real oil prices on steel exports to 
the United States for the time period between 1998 and 2008. Thereby, impulse response and 
variance decomposition estimates are analysed per steel exporting region (for 8 regions), per 
steel export country (for 64 countries) and per steel export category (for 18 countries). 
Statistical analysis of the impulse response estimates reveals that following an oil price 
shock, steel exports to the U.S. decrease for the majority of the African, Asian, C.I.S., 
European, Middle Eastern, and Oceanian countries analysed. On the other hand, steel exports 
to the U.S. increase for the majority of South American countries and for all North American 
countries analysed.  
Moreover, following a shock in real oil prices, steel exports to the U.S. decrease for the 
majority of steel export categories of the selected African (South Africa), Asian (China, 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), C.I.S. (Russia, Ukraine), European (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain), Middle Eastern (Turkey), and Oceanian (Australia) 
countries. On the other hand, steel exports to the U.S. increase for the majority of steel 
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export categories of the selected North- (Canada, Mexico) and South American (Brazil) 
countries. Thereby, a significant share of the impulse response estimates is statistically 
significant. 
The analysis also reveals that the explanatory power of the oil price variable for the steel 
export variable is moderate or high for each region and for the steel export categories of the 
countries analysed (with the exception of Taiwan and Ukraine). 
Finally, after classifying the steel export categories into low- and high-value categories, price 
patterns are identified for the majority of the 18 countries selected for analysis by category 
where, in line with economic theory, exports in low-value categories are affected 
overproportionally when compared with high-value categories. 
The findings show that during periods of rapidly rising oil prices, steel export volumes to the 
United States decrease for countries/regions geographically distant to the U.S. and increase 
for countries/regions geographically close to the United States. That is, when oil prices rise 
to a certain extent, international steel trade flows to the U.S. increasingly regionalise. 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that the explanatory power of oil prices for steel exports to 
the U.S. is significant. Finally, the evidence suggests that price patterns also play a role in 
the realignment process of international trade flows in the global steel industry. The findings 
described above are in line with economic theory and indicate that due to peak oil trade 
globalisation, at least in the steel industry and other industries that are vulnerable to 
increasing transport costs, may be at risk. 
In this context, the following policy recommendations can be made. Countries following an 
export-orientied growth strategy should implement trade cost reducing policies. For 
example, the competitiveness in the freight market should be improved, tariffs should be 
reduced further, and production costs for manufacturing products should be reduced to 
remain competitive in global export markets. If the above-mentioned measures do not help to 
sustain a country`s long-distance trade volumes, measures that help to increase regional trade 
to compensate the reduction of long-distance trade should be adopted. By no means should 
long-distance trade be subsidised to artificially preserve long-distance trade for ideological 
reasons. In this regard, the ecological benefits of an increase in regional rade should be kept 
in mind. 
With regard to the steel industry, more research will be necessary to gain further insight into 
the working mechanism of the transport cost channel for different countries and regions. 
Moreover, research should also be conducted to evaluate the impact of peak oil on the 
geography of trade for other industries. Considering the paucity of existing literature at the 
industry level, the link between peak oil and international trade patterns should be a fruitful 
area for research in coming years.  
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Notes 
1 The growing intensity of the peak oil debate is reflected by a broadening range of 
participants. Initially, the debate was rather limited to geological circles (exemplarily, see 
Campbell and Laherrère (1998) and Deffeyes (2005)) and then widened to economic circles 
(e.g. Rubin 2009; 2012) with a time delay. The issue has also increasingly been addressed by 
governmental institutions (UK ITPOES 2008). For instance, recent papers have been 
published by or on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (Hirsch et al. 2005; Hirsch 
2007), the British House of Commons (APPGOPO 2008), the National Assembly for Wales 
(Clubb 2008), the Parliament of South Australia (Kanck 2008), the Parliament of New 
Zealand (Smith 2010), the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM 2010), the 
German Military Forces (Bundeswehr Transformation Centre 2010), and the German Federal 
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR 2008). 
 
2 In most studies focusing on the impact of peak oil on economic developments, it is 
common practice not to engage in discussions when exactly peak oil will occur (e.g. 
Friedrichs 2010; Kerschner and Hubacek 2009). This debate should be left to geologists. 
Exemplarily, the reader is referred to a recent paper by Hirsch (2008) in which shortage 
scenarios are discussed. Resource scarcity and the occurrence of peak oil at some point in 
time, however, are accepted as a fact. 
 
3 Some experts argue that peak oil may already have occurred (Aleklett et al. 2010; Leigh 
2008). 
 
4 A considerable number of research articles exist about the macroeconomic effects of oil 
price shocks. Extensive reviews of the literature can be found in Sauter and Awerbuch 
(2003), Hamilton (2005), and Kilian (2007). 
 
5 Conventional oil production has been stagnant in recent years (Hamilton 2009) 
 
6 If it takes one or more than one barrel of oil to extract one barrel of oil (e.g. due to the 
geographical location of the resource) it is uneconomic to extract oil from an oil deposit 
(Friedrichs 2010; Leigh 2008). 
 
7 Complete economic integration would therefore require free trade, free capital movements 
and free migration (Henderson 1992).  
 
8 For a detailed description of the MAGIC software and the applied methodology, the reader 
is referred to Hernández and Romero (2012). 
 
9 The data provided by Feenstra can be accessed at the NBER website 
http://www.nber.org/data/ and are described in Feenstra et al. (2001).The dataset provided by 
Hummels is available from http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/hummels.  
 
10 The economic impact oil price volatility has been analysed in a number of articles, for 
example Lee et al. (1995), Ferderer (1996), Guo and Kliesen (2005), Elder and Serletis 
(2010), Henriques and Sadorsky (2011), Mork (1989) and Mork et al. (1994).  
 
11 Price dispersion also increases as a result of rising tariffs. Common borders, common 
language, inner-country trade, and the participation of countries in regional trade agreements 
and/or currency unions are supporting factors of price conversion. 
 
12 Moreover, Asia reduced its average tariff rate from 30% to 14% between the early 1980s 
and the late 1990s, and Latin America reduced its average tariff rate from 31% to 11% 
during the same time period (Clark et al. 2002). 
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13 Another study by Sampson and Yeats (1977) finds that transport costs pose a much 
greater trade barrier to geographically isolated Australia than tariffs. 
 
14 According to Stopford (2009: 119) and Behar and Venables (2010), the reasons for the 
declining maritime transport costs between 1950 and 1995 are increasing ship size, 
specialised vessels, improved on-board technology, and more efficient engines. 
 
15 Hummels (2007a,b), however, finds that although U.S. freight rates decreased steadily in 
real dollars per ton they did not fall relative to the value of goods shipped. In this context, 
Behar and Venables (2010: 20f.) note: “While historical studies suggest that the contribution 
of falling trade costs to the growth of trade is smaller than might have been expected, the 
puzzle is resolved by the fact that the measured fall in trade costs is quite low. Looking back, 
there are several reasons for this. One is the continuing importance of fuel costs. A second is 
that it is the fall in trade costs relative to the value of goods shipped that is the key variable, 
and it is not obvious that technical advance in transport has been consistently more rapid 
than technical progress in other areas. Finally, much of the technical advance in transport has 
gone into improved quality (speed and reliability) rather than lower cost.” 
 
16 A detailed description of the ocean transport cost categories can be found in Stopford 
(2009, chapter 6). 
 
17 The term ‘bunker’ is defined as the “fuel oil burned in the ship’s main engine.” (Stopford 
2009: xxi) 
 
18 In the UNCTAD (2008: 25f.) maritime report, the consequences of the oil price-fuel cost 
relationship for maritime transport in 2007/2008 are described as follows: “With over 80 per 
cent of world merchandise trade by volume, estimated to be carried by sea, the impact of 
rising fuel costs on maritime transport is of great relevance. Like other modes, maritime 
transport relies on oil for its propulsion. Rising oil prices have an immediate effect on ship 
bunker cost levels as well as carriers’ operating costs and management strategies. Reflecting 
the rising oil prices, by the end of 2007, prices for bunker fuel oil (380 cst) had increased by 
73 per cent in Rotterdam and 76 per cent in Los Angeles compared to the same period during 
the previous year. … The fuel cost burden for the shipping sector and therefore for trade, 
could be significant given the share of fuel costs in a ship’s overall costs.” 
 
19 The relative share of fuel costs could further increase in case environmental measures are 
implemented. If the new fuel standards agreed upon by the International Maritime 
Organisation are implemented, costs for low sulphur fuels to be used in Emission Control 
Areas will double the price for bunker fuel (WSC 2008). 
 
20 In this context the term, ‘operating costs’ stands for the sum of fixed and variable 
shipping costs. 
 
21 In accordance with new neoclassical growth theory, which views factor endowment as a 
key element for the comparative advantage of a given country, and new trade theory, which 
attributes comparative advantage and economies of scale equal importance when it comes to 
explanations of why countries trade, comparative advantage is still the most important 
theoretical explanation for predicting trade flows (Hernández and Romero 2012). 
 
22 Distance can be defined as “the extent of territory separating territorial places.” (Scholte 
2008: 1480). 
 
23 Apart from distance, there are additional geographical barriers or characteristics which 
usually have an impact on general transport costs but are not related to ocean transport costs, 
for example the cost of being landlocked or common borders (Behar and Venables 2010: 4; 
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Held et al. 1999: 5; Radelet and Sachs 1998). Limao and Venables (2001: 463) find that for 
the median landlocked country, transport costs are 55% higher than for the median costal 
economy, while trade volumes are 60% higher for the average coastal country, thereby 
accentuating the importance of maritime transport for international trade. During the 1990s, 
there were no landlocked countries among the top 15 exporters (Radelet and Sachs 1998). 
Being landlocked also means that goods have to cross at least one border to have access to 
ocean transport. This implies costs for crossing a border (Behar and Venables 2010: 13). 
 
24 The use of distance as a measure for transportation costs is, amongst other things, due to 
the severely limited data availability of direct transport cost measures. Using distance as a 
substitute for transport costs, however, has some limitations: First, transport costs are also 
influenced by other factors than distance (Geraci and Prewo 1977; Moneta 1959). Moreover, 
geographic distance does not only capture transportation costs of geographic space, but also 
other economic costs such as the acquisition of distant market information, communication 
with distant agents or different preferences over commodities (Anderson and van Wincoop 
2004; Tanaka 2010). Therefore, using distance as a proxy for transportation costs may result 
in an underestimation of the sensitivity of bilateral trade flows to transportation costs (Geraci 
and Prewo 1977). Distance, however, remains an important determinant of international 
transport costs and has been used in many studies about freight rates (Hummels 1999a, 2001; 
Limao and Venables 2001; Micco and Pérez 2001; Wilsmeier and Martinez-Zarzoso 2010). 
 
25 The sensitivity between distance and transport costs is also relevant for the location of 
economic activity. According to Quinet and Vickerman (2004: 131), “the classic theory 
gives transport an essential role in the choice of location for firms: firms locate in the place 
which enables them to minimize the total cost of transport, taking into account both the 
supply of inputs, including labour, and the delivery of outputs.” 
 
26 For a landlocked country, transport costs even rise by $2,170 or almost 50% of average 
costs for an additional 1,000km (Clark et al. 2002; Limao and Venables 2001). Moreover, 
Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2003) study the transport costs for exports of ceramic textiles from 
Spain and find that transport costs increase with growing distance and poor infrastructure 
(Wilsmeier and Martinez-Zarzoso 2010). 
 
27 The gravity model of international trade is a model using distance as an explanatory 
variable for bilateral trade. The model has been empirically used to analyse international 
trade since the early 1960s (Limao and Venables 2001). It is one of the most robust and 
extensively studied models of international trade (Behar and Venables 2010), one of the 
most successful empirical models in economics (Jacks et al. 2010), it has a strong general 
theoretical backing (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, 2004; Jacks et al. 2010; Krugman 
1995), and is the standard analytical framework for the prediction of bilateral trade flows 
(Limao and Venables 2001). 
 
28 Besides trade distance, geographical isolation also plays a role. Wilsmeier and Martinez-
Zarzoso (2010) find that the impact of being peripheral in the maritime network may be 
more significant than the impact of trade distance. Radelet and Sachs (1998) also find that 
geographic isolation and subsequently higher transport costs hamper the efforts of countries 
to increase manufacturing exports. On the other hand, high transport costs as a result of 
geographic isolation can also act as a protection against imports (Conlon 1982). 
 
29 This view is also shared by Rodrigue (2009) in view of the Asia Pacific Region where 
economic development has been the main driver of transport growth in recent years. As a 
result of increasing raw material and energy imports and increasing manufacturing exports, 
there has been a surge in long-distance trade. The UNCTAD (2009) report also links the 
rapid growth of world-ton-miles (a plus of 43% between 2000 and 2008) to the economic 
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rise of developing countries such as China and India which increasingly import sources from 
distant locations like Latin America and Africa. 
 
30 In other words, low transport costs give commodity trade place-utility. This phenomenon 
is referred to as the ‘Law of Squares in Transportation and Trade’ or Lardner’s Law. Bardi et 
al. (2006: 19) define Lardner’s Law as follows: “Reductions in transportation costs will 
encourage market areas to purchase products from distant suppliers that might otherwise be 
produced locally. The reduction in transportation cost is actually much greater for long 
distances than for short ones because of the fixed charges. … If a supplier can cover the 
transportation cost of a certain amount in his or her price range, an increase in the distance 
over which this given amount will cover the transport of goods will increase the market area 
of the product in an even greater ratio.”  
 
31 Ocean transport makes up 99% of world trade by weight and a majority of world trade by 
value (Hummels 2007b). 
 
32 North America and Europe have the most efficient ports followed by the Middle East and 
East Asia and the Pacific (Clark et al. 2002). 
 
33 Rodrigue and Browne (2008: 177) argue that the trend of increasing ship size in the bulk 
trades is coming to an end. This may be due to the fact that at some point economies of scale 
start to diminish with increasing ship size. Using bigger ships then stops paying off (Stopford 
2009: 59). 
 
34 The costs per ton of cargo depend on the annual costs of a ship and the annual bunker 
costs consumed which are divided by the tons of transported cargo (Stopford 2009: 412): 
costs per ton = ship costs per annum + bunker costs per annum / tons transported per annum 
 
35 Pedersen (2001: 86) argues that “although the average per unit costs of transport has been 
reduced, overall transport costs have generally not decreased,  because the amount and 
length of transport have increased as rapidly as the unit costs have decreased. Thus in spite 
of reduced unit transport costs the size of the transport sector as a percent of GDP has 
generally not decreased, and the availability of infrastructures and services has become 
increasingly important.” 
 
36 Together with declining international transport costs, trade liberalisation or tariff 
reductions top the list of usual suspects when it comes to the causes of post-Second World 
War trade growth (Hummels 1999b). U.S. tariffs on steel imports, however, have not been 
included in the analysis. During the sample period (see 4.2), there has been only one 
significant (temporary) change in U.S. steel import tariffs. In March 2002, the Bush 
Administration announced temporary tariffs on U.S. steel imports under section 201 of the 
1974 Trade Act (The White House 2002). The tariffs announced were between 8%-30% on 
various steel products (Rich 2002). Prior to the newly imposed tariffs, the average tariff rate 
on U.S. steel imports was between 0%-1%. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) declared 
the tariffs imposed illegal due to the violation of international tariff treaties and allowed the 
countries affected by the tariffs to retaliate (Ackman 2003; Tran 2003). In order to avert a 
looming trade war, President Bush lifted the tariffs in December 2003 (The White House 
2003). Because the tariffs were only in place for a short time period and were then lowered 
again to 0%-1% (in fact, there are no tariffs at all on the vast majority of steel products) 
(USTIC 2012, chapters 72, 73), a tariff variable has not been included because it can be 
assumed that its explanatory power for the variation in U.S. steel imports would have been 
quite limited. Prior to the period under investigation, tariffs on U.S. steel had already been 
reduced substantially in multiple rounds of GATT negotiations (Bourguignon et al. 2002; 
Findlay and O’Rourke 2001). 
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37 In 2008, the main steel producers were China with 38% of worldwide steel production 
followed by Japan (9%) and the U.S. (7%) (UNCTAD 2009). 
 
38 The countries which have been excluded due to their low export frequency are Albania, 
Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bosnia, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Faroe Islands, Gabon, 
Georgia, Grenada, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, 
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Sao Tome, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Tokelau, Tonga, Tunisia, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe. 
 
39 The countries which have been dropped from the analysis due to data availability 
problems and/or currency exchanges are Belarus, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Oman, 
Slovenia and Venezuela. 
 
40 In 2008, 90.9% of global crude steel was produced in the 64 countries included in the 
analysis. From a regional point of view, the datasets represent 98.4% of crude steel 
production in the EU, 37.7% of other European production, 96.3% of C.I.S. production, 
26.4% of North American production, 90.9% of South American production, 88.4% of 
African production, 73.3% of Middle Eastern production, 99.8% of Asian production, and 
100% of Oceanian production. The 64 countries selected also represent 94.8% of global 
exports of semi-finished and finished steel products in 2008. Regionally, they represent 
98.6% of the EU’s total exports, 41.7% of exports of other European countries, 95.6% of 
exports from the C.I.S., 53.3% of North American exports, 93% of South American exports, 
88.5% of African exports, 92.7% of Middle Eastern exports, 100% of Asian exports, and 
100% of Oceania’s exports. 
 
41 The 18 countries chosen for a more in-depth analysis of steel exports to the U.S. by 
product category represent 78.2% of global crude steel production in 2008 and 75.8% of 
global steel exports in 2008. 
 
42 These 14 countries are China (56,304mt), Japan (36,923mt), Ukraine (28,648mt), 
Germany (28,639mt), Russia (28,429mt), Belgium (21,235mt), South Korea (19,718mt), 
Turkey (18,535mt), Italy (18,040mt), France (17,125mt), Taiwan (10,038mt), the 
Netherlands (10,029mt), Spain (9,456mt), and Brazil (9,152mt). Because the analysis 
focuses on steel exports to the U.S., the United States (11,963mt), which were the 11 th 
largest steel exporting country in 2008, have not been included. Canada (7,440mt), Mexico 
(5,993mt), South Africa (2,188mt), and Australia (1,421mt) complete the list of 18 countries. 
Canada and Mexico have been included, because they have common borders with the United 
States and are members of NAFTA. South Africa has been chosen because it is the only 
African country with significant steel exports to the United States. Australia has been 
included, because it is the largest producer/exporter of coking coal and iron ore, the two 
commodities which are most important for the steel production process and because it is the 
largest Oceanian steel exporter.  
 
43 It is noteworthy that none of the main exporting countries is landlocked. Two countries 
have a common border with the U.S. (Canada, Mexico), and two countries are Anglophone 
(Australia, Canada). In terms of the stage of economic development, eleven countries are 
industrialised (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Spain, South Korea (Tiger State), Taiwan (Tiger State)) and seven are newly industrialising 
(Brazil, China, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine).  
 
44 A notable exception are import data from Canada. The U.S. derives its statistics on 
imports from Canada’s export statistics while Canada derives its statistics on imports from 
the U.S. export statistics on the basis of the U.S.– Canada Data Exchange. According to the 
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U.S. Census Bureau, as a result of the data exchange between both countries, the quality of 
import data has increased. For more information on the U.S. – Canada Data Exchange, the 
reader is referred to Mozes and Oberg (n.d.). 
 
45 The HS “is an international nomenclature for the classification of products. It allows 
participating countries to classify traded goods on a common basis for customs purposes. At 
the international level, the Harmonized System (HS) for classifying goods is a six-digit code 
system. … The Harmonized System was introduced in 1988 and has been adopted by most 
of the countries worldwide.” (United Nations 2010) 
 
46 “The SITC is a statistical classification of the commodities entering external trade 
designed to provide the commodity aggregates needed for purposes of economic analysis 
and to facilitate the international comparison of trade-by-commodity data. The Harmonized 
System and SITC Revision 3 are interrelated. The rearrangement of import and export data 
reported in terms of the Harmonized System into the SITC allows for an additional means of 
comparison between the U.S. and its trading partners in terms of commodity classification 
and trade statistics. ... Within the SITC framework, ‘Manufactured Goods’ includes all 
products classified in groups 5 through 9.” (U.S. Census 2010b)  
 
47 The U.S. Census Bureau defines the customs value as “the price actually paid or payable 
for merchandise when sold for exportation to the United States, excluding U.S. import 
duties, freight, insurance, and other charges incurred in bringing the merchandise to the 
United States. The term ‘price actually paid or payable’ means the total payment (whether 
direct or indirect, and exclusive of any costs, charges, or expenses incurred for 
transportation, insurance, and related services incident to the international shipment of the 
merchandise from the country of exportation to the place of importation in the United States) 
made, or to be made, for imported merchandise by the buyer to, or for the benefit, of the 
seller.” (U.S. Census 2012b) 
 
48 The U.S. steel import customs value datasets are published in nominal U.S. Dollars and 
need to be adjusted for inflation. Therefore, the datasets expressed in current dollars have 
been deflated by using the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI is the most widely 
used measure of inflation (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001) and is also used as a 
deflator in publications with similar content (e.g. Beverelli 2010). Data and information on 
the CPI are published on the website of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
http://www.bls.gov/CPI. 
 
49 The series is constantly updated and revised. 
 
50 In January 2001, category 20 (Line Pipe) was split up into sub-categories (20A: Line Pipe 
> 16 Inches In Diameter; 20B: Line Pipe £  16 Inches In Diameter; 20C: Line Pipe – Not 
Specified). However, a category can only be included in the analysis when observations are 
available for the whole sample period. Therefore, the observations for category 20 are used 
for the November 1998 to December 2000 period. For the January 2001 to September 2008 
period, the observations for 20A, 20B, and 20C have been added up. That is, the four 
categories have been integrated into one category, thereby using the original labelling ‘Line 
Pipe’ in the analysis. 
 
51 The series is constantly updated and revised. 
 
52 The crude oil price dataset is published in nominal U.S. Dollars and needs to be adjusted 
for inflation (EIA 2011f). The dataset has been deflated by using the U.S. Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). The CPI is the most widely used measure of inflation (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2001) and is also used as a deflator in publications with similar content (for 
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example Beverelli 2010). Data and information on the CPI are published on the website of 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/CPI. 
 
53 The G5 release contains exchange rates for the U.S. and Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
Mexico, Japan, Denmark, the Eurozone members, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. 
 
54 The bilateral exchange rates between the U.S. and the following countries have been 
collected from the OECD’s dataset: Australia, Austria, Belgium, China, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom. 
 
55 The “fxAverage (Foreign Exchange Rate Converter) is a multilingual currency exchange 
converter that calculates weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly average exchange rates for 
any user-specified time horizon.” (OANDA n.d.a) 
 
56 The bilateral exchange rates between the U.S. and the following countries have been 
collected from the OANDA currency conversion system: Algeria, Argentina, Bulgaria, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay. 
 
57 For more information on the company and its products, the reader is referred to: E-
forecasting.com, 65 Newmarket Road, Durham, New Hampshire, 03824, United States; 
Phone: 603.868.7436; email: info@e-forecasting.com; homepage: www.e-forecasting.com. 
 
58 The series is constantly updated and revised. 
 
59 The problem of spurious regressions is especially evident in macroeconomics. 
Consequently, the macroeconomic literature provides a good number of articles dealing with 
unit root testing, see e.g. Nelson and Plosser (1982) and Campbell and Mankiw (1987).  
 
60 The ADF exists in three variations designed to take into account the role of the constant 
term and the trend. Hence, before carrying out the ADF test, a useful first step is to plot the 
time series to be tested to determine which of the above listed variants of the test is suitable 
by inspecting the plot. ADF test 1 (no constant and no trend) should be used when the series 
seems to be wandering or fluctuating around a sample average of zero. ADF test 2 (with 
constant but no trend) should be used when the series seems to be wandering or fluctuating 
around a non-zero average. ADF test 3 (with constant and with trend) should be used when 
the series seems to be wandering or fluctuating around a linear trend. 
 
61 Following this premise, the maximal lag length that can be used is calculated as follows: 
the number of lags included should not exceed mp + 1 < T where 
 
m = number of endogenous variables (used in this study: 5) 
p = maximal lag length (?) 
T = total number of observations (119) 
 
Hence, 5p + 1 < 119 or p = 118/5 = 23,6 => maximal lag length: 23  
 
62 According to Lütkepohl (2004), strictly applying the AIC may lead to the inclusion of too 
many lags. 
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63 Alternatively, other testing procedures such as the Portmanteau test can also be applied to 
test for autocorrelation in the residuals. For a detailed discussion about exercisable 
autocorrelation testing procedures, the reader is referred to Lütkepohl (2004: 127-131). 
 
64 The econometric output for this study is produced in EViews. However, due to the fact 
that error bands for VEC model cannot be produced in EViews, GRETL is used for error 
band production. According to Cottrell and Lucchetti (2012: 208), “following common 
practice among econometric software, gretl computes the confidence intervals by using the 
bootstrap.” 
 
65 For a more in-depth discussion on Monte Carlo sampling methods the reader is referred to 
Mooney (1997). 
 
66 For more details of the Wishart distribution see Zellner (1971). 
 
67 The analysis of steel exports to the U.S. by steel product category in section 6.4 has been 
extended by the identification of price patterns. The anytical approach used for the analysis 
in section 6.4 is described in sub-section 6.4.1 
 
68 The estimated coking coal trade distances only have exemplary character and other ports 
of departure and destination also might have been selected. 
 
69 The distances estimated by using the port distance calculator (vesseltracker) have been 
controlled on a spot-check basis by using another port distance calculator (PortWorld n.d.). 
No significant differences between the estimates could be detected. 
 
70 However, it needs to be mentioned that the status for some countries (net importer or 
exporter) could not be determined due to a lack of data. 
 
71 Mirza and Zitouna (2008) find that the economic size of exporting countries positively 
affects exports volumes to the United States. 
 
72 Steel, iron ore, and coking coal are almost always shipped in Bulk. The bulk trade 
consists to a large extent of high-volume and price-sensitive cargo. Because the focus is on 
low-cost transport, the bulk transport industry usually ships large parcels of raw materials 
and semi-manufactures (Stopford 2009: 63f., 78, 590). An important criterion for bulk 
carriers is size. Generally, they are broken down into the following categories: Handy bulk 
carriers (10,000-40,000dwt) and Handymax bulk carriers (40,000-60,000dwt) usually carry 
minor bulks and small parcels of major bulks. Panamax bulk carriers (60,000-100,000dwt) 
primarily carry major bulks as well as large minor bulk parcels. Capesize bulk carriers 
(100,000-300,000dwt) serve the upper end of the bulk market and are used for the iron ore 
and coal trades (Stopford 2009: 591f.). The average size of bulk carriers is a dominant 
feature and has constantly increased over time. This is an indicator for the growing 
importance of economies of scale in the bulk shipping market (Lundgren 1996; Rodrigue and 
Browne 2008: 177). While small vessels are flexible but expensive to operate, large ships are 
rather inflexible and become progressively cheaper (Stopford 2009: 592), thus making them 
attractive for low-value commodity transport.In 2002 the average shipping size of steel 
billets was 24,650 tons and the average shipping size for steel pipes was 22,750 tons 
(Stopford 2009: 421). Moreover, in 2001/2002, the average size of coking coal shipments 
was 43,257 tons compared with 147,804 tons for iron ore (Stopford 2009: 421). 
 
73 The two main criteria for determining the stage of development are GDP per capita (stage 
1: < $2,000; transition from stage 1 to 2: $2,000-3,000; stage 2: $3,000-9,000; transition 
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from stage 2 to 3: $9,000-17,000; stage 3: > $17,000) and the extent to which countries are 
factor driven (Schwab and Porter 2008). 
 
74 When a country is in the transition process from a factor-driven to an efficiency-driven 
economy, this is indicated by ‘transition 1-2’. If a country is in the transition process from an 
efficiency-driven to an innovation-driven economy, this is indicated by ‘transition 2-3’. 
 
75 Wages (or hourly pay for time worked) include the following cost components: basic 
wages, piece rate, (overtime, shift, holiday, night) premiums, cost-of-living adjustments and 
bonuses and premiums paid each pay period (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). 
 
76 The BLS defines hourly compensation costs as follows: “Hourly compensation costs 
include (1) hourly direct pay and (2) employer social insurance expenditures and other labor 
taxes.” (U.S. Department of Labor 2009) 
 
77 The manufacturing sector includes the subsectors primary metal manufacturing and 
fabricated metal product manufacturing (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics n.d.). 
 
78 A definition of the primary metal manufacturing (NAICS 331) sector can be found in: 
U.S. Census n.d.a. The iron and steel mills (NAICS 331111) and the product manufacturing 
from purchased steel (NAICS 3312) sectors, which are sub-sectors of the primary steel 
manufacturing sector, are defined in: U.S. Census n.d.b. and U.S. Census 2011c. 
 
79 A definition of the fabricated metal product manufacturing (NAICS 332) sector can be 
found in: U.S. Census 2011b. 
 
80 This practise is also used in sections 6.2.2 – 6.2.9 and in section 6.4. 
 
81 In some cases, it is not possible to determine whether a country is a net coking coal 
importer or exporter due to a lack of data availability. 
 
82 Figures on iron ore imports and exports are only available for Belgium and Luxembourg 
combined. 
 
83 When multiple bilateral trade distances have been calculated (e.g. for coking coal export 
ports/steel import ports in the U.S.), the shortest bilateral trade distance is chosen for the 
analysis because it can be assumed that bilateral trade volumes are largest for the shortest 
trade routes.  
 
84 Mirza and Zitouna (2009) find that common language positively affects the probability to 
export. 
 
85 U.S. coking coal exports grew by 24.5% in 2007 and by 34% in 2008 (UNCTAD 2008, 
2009). 
 
86 The U.S. steel industry imports iron ore mainly from comparatively nearby Brazil (7mt 
out of 8mt in 2004) and also has easy access to iron ore from neighbouring Canada. 
Moreover, the U.S. itself are a net exporter of iron ore. China, on the other hand, is the 
largest net importer of iron ore. China imports iron ore from Australia (70mt in 2004) and 
India (40mt), but also from relatively distant Brazil (54mt), Pacific South America (6mt), 
North America (2mt), South Africa (17mt) and Scandinavia (1mt) (Stopford 2009: 449). 
Therefore, the U.S. steel industry has a comparative advantage in terms of resource 
abundance and/or upstream ocean transport costs for iron ore imports over the Chinese steel 
industry. Due to the fact that most parts of China and East Asia are short of high-grade iron 
ore deposits, transporting the raw material to the steel mills (mainly from Australia and 
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Brazil) adds additional upstream trade costs not typically incurred by U.S. steel producers 
(Rubin and Tal 2008). China is the biggest importer of iron ore.  
 
87 China`s comparative disadvantage can be shown by using the example of iron ore 
imports. According to UNCTAD (2008: 77), “with longer voyage times from China-Brazil 
than China-Australia, more Capesize tonnage is tied up going this route, thus further driving 
up the transport costs. A roundtrip voyage between Brazil and China takes on average about 
74 days compared with a roundtrip voyage from Australia to China, which takes about 30 
days. A 170000 dwt Capesize requires 0.59 vessels to carry 1 million metric tons/year from 
Australia to China, compared to 1.27 vessels for Brazil. Theoretically, this means that one 
Capesize vessel can make either five return trips from Brazil to China in one year against 12 
return trips from Australia to China.” Additionally, iron ore vessels usually do not return in 
ballast, thereby consuming valuable sailing time on longer voyages during which no revenue 
is earned (UNCTAD 2009). In 2008, Australian iron ore mining companies took advantage 
of the relative proximity of their resources to China by enforcing an extra charge reflecting 
Chinese freight savings (UNCTAD 2009). Therefore, the Chinese steel industry was 
punished twice when compared to the U.S. steel industry due to its relative remoteness from 
global iron ore producers. 
 
88 The United States have been excluded for obvious reasons. 
 
89 Multiple synonyms for vertical specialisation are used in the trade literature, for example 
slicing up the value chain (Krugman 1995), delocalisation (Leamer 1998), outsourcing 
(Bourguignon et al. 2002), trade in tasks, off-shoring (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008), 
international product fragmentation (Deardorff 1998; Jones and Kierzkowski 2001), vertical 
disintegration of production (Feenstra 1998; Bird and Rajan 2001), multi-stage production 
(Dixit and Grossman 1982), intra-product specialisation (Hummels et al. 2001), super-
specialisation (Arndt: 1996 1998), trans-world production process (Scholte 2005: 107), 
Heckscher-Ohlin plus production fragmentation (Knetter and Slaughter 2000), and intra-
product trade (Jones et al. 2005). 
 
90 Vertical specialisation can be illustrated by using the example of Chinese steel 
production: First, intermediate goods such as coking coal (e.g. from Australia) and iron ore 
(e.g. from Australia, Brazil) are imported from other countries (= country 1). Second, the 
intermediate goods are used in China (= country 2) to produce steel. Domestic intermediate 
goods also contribute to steel production as well as Chinese capital and labour. Third, while 
the produced raw steel is in part sold domestically, a significant part of Chinese steel 
production is also exported to other countries such as the United States (= country 3). 
 
91 According to Krugman (1995: 334), “in 1913, a given consumer good could, to a rough 
approximation, be exported only once. Today it can be exported many times: a good that is 
produced in one country may be assembled from subcomponents produced in yet other 
countries. As a result, the trade involved in the global production of a final good may easily 
be several times the value added in all stages of that production.” 
 
92 This trend can be illustrated by using the example of ocean trade. Demand for ocean 
transport services can be expressed most adequately in ton-miles because ton-miles reflect 
the development of cargo volumes and the distances travelled as well as the geographical 
distribution of suppliers and customers. The trend to a growth in ton-miles reflects the so 
called ‘new geography of trade’ which includes the trend towards vertical 
specialisation.Between 2006 and 2008, ton-miles growth rates declined significantly in a 
number of categories parallel to rapidly increasing crude oil prices. World seaborne trade 
ton-mile growth rates declined from 5.9% in 2006 to 4.5% in 2007 and to 4.2% in 2008. A 
similar trend can be observed for the five main dry bulks (2006: 9.4%; 2007: 7.0%; 2008: 
5.0%) and for coal trade (2006: 13.7%; 2007: 6.7%; 2008: 3.4%). The pattern for iron ore is 
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less clear (2006: 7.0%; 2007: 8.4%; 2008: 6.7%) but a slight downward-trend can be 
observed when comparing the growth rates for 2006 and 2008 (UNCTAD 2009). 
 
93 Bardi et al. (2006: 20) describe the concept of vertical specialisation based on 
comparative advantage as follows: “The concept of geographical specialization assumes that 
each nation … produces products and services for which its capital, labor, and raw materials 
are best suited. Because any one area can’t produce all needed goods, transportation is 
needed to send the goods that might be most efficiently produced at point A to point B in 
return for different goods efficiently produced at point B. The concept is closely aligned to 
the principle of comparative advantage.”  
 
94 For this reason, labour costs (manufacturing wages, compensation costs in the primary 
metal manufacturing and fabricated product manufacturing sectors) have been used as 
evaluation criteria in the analysis of the econometric estimates in chapter 6. 
 
95 China is the most important of those low-wage manufacturing platforms. Dean et al. 
(2007) measure the extent of vertical specialisation in the Chinese economy. They point out 
that two interconnected developments have shaped the nature of international trade in recent 
years. The first of these trends are explosive Chinese trade growth rates, the second is 
increasing vertical specialisation. Although the literature on both trends is large, few papers 
quantitatively assess these two trends together. Dean et al. (2007) find that the aggregate 
import content (the relative share of vertical specialisation) of Chinese exports was 29.3% in 
1997 and grew to 35.9% in 2002. Therefore, the vertical specialisation of the Chinese 
economy seems to increase over time. Moreover, intermediate goods accounted for about 
one third of China’s total exports in 2003, and made up nearly 40% of China’s export growth 
during the 1992-2003 period (Athukorala 2006; Athukorala and Yamashita 2006). Finally, 
China’s exports to the U.S. also contain a growing share of imported intermediate goods 
(Dean et al. 2007).When it comes to the extent of vertical specialisation in the Chinese steel 
industry, the value of imported inputs in the value of exports for the steel processing industry 
was 59% in 1997 and already 69% in 2002. 
 
96 For example, Koopman et al. (2008) find that only 18% of the Chinese processing export 
value is actually added in China while 82% consists of the value of imported intermediate 
inputs. 
 
97 For example, in the mid-2000s Scholte (2005: 68) stated that “differences in local costs of 
labour, raw materials, regulation and taxation often figure more importantly in … business 
calculations than the costs of transport across territorial distance and borders between the 
various sites in the global production chain.” 
 
98 The East Asian Trade Model may be at risk (Gangnes et al. 2011a; Jen and Bindelli 
2008).  
 
99 The low value-to-weight ratio of those commodities is even more important than the 
value-to-volume ratio. Hummels (1999b; 2007a; b) estimates an elasticity of maritime 
transport costs to weight/value of 0.41. He points out that besides factors such as the distance 
of trade or the quality of the transport service offered, the value-to-weight ratio of a 
commodity is an essential determinant of ad valorem transport costs for a particular product. 
Thereby, ocean shipping drives a particularly large wedge between the prices at the origin 
and destination for commodities with a very low value per ton (Hummels 2009). Hummels 
and Lugovskyy (2006) also emphasise that transportation costs are highly correlated with the 
weight/value of a shipment. Rubin and Tal (2008) analyse the impact of rising transport cost 
levels on trade between China and the United States. They report that a high percentage of 
Chinese exports to the U.S. (for example furniture, apparel, footwear, metal manufacturing 
and small industrial machinery) have a low value-to-freight ratio and therefore incur high 
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transportation costs relative to final selling prices. Parallel to a general slowdown in 
Chinese-U.S. export growth figures, the slowdown was significantly more pronounced for 
goods with a relatively high share of transport costs to final selling prices. In May 2008, 
freight-sensitive Chinese exports to the U.S. accounted for 42% of total exports compared to 
52% in 2004. Rubin and Tal estimate that export figures from China to the U.S. would have 
been higher by 30% for the 2004-2008 period if transport costs would not have increased 
substantially. 
 
100 According to Rodrik (2000: 181), a perfectly integrated global economy “would be a 
world economy in which national jurisdictions do not interfere with arbitrage in markets for 
goods, services or capital. Transaction costs and tax differentials would be minor; 
convergence in commodity prices and factor returns would be almost complete.” 
 
101 The majority of international trade flows has a regional connotation due to proximity 
and economic blocks such as NAFTA or the European Union. The likelihood of economic 
entities to trade with each other increases with proximity (Rodrigue 2009). This phenomenon 
is also referred to as the neighbourhood effect (Rohter 2008). 
 
102 Rugman et al. (2009) aim to determine whether the supply chains of North American 
companies are regional or global. In order to find out where North American MNCs perform 
the majority of their upstream and downstream activities, the authors analyse the supply 
chains of the 183 North American companies (16 Canadian, 5 Mexican, 162 U.S. firms) 
listed in the 2006 Fortune Global 500 ranking of the world’s 500 largest firms. They find that 
85% or 155 of the 183 companies have regional supply chains. Thereby, 91% of the 
upstream supply chains analysed (global: 3%) and 87% of the downstream supply chains 
analysed (global: 1%) are regional. The empirical evidence indicates that the supply chains 
of the majority of North American companies are regional, not global. 
 
103 Exemplarily, Krugman (1995: 330) stresses that “it is a late twentieth-century conceit 
that we invented the global economy just yesterday.”  
 
104 Chase-Dunn et al. (2000) identify three (1815-1879, 1903-1924, 1946-present) instead 
of two waves. 
 
105 According to O’Rourke and Williamson (1999: 167), “the middle ages were ones of de-
globalization and divergence.” 
 
106 In the most influential contribution to the literature about the first wave of globalisation 
(Jacks et al. 2006), O’Rourke and Williamson (1999: 35) describe this transport revolution as 
follows: “The decline in international transport costs after mid-century was enormous, and it 
ushered a new era. When economists look at this period, they tend to ignore this fact and 
focus instead on tariffs and trade. This is a mistake. It turns out that tariffs in the Atlantic 
economy did not fall from the 1870s to World War I; the globalization that took place in the 
nineteenth century cannot be ascribed to more liberal trade policy. Instead, it was falling 
transport costs that provoked globalization. Indeed, rising tariffs were mainly a defensive 
response to the competitive winds of market integration as transport costs declined.” 
 
107 According to Estevadeordal et al. (2003: 362), transportation costs on maritime routes 
“fell dramatically before 1914, as is well known, but they then rose steeply up to 1939 – a 
lesser known fact.” 
 
108 Before that, transport costs rose sharply during the 1914-1945 period (Estevadeordal et 
al. 2003). 
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109 John Maynard Keynes (1919: 9f.) famously bemoans the end of the first wave of 
globalisation in his publication ‘The Economic Consequences of the Peace’: “What an 
extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in 
August 1914! … The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea 
in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and 
reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and 
by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any 
quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits 
and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith 
of the townspeople of any municipality in any continent that fancy or information might 
recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of 
transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could despatch his 
servant to the neighbouring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might 
seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of 
their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would 
consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference. But, most 
important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in 
the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous and 
avoidable.” 
 
110 According to Jacks et al. (2008a), international trade costs on average increased by 18% 
during the 1929-1932 period alone. 
 
111 Other experts also weigh in on this issue. For example, James (2002: 1) remarks that 
“often we believe that this [globalisation] is irreversible, that it provides a one-way road to 
the future. But historical reflections lead to a more sober and more pessimistic assessment. 
There have already been highly developed and highly integrated international communities 
that dissolved under the pressure of unexpected events. But in every case the momentum was 
lost: the pendulum swung back.” And Abdelal and Segal (2007: 103) refer to “historians 
such as Niall Ferguson and Harold James [who have] pointed out that the previous era of 
globalization (which ran from about 1870 to 1914) had once seemed as unstoppable as the 
current one but had ended disastrously.” 
 
112 As Scholte (2005: 86) puts it, “although recent decades of globalization have shown 
progressive acceleration, the trend is not inherently linear.” 
 
113 Beverelli (2010: 1) describes the situation in the ocean transport sector as follows: “Like 
other modes, maritime transport relies heavily on oil for propulsion and, in view of 
limitations imposed by existing technology and costs, is not yet in a position to adopt 
effective energy substitutes (e.g. biofuels, solar and wind). At the same time, fossil fuel 
reserves are finite, oil extraction is becoming increasingly costly and oil production overall is 
believed to either already have peaked or to reach its maximum level soon. The dependency 
of the maritime transport sector on a source of energy that is becoming increasingly scarce 
and more costly to produce, compounded by limited prospects, at least in the short term, for 
using alternative energy may entail some serious implications for the cost of maritime 
transport services. With over 80 per cent of global merchandise trade being carried by sea, 
the question of how changes in oil prices affect ocean shipping rates is of considerable 
relevance.” 
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1 Mathematical Derivation of Peak Oil 
Martin King Hubbert used the following mathematical derivation to calculate peak oil 
production (Cavallo 2005; Stieler 2006): 
[A1.1]   Q(t) = Qmax / (1+ a exp bt) 
Alternative one :  Q(t) = Qmax / 1+ a
bt  
Alternative two :  Q(t) = Qtotb exp(-b(t-t0)) / (1 + exp(-b(t-t0))
2    
Variables : 
Q(t) = cumulative production 
Qmax =  Qtot  = total resource available or ultimate recovery of crude oil 
a and b = constants 
Crude oil production (the first derivative of [A1.1]) begins slowly, then grows exponentially, 
reaches a maximum, and then declines. The characteristics of this equation are its symmetry 
about the point of maximum annual production and the identical increase and decrease of 
annual production. The maximum annual production is given by: 
[A1.2 ]  Pmax = Qmax b  / 4, 
The year of maximum annual production is given by: 
tmax  = (1/b) 1n (1/a) 
An alternative to Hubbert’s 
calculation of peak oil is 
described below by using the 
example of U.S. oil production: 
In its original form, Hubbert’s 
calculation involves serious 
mathematics, a circumstance 
that raised suspicions among 
experts he may be hiding 
something behind this mathe-
matical curtain. By not pub-
lishing his reasons for choosing 
specific formulas until 1982, 
Hubbert partly contributed to 
the confusion. In his publication 
‘Beyond Oil’, Kenneth 
Deffeyes, a former colleague, provides a simplified alternative derivation, thereby obtaining 
results that are identical with those of Hubbert. 
Source: Deffeyes 2005: 37
Figure A1.1 Hubbert’s Diagram of Oil Production 
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Like Hubbert, Deffeyes chooses the historical development of U.S. oil production as a data 
set for testing. In order to present his derivation graphically, Deffeyes picks a coordinate 
system in which the horizontal axis plots the cumulative oil production Q and the vertical 
axis represents the ratio of annual production to cumulative production (P/Q) (see figure 
A1.1). P stands for annual oil production and Q stands for cumulative oil production (from 
1859 to a particular year). The points in the upper left of the graph are a result of low 
cumulative oil production (in the denominator).  
The straight line (= best fits the data from 1958 to 2003 in the previous graph) in figure A1.2 
meets the horizontal axis at 228 billion barrels. However, this number only shows the 
momentary position of 
the straight line as it 
represents Hubbert’s 
expected amount of 
produced oil within the 
U.S. when the last drop 
of oil has been pumped 
(Qt = cumulative total). 
The intercept of the 
straight line with the 
virtual axis (a) expresses 
the annual oil production 
as a fraction of 
cumulative production. It 
can be regarded as an 
idealised beginning when 
cumulative crude oil 
production in the U.S. 
was zero.  
For the U.S., the vertical intercept for a is 0.0536 which equals 5.36% per year. Hubbert’s 
entire theory is reflected by that line. In fact, that line is Hubbert’s Law. At this stage, three 
additional equations come into play: 
[A1.3]   Y = a + mX  
[A1.4]   P/Q = a – (a/Qt) Q 
[A1.5]   P = a (1 – Q/Qt) Q 
  
Figure A1. 2 Mathematical Graph of Oil Production 
Source: Deffeyes 2005: 38
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Equation [A1.3] is the mathematical equation of a straight line in a coordinate system: 
Y = the vertical axis of the graph 
X = the horizontal axis 
a = the value of Y when X is zero 
m = the slope of the line 
Equation [A1.4] can be regarded as a translation in which the symbols of the graph are set: 
- Y becomes P/Q 
- X is Q 
- a keeps the same meaning  
- m is - a/Qt 
- the minus sign arises because Y decreases as X increases 
Equation [A1.5] describes a bell-shaped curve and can be obtained by multiplying both sides 
of equation [A1.4] with Q. As mentioned previously, the peak of oil production which is 
indicated within the graph by a + (see figure A1.2), occurs when half of the oil has been 
pumped. The essential part of the theory can be found inside the parentheses of equation 
[A1.5]: (1 – Q/Qt): 
When Q/Qt  is the fraction of the total oil which has already been produced, (1 – Q/Qt) is the 
fraction yet to be produced. 
Equation [A1.5] indicates that the ability to produce oil (P) is linearly dependent on the 
fraction of oil that is yet to be extracted. At the beginning of oil production (in the United 
States) Q was 0 and the term 
inside the parentheses 
equaled 1, whereas at the 
very end of crude oil 
production, Q and Qt become 
equal and (1 – Q/Qt): 1 – 1 = 
0. Between those two 
neuralgic points, Q slides 
down the straight line from 0 
to 1 (see figure A1.2).  
In the end, the whole debate 
between the supporters and 
critics of Hubbert’s Law 
comes down to what is inside 
these parentheses. 
  
Figure A1. 3 Oil Production , Hubbert Curve 
Source: Deffeyes 2005: 41
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In order to get to the bell-shaped curve shown in figure A1.3, another equation is needed: 
P = a + (1 – Q/Qt) Q        [A1.6] 
1/P = 1/(a + (1- Q/Qt) Q)        [A1.7] 
Equation [A1.7] is the reciprocal of equation [A1.6]. In other words, by dividing 1 by both 
sides of [A1.6], one gets [A1.7], which now expresses years per billion barrels instead of 
billion barrels per year. Each dot in figure A1.3 stands for one billion barrels of production, 
thereby corresponding to the ideal straight line (for the U.S.) in figure A1.2. For every billion 
barrel of cumulative U.S. production (Q), a (0.0536) and Qt (228.4 billion barrels) are used 
to compute a time interval (1/P). The single time intervals are then summed up to get the 
total time-span of oil production. The resulting graph is the bell-shaped curve shown in 
figure A1.3. 
Given that the bell-shaped curve or rather logistic curve is symmetrical in time, its downside 
mirrors its upside (This is of course an ideal-type scenario.) which is a consequence of the 
production rate’s linear dependence on the unproduced fraction. 
The area below the logistic curve is Qt. As a result of the symmetry in time, the peak year 
occurs when the area below the curve reaches half of Qt. The maximum extraction during the 
year in which the midpoint is reached is 0.25aQt. If Hubbert’s law is applied to calculate the 
peak of global oil production, world oil production swings into the straight line in 1983. 
Deffeyes uses 2 trillion barrels of oil as the final amount of produced oil (Qt) and an a
intercept of 0.05, thereby calculating 2003 as the year in which daily oil production reaches 
its physical limit (see + in figure A1.3). However, there are numerous other estimates for Qt
and by putting in other figures, the results obtained are different (Deffeyes 2005:35ff.). 
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2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Section 2 contains graphical displays and descriptive statistics for the research 
variables used in the econometric analysis. 
2.1 Descriptive Statistics Real Oil Price (OIL) and U.S. Real GDP (RGDP) 
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OIL
 Mean 44.553
 Maximum 127.478
 Minimum 11.170
 Std. Dev. 25.917
 Skewness 1.247
 Kurtosis 4.134
 Jarque-Bera 37.212
 Sum 5,301.806
 Sum Sq. Dev. 79,261.570
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Descriptive Statistics 
RGDP
 Mean 12,043.670
 Maximum 13,332.000
 Minimum 10,501.000
 Std. Dev. 858.974
 Skewness 0.016
 Kurtosis 1.701
 Jarque-Bera 8.366
 Sum 1,433,197.000
 Sum Sq. Dev. 87,064,652.000
 Observations 119
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2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, 
EXRA 
QMT = U.S. Steel Imports, VALUE = U.S. Steel Import Value, EXRA = Echange Rates, per 
exporting country. 
2.2.1 European Union 
2.2.1.1 Austria 
2.2.1.2 Belgium 
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Descriptive Statistics -Austria
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 14,431 19,155,038
 Maximum 1.172 40,319 53,829,909
 Minimum 0.635 1,839 1,022,289
 Std. Dev. 0.151 6,849 12,773,280
 Skewness 0.290 0.737 0.890
 Kurtosis 1.960 4.159 2.772
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 17.434 15.951
 Sum 106.313 1,717,306 2.28E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 5.54E+09 1.93E+16
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Descriptive Statistics -Belgium
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 27,830 22,431,229
 Maximum 1.172 94,264 49,109,313
 Minimum 0.635 3,937 6,520,559
 Std. Dev. 0.151 18,296 10,127,288
 Skewness 0.290 1.115 0.545
 Kurtosis 1.960 4.070 2.669
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 30.335 6.431
 Sum 106.313 3,311,810 2.67E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 3.95E+10 1.21E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
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2.2.1.3 Bulgaria 
2.2.1.4 Czech Republic 
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Descriptive Statistics - Czech Republic
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 28.476 12,646 8,355,464
 Maximum 41.229 54,298 33,791,675
 Minimum 14.942 0 0
 Std. Dev. 7.185 9,825 7,243,364
 Skewness 0.058 1.449 1.499
 Kurtosis 1.842 5.692 5.083
 Jarque-Bera 6.718 77.580 66.097
 Sum 3,388.688 1,504,910 9.94E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 6,092.302 1.14E+10 6.19E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Bulgaria
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 304.597 7,616 2,714,540
 Maximum 1,905.800 38,629 16,204,374
 Minimum 1.241 0 0
 Std. Dev. 681.641 10,165 4,037,947
 Skewness 1.820 1.210 1.625
 Kurtosis 4.356 3.237 4.669
 Jarque-Bera 74.801 29.295 66.186
 Sum 36,246.980 906,345 3.23E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev.54,826,811.000 1.22E+10 1.92E+15
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2.2.1.5 Denmark 
2.2.1.6 Estonia 
Descriptive Statistics - Denmark
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 6.653 134 336,370
 Maximum 8.740 624 2,353,103
 Minimum 4.734 2 15,736
 Std. Dev. 1.122 130 283,608
 Skewness 0.300 0.943 3.172
 Kurtosis 1.967 3.392 22.488
 Jarque-Bera 7.068 18.390 2,082.623
 Sum 791.722 15,953 40,028,006
 Sum Sq. Dev. 148.634 2,005,925 9.49E+12
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - Estonia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 13.989 805 472,160
 Maximum 18.329 16,258 7,716,958
 Minimum 9.940 0 0
 Std. Dev. 2.358 2,608 1,514,928
 Skewness 0.292 3.706 3.461
 Kurtosis 1.956 17.275 14.212
 Jarque-Bera 7.097 1,282.864 860.937
 Sum 1,664.647 95,826 56,187,080
 Sum Sq. Dev. 655.915 8.03E+08 2.71E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
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2.2.1.7 Finland 
2.2.1.8 France 
Descriptive Statistics - Finland
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 8,658 5,816,721
 Maximum 1.172 50,582 16,843,433
 Minimum 0.635 257 1,448,245
 Std. Dev. 0.151 7,868 2,978,210
 Skewness 0.290 2.066 0.816
 Kurtosis 1.960 9.373 3.585
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 286.028 14.904
 Sum 106.313 1,030,353 6.92E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 7.30E+09 1.05E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - France
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 51,384 43,348,653
 Maximum 1.172 109,261 74,881,245
 Minimum 0.635 16,164 17,368,092
 Std. Dev. 0.151 22,249 11,959,236
 Skewness 0.290 0.566 -0.014
 Kurtosis 1.960 2.445 2.779
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 7.891 0.247
 Sum 106.313 6,114,699 5.16E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 5.84E+10 1.69E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
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2.2.1.9 Germany 
2.2.1.10 Hungary 
Descriptive Statistics - Germany
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 113,608 93,415,145
 Maximum 1.172 204,677 204,000,000
 Minimum 0.635 53,552 41,605,227
 Std. Dev. 0.151 32,772 33,845,523
 Skewness 0.290 0.624 0.846
 Kurtosis 1.960 3.018 3.667
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 7.724 16.407
 Sum 106.313 13,519,321 1.11E+10
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 1.27E+11 1.35E+17
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Descriptive Statistics - Hungary
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 226.503 1,444 399,708
 Maximum 309.181 6,276 2,206,033
 Minimum 147.345 0 0
 Std. Dev. 39.390 1,719 477,576
 Skewness 0.303 1.187 1.404
 Kurtosis 2.196 3.534 4.846
 Jarque-Bera 5.033 29.343 56.026
 Sum 26,953.880 171,799 47,565,214
 Sum Sq. Dev. 183,089.200 3.49E+08 2.69E+13
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 11 
2.2.1.11 Ireland 
2.2.1.12 Italy 
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Descriptive Statistics - Ireland
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 482 326,419
 Maximum 1.172 35,348 27,162,172
 Minimum 0.635 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.151 3,291 2,487,539
 Skewness 0.290 10.148 10.685
 Kurtosis 1.960 107.676 115.761
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 56,370.940 65,309.320
 Sum 106.313 57,301 38,843,802
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 1.28E+09 7.30E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Italy
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 39,919 40,027,844
 Maximum 1.172 124,840 111,000,000
 Minimum 0.635 8,156 10,157,350
 Std. Dev. 0.151 23,071 25,441,511
 Skewness 0.290 0.830 0.780
 Kurtosis 1.960 3.443 2.514
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 14.636 13.250
 Sum 106.313 4,750,319 4.76E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 6.28E+10 7.64E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 12 
2.2.1.13 Latvia 
2.2.1.14 Lithuania 
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Descriptive Statistics - Latvia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.566 7,171 1,891,372
 Maximum 0.642 54,448 12,937,328
 Minimum 0.447 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.047 12,716 2,843,156
 Skewness -0.597 2.043 1.995
 Kurtosis 2.839 6.451 6.519
 Jarque-Bera 7.190 141.815 140.367
 Sum 67.368 853,370 2.25E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.259 1.91E+10 9.54E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Lithuania
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 3.224 210 50,083
 Maximum 4.003 14,423 2,633,652
 Minimum 2.204 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.638 1,400 262,804
 Skewness 0.135 9.130 8.483
 Kurtosis 1.416 91.221 80.962
 Jarque-Bera 12.797 40,243.810 31,564.520
 Sum 383.613 24,966 5,959,918
 Sum Sq. Dev. 48.007 2.31E+08 8.15E+12
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 13 
2.2.1.15 Luxembourg 
2.2.1.16 Netherlands 
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Descriptive Statistics - Luxembourg
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 16,648 11,157,436
 Maximum 1.172 34,513 30,915,308
 Minimum 0.635 4,032 2,287,080
 Std. Dev. 0.151 5,728 5,455,461
 Skewness 0.290 0.523 1.169
 Kurtosis 1.960 3.302 4.059
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 5.872 32.659
 Sum 106.313 1,981,063 1.33E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 3.87E+09 3.51E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Netherlands
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 46,209 21,438,890
 Maximum 1.172 95,610 55,083,454
 Minimum 0.635 2,491 1,656,878
 Std. Dev. 0.151 21,950 11,103,068
 Skewness 0.290 -0.124 0.461
 Kurtosis 1.960 2.226 2.890
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 3.271 4.268
 Sum 106.313 5,498,873 2.55E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 5.69E+10 1.45E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 14 
2.2.1.17 Poland 
2.2.1.18 Portugal 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EXRA
0
4,000,000
8,000,000
12,000,000
16,000,000
20,000,000
24,000,000
28,000,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
VALUE
Descriptive Statistics - Poland
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 3.573 10,788 4,391,065
 Maximum 4.641 66,375 27,587,341
 Minimum 2.072 121 90,310
 Std. Dev. 0.628 12,407 4,316,920
 Skewness -0.621 2.009 2.186
 Kurtosis 2.416 8.222 9.916
 Jarque-Bera 9.341 215.230 331.914
 Sum 425.200 1,283,735 5.23E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 46.577 1.82E+10 2.20E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Portugal
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 434 466,932
 Maximum 1.172 8,743 1,939,332
 Minimum 0.635 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.151 1,041 459,955
 Skewness 0.290 5.320 1.339
 Kurtosis 1.960 37.897 4.404
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 6,599.811 45.329
 Sum 106.313 51,606 55,564,939
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 1.28E+08 2.50E+13
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 15 
2.2.1.19 Romania 
2.2.1.20 Slovakia 
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Descriptive Statistics - Romania
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 2.720 19,386 8,829,051
 Maximum 3.496 77,104 32,526,515
 Minimum 0.993 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.636 16,987 6,846,883
 Skewness -0.763 1.316 1.008
 Kurtosis 2.866 4.583 3.789
 Jarque-Bera 11.646 46.793 23.253
 Sum 323.737 2,306,890 1.05E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 47.695 3.40E+10 5.53E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Slovakia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 36.086 4,158 1,678,266
 Maximum 51.145 47,915 11,344,035
 Minimum 19.272 0 2,737
 Std. Dev. 8.927 8,296 2,302,846
 Skewness -0.044 3.104 2.629
 Kurtosis 1.855 13.056 9.661
 Jarque-Bera 6.536 692.541 357.116
 Sum 4,294.215 494,852 2.00E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 9,403.579 8.12E+09 6.26E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 16 
2.2.1.21 Spain 
2.2.1.22 Sweden 
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Descriptive Statistics - Spain
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.893 30,881 25,986,076
 Maximum 1.172 88,109 56,353,147
 Minimum 0.635 3,567 4,785,222
 Std. Dev. 0.151 16,891 11,019,209
 Skewness 0.290 1.021 0.395
 Kurtosis 1.960 4.166 2.895
 Jarque-Bera 7.034 27.407 3.144
 Sum 106.313 3,674,850 3.09E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.682 3.37E+10 1.43E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Sweden
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 8.120 17,991 34,318,257
 Maximum 10.793 39,328 88,541,241
 Minimum 5.947 6,525 13,560,492
 Std. Dev. 1.285 5,971 18,279,353
 Skewness 0.457 0.521 0.900
 Kurtosis 2.303 3.102 2.711
 Jarque-Bera 6.547 5.431 16.475
 Sum 966.276 2,140,918 4.08E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 194.795 4.21E+09 3.94E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 17 
2.2.1.23 United Kingdom 
2.2.2 Other Europe 
2.2.2.1 Norway 
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Descriptive Statistics - United Kingdom
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 0.593 43,051.290 42,011,328.000
 Maximum 0.713 102,373.800 1.08E+08
 Minimum 0.483 177.338 354,256.600
 Std. Dev. 0.067 14,895 18,027,786
 Skewness 0.178 0.720 0.929
 Kurtosis 1.777 5.170 3.825
 Jarque-Bera 8.044 33.635 20.508
 Sum 70.524 5,123,104 5.00E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.531 2.62E+10 3.84E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Norway
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 7.192 3,405 1,969,592
 Maximum 9.379 17,992 15,998,890
 Minimum 5.054 3 25,797
 Std. Dev. 1.185 4,167 2,113,650
 Skewness 0.204 1.983 3.118
 Kurtosis 2.075 5.976 18.409
 Jarque-Bera 5.065 121.914 1,370.127
 Sum 855.901 405,140 2.34E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 165.578 2.05E+09 5.27E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 18 
2.2.2.2 Switzerland 
2.2.3 C.I.S. 
2.2.3.1 Kazakhstan 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EXRA
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
VALUE
Descriptive Statistics - Switzerland
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 1.386 1,148.955 2,729,521
 Maximum 1.786 4,912.073 6,104,008
 Minimum 1.013 414.810 982,318
 Std. Dev. 0.208 666.511 1,263,277
 Skewness 0.310 2.980 0.714
 Kurtosis 1.950 14.913 2.535
 Jarque-Bera 7.369 879.769 11.196
 Sum 164.971 136,726 3.25E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 5.119 52,419,896 1.88E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Kazakhstan
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 136.067 4,622.343 1,754,875
 Maximum 158.070 49,686.600 34,105,056
 Minimum 82.694 0 0
 Std. Dev. 14.917 9,129.293 3,961,657
 Skewness -1.599 2.792 5.134
 Kurtosis 6.528 11.576 39.167
 Jarque-Bera 112.431 519.272 7,008.664
 Sum 16,191.930 550,058.900 2.09E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 26,258.000 9.83E+09 1.85E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 19 
2.2.3.2 Russia 
2.2.3.3 Ukraine 
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Descriptive Statistics - Russia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 27.789 130,669 53,553,902
 Maximum 31.859 669,636 270,000,000
 Minimum 17.498 1,851.100 2,164,585.000
 Std. Dev. 2.562 107,318.500 51,856,822.000
 Skewness -0.736 1.818 1.715
 Kurtosis 4.078 8.178 6.002
 Jarque-Bera 16.496 198.522 103.018
 Sum 3,306.907 15,549,573 6.37E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 774.506 1.36E+12 3.17E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Ukraine
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 5.204 65,437.620 29,113,190
 Maximum 5.681 227,996 1.78E+08
 Minimum 3.886 118.200 110,933
 Std. Dev. 0.415 58,104.680 32,796,135
 Skewness -1.864 0.942 2.056
 Kurtosis 5.842 3.028 8.047
 Jarque-Bera 108.964 17.592 210.157
 Sum 619.266 7,787,077 3.46E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 20.348 3.98E+11 1.27E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 20 
2.2.4 North America 
2.2.4.1 Canada 
2.2.4.2 Costa Rica 
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Descriptive Statistics - Canada
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 1.335 433,530.400 2.94E+08
 Maximum 1.600 705,445.800 6.92E+08
 Minimum 0.967 280,173.700 1.40E+08
 Std. Dev. 0.195 77,208.740 1.23E+08
 Skewness -0.305 1.043 1.240
 Kurtosis 1.674 4.574 4.206
 Jarque-Bera 10.564 33.849 37.728
 Sum 158.815 51,590,117.000 3.50E+10
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.503 7.03E+11 1.77E+18
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Costa Rica
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 416.803 255.558 151,113
 Maximum 562.435 7,741.794 3,645,949
 Minimum 266.214 0 0
 Std. Dev. 91.704 957.060 480,510
 Skewness -0.080 6.153 5.797
 Kurtosis 1.579 42.410 38.111
 Jarque-Bera 10.141 8,451.955 6,778.975
 Sum 49,599.590 30,411.410 17,982,441
 Sum Sq. Dev. 992,338.600 1.08E+08 2.72E+13
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 21 
2.2.4.3 Dominican Republic 
2.2.4.4 El Salvador 
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Descriptive Statistics - Dominican Republic
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 26.585 4,609 2,219,503
 Maximum 48.406 29,977 15,155,623
 Minimum 15.412 3.502 3,515.768
 Std. Dev. 9.477 4,641.501 2,377,966
 Skewness 0.239 1.939 2.200
 Kurtosis 1.878 9.780 10.649
 Jarque-Bera 7.377 302.496 386.038
 Sum 3,163.595 548,436 2.64E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 10,598.070 2.54E+09 6.67E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - El Salvador
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 8.819 517.885 211,307
 Maximum 9.156 8,498.880 2,852,173
 Minimum 8.677 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.132 1,499.229 579,692.200
 Skewness 1.557 3.473 3.008
 Kurtosis 4.188 15.335 11.388
 Jarque-Bera 55.055 993.717 528.224
 Sum 1,049.445 61,628 25,145,505
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.058 2.65E+08 3.97E+13
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 22 
2.2.4.5 Guatemala 
2.2.4.6 Honduras 
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Descriptive Statistics - Guatemala
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 7.847 635.756 419,660
 Maximum 8.340 11,608.060 7,147,216
 Minimum 6.575 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.332 1,165.259 727,941
 Skewness -1.374 7.196 6.896
 Kurtosis 5.953 67.385 62.819
 Jarque-Bera 80.683 21,581.760 18,685.440
 Sum 933.805 75,655 49,939,515
 Sum Sq. Dev. 12.996 1.60E+08 6.25E+13
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Honduras
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 17.559 81.975 38,573.190
 Maximum 19.739 539.472 218,586.700
 Minimum 13.718 0 0
 Std. Dev. 2.046 126.861 52,387.110
 Skewness -0.489 1.972 1.510
 Kurtosis 1.698 6.433 4.604
 Jarque-Bera 13.144 135.593 58.001
 Sum 2,089.563 9,755 4,590,209
 Sum Sq. Dev. 493.932 1,899,043 3.24E+11
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 23 
2.2.4.7 Mexico 
2.2.4.8 Panama 
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Descriptive Statistics - Mexico
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 10.324 267,181.800 1.45E+08
 Maximum 11.520 454,127.400 3.13E+08
 Minimum 9.064 85,010.500 41,745,343.000
 Std. Dev. 0.753 62,570.940 67,198,425.000
 Skewness -0.232 -0.115 0.437
 Kurtosis 1.587 3.476 1.975
 Jarque-Bera 10.971 1.386 8.996
 Sum 1,228.589 31,794,635 1.73E+10
 Sum Sq. Dev. 66.820 4.62E+11 5.33E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Panama
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 1.008 36.034 24,570.160
 Maximum 1.040 2,917 1,400,450
 Minimum 0.984 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.014 287.283 176,894.400
 Skewness 1.108 9.109 7.500
 Kurtosis 3.011 88.537 57.395
 Jarque-Bera 24.369 37,923.470 15,786.150
 Sum 119.981 4,288.030 2,923,849
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.024 9,738,718 3.69E+12
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 24 
2.2.4.9 Trinidad and Tobago 
2.2.5 South America 
2.2.5.1 Argentina 
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Descriptive Statistics - Trinidad and Tobago
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 6.222 17,123.470 5,610,439
 Maximum 6.351 54,530.630 17,715,314
 Minimum 6.003 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.084 12,882.970 3,876,151
 Skewness -0.053 0.585 0.618
 Kurtosis 2.454 2.593 3.297
 Jarque-Bera 1.534 7.606 8.007
 Sum 740.403 2,037,693 6.68E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.829 1.96E+10 1.77E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Argentina
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 2.390 24,781.900 11,900,994
 Maximum 3.670 83,980.270 47,644,429
 Minimum 0.998 736.481 984,602
 Std. Dev. 0.986 18,622.940 7,125,206
 Skewness -0.624 1.182 1.722
 Kurtosis 1.553 4.090 8.508
 Jarque-Bera 18.104 33.576 209.260
 Sum 284.444 2,949,047 1.42E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 114.801 4.09E+10 5.99E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 25 
2.2.5.2 Brazil 
2.2.5.3 Chile 
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Descriptive Statistics - Brazil
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 2.315 223,639.200 84,565,169
 Maximum 3.797 476,082.200 2.28E+08
 Minimum 1.193 41,518.500 27,793,602
 Std. Dev. 0.550 98,009.640 42,911,375
 Skewness 0.564 0.523 1.056
 Kurtosis 2.684 2.755 3.682
 Jarque-Bera 6.814 5.732 24.418
 Sum 275.427 26,613,065.000 1.01E+10
 Sum Sq. Dev. 35.650 1.13E+12 2.17E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Chile
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 583.248 3,599.684 902,071.900
 Maximum 753.199 186,122 5,805,511
 Minimum 443.692 0 0
 Std. Dev. 81.764 17,199.280 1,191,916
 Skewness 0.531 10.180 2.369
 Kurtosis 2.113 108.405 8.752
 Jarque-Bera 9.503 57,143.110 275.327
 Sum 69,406.520 428,362.400 1.07E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 788,880.800 3.49E+10 1.68E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 26 
2.2.5.4 Colombia 
2.2.5.5 Ecuador 
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Descriptive Statistics - Colombia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 2,310.666 6,011.581 5,584,612
 Maximum 3,023.206 32,487.570 36,331,463
 Minimum 1,525.688 76.195 53,547.850
 Std. Dev. 374.063 4,157.594 5,424,235.000
 Skewness -0.018 2.493 2.383
 Kurtosis 2.443 15.437 12.136
 Jarque-Bera 1.543 890.158 526.447
 Sum 274,969.200 715,378.100 6.65E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev.16,510,918.000 2.04E+09 3.47E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
Descriptive Statistics - Ecuador
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 23,844.370 124.932 82,518.750
 Maximum 25,998.800 480.786 341,692.900
 Minimum 6,477.922 0 0
 Std. Dev. 4,866.862 102.863 65,900.670
 Skewness -2.620 1.328 1.268
 Kurtosis 8.288 4.677 4.601
 Jarque-Bera 274.767 48.912 44.577
 Sum 2,837,480.000 14,866.920 9,819,731
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.79E+09 1,248,532.000 5.12E+11
 Observations 119 119 119
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 27 
2.2.5.6 Peru 
2.2.5.7 Uruguay 
Descriptive Statistics - Uruguay
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 20.608 179 87,415
 Maximum 29.754 4,402 960,315
 Minimum 10.780 0 0
 Std. Dev. 6.802 720 195,528
 Skewness -0.308 4.369 2.920
 Kurtosis 1.492 21.022 11.628
 Jarque-Bera 13.149 1,988.962 538.196
 Sum 2,452 21,317 10,402,374
 Sum Sq. Dev. 5,459 61,189,153 4.51E+12
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - Peru
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 3.405 204 97,667
 Maximum 3.762 4,087 2,403,950
 Minimum 2.768 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.211 677 336,104
 Skewness -0.915 4.411 4.951
 Kurtosis 3.495 23.061 29.369
 Jarque-Bera 17.836 2,381.369 3,933.879
 Sum 405.2 24,242 11,622,354
 Sum Sq. Dev. 5.269 54,139,599.000 1.33E+13
 Observations 119 119 1190
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Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 28 
2.2.6 Africa 
2.2.6.1 Algeria 
2.2.6.2 Egypt 
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Descriptive Statistics - Algeria
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 74.325 765 54,812
 Maximum 83.317 68,099 3,272,680
 Minimum 59.019 0 0
 Std. Dev. 5.822 6,431 332,801
 Skewness -0.504 9.915 8.323
 Kurtosis 2.569 103.110 76.951
 Jarque-Bera 5.963 51,642 28,490
 Sum 8,845 91,080 6,522,665
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4,000 4.88E+09 1.31E+13
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - Egypt
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 5.030 17,633 7,417,015
 Maximum 6.273 111,951 47,613,320
 Minimum 3.416 0 0
 Std. Dev. 1.042 26,824 12,329,944
 Skewness -0.455 1.678 1.806
 Kurtosis 1.597 4.953 5.227
 Jarque-Bera 13.875 74.765 89.246
 Sum 599 2,098,334 8.83E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 128.231 8.49E+10 1.79E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 29 
2.2.6.3 South Africa 
2.2.7 Middle East 
2.2.7.1 Israel 
Descriptive Statistics - South Africa
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 7.374 31,182 15,590,921
 Maximum 11.676 93,699 46,275,159
 Minimum 5.651 2,812 1,549,036
 Std. Dev. 1.393 20,251 8,723,405
 Skewness 1.487 0.776 0.870
 Kurtosis 4.731 3.146 3.745
 Jarque-Bera 58.692 12.051 17.753
 Sum 877.5 3,710,681 1.86E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 228.9 4.84E+10 8.98E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - Israel
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 4.300 1,027 600,836
 Maximum 4.935 74,835 40,381,605
 Minimum 3.358 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.328 6,829 3,682,520
 Skewness -0.681 10.742 10.727
 Kurtosis 3.708 116.602 116.385
 Jarque-Bera 11.695 66,278.240 66,027.000
 Sum 511.747 122,175 71,499,423
 Sum Sq. Dev. 12.668 5.50E+09 1.60E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 30 
2.2.7.2 Saudi Arabia 
2.2.7.3 Turkey 
Descriptive Statistics - Saudi Arabia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 3.751 1,130 582,062
 Maximum 3.758 20,139 9,829,239
 Minimum 3.736 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.002 3,779 1,553,446
 Skewness -2.087 3.648 4.242
 Kurtosis 24.275 15.376 21.478
 Jarque-Bera 2,330.643 1,023.358 2,049.851
 Sum 446.4 134,512 69,265,405
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.001 1.68E+09 2.85E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
3.735
3.740
3.745
3.750
3.755
3.760
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EXRA
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
VALUE
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
200,000
240,000
280,000
320,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EXRA
0
20,000,000
40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
100,000,000
120,000,000
140,000,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
VALUE
Descriptive Statistics - Turkey
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 1.198 87,727 36,316,487
 Maximum 1.690 314,758 136,000,000
 Minimum 0.296 322 367,701
 Std. Dev. 0.404 67,700 33,903,255
 Skewness -0.999 1.160 1.315
 Kurtosis 2.604 3.736 3.765
 Jarque-Bera 20.579 29.366 37.209
 Sum 142.564 10,439,508 4.32E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 19.251 5.41E+11 1.36E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 31 
2.2.7.4 United Arab Emirates 
2.2.8 Asia 
2.2.8.1 China 
Descriptive Statistics - United Arab Emirates
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 3.673 709 736,685
 Maximum 3.674 5,368 7,008,231
 Minimum 3.671 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0 906 1,008,723
 Skewness -1.531 2.514 3.615
 Kurtosis 12.244 10.831 19.925
 Jarque-Bera 470.185 429.453 1,679.541
 Sum 437.128 84,402 87,665,457
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.49E-05 96,901,336 1.20E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
3.6705
3.6710
3.6715
3.6720
3.6725
3.6730
3.6735
3.6740
3.6745
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EXRA
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
8,000,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
VALUE
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
6.8
7.0
7.2
7.4
7.6
7.8
8.0
8.2
8.4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EXRA
0
100,000,000
200,000,000
300,000,000
400,000,000
500,000,000
600,000,000
700,000,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
VALUE
Descriptive Statistics - China
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 8.073 166,566.800 1.25E+08
 Maximum 8.280 541,854.200 6.82E+08
 Minimum 6.831 5,324.874 4,151,652.000
 Std. Dev. 0.382 143,826.800 1.42E+08
 Skewness -1.989 1.097 1.370
 Kurtosis 5.960 3.224 4.345
 Jarque-Bera 121.912 24.103 46.219
 Sum 960.653 19,821,449.000 1.48E+10
 Sum Sq. Dev. 17.213 2.44E+12 2.38E+18
 Observations 119 119 119
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 32 
2.2.8.2 Hong Kong 
2.2.8.3 India 
Descriptive Statistics - Hong Kong
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 7.786 677.286 430,380
 Maximum 7.820 24,020.720 10,344,866
 Minimum 7.743 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.019 3,122.431 1,461,689
 Skewness -0.651 6.092 5.726
 Kurtosis 2.295 41.269 36.527
 Jarque-Bera 10.879 7,997.726 6,223.469
 Sum 926.558 80,597 51,215,244
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.044 1.15E+09 2.52E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - India
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 44.830 58,774.250 46,298,804
 Maximum 49.020 218,431.200 276,000,000
 Minimum 39.270 1,888.710 1,933,298
 Std. Dev. 2.459 40,217.730 42,101,986
 Skewness -0.352 1.132 1.810
 Kurtosis 2.605 5.414 9.012
 Jarque-Bera 3.235 54.308 244.223
 Sum 5,334.726 6,994,136 5,510,000,000
 Sum Sq. Dev. 713.424 1.91E+11 2.09E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 33 
2.2.8.4 Indonesia 
2.2.8.5 Japan 
Descriptive Statistics - Indonesia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 9,052.103 11,854.780 4,040,970
 Maximum 11,326.400 91,851.300 23,042,610
 Minimum 6,797.258 7.895 29,517
 Std. Dev. 819.770 17,945.190 4,478,325
 Skewness -0.047 2.206 1.723
 Kurtosis 4.126 7.878 5.856
 Jarque-Bera 6.331 214.486 99.298
 Sum 1,077,200 1,410,719 481,000,000
 Sum Sq. Dev.79,298,755.000 3.80E+10 2.37E+15
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - Japan
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 114.534 145,723 110,000,000
 Maximum 133.640 750,781 289,000,000
 Minimum 100.760 58,517.350 46,662,556
 Std. Dev. 7.124 81,265.530 40,743,380
 Skewness 0.264 4.038 1.100
 Kurtosis 2.492 28.081 5.133
 Jarque-Bera 2.664 3,442.410 46.559
 Sum 13,629.520 17,341,036 1.31E+10
 Sum Sq. Dev. 5,989.200 7.79E+11 1.96E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 34 
2.2.8.6 Malaysia 
2.2.8.7 Philippines 
Descriptive Statistics - Malaysia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 3.707 16,971.780 8,090,816
 Maximum 3.801 121,166.400 66,003,225
 Minimum 3.160 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.174 21,527.570 10,423,356
 Skewness -1.788 2.468 2.647
 Kurtosis 4.867 10.493 12.386
 Jarque-Bera 80.679 399.198 575.704
 Sum 441.189 2,019,641.000 9.63E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 3.564 5.47E+10 1.28E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EXRA
0
10,000,000
20,000,000
30,000,000
40,000,000
50,000,000
60,000,000
70,000,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
VALUE
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
36
40
44
48
52
56
60
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EXRA
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
VALUE
Descriptive Statistics - Philippines
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 49.277 782 382,285
 Maximum 56.471 10,213 6,092,125
 Minimum 37.896 0 0
 Std. Dev. 5.771 1,826.765 970,045.900
 Skewness -0.557 2.873 3.531
 Kurtosis 1.985 11.366 16.575
 Jarque-Bera 11.254 510.679 1,161.074
 Sum 5,863.943 93,072.780 45,491,892
 Sum Sq. Dev. 3,930.172 3.94E+08 1.11E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2 Graphical Display and Descriptive Statistics per Country – QMT, VALUE, EXRA 
A 35 
2.2.8.8 Singapore 
2.2.8.9 South Korea 
Descriptive Statistics - Singapore
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 1.665 1,462.423 900,481
 Maximum 1.839 21,854.110 10,464,861
 Minimum 1.359 0 0
 Std. Dev. 0.118 3,914.881 1,749,255
 Skewness -0.939 3.142 3.251
 Kurtosis 3.243 12.568 13.896
 Jarque-Bera 17.782 649.798 798.389
 Sum 198.125 174,028.300 1.07E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.646 1.81E+09 3.61E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - South Korea
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 1,117.046 163,893 90,673,252
 Maximum 1,327.760 297,042 257,000,000
 Minimum 914.940 53,094.180 25,523,628
 Std. Dev. 124.034 55,653.840 44,173,697
 Skewness -0.146 0.197 0.979
 Kurtosis 1.795 2.522 4.147
 Jarque-Bera 7.620 1.897 25.520
 Sum 132,928.500 19,503,252 1.08E+10
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1,815,351.000 3.65E+11 2.30E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
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2.2.8.10 Taiwan 
2.2.8.11 Thailand 
Descriptive Statistics - Taiwan
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 32.875 64,120.420 55,620,519
 Maximum 35.073 204,736.200 172,000,000
 Minimum 30.356 8,757.973 11,572,937
 Std. Dev. 1.275 45,358.320 40,223,636
 Skewness -0.085 1.031 1.017
 Kurtosis 2.166 3.434 3.303
 Jarque-Bera 3.589 22.006 20.962
 Sum 3,912.079 7,630,330 6.62E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 191.791 2.43E+11 1.91E+17
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - Thailand
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 39.140 22,473.170 11,697,711
 Maximum 45.641 123,611.900 80,970,542
 Minimum 30.158 108.290 130,001
 Std. Dev. 3.980 21,739.250 12,531,325
 Skewness -0.575 1.525 2.434
 Kurtosis 2.535 6.132 11.671
 Jarque-Bera 7.625 94.762 490.234
 Sum 4,657.635 2,674,308.000 1.39E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1,869.260 5.58E+10 1.85E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - Australia
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 1.500 59,195 20,973,544
 Maximum 1.997 177,690.100 70,639,513
 Minimum 1.039 1,202.959 707,283
 Std. Dev. 0.267 30,476.340 14,499,614
 Skewness 0.281 0.721 1.249
 Kurtosis 1.955 4.268 4.086
 Jarque-Bera 6.983 18.283 36.802
 Sum 178.558 7,044,206 2.50E+09
 Sum Sq. Dev. 8.424 1.10E+11 2.48E+16
 Observations 119 119 119
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Descriptive Statistics - New Zealand
EXRA QMT VALUE
 Mean 1.766 8,282.305 3,369,090
 Maximum 2.508 22,792.470 10,830,014
 Minimum 1.250 75.200 55,206
 Std. Dev. 0.375 4,531.623 2,463,021
 Skewness 0.473 0.549 1.204
 Kurtosis 1.905 3.180 3.784
 Jarque-Bera 10.388 6.138 31.806
 Sum 210.138 985,594.300 4.01E+08
 Sum Sq. Dev. 16.625 2.42E+09 7.16E+14
 Observations 119 119 119
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 38 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
2.3.1 European Union 
2.3.1.1 Belgium 
1A      1B 
3      4 
6A      6B 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 39 
7      8 
14      14A 
15      16 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 40 
17      18 
19      20 
21A      21B 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 41 
21CD      21E 
23 
28      29 
  
0
40
80
120
160
200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 42 
29A      31 
32      33A    
33B      34  
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 43 
35      36 
37 
2.3.1.2 France 
1B 
  
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 44 
3      4 
6A      6B 
7      14    
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 45 
14A      16 
17      18 
19      20 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
36,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 46 
21A      21B 
21CD      21E 
22A      23 
  
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 47 
28      29 
29A      31 
32      33A 
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 48 
34 
35      36      
37 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 49 
2.3.1.3 Germany 
1A      1B 
3      4 
5      6A 
  
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 50 
6B      7 
8      9 
14      14A 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 51 
15      16 
17      18 
19      20 
  
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
3,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 52 
21A      21B 
21CD      21E 
22A      23 
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 53 
28      29 
29A      31 
32      33A 
  
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 54 
33B      34 
35      36 
37 
  
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 55 
2.3.1.4 Italy 
1A      1B 
3      4 
6A      6B 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 56 
7      14 
14A      15 
16      17 
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 57 
18      19 
20      21A 
21B      21CD 
  
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 58 
21E      22A 
23      31 
32      33A 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 59 
34      35 
36      37 
2.3.1.5 Netherlands 
1B      3 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 60 
4      6A 
6B      14 
14A      16 
  
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 61 
17      18 
19      20 
21A      21B 
  
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 62 
21CD      21E 
22A      23 
28      29 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 63 
29A      31 
32      33A 
34      37 
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 64 
2.3.1.6 Spain 
1B      3 
4      6A 
6B      7 
  
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 65 
8      14 
14A      16 
17      18 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 66 
19      20 
21A      21B 
21CD      21E 
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 67 
22A      23 
29      31 
32      33A 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 68 
33B      34 
37 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 69 
2.3.2 C.I.S. 
2.3.2.1 Russia 
1B      3 
4      6A 
6B      14 
  
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
200,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 70 
15      16 
17      18 
19      20 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 71 
21A      23 
31      32 
33A      35 
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 72 
37 
2.3.2.2 Ukraine 
1B      3 
4      6A 
  
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
200,000
240,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 73 
6B      14 
16      17 
18      21A 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 74 
21B      21CD 
22A      31 
32 
  
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 75 
2.3.3 North America 
2.3.3.1 Canada 
1A      1B 
3      4 
5      6A 
  
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 76 
6B      7 
8      9 
14      14A 
  
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 77 
15      16 
17      18 
19      20 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
36,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 78 
21A      21B 
21CD      21E 
22A      22B 
  
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
11,000
12,000
13,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
15,000
17,500
20,000
22,500
25,000
27,500
30,000
32,500
35,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 79 
28      29 
29A      31 
32      33A 
  
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
55,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 80 
33B      34 
35      36 
37 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 81 
2.3.3.2 Mexico 
1A      1B 
3      4 
6A 
  
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
200,000
240,000
280,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 82 
6B      8 
9      14 
14A      15 
  
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 83 
16      17 
18      20 
21A      21B 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 84 
21CD      21E 
22A      22B 
23      28 
  
0
40
80
120
160
200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 85 
29      31 
32      33A 
33B      34 
  
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
360
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 86 
35      36 
37 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 87 
2.3.4 South America (Brazil) 
1A      1B 
3      4 
6A      6B 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 88 
9      14 
14A      15 
16      17 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 89 
18      19 
20      21A 
21B      21CD 
  
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 90 
21E      22A 
23      28 
29      29A 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
3,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 91 
31      33A 
33B      34 
35      36 
  
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 92 
37 
2.3.5 Africa (South Africa) 
1B      3 
4      6A 
  
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 93 
6B      14 
16      18 
19      20 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 94 
21A      21CD 
21E      22A 
22B      23 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 95 
31      32 
33A      37 
  
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 96 
2.3.6 Middle East (Turkey) 
1B      3 
4      6A 
6B      14 
  
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
200,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 97 
14A      15 
16      17 
18      19 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
200,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 98 
21A      21B 
21CD      22A 
23      31 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 99 
32      33A 
36      37 
  
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 100 
2.3.7 Asia 
2.3.7.1 China 
1A      1B 
3      4 
5      6A 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
200,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 101 
6B      7 
8      9 
14A      15 
  
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 102 
16      17 
18      20 
21A      21B 
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 103 
21CD      21E 
22A      22B 
23      28 
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 104 
29      31 
32      33A 
33B       
  
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 105 
35      36 
37 
2.3.7.2 Japan 
1A      1B 
  
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 106 
3      4 
5      6A 
7      8 
  
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
3,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 107 
14      14A 
15      16 
17      18 
  
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 108 
19      20 
21A      21B 
21CD      21E 
  
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 109 
22A      22B 
23      28 
29      29A 
  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 110 
31      32 
33A      33B 
34      35 
  
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 111 
36      37 
2.3.7.3 South Korea 
1B      3 
4      6A 
  
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 112 
6B      7 
8      14 
14A      16 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 113 
18      19 
20      21A 
21B      21CD 
  
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 114 
21E      22A 
22B       
29      31 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 115 
32      33A 
33B      34 
35      36 
  
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 116 
37 
2.3.7.4 Taiwan 
1A      1B 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 117 
3      4 
6A      6B 
7      14 
  
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 118 
14A      16 
17      18 
19      20 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4
8
12
16
20
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 119 
21A      21CD 
21E      22A 
23      29 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10
20
30
40
50
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 120 
31      32 
33A      33B 
34      36 
  
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 121 
37 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 122 
2.3.8 Oceania (Australia) 
1A      1B 
4      6A 
6B      9 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 123 
14      15 
16      17 
18      19 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
3,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
360
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 124 
21A      21CD 
21E      22A 
23      28 
  
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 125 
29      29A 
31      32 
34      36 
  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10
20
30
40
50
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
50
100
150
200
250
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 2 Graphical Display of Research Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3 Graphical Display of U.S. Steel Exports per Category 
A 126 
37 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
QMT
Appendix: 3 Model Specification 
3.1 ADF-Test Results – OIL, RGDP, EXRA 
A 127 
3 Model Specification 
Section 3 contains the ADF test results for OIL, RGDP and EXRA (3.1) and the 
specification estimates for the steel exporting countries (3.2) and for steel exports per export 
category (3.3). Moreover section 3 contains the t-statistics/adjustment vectors of the VECMs 
for the steel exporting countries (3.4) and the steel exports per category (3.5). 
3.1 ADF-Test Results – OIL, RGDP, EXRA 
Section 3.1 shows the ADF test results for the oil price, real GDP and exchange rate 
variables. 
Table A3.1 ADF Test Results – OIL, RGDP 
OIL RGDP
SIC 0.848 0.404
AIC 0.848 0.404
HQC 0.848 0.404
ADF Test Results
(p-values)Information 
Criteria
Table A3.2 ADF Test Results –EXRA 
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.129
AIC 0.090
HQC 0.140
SIC 0.970
AIC 0.970
HQC 0.970
SIC 0.816
AIC 0.890
HQC 0.890
SIC 0.900
AIC 0.900
HQC 0.900
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.931
AIC 0.931
HQC 0.931
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
Austria
European 
Union
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
Belgium
Finland
Estonia
Denmark
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
Ireland
Hungary
Germany
France
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.751
AIC 0.620
HQC 0.751
SIC 0.833
AIC 0.841
HQC 0.793
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.980
AIC 0.980
HQC 0.980
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
Romania SIC 0.042
AIC  0.180*
HQC 0.264*
SIC 0.812
AIC 0.889
HQC 0.889
SIC 0.977
AIC 0.977
HQC 0.977
Luxembourg
Lithuania
Latvia
Slovakia
Spain
Portugal
European 
Union
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
Italy
Poland
Netherlands
SIC 0.784
AIC 0.857
HQC 0.784
SIC 0.804
AIC 0.691
HQC 0.804
United 
Kingdom
Sweden
European 
Union
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
SIC 0.825
AIC 0.894
HQC 0.894
SIC 0.832
AIC 0.874
HQC 0.832
Switzerland
Other Europe
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
Norway
SIC 0.338
AIC 0.491
HQC 0.491
SIC 0.526
AIC 0.526
HQC 0.526
SIC 0.387
AIC 0.387
HQC 0.387
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
Algeria
Egypt
South Africa
Africa
*integrated of order 2, I(2)
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Table A3.2 ADF Test Results –EXRA (continued) 
SIC 0.877 SIC 0.393 SIC 0.912
AIC 0.932 AIC 0.292 AIC 0.912
HQC 0.877 HQC 0.393 HQC 0.912
SIC 0.880 SIC 0.211 SIC 0.007
AIC 0.880 AIC 0.493 AIC 0.027
HQC 0.880 HQC 0.211 HQC 0.007
SIC 0.366 SIC 0.391 SIC 0.366
AIC 0.456 AIC 0.391 AIC 0.366
HQC 0.366 HQC 0.391 HQC 0.366
SIC 0.618 SIC 0.155 SIC 0.019
AIC 0.586 AIC 0.155 AIC 0.019
HQC 0.618 HQC 0.155 HQC 0.019
SIC 0.003 SIC 0.000 SIC 0.302
AIC 0.036 AIC 0.000 AIC 0.302
HQC 0.036 HQC 0.000 HQC 0.302
SIC 0.125 SIC 0.625 SIC 0.298
AIC 0.125 AIC 0.885 AIC 0.154*
HQC 0.125 HQC 0.885 HQC 0.154*
SIC 0.645 SIC 0.505 SIC 0.332
AIC 0.721 AIC 0.505 AIC 0.107
HQC 0.645 HQC 0.505 HQC 0.332
SIC 0.471 SIC 0.976
AIC 0.471 AIC 0.941
HQC 0.471 HQC 0.941
SIC 0.120 South Korea SIC 0.599
AIC 0.120 SIC 0.912 AIC 0.599
HQC 0.120 AIC 0.608 HQC 0.599
HQC 0.608 SIC 0.134
SIC 0.000 AIC 0.134
AIC 0.000 HQC 0.134
HQC 0.000 SIC 0.707
SIC 0.002 SIC 0.177 AIC 0.707
AIC 0.002 AIC 0.175 HQC 0.707
HQC 0.002 HQC 0.175
SIC 0.366 SIC 0.001
AIC 0.655 AIC 0.013
HQC 0.366 HQC 0.001
SIC 0.009 SIC 0.902
AIC 0.000 AIC 0.902
HQC 0.009 HQC 0.902
SIC 0.853
*integrated of order 2, I(2) AIC 0.794
HQC 0.794
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
Australia
New Zealand
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
United Arab 
Emirates
Asia
Information 
Criteria
Japan
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
Oceania
Information 
Criteria
Russia
Ukraine
South 
America
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Uruguay
Middle East
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
Israel
Trinidad and 
Tobago
C.I.S.
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
Kazakhstan
Canada
Costa Rica
Dominican 
Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Panama
North 
America
Information 
Criteria
ADF 
Test    
(p-values)
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3.2 Model Specification – Steel Exporting Countries 
3.2.1 Stability Criteria Test Results for the VEC Models 
Section 3.2 contains tables with model specification test results.The tables are structured as 
follows:  
- The first column lists the steel exporting countries/steel product categories included 
in the analysis.  
- The second column then lists the information criteria used for unit root testing and 
lag length selection, the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC). 
- The third column lists the unit root test results for the steel import variable (QMT) 
and the fourth column lists the unit root test results for the steel import value 
variable (VALUE).  
- The fifth column lists the lag lengths suggested by the different information criteria. 
- The sixth column lists the lag length selected. 
- Column seven and eight list the number of cointegrating relationships estimated by 
using the trace test and maximum eigenvalue test. 
- The ninth column shows whether autocorrelation has been detected. If no 
autocorrelation exists in the residuals, at least at the 5% level, this is indicated by a 
dash. If autocorrelation has been detected and could not be removed by adding 
additional lags, the test result indicating serial correlation and the lag length where 
serial correlation might exist are listed. 
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3.2.2 European Union 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  EU
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.009 0.797 1
AIC 0.035 0.945 3, 10, 11, 15 2
HQC 0.009 0.945 3
SIC 0.000 0.015 1, 3
AIC 0.138 0.180 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.072 3 (AIC)
SIC 0.020 0.062 1
AIC 0.020 0.062 3 1
HQC 0.020 0.062 3
SIC 0.000 0.685 1
AIC 0.005 0.834 2, 3, 13, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.696 3
SIC 0.209 0.010 1
AIC 0.209 0.010 3 3
HQC 0.209 0.010 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.012 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.001 0.004 3
SIC 0.047 0.027 1
AIC 0.655 0.027 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.047 0.027 3 (AIC)
SIC 0.186 0.138 1
AIC 0.476  0.082* 3, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.212 0.289 3
SIC 0.000 0.408 1
AIC 0.000 0.408 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.408 3
SIC 0.030 0.001 1
AIC 0.030 0.001 3, 15 1
HQC 0.030 0.001 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
SIC 0.003 0.550 1
AIC 0.032 0.729 10, 11, 12, 14, 5 3
HQC 0.003 0.729 3
SIC 0.318 0.000 1, 2
AIC 0.318 0.233 4, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.318 0.084 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
3 3  -
2 1  -9
1 1  -
1 1
0  -
3  -
1  -
2  -
0
 -
2 2  -
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech 
Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
10
2
4
1  -
3 1  -
Italy
11
 -
Latvia
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
Lag Length
Ireland
Estonia
Country
Information 
Criteria
15
10
8
5
8
3
 -
2
3
4
2
3
2
3 0
10
13
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3.2.3 Other Europe 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model -   Other Europe
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.000 0.041 1
AIC 0.003 0.506 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.451 3
SIC 0.000 0.523 1
AIC 0.312 0.523 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.523 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
1
 -
 -
Auto-
correlation 
2
2
2
Cointegration RelationsLag Length
14
3
Norway
Switzerland
Country
Information 
Criteria
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  EU (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 3
AIC 0.000 0.000 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3, 14
SIC 0.000 0.917 1
AIC 0.000 0.995 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.995 3
SIC 0.000 0.002 1
AIC 0.001 0.002 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.001 0.002 3
SIC 0.005 0.000 1
AIC 0.005 0.000 3, 10, 11, 15 2
HQC 0.005 0.000 3
SIC 0.177 0.001 1
AIC 0.177 0.016 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.177 0.001 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.008 0.002 4, 15 1
HQC 0.008 0.002 3
SIC 0.977 0.002 1
AIC 0.977 0.002 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.977 0.002 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.585 0.143 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.585 0.012 3
SIC 0.010 0.697 1
AIC 0.194 0.914 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.194 0.914 3
SIC 0.000 0.352 1
AIC 0.000 0.352 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.352 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
2 2  -
3 0  -
1 0
3 1  -
2 2  -
12
14
 0.0066 (lag 
12)
ADF Test Results
2 0  -
2 1  -
2 2  -
3
11
10
15
14
4
(p-values)
2 1  -
9
10
1 0  -
Spain
Sweden
United 
Kingdom
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Lithuania
Country
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3.2.4 C.I.S. 
3.2.5 North America 
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  C.I.S.
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.007 0.000 2
AIC 0.007 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.007 0.000 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.015 3, 4, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.015 3
SIC 0.015 0.599 1, 2
AIC 0.015 0.950 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.015 0.599 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
1
1
1
Lag Length
15
8
13
0
0
1
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
 0.0266 (lag 15)
 -
 -
Kazakhstan
Russia
Ukraine
Country
Information 
Criteria
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  North America
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.067 0.917 1
AIC 0.875 1.000 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.067 1.000 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.014 0.000 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
SIC 0.033 0.187 1
AIC 0.033 0.661 4, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.033 0.187 3
SIC 0.002 0.002 1
AIC 0.110 0.098 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.002 0.098 3 (AIC)
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
SIC 0.030 0.016 1
AIC 0.030 0.016 3, 15 1
HQC 0.030 0.016 3
SIC 0.000 0.833 1
AIC 0.000 0.796 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.645 3
SIC 0.000 0.891 1, 13
AIC 0.000 0.891 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.891 8, 13, 15
SIC 0.074 0.000 1
AIC 0.542 0.010 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.074 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
 0.0458 (lag 1)
Costa Rica
0.0266 (lag 5) 
0.0459 (lag 6)
0.0495 (lag 4) 
0.0205 (lag 6)
12 2 1
10 3 1
3 1 1  -
11 3
13 4 2  -
 -
13 4 2  -
10 1 1
3  -
15 2 2
15 4 4  -
Auto-
correlation 
Cointegration Relations
Country
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Canada
Dominican 
Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Mexico
Honduras
Panama
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3.2.6 South America 
3.2.7 Africa 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  South America
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.046 0.000 2
AIC 0.276 0.002 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.046 0.000 3 (AIC)
SIC 0.000 0.105 1
AIC 0.012 0.340 3, 10, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.012 0.105 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.010 7, 9, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
SIC 0.000 0.981 2
AIC 0.000 0.981 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.981 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 2
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 4, 14 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.534 3, 12, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3 (AIC)
SIC 0.012 0.038 1
AIC 0.267 0.524 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.012 0.038 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
3 1 1  -
3 2 2  -
3 1 1  0.0471 (lag 1)
9 2 2  -
9 2 2  -
10 1 1  0.0480 (lag 1)
8 2 2  -
Auto-
correlation 
Cointegration Relations
Country
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  Africa
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3, 14
SIC 0.008 0.036 1
AIC 0.004 0.375 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.008 0.036 3 (AIC)
SIC 0.000 0.001 1
AIC 0.120 0.001 3, 15 1
HQC 0.120 0.001 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
1
2
1
Lag Length
14
15
8
1
2
1
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
 -
 -
 -
Algeria
Egypt
South Africa
Country
Information 
Criteria
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3.2.8 Middle East 
3.2.9 Asia 
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  Asia
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.729 0.998 2
AIC 0.729 0.155* 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.729 0.998 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.272 0.366 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 (AIC)
SIC 0.096 0.997 2
AIC 0.172 0.999 3, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.096 0.997 3
SIC 0.147 0.000 1
AIC 0.176 0.426 3, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.176 0.000 3 (AIC)
SIC 0.000 0.145 1
AIC 0.000 0.845 3, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.145 3
SIC 0.009 0.025 1
AIC 0.053 0.122 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.009 0.122 3, 14, 15
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.042 0.061 4, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
SIC 0.000 0.003 1
AIC 0.001 0.003 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.003 3
South Korea SIC 0.019 0.940 2
AIC 0.019 0.978 3, 4, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.019 0.940 3
SIC 0.053 0.345 1
AIC 0.101 0.345 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.101 0.345 3
SIC 0.009 0.215 1
AIC 0.009 0.215 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.009 0.215 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
3 2 2  -
6 1 0  -
12 3 3  -
 -
3 1 1  -
12 1 1
3 3 1
1  -
14 3 1 0.0045 (lag 6)
Thailand
Taiwan
Singapore
Malaysia
Cointegration RelationsLag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
Indonesia
Japan
Philippines
India
China
Hong Kong
Country
Information 
Criteria
Auto-
correlation 
 0.0011 (lag 5)  
0.0070 (lag 11)
4 1 2  -
3 3 3
14 3 3  -
 -
13 3
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  Middle East
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
SIC 0.075 0.080 1
AIC 0.075 0.068 4, 11, 12, 15 3
HQC 0.075 0.080 3
SIC 0.000 1.000 1
AIC 0.408 0.918* 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.408 1.000 4 (HQC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
14 4 1
Cointegration Relations
 -
11 3 1  -
Auto-
correlation 
Israel
United Arab 
Emirates
Saudi Arabia
Country
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
Turkey
3 1 0  -
3
 -
1 1
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3.2.10 Oceania 
Stability Criteria VEC Model -  Oceania
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
SIC 0.004 0.846 1
AIC 0.039 0.965 3, 10, 11, 15 2
HQC 0.039 0.846 3
SIC 0.000 0.045 1
AIC 0.001 0.129 3 3
HQC 0.001 0.045 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
New Zealand
Australia
Country
Information 
Criteria
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
10
5
Lag Length Auto-
correlation 
Cointegration Relations
 0.0454 (lag 5)
 -
2
3
0
0
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories  
3.3.1 European Union 
3.3.1.1 Belgium 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Belgium
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.006 0.170 1
AIC 0.136 0.127 5, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.006 0.477 3 (AIC)
1B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.004 0.018 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
3 SIC 0.208 0.162 1
AIC 0.039 0.162 3, 15 4
HQC 0.208 0.162 3
4 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6A SIC 0.028 0.435 3
AIC 0.028 0.435 3, 11, 12, 13, 15 1
HQC 0.028 0.435 3
6B SIC 0.003 0.016 1
AIC 0.003 0.016 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.003 0.016 3
7 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 1, 3
8 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
14 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.000 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.001 0.000 3
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.331 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.331 3, 15
15 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
 -
1
4 415
Cointegration Relations
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
5
12
4
14
2
3
Auto-
correlation 
2 0  -
 -1
2 2  -
4 1 0.0021 (lag 8)
3
5
10
3
 -
1   -
1 1  -
3
2 2
2 2  -
2 1  -
 -11
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Belgium (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
16 SIC 0.016 0.030 1
AIC 0.104 0.030 3 2
HQC 0.104 0.030 3
17 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
18 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
19 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
20 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.127 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3 (AIC)
21A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21CD SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
23 SIC 0.775 0.031 1
AIC 0.431 0.031 5, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.431 0.031 3
28 SIC 0.050 0.046 1
AIC 0.008 0.017 10, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.013 0.017 3
29 SIC 0.001 0.001 1
AIC 0.011 0.001 3, 11, 12, 15 2
HQC 0.001 0.001 3
29A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
31 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
32 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.234 0.152 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.234 0.000 3 (HQC)
33A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.007 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
33B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.130 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.130 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
3
5
4
13
5
14
3
4
3
 -
3
1
1
2
9
4
5
11
4
3
4
5 2
2  -
22
 -
 -
 -
 -
2
2
1
2
2 2
2 2
1
1
4
1
1
 -
 -22
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
2 2  -
 -
1 1  -
 -22
1
2 2
 -
 -
 -
 -
22
 -
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3.3.1.2 France 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Belgium (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
34 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.024 0.066 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.001 3 (AIC)
35 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
36 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.009 0.000 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.009 0.000 3
37 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
13
15
15
5
2 0  -
0.0092 (lag 2)
 -
 -2
1
2
1
2 2
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / France
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
3 SIC 0.000 0.004 1
AIC 0.000 0.053 3, 12, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.053 3
4 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.002 0.000 5, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.002 0.000 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.096 1
AIC 0.000 0.640 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.096 3
6B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.101 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.001 0.000 3
7 SIC 0.125 0.027 1
AIC 0.228 0.071 3, 9, 11, 15 4
HQC 0.125 0.027 3 (AIC)
14 SIC 0.034 0.000 1
AIC 0.034 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.034 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
0
Auto-
correlation 
 0.0453 (lag 8)
4
0  -
2  -
2
1
2
 -4
2  -
1  -
2
1
15
Cointegration Relations
12
5
3
2  -2
ADF Test Results
(p-values)Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
2
3
9
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / France (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.122 0.343 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.122 0.058 3
16 SIC 0.000 0.217 1
AIC 0.070 0.217 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.217 3
17 SIC 0.000 0.042 1
AIC 0.000 0.042 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.042 3
18 SIC 0.178 0.001 1
AIC 0.081 0.104 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.081 0.104 3
19 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.007 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
20 SIC 0.000 0.024 1
AIC 0.056 0.024 3, 4, 5, 7, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.024 3 (AIC)
21A SIC 0.001 0.201 2, 3
AIC 0.081 0.201 5, 11, 12, 15 2
HQC 0.001 0.201 3
21B SIC 0.000 0.005 1
AIC 0.000 0.730 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.730 3
21CD SIC 0.000 0.397 1
AIC 0.000 0.799 4, 11, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.397 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 3
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
22A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.003 0.000 3, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.003 0.000 3
23 SIC 0.214 0.171 1
AIC 0.214 0.171 3, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.214 0.171 3
28 SIC 0.481 0.222 2, 3
AIC 0.481 0.455 3, 5, 12, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.481 0.455 3
29 SIC 0.528 0.600 1
AIC 0.528 0.600 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.528 0.600 3
29A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
31 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.930 0.003 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.012 0.003 3 (AIC)
32 SIC 0.095 0.081 1
AIC 0.632 0.081 3, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.095 0.081 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
 -
1  -
1
1
2  -2
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
1
 -
1  -
3
2
0  -
1  -
3
1
1
 -
1  -
1
1
1  -
2  -
1
4
1
 -
2  -
2
2
3  -
0  -
5
3
0
0  -
1  -
2
3
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
3
7
8
4
4
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
7
14
13
8
7
12
3
13
5
3
4
Lag Length
13
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3.3.1.3 Germany 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / France (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
33A SIC 0.0559 0.3462 2
AIC 0.3565 0.8102 6, 15 2
HQC 0.0559 0.8102 3
34 SIC 0.0000 0.0000 1
AIC 0.0000 0.0000 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0000 3
35 SIC 0.0001 0.0000 1
AIC 0.0001 0.0000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0001 0.0000 3
36 SIC 0.0000 0.0000 1
AIC 0.0000 0.0000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0000 3
37 SIC 0.0228 0.0044 1
AIC 0.0596 0.0470 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.0596 0.0470 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
 -2
 -
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
1
 -
1
2
1  -
1  -
1
1
1
2
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
3
2
3
7
5
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Germany
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.029 5, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.029 3
1B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.005 0.000 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
3 SIC 0.000 0.003 2
AIC 0.019 0.124 3, 4, 14 2
HQC 0.019 0.003 3 (AIC)
4 SIC 0.021 0.000 1
AIC 0.021 0.001 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.021 0.000 3
5 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.065 0.000 3, 12, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3 (AIC)
6A SIC 0.000 0.578 1
AIC 0.000 0.578 3, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.578 3
6B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.193 0.000 10, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.003 0.000 3
7 SIC 0.012 0.000 1, 2
AIC 0.259 0.000 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.162 0.000 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Information 
Criteria
Product 
Category
2
12
5
2
4
5
12
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values) Auto-
correlation 
2 2  -
15
2 2  -
2 2  -
 -
  -
2
3 1
1 0
2  -
2 1  -
2 2  -
Cointegration Relations
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Germany (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
8 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
9 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
14 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.673 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.489 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.489 3
15 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.323 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3 (AIC)
16 SIC 0.386 0.864 1
AIC 0.386 0.872 3, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.386 0.864 3
17 SIC 0.004 0.844 1
AIC 0.509 0.873 3, 15 3
HQC 0.004 0.844 3
18 SIC 0.000 0.030 1
AIC 0.475 0.953 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.953 3
19 SIC 0.003 0.382 1
AIC 0.022 0.382 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.003 0.382 3
20 SIC 0.006 0.279 1
AIC 0.025 0.279 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.006 0.279 3
21A SIC 0.000 0.886 1
AIC 0.041 0.797 3, 15 2
HQC 0.004 0.886 3
21B SIC 0.000 0.791 1
AIC 0.224 0.791 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.791 3 (AIC)
21CD SIC 0.000 0.345 1
AIC 0.079 0.858 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.007 0.520 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.011 1
AIC 0.000 0.011 3, 14 2
HQC 0.000 0.011 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
Information 
Criteria
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
2 0  -
1 1
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
11
7
13
5
3
11
5
3
7
3
11
3
4
14
1 1
3 3
2 1
2 2
3 0
2 2
2 0
3 2  -
1 1  -
 -
1 1  -
1 1 0.0452 (lag 1)
 -
3 1  -
 -
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Germany (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
22A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
23 SIC 0.000 0.048 1
AIC 0.000 0.048 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.048 3
28 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.074 0.179 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.179 3
29 SIC 0.013 0.015 2
AIC 0.033 0.068 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.033 0.015 3
29A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.003 0.029 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.029 3
31 SIC 0.001 0.125 1
AIC 0.001 0.021 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.001 0.125 3
32 SIC 0.460 0.000 1
AIC 0.329 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.460 0.000 3
33A SIC 0.031 0.019 1
AIC 0.075 0.033 7, 10, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.075 0.033 3 (AIC)
33B SIC 0.000 0.073 1
AIC 0.004 0.453 4, 5, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.073 3
34 SIC 0.000 0.905 1
AIC 0.012 0.801 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.801 3
35 SIC 0.000 0.078 1
AIC 0.000 0.528 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.078 3
36 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.684 0.000 8, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.684 0.000 3 (AIC)
37 SIC 0.600 0.651 1
AIC 0.600 0.780 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.600 0.780 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
Information 
Criteria
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
8
3
4
3
13
3
6
3
3
2
7
4
15
2 1  -
2 0  -
3 0
1 1  -
1 1  -
2 0  -
1 1
2 1  -
2 1  -
2 2  -
 -
1 1  -
1 0  -
 -
2 2  -
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3.3.1.4 Italy 
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Italy
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.593 0.999 1
AIC 0.593 0.999 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.593 0.999 3
1B SIC 0.001 0.005 1
AIC 0.069 0.177 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.014 0.000 3  (AIC)
3 SIC 0.047 0.064 1
AIC 0.006 0.032 3 2
HQC 0.047 0.064 3  (AIC)
4 SIC 0.039 0.011 1
AIC 0.018 0.011 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.018 0.011 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.002 1
AIC 0.081 0.002 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.107 0.002 3
6B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
7 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
14 SIC 0.008 0.001 1
AIC 0.008 0.336 3, 15 2
HQC 0.008 0.336 3
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 6, 13 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
15 SIC 0.045 0.027 1
AIC 0.065 0.068 3, 13, 15 1
HQC 0.011 0.068 3
16 SIC 0.059 0.772 1
AIC 0.116 0.895 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.059 0.772 3
17 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.424 0.334 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.424 0.334 3
18 SIC 0.015 0.394 1
AIC 0.015 0.982 3, 12, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.015 0.394 3
19 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 6, 11, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
20 SIC 0.377 0.707 1
AIC 0.377 0.910 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.377 0.977 3
21A SIC 0.043 0.944 1
AIC 0.043 0.999 5, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.043 0.999 3
21B SIC 0.039 0.596 1
AIC 0.039 0.920 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.039 0.596 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
5
13
3
12
3
14
14
Lag Length Auto-
correlation 
3 3  -
3
1 0  -
1 1  -
1
2 2  -
2 2  -
1 1 0.0456 (lag 8)
1 1  -
3 0.0432 (lag 3)
2 2  -
3
4
5
13
10
11
15
11
11
12
1 1  -
3 1  -
1  -
2 2  -
2 1  -
1 0  -
1 1  -
3 3  -
ADF Test Results
(p-values) Cointegration Relations
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Italy (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
21CD SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.463 3, 13, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.463 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
22A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.327 3, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.327 3
23 SIC 0.598 0.716 1
AIC 0.722 0.716 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.426 0.716 3
31 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 10, 11, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
32 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.045 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.001 3
33A SIC 0.366 0.258 1
AIC 0.747 0.713 3, 15 2
HQC 0.366 0.258 3
34 SIC 0.195 0.184 1
AIC 0.049 0.054 6, 11, 12, 15 3
HQC 0.195 0.184 3  (AIC)
35 SIC 0.385 0.001 3
AIC 0.141 0.559 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.385 0.293 3
36 SIC 0.000 0.054 1, 3
AIC 0.040 0.092 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.054 3
37 SIC 0.195 0.128 1, 2
AIC 0.000 0.507 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.507 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
3
13
3
11
11
13
7
12
5
10
3 1  -
1 0  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
2 1  -
4 1  -
4 2  -
2 0  -
3 1  -
2 1  -
1
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3.3.1.5 Netherlands 
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Netherlands
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
3 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
4 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.065 0.000 3, 10, 11, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.003 0.000 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.003 0.000 5
6B SIC 0.000 0.005 1
AIC 0.041 0.041 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.041 0.005 3
14 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.061 0.000 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
14A SIC 0.082 0.083 1, 3
AIC 0.082 0.083 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.082 0.083 4, 7, 8
16 SIC 0.000 0.442 1
AIC 0.000 0.442 4, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.442 3
17 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.022 0.248 3, 6, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.022 0.051 3 (AIC)
18 SIC 0.000 0.030 1                   
AIC 0.394 0.086 5, 15 2 
HQC 0.074 0.030 4
19 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
20 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 5, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21CD SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 2
AIC 0.000 0.314 6, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
22A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
1 1  -
1 1  -
3 1  -
2 2 0.0444 (lag 4)
2 2  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
2 2  -
2 2
4 2  -
3 1  -
3 1  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
3 1  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Auto-
correlation 
Cointegration Relations
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
14
14
5
3
11
4
6
5
5
12
5
3
14
4
2
4
13
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
A 146 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Netherlands (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
23 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.048 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
28 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
29 SIC 0.000 0.444 1
AIC 0.686 0.742 3 2
HQC 0.308 0.444 3 (AIC)
29A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.125 0.000 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
31 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
32 SIC 0.009 0.003 1
AIC 0.087 0.003 3, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.087 0.003 3
33A SIC 0.000 0.001 1
AIC 0.000 0.001 3, 10, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.001 3
34 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.001 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
37 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.000 3, 10, 11, 12, 15 2
HQC 0.001 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
2 2  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
2 2  -
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
2 1  -
1 1  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
10
4
3
7
4
3
3
5
3
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
A 147 
3.3.1.6 Spain 
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Spain
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1B SIC 0.126 0.041 1
AIC 0.126 0.230 3, 15 2
HQC 0.126 0.230 3
3 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.003 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
4 SIC 0.003 0.000 1
AIC 0.003 0.001 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.003 0.001 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6B SIC 0.163 0.016 1
AIC 0.163 0.033 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.163 0.016 3
7 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.175 0.607 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.175 0.002 3  (AIC)
8 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
14 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.098 0.105 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.105 3 (HQC)
14A SIC 0.002 0.218 3
AIC 0.000 0.234 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.002 0.218 3
16 SIC 0.008 0.001 1
AIC 0.065 0.166 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.065 0.012 3
17 SIC 0.000 0.014 1
AIC 0.027 0.087 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.027 0.087 3  (AIC)
18 SIC 0.000 0.018 1
AIC 0.000 0.018 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.018 3
19 SIC 0.000 0.596 1
AIC 0.000 0.952 3, 6, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.952 3
20 SIC 0.146 0.236 3
AIC 0.036 0.236 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.146 0.236 3
21A SIC 0.000 0.139 1
AIC 0.000 0.139 3, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.139 3
21B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.561 0.394 5, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.000 3  (AIC)
21CD SIC 0.000 0.063 1
AIC 0.000 0.995 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.063 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 6, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
2 2  -
3 3  -
2 0  0.0028 (lag 7)
2 2  -
3 1  -
1 1  -
3 3  -
1 1  -
2 0  -
2 0  -
2 1  -
3 2  -
1 1  -
 -
1 1  -
1 1
 -
2 2  -
Auto-
correlation 
2 2  -
1 1
Cointegration RelationsProduct 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
4
3
4
3
3
10
3
3
3
13
7
3
5
12
5
5
6
5
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Spain (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
22A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
23 SIC 0.000 0.031 1
AIC 0.000 0.031 3, 10, 11, 12, 14 1
HQC 0.000 0.031 3
29 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 2, 3
31 SIC 0.001 0.000 1
AIC 0.234 0.522 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.234 0.000 3
32 SIC 0.190 0.184 1
AIC 0.460 0.586 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.460 0.184 3
33A SIC 0.322 0.275 1
AIC 0.651 0.615 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.651 0.615 3
33B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.173 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
34 SIC 0.000 0.000 3
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 10, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
37 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
1 1  -
2 1  -
3 3  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
2 2  -
1 1  -9
11
4
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
3
3
10
3
9
12
Appendix: 3 Model Specification 
3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
A 149 
3.3.2 C.I.S. 
3.3.2.1 Russia 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Russia
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.002 0.001 3, 4 1
HQC 0.000 0.001 3
3 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.118 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3 (AIC)
4 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 9, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.102 2
AIC 0.010 0.760 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.102 3
6B SIC 0.163 0.016 1
AIC 0.163 0.033 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.163 0.016 3
14 SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 2
AIC 0.001 0.000 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.001 0.000 3
15 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 2, 3
16 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.573 8, 11, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3 (AIC)
17 SIC 0.000 0.006 1
AIC 0.000 0.357 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.006 3
18 SIC 0.283 0.348 1
AIC 0.283 0.907 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.283 0.348 3, 15
19 SIC 0.027 0.036 1
AIC 0.538 0.261 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.027 0.261 3 (AIC)
20 SIC 0.559 0.647 1
AIC 0.737 0.848 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.559 0.647 3
21A SIC 0.003 0.008 1
AIC 0.407 0.355 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.134 0.008 3
23 SIC 0.009 0.001 1
AIC 0.009 0.019 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.009 0.019 3
31 SIC 0.002 0.002 1
AIC 0.002 0.009 8, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.002 0.001 3
32 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.007 0.039 3, 8, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.015 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
 -
1 0  -
2 2  -
1 0  -
1 0
 -
1 1  -
1 1  -
3 2  -
3 3
 -
 -
1 1  -
2 2  -
2 2
1 1
 -
2 1  -
1 0  -
2 2 0.0421 (lag 2)
1 0
Auto-
correlation 
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
7
6
3
14
8
11
9
8
8
4
12
4
7
15
12
3
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
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3.3.2.2 Ukraine 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Russia (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
33A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.000 3, 8, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
35 SIC 0.020 0.234 1
AIC 0.200 0.837 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.020 0.234 3
37 SIC 0.000 0.000 2
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
0  -
1 0  -
2 1  -
15
3
8
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Ukraine
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1B SIC 0.0127 0.4424 1, 2, 3
AIC 0.2803 0.9130 5, 11, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0127 0.4424 3
3 SIC 0.3638 0.3858 1, 2, 3
AIC 0.7068 0.7015 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.6977 0.6950 3, 4, 15
4 SIC 0.0000 0.0000 3, 4
AIC 0.0000 0.0000 7, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0000 3, 4, 5
6A SIC 0.0000 0.0017 1
AIC 0.0000 0.0017 4, 5, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0017 3
6B SIC 0.0315 0.0099 2, 3
AIC 0.1654 0.1208 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.1654 0.0167 3, 10, 12, 14, 15
14 SIC 0.0019 0.0043 3
AIC 0.1343 0.1059 5, 6, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0183 0.0043 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
1 1 0.0037 (lag 3)
1 1  -
0.0047 (lag 8) 
0.0230 (lag 9)
1 0  -
1  -
2 2 0.0140 (lag 4)
1
1 0
Auto-
correlation 
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
15
3
10
12
15
11
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Ukraine (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
16 SIC 0.158 0.339 1, 2, 3
AIC 0.281 0.339 5, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.158 0.339 3, 5
17 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 9, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
18 SIC 0.001 0.006 1, 2, 3
AIC 0.016 0.268 4, 15 1
HQC 0.016 0.006 3
21A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.036 0.153 4, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.153 3
21B SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 2
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 4, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21CD SIC 0.968 1.000 1
AIC 0.996 1.000 6, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.968 1.000  
1
5, 6
22A SIC 0.000 0.066 1
AIC 0.000 0.999 3, 4, 5, 15 1
HQC 0.000 1.000 3
31 SIC 0.033 0.033 2
AIC 0.033 0.033 10 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.033 0.033 4
32 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
 -
1 1
0.0455 (lag 2) 
0.0360 (lag 3)
 -1 0
1 0
 -
1 1  -
1 1 0.0153 (lag 14)
1 1
1 1  -
1 1  -
 -1 1
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
3
15
4
3
14
3
5
3
3
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
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3.3.3 North America 
3.3.3.1 Canada 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Canada
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.362 0.342 1
AIC 0.292 0.342 3, 5, 15 3
HQC 0.362 0.342 3
1B SIC 0.132 0.999 1
AIC 0.683 0.869* 3, 12, 13, 15 2
HQC 0.683 0.999 3
3 SIC 0.167 0.873  
0
1
AIC 0.107* 0.873 4, 12, 13, 15 4
HQC 0.167 0.873 3
4 SIC 0.000 0.175 1
AIC 0.000 0.432 3 1
HQC 0.002 0.432 3
5 SIC 0.060 0.000 1
AIC 0.060 0.000 3, 15 2
HQC 0.060 0.000 3
6A SIC 0.210 0.872 1
AIC 0.210 1.000 3, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.210 0.999 3
6B SIC 0.398 0.998 1
AIC 0.994 0.098* 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.398 1.000 3
7 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
8 SIC 0.000 0.274 1
AIC 0.000 0.960 3, 11, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.947 3
9 SIC 0.000 0.001 1
AIC 0.000 0.013 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.001 3
14 SIC 0.331 0.103 1
AIC 0.889 0.620 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.331 0.103 3
14A SIC 0.000 0.404 1
AIC 0.002 0.404 3 2
HQC 0.000 0.404 3, 13, 14, 15
15 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.456 0.510 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.307 0.510 3 (AIC)
16 SIC 0.868 0.228 1
AIC 0.868 0.228 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.868 0.228 3
17 SIC 0.006 0.001 1
AIC 0.006 0.001 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.006 0.001 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
Lag Length Auto-
correlation 
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
1
4
6
12
12
3
5
4  -
1  -
3  -
2  0.0435 (lag 9)
6 2
4
1
2
3
2
3
2
 -
3 1  -
1  -
4 0  -
1
 - 
 -
 -
 -
 -
11 1  -
3 1  -
2
2
1
1
6 1
7 1
12
14
2
0
3
ADF Test Results
(p-values) Cointegration Relations
1
2
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
A 153 
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Canada (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
18 SIC 0.043 0.987 1
AIC 0.132 0.547* 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.043 0.987 3
19 SIC 0.393 0.682 1
AIC 0.999 1.000 3, 8, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.393 0.871 3
20 SIC 0.002 0.051 1, 2
AIC 0.002 0.607 3, 11, 12, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.002 0.051 3
21A SIC 0.023 0.067 1
AIC 0.052* 0.181* 3, 15 1
HQC 0.052* 0.055* 3
21B SIC 0.287 0.000 1
AIC 0.287 0.586 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.287 0.000 3 (AIC)
21CD SIC 0.360 0.992 1
AIC 0.535 0.978 3, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 3
HQC 0.360 0.360 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.015 1
AIC 0.295 0.983 3, 11, 12, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.102 3 (AIC)
22A SIC 0.004 0.759 1
AIC 0.284 0.866 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.759 0.759 3 (AIC)
22B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 8, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
28 SIC 0.002 0.000 1
AIC 0.029 0.052 3 2
HQC 0.029 0.052 3 (AIC)
29 SIC 0.577 0.853 1
AIC 0.726 0.906 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.726 0.853 3
29A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.505 0.881 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.881 3
31 SIC 0.076 1.000 1, 2
AIC 0.834 1.000 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.834 1.000 3
32 SIC 0.005 0.028 1
AIC 0.005 0.126 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.005 0.028 3 (AIC)
33A SIC 0.000 0.297 1
AIC 0.001 0.769 3, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.001 0.297 3
33B SIC 0.098 0.233 1
AIC 0.098 0.811 3, 15 2
HQC 0.098 0.233 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
 -
 -
2
1
2
4
3
 -
 -
 -
 -1
2
2
3
3
3
2
1  -
3
8
8 0
 -
2  -
1
 -2
1  -
 -1
1  -
2
 -
10 2  -
8 0
11 2
 0.0446 (lag 3)3
3
3
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
4
3
2
12
2
4
12
0
2
14 2
8
2
1
1
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
A 154 
3.3.3.2 Mexico 
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Canada (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
34 SIC 0.580 0.428 1
AIC 0.721 0.482 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.580 0.428 3
35 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
36 SIC 0.009 0.032 1
AIC 0.009 0.032 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.009 0.032 3
37 SIC 0.004 0.000 1
AIC 0.290 0.016 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.360 0.016 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
3
1  -
0  -
3
3
1  -
 -11
1
1
8 1
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Mexico
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.082 0.074 3, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.082 0.074 3 (AIC)
1B SIC 0.000 0.674 1, 2
AIC 0.004 0.674 3, 4, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.013 0.674 3
3 SIC 0.214 0.174 1
AIC 0.719 0.588 3, 4, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.719 0.139 3
4 SIC 0.700 1.000 1
AIC 0.993 1.000 10, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.993 1.000 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6B SIC 0.004 0.143 1
AIC 0.010 0.066 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.038 0.066 3
8 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 11, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
9 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 4, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
1
1
4
3
1
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
1
1
0.0494 (lag 13)
 0.0492 (lag 8)
2
0
 -
 -
 -
 -11
4
1
4
3
10
2
15
10
111
ADF Test Results
(p-values) Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
Lag Length
 0.0325 (lag 8)
 -
14
11
1
1
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
A 155 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Mexico (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
14 SIC 0.103 0.573 1
AIC 0.387 0.614 3, 15 1
HQC 0.103 0.573 2, 3
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.143 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3 (AIC)
15 SIC 0.009 0.551 1
AIC 0.063 0.787 4, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.009 0.551 3 (AIC)
16 SIC 0.006 0.000 1
AIC 0.006 0.003 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.006 0.003 3
17 SIC 0.000 0.820 1
AIC 0.000 0.820 4, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.820 3
18 SIC 0.000 0.221 1
AIC 0.000 0.642 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.642 3
20 SIC 0.000 0.898 2
AIC 0.000 0.898 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.898 3
21A SIC 0.003 0.920 1
AIC 0.276 0.920 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.003 0.920 3 (AIC)
21B SIC 0.006 0.000 1
AIC 0.170 0.000 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.006 0.000 3
21CD SIC 0.000 0.188 1
AIC 0.038 0.682 3, 4, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.188 3
21E SIC 0.007 0.001 1
AIC 0.007 0.001 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.007 0.001 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
5 1
2
2
1
1 0
1
1
4 0
13
3
13
4
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
13
3
12
1
2
1
1
1
1
 -
 -
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
6
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3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
A 156 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Mexico (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
22A SIC 0.112 0.451 1
AIC 0.112 0.620 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.112 0.451 3
22B SIC 0.202 0.333 1
AIC 0.310 0.324 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.310 0.324 3
23 SIC 0.600 0.887 1
AIC 0.600 0.887 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.600 0.887 3, 15
28 SIC 0.353 0.291 1
AIC 0.001 0.291 4 1
HQC 0.353 0.291 3 (AIC)
29 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 9, 10, 11, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 1, 3
31 SIC 0.004 0.015 1
AIC 0.000 0.002 3, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.015 3
32 SIC 0.000 0.317 1
AIC 0.001 0.552 1, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.317 1
33A SIC 0.159 0.013 1
AIC 0.525 0.086 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.309 0.086 3
33B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
34 SIC 0.033 0.596 1
AIC 0.353 0.684 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.240 0.596 3 (AIC)
35 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
36 SIC 0.018 0.583 1
AIC 0.003 0.709 4, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.018 0.709 3
37 SIC 0.000 0.883 1
AIC 0.000 0.999 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.883 1, 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
12 2
15 1
4 01
2
2
12 1
3 0
7 1
1
1
3 1
1
1
9 0
9 0
1
1
5 1
4
3
1
1
1
2
1
 -
 -
 -
3 02
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
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3.3.4 South America (Brazil) 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Brazil
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
1B SIC 0.036 0.000 1
AIC 0.036 0.014 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.036 0.000 3
3 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.564 0.195 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.195 3
4 SIC 0.008 0.000 1
AIC 0.204 0.250 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.204 0.250 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.009 1
AIC 0.000 0.111 3, 4, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.111 3
6B SIC 0.006 0.004 1
AIC 0.528 0.004 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.528 0.004 3
9 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.484 0.157 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.157 3 (HQC)
14 SIC 0.000 0.922 1
AIC 0.000 1.000 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.922 3
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.146 0.071* 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.099* 3
15 SIC 0.000 0.009 1
AIC 0.000 0.009 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.009 3
16 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.000 4, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
17 SIC 0.003 0.854 1
AIC 0.003 0.917 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.003 0.854 3
18 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
19 SIC 0.518 0.722 1, 2, 3
AIC 0.229 0.722 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.518 0.722 3
20 SIC 0.017 0.084 1
AIC 0.031 0.084 8, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.017 0.084 3
21A SIC 0.002 0.003 1, 2
AIC 0.002 0.710 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.002 0.003 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
15
9
15
10
15
Auto-
correlation 
3
3
15
1
1
1
0.0326 (lag  6) 
0.0000 (lag 14)
 -
3 1  -
1
0  -
3  -
3 1  -
Cointegration Relations
8
7
9
15
3
3
13
9
1
2 0
1
3 1
1
2  -
1 0  -
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
0.0192 (lag 6) 
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 0  -
2 2  -
1  -
2
 -
2 2  -
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Brazil (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
21B SIC 0.004 0.084 1
AIC 0.004 0.084 3, 8, 15 2
HQC 0.004 0.084 3
21CD SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.003 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.003 3
21E SIC 0.001 0.002 2, 3
AIC 0.001 0.000 9, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.001 0.000 3
22A SIC 0.186 0.168 1
AIC 0.338 0.334 8, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.186 0.046 3, 4
23 SIC 0.000 0.003 1
AIC 0.005 0.003 3, 14 1
HQC 0.000 0.003 3
28 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
29 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.012 0.006 3, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.006 3
29A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
31 SIC 0.004 0.007 1
AIC 0.149 0.010 3, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.149 0.007 3
33A SIC 0.024 0.043 1
AIC 0.024 0.138 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.024 0.043 3 (AIC)
33B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.134 0.000 3, 13, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
34 SIC 0.239 0.242 1
AIC 0.291 0.288 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.239 0.242 3
35 SIC 0.001 0.000 3
AIC 0.979 0.545 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.979 0.545 3, 15 (AIC)
36 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3, 15
37 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.006 0.004 8, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
15
12
8
4
3
4
7
1 1
3
2
12
6
3
3
3
15
4
1 1
11
 -
1  -2
3 1  -
1  -
0.0295 (lag 3)4
01  -
11  -
 -
 -1 1
0.0476 (lag 2)
2  -
1  -
1  -3
1
0
1
 -0
 -1
1
3
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
Appendix: 3 Model Specification 
3.3 Model Specification – Steel Export Categories 
A 159 
3.3.5 Africa (South Africa) 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / South Africa
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
3 SIC 0.022 0.044 1
AIC 0.114 0.148 3, 15 1
HQC 0.114 0.044 3
4 SIC 0.310 0.293 1
AIC 0.485 0.293 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.485 0.293 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.049 1
AIC 0.272 0.312 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.272 0.312 3 (AIC)
6B SIC 0.262 0.106 1
AIC 0.262 0.106 3, 15 2
HQC 0.262 0.106 3
14 SIC 0.000 0.001 1
AIC 0.000 0.012 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.001 3
16 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
18 SIC 0.011 0.056 1
AIC 0.011 0.056 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.011 0.056 3
19 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
20 SIC 0.003 0.034 1
AIC 0.026 0.034 3, 15 1
HQC 0.003 0.034 3
21A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21CD SIC 0.547 0.479 1
AIC 0.547 0.479 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.547 0.479 3
21E SIC 0.343 0.173 1
AIC 0.343 0.674 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.343 0.359 3
22A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
22B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.001 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 0  -
2 0  -
1 0  -
1 1  -
Auto-
correlation 
3
13 3 3 0.0167 (lag 9)
Cointegration RelationsProduct 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
8
4
11
3
3
3
4
7
3
3
6
3
3
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3.3.6 Middle East (Turkey) 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / South Africa (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
23 SIC 0.002 0.002 1
AIC 0.753 0.002 3, 10, 11, 12, 15 1
HQC 0.002 0.002 3
31 SIC 0.013 0.000 1
AIC 0.207 0.000 3, 10, 11, 15 1
HQC 0.207 0.000 3
32 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 10, 11, 12, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
33A SIC 0.003 0.035 1
AIC 0.003 0.201 3, 15 1
HQC 0.003 0.201 3
37 SIC 0.098 0.000 1
AIC 0.098 0.029 3, 10, 11 2
HQC 0.098 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
2 2  -
1 1  -
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
11
11
12
3
12
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Turkey
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1B SIC 0 0.0131 1
AIC 0.009 0.0131 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.009 0.0131 3
3 SIC 0.069 0.097 1
AIC 0.449 0.046 4 1
HQC 0.069 0.097 3
4 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6B SIC 0.000 0.247 1
AIC 0.006 0.247 4, 15 1
HQC 0.006 0.247 3
14 SIC 0.000 0.093 1
AIC 0.039 0.093 4, 6, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.093 3
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Auto-
correlation 
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations
1 1  -
 -
1 0  -
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
 -
4
1 1
1 0
3
5 1 0
14
8
8
4
 -
1 1  -
2 1  -
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Turkey (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
15 SIC 0.0024 0.0054 1
AIC 0.0024 0.0054 3, 15 1
HQC 0.0024 0.0054 3
16 SIC 0.0000 0.0000 1
AIC 0.0000 0.0000 6 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0000 6
17 SIC 0.0000 0.0000 1
AIC 0.0000 0.0000 4, 12, 13, 15 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0000 3
18 SIC 0.0130 0.0138 1
AIC 0.2281 0.0770 4, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.2281 0.0138 3 (AIC)
19 SIC 0.0156 0.0347 1
AIC 0.0808 0.0347 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0156 0.0347 3 (AIC)
21A SIC 0.0684 0.1045 1
AIC 0.0684 0.2408 3, 4, 7, 8, 15 3
HQC 0.0684 0.1045 3
21B SIC 0.0000 0.0001 1
AIC 0.0000 0.0001 4, 15 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0001 3
21CD SIC 0.0001 0.0271 1
AIC 0.0049 0.0138 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0001 0.0271 3
22A SIC 0.0470 0.1050 2
AIC 0.3129 0.2220 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.3519 0.2220 3
23 SIC 0.0000 0.0003 1
AIC 0.0758 0.0922 3, 10, 11, 15 1
HQC 0.0758 0.0922 3
31 SIC 0.0003 0.0015 1
AIC 0.0003 0.0013 3 1
HQC 0.0003 0.0015 3
32 SIC 0.0003 0.0012 1
AIC 0.0017 0.0027 3, 4, 15 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0222 3
33A SIC 0.0016 0.0014 1
AIC 0.0016 0.0014 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0016 0.0014 3
36 SIC 0.0000 0.0000 1
AIC 0.0000 0.0000 3, 11, 12 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0000 3
37 SIC 0.0000 0.0000 1
AIC 0.0000 0.0039 5, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.0000 0.0000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
3
1 1  -
1 0  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 0  -
1  -
1  -
1 1  -
 -
1 1  -
 -
1 0  -
5 3
3 0
1 1  -
1 1
Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
 -
315
11
3
3
15
9
9
3
14
7
11
4
3
13
7
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3.3.7 Asia 
3.3.7.1 China 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / China
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.00 0.00 1
AIC 0.00 0.00 8, 11, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.00 0.00 3
1B SIC 0.00 0.00 1
AIC 0.00 0.00 3, 15 1
HQC 0.00 0.00 3
3 SIC 0.07 0.00 1
AIC 0.07 0.02 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.07 0.02 3
4 SIC 0.15 0.06 1
AIC 0.03 0.06 9, 11, 12, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.06 0.06 3
5 SIC 0.00 0.00 1
AIC 0.00 0.00 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.00 0.00 3
6A SIC 0.01 0.19 1
AIC 0.03 0.19 3, 12, 15 1
HQC 0.03 0.19 3
6B SIC 0.73 0.00 1
AIC 0.43 0.25 2, 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.43 0.00 3
7 SIC 0.05 0.05 1, 12, 13
AIC 0.05 0.05 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.05 0.05 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
8 SIC 0.14 0.17 1
AIC 0.334* 0.311* 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.334* 0.311* 8, 14, 15
9 SIC 0.001 0.003 1
AIC 0.860 0.974 4, 9, 10, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.001 0.974 3 (AIC)
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.140 0.145 3, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.157 0.145 3 (AIC)
15 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
16 SIC 0.000 0.017 1
AIC 0.331 0.341 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.331 0.341 3
17 SIC 0.538 0.940 1
AIC 0.416 0.940 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.538 0.940 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
Auto-
correlation 
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
 0.0289 (lag 5)
2
6
9
1  -
2  -
 -2
8 1
1
2
3
0
 -
15 3  -
 -
 -
14
15 1
1
4
2
3
2 2
 -
8 0  -
 0.0363 (lag 7)
2  -
2
3
1
5
5
2
1
13
9
11 3  -
11 1  -
3
5
ADF Test Results
(p-values) Cointegration Relations
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / China (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
18 SIC 0.228 0.160 1
AIC 0.432 0.356 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.228 0.160 3
20 SIC 0.927 1.000 2
AIC 0.987 1.000 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.987 0.999 3, 6, 13, 14, 15
21A SIC 0.589 0.902 2
AIC 0.589 0.965 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.589 0.902 3
21B SIC 0.230 0.941 1
AIC 0.541 0.964 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.541 0.964 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
21CD SIC 0.572 0.748 1, 3
AIC 0.623* 0.112* 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.623*  0.7475 3, 14, 15
21E SIC 0.249 0.513 1
AIC 0.249 0.513 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.249 0.513 3
22A SIC 0.296 0.337 1
AIC 0.165 0.181 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.177 0.369 3, 15
22B SIC 0.212 0.260 1
AIC 0.212 0.260 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.212 0.260 10, 11, 14, 15
23 SIC 0.238 0.822 1
AIC 0.764 0.994 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.454 0.994 3
28 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.039 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.039 3
29 SIC 0.072 0.096 1
AIC 0.547 0.640 3, 15 3
HQC 0.072 0.096 3
31 SIC 0.229 0.106 1, 2
AIC 0.229 0.241 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.229 0.338 3
32 SIC 0.141 0.450 1
AIC 0.521 0.968 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.521 0.849 3
33A SIC 0.436 0.694 2, 3
AIC 0.534 0.738 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.436 0.694 3
33B SIC 0.033 0.004 1
AIC 0.033 0.054 3 2
HQC 0.033 0.004 3 (AIC)
35 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.917 0.453 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.917 0.453 3, 13, 14, 15 (AIC)
36 SIC 0.001 0.002 1
AIC 0.001 0.002 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.001 0.002 3, 15
37 SIC 0.448 0.824 1
AIC 0.110 0.844 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.132* 0.824 4, 5, 14, 15
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
24 2  -
2
2
1
1
3 1
 0.0245 (lag 4)014
 -04
4
3  -
 -
 -
3
 -
2
 -
5
1
0
2
02
1
4
3
1
4
 -13 1
4  -
6 2  0.0209 (lag 5)
1  -
3
2
10
3
4
5
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
 -
4 1  -
 -
15  -
2  -11
4
3 0
2
1
11 2
1
 0.0000 (lag 1)
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3.3.7.2 Japan 
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Japan
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.232 0.241 1
AIC 0.069 0.094 4, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.069 0.241 4
1B SIC 0.021 0.061 1
AIC 0.154 0.276 3, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.021 0.061 3 (AIC)
3 SIC 0.000 0.259 1
AIC 0.022 0.259 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.088 0.259 3 (HQC)
4 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
5 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.804 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.804 3 (AIC)
7 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.230 0.827 4, 11, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.760 3 (AIC)
8 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 10, 13, 14 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
14 SIC 0.520 0.971 1
AIC 0.732 0.990 10, 12, 15 1
HQC 0.520 0.990 3
14A SIC 0.801 0.507 1
AIC 0.645 0.590 8, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.645 0.590 3
15 SIC 0.000 0.022 1
AIC 0.002 0.022 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.002 0.022 3
16 SIC 0.003 0.063 1
AIC 0.003 0.063 3, 15 1
HQC 0.003 0.063 3
17 SIC 0.130 0.055 1
AIC 0.130 0.112 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.130 0.055 3
18 SIC 0.041 0.129 1
AIC 0.041 0.303 5, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.041 0.129 3
19 SIC 0.303 0.545 1, 2
AIC 0.443 0.732 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.443 0.545 3
20 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.226 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
Auto-
correlation 
2
1
1
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
4 3
5
 0.0333 (lag 4)  
0.0167 (lag 7)
1
2  -
 -
15 3  -
11
7
 -
 -10
24
0
0
 -
11  -
10  -
6  -
8
 -
2  -
 -
14  -
4
1
0
1
0
2
1
0
0
1
1
1
12 3  -
3  -
9 1
1
1
5
02
14
0
ADF Test Results
(p-values) Cointegration Relations
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Japan (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
21A SIC 0.221 0.289 1
AIC 0.221 0.289 4, 7, 8, 13, 15 2
HQC 0.221 0.289 3
21B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21CD SIC 0.000 0.191 1
AIC 0.003 0.191 3, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.003 0.191 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.066 1
AIC 0.000 0.944 3, 12, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.066 3
22A SIC 0.000 0.001 1
AIC 0.000 0.001 4, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.001 1, 3
22B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.001 1, 3
23 SIC 0.224 0.035 1
AIC 0.224 0.121 3, 11, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.224 0.035 3 (AIC)
28 SIC 0.004 0.006 1
AIC 0.131 0.166 4, 15 4
HQC 0.131 0.166 3 (AIC)
29 SIC 0.002 0.001 1
AIC 0.000 0.001 3, 4 1
HQC 0.002 0.001 3, 15
29A SIC 0.106 0.059 1
AIC 0.057 0.011 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.077 0.011 3
31 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.030 0.004 8, 11, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.004 3
32 SIC 0.000 0.002 1
AIC 0.009 0.002 3, 15 1
HQC 0.009 0.002 3
33A SIC 0.001 0.001 1
AIC 0.000 0.001 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.001 3, 4
33B SIC 0.176 0.380 1
AIC 0.176 0.339* 5, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.176 0.771 3, 15
34 SIC 0.004 0.733 1
AIC 0.114 0.856 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.004 0.733 3 (AIC)
35 SIC 0.000 0.195 1
AIC 0.274 0.888 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.000 0.888 3 (AIC)
36 SIC 0.453 0.003 1
AIC 0.098 0.536 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.453 0.536 1, 3
37 SIC 0.008 0.038 1
AIC 0.008 0.013 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.008 0.204 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
4
14 2  -
 -
3
2
7 2  -
3 0  -
6 0
2
1
 -
15 4  -
4 0  -
4 0  -
11 3
1
1
3
4
8 2  -
8  -
3 0  -
15 1  0.0242 (lag 8)
11 4 -
1
0
1
2
1
1
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
11 1  -
10 1  -
13 2  -
4 0  -
5
3
4
1
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3.3.7.3 South Korea 
  
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / South Korea
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.239 0.000 6, 11, 12, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3  (AIC)
3 SIC 0.071 0.127 1
AIC 0.457 0.495 3 3
HQC 0.457 0.127 3
4 SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 3
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3, 15
6A SIC 0.064 0.012 1
AIC 0.099 0.032 3, 4, 15 1
HQC 0.169 0.157 3
6B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.360 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.360 5, 7, 12
7 SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 12
AIC 0.295 0.288 9, 10, 11, 12 3
HQC 0.387 0.325 3, 11, 12  (AIC)
8 SIC 0.308 0.165 2, 3
AIC 0.308 0.165 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.308 0.165 8, 11, 12, 14, 15
14 SIC 0.014 0.126 1
AIC 0.014 0.387 4, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.014 0.332 3, 4
14A SIC 0.018 0.409 1
AIC 0.042 0.246 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.191 0.409 4, 14, 15 (HQC)
16 SIC 0.132 0.003 1
AIC 0.466 0.667 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.466 0.667 3  (AIC)
18 SIC 0.119 0.165  
AIC 0.420 0.428 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.119 0.165 3, 15
19 SIC 0.017 0.102 1, 3
AIC 0.285 0.266 3, 10, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.285 0.266 3
20 SIC 0.000 0.002 1
AIC 0.000 0.004 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.002 3
21A SIC 0.345 0.519 1
AIC 0.284 0.396 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.524 0.519 3
21B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.000 3  (AIC)
21CD SIC 0.002 0.338 1
AIC 0.036 0.494 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.002 0.338 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
3
2
15
3
15
9
0
1
0
3
11
4
 -
 0.0000 (lag 1)
 -
 -
 0.0382 (lag 1),  
0.0374 (lag 12)
3 0  -
1
0
2
3
6
15
 -
 -
 0.0121 (lag 6)
 -
1 0
3
2
1
 -
 -02
15
4 0
3 1
33
6
1
2
1
3
1
1
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
ADF Test Results
(p-values) Auto-
correlation 
6
13
1
3
1
1
 -
 -
 -
1
Cointegration Relations
 0.0276 (lag 1)
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / South Korea (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
21E SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 3, 4, 15
AIC 0.000 0.000 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
22A SIC 0.005 0.339 1, 2
AIC 0.404 0.395 3, 11, 12, 13, 15 2
HQC 0.301 0.339 3
22B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 14 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
29 SIC 0.001 0.000 1
AIC 0.467 0.000 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.001 0.000 3  (AIC)
31 SIC 0.649 0.605 1, 3
AIC 0.113 0.157* 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 3
HQC 0.649 0.605 3
32 SIC 0.038 0.047 1
AIC 0.038 0.047 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.038 0.047 3
33A SIC 0.129 0.149 1
AIC 0.129 0.149 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.129 0.149 3, 15
33B SIC 0.234 0.249 1
AIC 0.138 0.185 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.138 0.185 3
34 SIC 0.387 0.194 1, 3
AIC 0.249 0.194 4, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.387 0.194 3, 4, 15
35 SIC 0.001 0.096 1, 2, 12, 13
AIC 0.046 0.049 10, 12, 13 1
HQC 0.046 0.049 10, 12, 13  (AIC)
36 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.611 0.000 5, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.009 0.000 3  (AIC)
37 SIC 0.000 0.007 1
AIC 0.000 0.319 3, 10, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.007 3  (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
7 1
3 1
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
10 2
2
1
10
3
2
1
1
2
10
1
3
2
11 3
3
15 4
4
2
1
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
7 1
12 2
3 1
 -
 -
 -
0.041 (lag 2),  
0.0000 (lag 3)
1
 0.0246 (lag 3)
 0.0283 (lag 4)
 -1
1
2
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3.3.7.4 Taiwan 
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Taiwan
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.002 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.002 3
1B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 5, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
3 SIC 0.029 0.077 1
AIC 0.077 0.012 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.029 0.012 3 (AIC)
4 SIC 0.001 0.000 5
AIC 0.086 0.096 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.086 0.096 9 (AIC)
6A SIC 0.052 0.035 1
AIC 0.052 0.654 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.052 0.035 3 (AIC)
6B SIC 0.009 0.336 1
AIC 0.009 0.046 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 1
HQC 0.009 0.336 3
7 SIC 0.000 0.000 10, 12, 15
AIC 0.000 0.168 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.168 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 (AIC)
14 SIC 0.000 0.446 1
AIC 0.066 0.998 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.008 0.998 3
14A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
16 SIC 0.823 0.791 1
AIC 0.823 0.961 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.823 0.791 3
17 SIC 0.230 0.182 1, 2
AIC 0.230 0.246 10, 11, 12 4
HQC 0.230 0.182 3, 12
18 SIC 0.557 0.539 1, 3
AIC 0.004 0.009 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.557 0.539 3
19 SIC 0.031 0.160 1
AIC 0.110 0.463 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.110 0.081 3, 15 (AIC)
20 SIC 0.084 0.117 1
AIC 0.048 0.111 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.048 0.111 3
21A SIC 0.008 0.085 3
AIC 0.008 0.085 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.008 0.085 3, 11, 14, 15
21CD SIC 0.012 0.268 1
AIC 0.051 0.268 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.051 0.268 3 (AIC)
21E SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 1, 2
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
12
13
3
3
1
4
11
8
2
5
12
13
3
13
8
12
0
0
1
3
4
13 3
10
0
1
22
1
0
2
2
 0.0148 (lag 5)
 -
 -
 -
 -
 0.0021 (lag 2)
 0.0495 (lag 7)
 -
1
1
 -
 -
 -
 0.0000 (lag 1),  
0.0000 (lag 2),  
0.0218 (lag 7)
5
4
1
2
 -
 -
 -
1
1
2
ADF Test Results
(p-values) Cointegration Relations
 -
 -
Lag Length Auto-
correlation 
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
5
5
5
1
5
3 1
1
2
2
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Taiwan (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
22A SIC 0.000 0.004 3, 12, 13, 14
AIC 0.039 0.488 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.039 0.139 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 (AIC)
23 SIC 0.406 0.171 2
AIC 0.062* 0.171 3, 4, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.255 0.171 3
29 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 2
31 SIC 0.227 0.139 3, 7, 8, 9, 11
AIC 0.227 0.139 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.227 0.139 10, 11, 14, 15
32 SIC 0.000 0.004 1
AIC 0.000 0.003 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.004 3
33A SIC 0.320 0.357 1, 2
AIC 0.320 0.329 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.320 0.264 3, 14, 15
33B SIC 0.284 0.465 1
AIC 0.154 0.117 4, 11, 12, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.154 0.117 3, 14, 15
34 SIC 0.322 0.279 1
AIC 0.359 0.231 3, 11, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.322 0.279 3
36 SIC 0.095 0.223 1
AIC 0.144 0.040 3, 11, 12, 15 2
HQC 0.030 0.125 3, 15 (AIC)
37 SIC 0.051 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.311 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.311 3 (AIC)
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
3
12
0
2
0
1
2
2
11 2
3
2
2
2
3
10
3
1
2
1
13 0
4 0
 -
 -
 -
 -
 0.0474 (lag 5)
 -
2
 -
 -
 0.0276 (lag 2)
2
1
3
1
 0.0441 (lag 1),  
0.0389 (lag 2),  
0.0002 (lag 3)
1
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
ADF Test Results
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
(p-values)
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3.3.8 Oceania (Australia) 
Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Australia
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
1A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.032 0.395 3, 15 2
HQC 0.032 0.082 3 (AIC)
1B SIC 0.002 0.000 1
AIC 0.002 0.001 3, 9, 12, 15 1
HQC 0.002 0.001 3
4 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 4, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
6A SIC 0.015 0.098 1
AIC 0.079 0.098 3, 15 1
HQC 0.015 0.098 3
6B SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.778 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
9 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
14 SIC 0.000 0.000 1, 3
AIC 0.000 0.000 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3, 10, 11
15 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
16 SIC 0.294 0.260 1
AIC 0.434 0.456 3, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.393 0.260 3
17 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.166 0.019 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
18 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 8, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
19 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
21A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.143 3 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3 (AIC)
21CD SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.030 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.030 3
21E SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
22A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews®
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
2 1  -
1 1  -
1 0  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1 1  -
1  -
1 1  -
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length
3
9
4
Auto-
correlation 
2 0  -
1
Cointegration Relations
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
3
3
5
13
4
7
3
8
4
6
13
3
3
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Stability Criteria VEC Model - Categories / Australia (continued)
QMT  suggested selected Trace Eigenvalue selected
23 SIC 0.076 0.000 1
AIC 0.076 0.002 3, 13, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.076 0.000 3
28 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
29 SIC 0.420 0.415 1
AIC 0.056 0.098 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 4
HQC 0.420 0.415 3, 12, 14, 15
29A SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 3, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
31 SIC 0.000 0.999 1
AIC 0.239 0.999 3, 14, 15 2
HQC 0.000 0.999 3
32 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.000 3, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
34 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.001 0.000 3, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
36 SIC 0.000 0.000 1
AIC 0.000 0.000 6, 13, 14, 15 1
HQC 0.000 0.000 3
37 SIC 0.303 0.344 1
AIC 0.187* 0.344 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 3
HQC 0.303 0.344 3
Source: Author's calculations, EViews® *integrated of order 2, I(2)
Product 
Category
Information 
Criteria
Lag Length Cointegration Relations Auto-
correlation 
1 1  -
ADF Test Results
(p-values)
4 4 0.0409 (lag 5)
1 0  -
3
2  -
 -11
1 1
1
 0.0436 (lag 2) 
0.0432 (lag 3)
1 1  -
 -
2
2 2  -13
13
9
3
6
15
8
3
10
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3.4  VECM t-Statistics and Adjustment Vectors for Steel Exporting Countries 
The econometric analysis focuses on the interpretation of the impulse response and variance 
decomposition estimates and on the Granger causality test results but not on cointegration 
analysis. Although the adjustment vectors and the corresponding t-statistics of the VECMs 
have not been included in the analysis, they are reported in the appendix as additional 
indicators for the stability of the VEC models. 
3.4.1 European Union 
Adjustment Vectors - t-Statistics (QMT) - EU
Eq 1  109.4389 3.257
Eq 2 -2.0837 -3.347
Eq 1 -2,491.5730 -4.319
Eq 2 -0.9534 -1.203
Eq 3  0.0021 1.893
Bulgaria Eq 1 -422.9220 -2.553
Eq 1 -247.4633 -3.589
Eq 2 -0.3149 -2.797
Eq 1 1.5616 1.515
Eq 2 -0.3729 -1.665
Eq 3 -0.0001 -0.840
Estonia Eq 1 -693.6754 -2.646
Eq 1 134.5971 0.843
Eq 2 -2.2452 -3.234
Eq 3 0.0021 2.146
Eq 1 9.2518 0.039
Eq 2 -0.2088 -0.395
Eq 3 -0.0007 -1.145
Eq 1 -445.8797 -1.202
Eq 2 -0.4257 -2.276
Hungary Eq 1 -63.8345 -2.431
Ireland Eq 1 -39.9937 -4.822
Eq 1 173.7128 0.376
Eq 2 -1.7719 -4.232
Eq 3 0.0007 1.154
Eq 1 -357.7281 -1.565
Eq 2 0.7545 1.495
Lithuania Eq 1 4.4807 0.931
Eq 1 -275.6786 -1.647
Eq 2 -0.4282 -1.633
Netherlands Eq 1 -1,893.9450 -1.603
Luxembourg
Latvia
Italy
Germany
Finland
France
Denmark
t-Statistic
Czech 
Republic
Austria
Country
Belgium
Adjustment 
Vector
Cointegrating 
Equation
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3.4.2 Other Europe 
3.4.3 C.I.S. 
Adjustment Vectors  and t-Statistics - Other Europe  
Eq 1 -136.9150 -0.517
Eq 2 0.1832 0.190
Eq 1 -13.6130 -4.597
Eq 2 -1.2914 -5.164
t-Statistic
Norway
Switzerland
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
Adjustment Vectors  and t-Statistics - C.I.S.
Kazakhstan Eq 1 -660.8558 -1.667
Russia Eq 1 -639.3906 -2.153
Ukraine Eq 1 -1,457.7510 -3.350
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
Adjustment Vectors - t-Statistics (QMT) - EU (continued)
Eq 1 -333.0198 -1.480
Eq 2 -0.9794 -1.591
Eq 1 15.7095 0.710
Eq 2 -0.7462 -2.216
Eq 3 0.0005 0.659
Eq 1 -2,747.2690 -1.734
Eq 2 -0.6597 -0.789
Eq 1 302.1989 1.180
Eq 2 3.7012 1.167
Eq 1 -33.7023 -0.216
Eq 2 -0.1712 -0.951
Eq 1 -297.6645 -1.012
Eq 2 -0.1131 -0.272
Eq 1 -367.5443 -2.464
Eq 2 -0.4738 -3.702
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
United 
Kingdom
Romania
Poland
Portugal
t-StatisticCountry
Adjustment 
Vector
Cointegrating 
Equation
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3.4.4 North America 
3.4.5 South America 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - North America
Eq 1 -4,879.7990 -1.110
Eq 2 1.0233 1.252
Eq 3 -0.0006 -0.634
Eq 4 -488,682.4000 -1.183
Eq 1 -61.8205 -1.558
Eq 2 -2.6289 -0.663
Eq 1 189.8433 0.350
Eq 2 0.9128 0.398
Eq 1 -71.2189 -1.297
Eq 2 1.7959 1.806
Eq 3 -0.0062 -1.861
Guatemala Eq 1 -21.6842 -5.130
Honduras Eq 1 0.1897 0.300
Mexico Eq1 -731.6192 -0.880
Eq 1 2.0456 0.725
Eq 2 5.1524 0.364
Eq 1 891.7730 2.368
Eq 2 -2.1937 -2.147
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
El Salvador
Canada
Dominican 
Republic
Panama
Costa Rica
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - South America
Eq 1  240.7310 0.896
Eq 2 -3.2123 -4.677
Brazil Eq 1  2,031.7480 1.688
Eq 1 -27.6903 -0.157
Eq 2  0.0726 0.164
Eq 1  191.3883 2.884
Eq 2 -0.5323 -1.340
Ecuador Eq 1 1.6976 4.327
Eq 1 29.2465 2.977
Eq 2 1.5171 1.943
Uruguay Eq1 0.2037 0.061
Chile
Colombia
Peru
t-Statistic
Argentina
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
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3.4.6 Africa 
3.4.7 Middle East 
3.4.8 Asia 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Africa 
Algeria Eq 1  150.7566 1.554
Eq 1 -1,502.4540 -0.869
Eq 2 2.5266 2.123
South Africa Eq 1 415.1586 3.734
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
Egypt
Adjustment Vectors  and t-Statistics - Middle East
Israel Eq 1 -440.7049 -5.811
Saudi Arabia Eq 1 -126.6160 -4.830
Eq 1 2,017.0290 0.950
Eq 2 -3.2439 -3.105
Eq 3 0.0044 3.054
United Arab 
Emirates
Eq 1 -61.0131 -2.089
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
Turkey
Adjustment Vectors  and t-Statistics - Asia
Eq 1 1,604.7290 2.570
Eq 2  0.0864 1.336
Eq 1 -19.1526 -0.747
Eq 2 -1.1050 -0.725
Eq 3 0.0004 0.126
Eq 1 1,155.0280 0.723
Eq 2 -2.0610 -3.252
Eq 3 0.0010 0.885
Eq 1 -268.2634 -0.814
Eq 2 1.3583 1.833
Eq 3 -0.0057 -2.118
Eq 1 3,738.3550 1.152
Eq 2 0.2712 0.238
Eq 3 -0.0016 -0.702
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
India
Indonesia
China
Hong Kong
Japan
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3.4.9 Oceania 
Adjustment Vectors  and t-Statistics - Asia (continued)
Malaysia Eq 1 23.0664 0.034
Philippines Eq 1 -35.5861 -4.722
Singapore Eq 1 44.3068 1.172
South Korea Eq 1 206.5761 1.803
Eq 1 1,308.2550 0.872
Eq 2 -0.4862 -0.425
Eq 3 0.0003 0.173
Eq 1 124.7154 0.483
Eq 2 0.5369 2.697
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
Thailand
Taiwan
Adjustment Vectors  and t-Statistics - Oceania
Eq 1 -1,233.4160 -1.199
Eq 2 0.6698 0.908
Eq 1 53.3073 0.797
Eq 2 -0.4543 -1.506
Eq 3 -0.0008 -1.703
t-Statistic
Australia
New Zealand
Country
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
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3.5 VECM t-Statistics and Adjustment Vectors for Steel Export Categories  
The econometric analysis focuses on the interpretation of the impulse response and variance 
decomposition estimates and on the Granger causality test results but not on cointegration 
analysis. Although the adjustment vectors and the corresponding t-statistics of the VECMs 
have not been included in the analysis, they are reported in the appendix as additional 
indicators for the stability of the VEC models. 
3.5.1 European Union 
3.5.1.1 Belgium 
  
 Adjustment Vectors - t-Statistics (QMT) - Belgium
Eq 1 -1.2832 -0.414
Eq 2 -1.0826 -3.143
1B Eq 1 146.4816 4.186
Eq 1 -93.4076 -0.346
Eq 2 -0.1028 -0.023
Eq 3 -0.0065 -0.358
Eq 4 11,162.1700 0.370
Eq 1 -2.5584 -2.338
Eq 2 -1.4125 -2.717
6A Eq 1 -68.2287 -1.154
Eq 1 -7.1990 -0.606
Eq 2 -0.2771 -1.675
7 Eq 1 -5.1695 -2.402
8 Eq 1 -0.0670 -4.501
Eq 1 -1.3929 -0.466
Eq 2 0.3979 1.954
Eq 1 1.1611 1.880
Eq 2 -2.1827 1.880
15 Eq 1 -5.3121 -5.032
Eq 1 0.0728 0.521
Eq 2 -0.4138 -1.322
Eq 1 -0.3144 -0.209
Eq 2 0.4430 0.627
18 Eq 1 10.8940 3.182
19 Eq 1 0.1604 2.600
20 Eq 1 -0.4871 -1.551
21A Eq 1 0.1810 5.558
21B Eq 1 0.1364 4.656
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
1A
Product 
Category
14A
3
4
6B
14
16
17
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 Adjustment Vectors - t-Statistics (QMT) - Belgium (continued)
Eq 1 -0.0492 -0.142
Eq 2 -1.7633 -3.952
Eq 1 0.0384 0.205
Eq 2 -2.6186 -3.063
Eq 1 -1.2404 -0.521
Eq 2 -2.3973 -3.522
Eq 1 -14.5696 -2.127
Eq 2 0.5078 0.949
Eq 1 -19.8482 -2.272
Eq 2 0.5100 0.610
29A Eq 1 -21.2225 -2.677
Eq 1 -77.8045 -1.295
Eq 2 -0.9614 -2.585
Eq 1 -4.0595 -0.044
Eq 2 -0.8444 -3.798
Eq 1 14.0327 0.927
Eq 2 -1.1851 -4.266
Eq 1 -15.3166 -2.286
Eq 2 -1.3070 -3.127
Eq 1 -47.6491 -1.707
Eq 2 -0.3129 -0.218
Eq 1 1.1559 2.769
Eq 2 3.8904 1.044
36 Eq 1 -0.1245 -2.037
Eq 1 -8.0599 -4.280
Eq 2 1.9333 1.236
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
33A
29
31
32
Product 
Category
37
33B
34
35
21CD
21E
23
28
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3.5.1.2 France 
Adjustment Vectors - t-Statistics (QMT) - France
Eq 1 -4.0531 -0.555
Eq 2 0.1181 0.299
3 Eq 1 -424.3245 -3.584
Eq 1 -1.4332 -3.237
Eq 2 -1.0248 -1.671
Eq 1 4.7470 0.883
Eq 2 -0.4792 -6.172
6B Eq 1 23.1694 5.151
Eq 1 29.1126 0.813
Eq 2 -7.4280 -3.651
Eq 3 0.0130 2.828
Eq 4 -339.1865 -0.084
Eq 1 -18.8898 -1.866
Eq 2 -0.7345 -3.580
Eq 1 0.1741 2.549
Eq 2 -0.1453 -0.416
16 Eq 1 20.8084 2.866
17 Eq 1 -3.6983 -0.498
Eq 1 2.2265 0.582
Eq 2 -0.5574 -3.025
Eq 3 0.0003 1.330
19 Eq 1 -51.9076 -1.408
Eq 1 -48.4515 -3.493
Eq 2 -0.3774 -0.785
Eq 3 -0.0007 -0.818
Eq 1 -38.6933 -2.271
Eq 2 -2.0306 -3.402
21B Eq 1 -1.9200 -0.213
Eq 1 15.3168 1.043
Eq 2 -3.0063 -1.976
21E Eq 1 -0.2465 -5.519
22A Eq 1 1.8108 5.019
Eq 1 -9.8670 -0.502
Eq 2 0.3153 0.491
Eq 3 -0.0001 -0.124
Eq 1 11.1937 0.938
Eq 2 4.4837 1.934
Eq 3 -0.0101 -2.075
29 Eq 1 -35.0084 -4.432
Eq 2 0.0648 0.115
18
21A
21CD
23
28
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
20
1B
6A
14A
4
7
14
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3.5.1.3 Germany 
Adjustment Vectors - t-Statistics (QMT) - France (continued)
Eq 1 -35.0084 -4.432
Eq 2 0.0648 0.115
Eq 1 3.9307 0.071
Eq 2 -1.2842 -4.298
Eq 1 61.6745 1.203
Eq 2 0.1269 0.211
Eq 3 -0.0007 -0.893
Eq 1 -11.5085 -0.915
Eq 2 -1.7765 -2.826
Eq 1 1.0610 1.458
Eq 2 -2.6503 -1.964
34 Eq 1 -2.0414 -3.948
35 Eq 1 -3.9567 -1.035
36 Eq 1 0.2663 2.735
Eq 1 -1.6521 -1.287
Eq 2 -0.7175 -4.362
33B
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
37
29A
31
32
33A
Adjustment Vectors  - t-Statistics (QMT) - Germany
Eq 1 -4.4998 -4.128
Eq 2 -0.9002 -2.755
Eq 1 -499.5066 -3.456
Eq 2 -0.4032 -1.073
Eq 1 -304.3777 -2.906
Eq 2 -1.2377 -2.944
Eq 1 -2.3952 -0.056
Eq 2 0.7181 1.794
Eq 1 7.5035 0.605
Eq 2 -1.7281 -2.296
Eq 1 -44.5867 -1.177
Eq 2 -1.2139 -5.538
Eq 3 0.0002 0.942
6B Eq 1 -102.9320 -2.193
Eq 1 -2.3340 -0.124
Eq 2 -0.2042 -0.090
1B
3
6A
4
5
7
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
1A
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Adjustment Vectors  - t-Statistics (QMT) - Germany (continued)
8 Eq 1 0.5097 1.747
9 Eq 1 -1.1292 -6.039
14 Eq 1 -40.6661 -0.715
Eq 1 6.6897 2.280
Eq 2 0.8041 3.527
Eq 1 -27.1994 -0.301
Eq 2 -1.7403 -4.429
Eq 1 -80.9031 -2.187
Eq 2 -0.4253 -0.413
Eq 3 0.0001 0.074
Eq 1 -14.1245 -1.530
Eq 2 -0.6742 -2.427
Eq 3 -0.0001 -1.013
18 Eq 1 6.4915 5.576
19 Eq 1 -0.1777 -0.006
Eq 1 -73.5025 -0.287
Eq 2 -1.7637 -2.551
Eq 1 12.4038 0.667
Eq 2 0.0737 0.471
Eq 1 -52.6237 -0.653
Eq 2 -1.4976 -1.780
Eq 3 0.0003 0.743
21CD Eq 1 1.8935 1.667
Eq 1 -0.2974 -0.513
Eq 2 -0.3703 -3.135
Eq 1 -8.1221 -2.295
Eq 2 -0.6917 -1.656
Eq 1 -33.8754 -2.171
Eq 2 -0.4054 -0.387
28 Eq 1 -5.5775 -2.179
29 Eq 1 23.5413 1.931
29A Eq 1 10.6050 4.546
31 Eq 1 70.80 2.411
32 Eq 1 -39.37 -0.827
Eq 1 12.25 0.207
Eq 2 -1.56 -4.159
Eq 1 82.98 1.733
Eq 2 0.29 0.638
Eq 3 0.00 -0.918
Eq 1 6.27 4.676
Eq 2 -0.58 -2.242
14A
17
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
15
16
20
21B
22A
34
21A
21E
23
33A
33B
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3.5.1.4 Italy 
  
Adjustment Vectors  - t-Statistics (QMT) - Germany (continued)
Eq 1 -72.18 -3.384
Eq 2 -1.91 -3.381
Eq 1 -19.04 -3.423
Eq 2 -0.38 -0.425
Eq 1 -8.02 -1.034
Eq 2 -1.01 -3.138
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
37
35
36
Adjustment Vectors  - t-Statistics (QMT) - Italy
Eq 1 -90.0540 -2.288
Eq 2 -0.3511 -0.489
Eq 3 0.0005 1.931
Eq 1 -799.2350 -2.228
Eq 2 1.0638 0.758
Eq 3 -0.0036 -1.077
Eq 1 -176.3666 -2.179
Eq 2 -1.1444 -2.622
4 Eq 1 -46.0468 -0.452
6A Eq 1 -48.5758 -5.592
6B Eq 1 -60.9008 -3.238
7 Eq 1 -14.8032 -4.289
Eq 1 4.3110 0.322
Eq 2 -0.6197 -3.394
Eq 1 -13.6152 -3.190
Eq 2 -1.5968 -2.772
15 Eq 1 -244.8792 -1.720
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
1A
1B
3
14A
14
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Adjustment Vectors  - t-Statistics (QMT) - Italy (continued)
Eq 1 -10.5830 -0.729
Eq 2 0.0590 0.413
17 Eq 1 -13.9930 -4.190
Eq 1 1.1531 0.044
Eq 2 -3.1321 -2.089
Eq 3 0.0009 1.803
19 Eq 1 10.7226 3.117
Eq 1 -1,045.3150 -2.922
Eq 2 -1,045.3150 -2.965
Eq 3 0.0049 3.037
Eq 1 -39.1631 -2.005
Eq 2 -0.8066 -1.978
21B Eq 1 0.4220 0.186
21CD Eq 1 0.5608 1.308
21E Eq 1 -0.2236 -1.488
22A Eq 1 0.9170 1.386
Eq 1 0.2991 0.049
Eq 2 -0.2626 -2.878
Eq 1 -489.1568 -2.665
Eq 2 0.5402 1.235
32 Eq 1 -22.8955 -3.452
Eq 1 -8.3609 -0.602
Eq 2 -0.6464 -2.474
Eq 1 -7.9034 -1.918
Eq 2 0.7919 0.224
Eq 3 -0.0013 -0.377
35 Eq 1 -0.2589 -0.195
Eq 1 0.5803 0.596
-1.2854 -2.664
Eq 1 1.0223 1.902
Eq 2 -0.0584 -0.192
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
18
36
37
16
20
31
34
21A
23
33A
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3.5.1.5 Netherlands 
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Netherlands
Eq 1 -158.2165 -2.979
Eq 2 -1.3359 -2.130
3 Eq 1 -0.2814 -4.495
4 Eq 1 0.4340 0.248
6A Eq 1 0.5165 0.206
6B Eq 1 -955.0081 -2.645
Eq 1 -4.9343 -1.987
Eq 2 0.0036 0.011
Eq 1 6.5984 2.457
Eq 2 13.9039 1.751
Eq 3 -0.0346 -1.882
Eq 4 -458.9608 -1.786
Eq 1 0.3687 1.206
Eq 2 -1.0007 -3.715
Eq 3 -0.0001 -0.805
17 Eq 1 2.4577 0.675
Eq 2 0.3398 1.698
Eq 1 -14.3608 -2.623
Eq 2 -0.9353 -3.538
Eq 1 0.9462 3.981
Eq 2 -0.4591 -2.419
20 Eq 1 -2.9680 -2.363
Eq 1 -0.1224 -0.129
Eq 2 0.3151 1.441
Eq 1 -3.5488 -2.827
Eq 2 -0.3637 -0.720
21CD Eq 1 -0.3719 -0.372
21E Eq 1 0.0126 1.111
22A Eq 1 1.3131 3.021
23 Eq 1 0.2564 5.731
28 Eq 1 -4.2205 -5.323
Eq 1 -20.9963 -0.866
Eq 2 -3.4503 -3.353
Eq 1 -37.9816 -3.381
Eq 2 0.1739 0.109
31 Eq 1 -12.5053 -1.334
32 Eq 1 -55.6561 -0.634
Eq 1 -31.5317 -2.156
Eq 2 0.2171 1.657
Eq 1 -0.4055 -0.220
Eq 2 -2.1113 -3.177
Eq 1 -2.2471 -3.375
Eq 2 2.1618 3.568
19
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
1B
14
14A
16
18
37
34
21A
29A
21B
29
33A
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3.5.1.6 Spain 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Spain
Eq 1 -52.3848 -1.063
Eq 2 -0.3565 -2.566
3 Eq 1 -37.8407 -2.968
Eq 1 172.3852 1.537
Eq 2 -2.1179 -3.392
6A Eq 1 1.8409 3.952
6B Eq 1 7.0068 2.314
Eq 1 1.6814 0.330
Eq 2 -1.3566 -2.874
Eq 3 0.0003 0.251
8 Eq 1 -1.6385 -3.614
Eq 1 -44.3439 -1.907
Eq 2 -0.8883 -3.448
Eq 1 2.7831 2.143
Eq 2 -1.6888 -2.055
16 Eq 1 18.5525 5.396
Eq 1 -3.0444 -1.124
Eq 2 0.1644 0.390
18 Eq 1 25.5816 3.837
Eq 1 21.8637 0.871
Eq 2 0.0590 0.480
Eq 3 -0.0004 -1.882
Eq 1 8.0482 2.915
Eq 2 -4.8758 -2.392
Eq 1 2.9650 0.233
Eq 2 -0.5170 -1.612
Eq 3 -0.0002 -0.949
Eq 1 -6.1317 -3.246
Eq 2 -0.6990 -2.009
Eq 3 0.0002 1.308
Eq 1 -6.5125 -0.862
Eq 2 -1.0915 -1.084
Eq 1 -0.0079 -0.114
Eq 2 -25.8618 -3.945
22A Eq 1 -0.2798 -1.807
23 Eq 1 -1.3861 -1.727
Eq 1 18.1083 3.184
Eq 2 -1.1491 -1.877
31 Eq 1 17.1035 3.258
20
21A
21B
29
19
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
1B
7
14A
17
4
14
21CD
21E
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3.5.2 C.I.S. 
3.5.2.1 Russia 
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Spain (continued)
Eq 1 -0.7945 -0.336
Eq 2 -0.0455 -0.189
Eq 1 -129.5359 -3.014
Eq 2 -0.3655 -1.308
Eq 3 -0.0014 -1.386
33B Eq 1 -7.0179 -4.730
Eq 1 0.3020 3.323
Eq 2 -12.5830 -3.501
37 Eq 1 -0.4392 -4.087
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
34
32
33A
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Russia
1B Eq 1 -870.0803 -1.774
Eq 1 47.1342 1.845
Eq 2 1.1141 0.590
4 Eq 1 -67.2520 -2.370
Eq 1 86.4984 1.797
Eq 2 0.1457 0.996
6B Eq 1 -1,177.1570 -2.623
Eq 1 -41.9469 -1.275
Eq 2 0.0813 0.421
15 Eq 1 -68.5937 -3.439
16 Eq 1 -138.4103 -1.215
Eq 2 -14.1280 -6.109
17 Eq 1 -17.4675 -3.776
Eq 1 -14.7894 -1.841
Eq 2 0.6705 0.670
Eq 3 -0.0019 -1.530
19 Eq 1 -20.9661 -0.337
Eq 2 4.3957 2.637
Eq 3 -0.0063 -2.851
20 Eq 1 -18.2870 -3.956
Eq 1 20.4884 3.034
Eq 2 -1.0602 -4.726
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
3
21A
6A
14
18
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
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3.5.2.2 Ukraine 
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Russia (continued)
23 Eq 1 -8.9024 -2.346
31 Eq 1 5.6641 0.044
32 Eq 1 -115.7993 -3.247
33A Eq 1 -3.0116 -4.943
Eq 1 -20.2564 -1.446
Eq 2 -0.1145 -3.767
37 Eq 1 -1.7574 -2.799
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
35
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Ukraine
1B Eq 1 1,011.9280 3.275
Eq 1 -441.8830 -2.437
Eq 2 -0.1352 -0.031
4 Eq 1 2.1500 1.260
6A Eq 1 -341.9091 -0.417
6B Eq 1 8.1479 1.780
14 Eq 1 42.1472 1.685
16 Eq 1 -55.4791 -3.259
17 Eq 1 -3.5142 -5.213
18 Eq 1 -3.2202 -0.757
21A Eq 1 -2.4621 -0.880
21B Eq 1 -8.5617 -4.564
21CD Eq 1 -0.4702 -1.046
22A Eq 1 -6.7354 -1.674
31 Eq 1 4.9848 0.459
32 Eq 1 17.7226 3.122
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
3
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3.5.3 North America 
3.5.3.1 Canada 
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Canada
Eq 1 18.5530 4.319
Eq 2 -0.5887 -1.258
Eq 3 0.0001 0.195
Eq 1 -1,260.4030 -0.919
Eq 2 -1.4151 -2.079
Eq 1 215.8064 0.892
Eq 2 1.0455 1.854
Eq 3 -0.0021 -2.249
Eq 4 -110,081.7000 -2.815
Eq 1 12.6642 0.217
Eq 2 0.2511 1.101
Eq 1 -14.1383 -2.369
Eq 2 -0.3046 -0.548
Eq 1 69.3814 1.127
Eq 2 -0.2138 -1.878
Eq 3 -0.0002 -1.443
Eq 1 66.8928 1.357
Eq 2 -0.4744 -1.856
7 Eq 1 3.0711 2.938
8 Eq 1 32.4213 3.342
9 Eq 1 -9.6485 -2.956
Eq 1 -135.1036 -0.412
Eq 2 -1.3295 -1.643
Eq 3 0.0002 0.402
Eq 4 27,556.9300 0.761
Eq 1 86.1145 0.851
Eq 2 -3.1473 -3.537
Eq 1 -8.5655 -0.640
Eq 2 2.3217 3.290
Eq 1 16.4260 2.153
Eq 2 -0.0196 -0.414
17 Eq 1 1.0544 0.432
Eq 1 138.9118 2.545
Eq 2 0.3647 3.515
Eq 1 116.7585 1.444
Eq 2 -0.6396 -1.634
Eq 3 0.0001 0.581
Eq 1 -219.4312 -2.562
Eq 2 -0.6933 -3.510
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
19
20
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
1A
1B
3
4
5
6A
6B
14
14A
15
16
18
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Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Canada (continued)
21A Eq 1 3.7718 1.312
Eq 1 21.4536 2.191
Eq 2 -1.2964 -2.489
Eq 1 2.4455 0.276
Eq 2 0.0201 0.065
Eq 3 0.0000 -0.973
Eq 1 15.8355 1.556
Eq 2 -0.7329 -1.629
Eq 3 0.0004 0.906
Eq 1 -152.7282 -1.673
Eq 2 -0.4292 -1.939
Eq 3 -0.0004 -2.340
22B Eq 1 -56.9862 -2.436
Eq 1 4.5512 1.833
Eq 2 -1.5735 -2.600
Eq 1 -10.8290 -0.436
Eq 2 -0.2961 -1.728
29A Eq 1 -21.2201 -3.368
Eq 1 -55.0231 -0.453
Eq 2 0.0701 0.424
Eq 1 -284.6262 -3.391
Eq 2 -0.5451 -0.694
Eq 3 -0.0012 -1.219
Eq 1 -170.5949 -1.316
Eq 2 -0.9115 -1.567
Eq 3 0.0007 0.817
Eq 1 4.1442 0.747
Eq 2 -0.7278 -1.061
34 Eq 1 57.3098 3.015
35 Eq 1 0.3177 0.875
36 Eq 1 12.7399 4.161
37 Eq 1 -0.6122 -0.142
33A
33B
32
29
21CD
21E
22A
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
21B
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
31
28
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3.5.3.2 Mexico 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Mexico
Eq 1 17.2500 1.179
Eq 2 -0.4332 -0.767
Eq 3 0.0001 0.149
Eq 4 774.6879 3.381
1B Eq 1 -951.8549 -3.002
Eq 1 151.4516 0.325
Eq 2 4.5191 1.360
Eq 3 4.5191 -1.571
Eq 4 19,457.8900 1.897
Eq 1 -2.2302 -0.049
Eq 2 -0.7870 -1.045
Eq 3 0.0011 1.156
6A Eq 1 0.0841 0.108
6B Eq 1 -29.0763 -1.451
8 Eq 1 0.0748 1.108
9 Eq 1 1.1683 0.708
14 Eq 1 2.0058 1.333
Eq 1 -63.2158 -1.186
Eq 2 -3.8836 -1.538
Eq 1 -52.5583 -0.307
Eq 2 -0.5279 -1.763
Eq 3 0.0005 0.793
16 Eq 1 -0.0117 -0.047
17 Eq 1 -0.7587 -28.186
18 Eq 1 -2.3630 -0.184
20 Eq 1 357.8468 2.287
Eq 1 -2.3414 -0.424
Eq 2 -0.4243 -3.429
21B Eq 1 -11.0456 -1.175
21CD Eq 1 -0.1830 -1.837
21E Eq 1 -2.1878 -2.803
Eq 1 -6.3977 -1.008
Eq 2 -0.1758 -1.022
Eq 3 -0.0003 -1.925
22B Eq 1 -0.7010 -6.051
Eq 1 -26.5309 -2.035
Eq 2 0.3376 1.766
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
21A
23
14A
Product 
Category
1A
3
4
15
22A
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3.5.4 South America (Brazil) 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Mexico (continued)
28 Eq 1 1.9431 1.454
29 Eq 1 -0.5800 -1.816
31 Eq 1 156.0388 2.787
32 Eq 1 -79.1706 -3.734
33A Eq 1 79.0256 2.517
33B Eq 1 3.6425 1.426
34 Eq 1 -27.1493 -2.962
Eq 1 13.3448 2.970
Eq 2 -10.3389 -3.334
36 Eq 1 -3.7695 -4.455
Eq 1 9.4201 0.447
Eq 2 -0.4121 -1.412
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
37
Product 
Category
35
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Brazil
1A Eq 1 47.5136 5.238
1B Eq 1 -2,988.3420 -3.627
3 Eq 1 567.3887 0.811
4 Eq 1 866.9753 3.233
6A Eq 1 -39.5277 -1.104
6B Eq 1 25.3412 1.988
Eq 1 -1.1362 -2.065
Eq 2 2.9536 3.510
Eq 1 367.8156 2.761
Eq 2 -3.8777 -3.734
14A Eq 1 485.6935 3.823
15 Eq 1 75.3971 1.968
16 Eq 1 0.8316 0.680
Eq 1 -1.2344 -0.124
Eq 2 -1.5021 -1.973
18 Eq 1 7.2614 1.645
Eq 1 70.0441 0.581
Eq 2 0.5402 0.663
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
9
17
14
19
Product 
Category
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3.5.5 Africa (South Africa) 
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Brazil (continued)
20 Eq 1 110.9440 2.142
21A Eq 1 71.5317 4.084
Eq 1 0.8732 0.271
Eq 2 0.1031 0.267
21CD Eq 1 2.0782 4.048
21E Eq 1 0.1443 6.080
22A Eq 1 4.1567 7.097
23 Eq 1 17.1601 3.266
28 Eq 1 17.1353 1.244
29 Eq 1 96.4940 1.049
29A Eq 1 -0.5079 -0.305
31 Eq 1 0.5874 0.322
33A Eq 1 85.2750 0.929
33B Eq 1 15.7913 2.556
Eq 1 -3.8015 -0.019
Eq 2 4.4837 3.644
Eq 3 -0.0087 -4.301
Eq 4 -3,799.4270 -1.716
Eq 1 -0.2619 -0.823
Eq 2 -0.7202 -1.403
36 Eq 1 21.6681 1.072
37 Eq 1 4.9424 2.853
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
21B
35
Product 
Category
34
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - South Africa
1B Eq 1 -302.1242 -3.677
3 Eq 1 -94.3082 -3.157
Eq 1 103.2539 1.318
Eq 2 -4.0479 -1.746
Eq 3 0.0119 1.713
Eq 1 -15.7500 -1.005
Eq 2 -1.0737 -4.913
Eq 1 -1.6836 -0.849
Eq 2 0.2977 0.509
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
4
6A
6B
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3.5.6 Middle East (Turkey) 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - South Africa (continued)
14 Eq 1 21.9077 3.480
16 Eq 1 -4.1973 -5.271
18 Eq 1 -0.1185 -3.758
19 Eq 1 -30.8984 -2.286
20 Eq 1 10.1497 0.823
21A Eq 1 -12.6580 -4.968
21CD Eq 1 -0.2137 -0.392
21E Eq 1 0.4679 1.645
22A Eq 1 2.6574 4.219
22B Eq 1 0.6440 3.403
23 Eq 1 -60.6351 -3.170
31 Eq 1 -144.2083 -2.389
32 Eq 1 -336.4327 -2.420
33A Eq 1 42.4869 2.138
Eq 1 -1.5186 -3.620
Eq 2 1.4244 1.281
37
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Turkey
1B Eq 1 -50.5985 -0.132
3 Eq 1 -62.3275 -3.449
4 Eq 1 -46.7491 -2.927
6A Eq 1 -19.4571 -1.771
6B Eq 1 266.0030 3.348
Eq 1 -2.8693 -0.102
Eq 2 -0.6211 -2.768
14A Eq 1 -9.6861 -3.765
15 Eq 1 2,220.5520 2.843
16 Eq 1 1.6864 2.211
17 Eq 1 1.5882 3.572
Eq 1 124.2145 0.657
Eq 2 -4.0601 -1.717
Eq 3 0.0018 0.532
19 Eq 1 4.5297 0.719
t-Statistic
14
18
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
Appendix: 3 Model Specification 
3.5 VECM t-Statistics and Adjustment Vectors for Steel Export Categories 
A 194 
3.5.7 Asia 
3.5.7.1 China 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Turkey (continued)
Eq 1 101.0343 2.947
Eq 2 -1.3660 -2.755
Eq 3 0.0017 1.946
21B Eq 1 0.0315 2.875
21CD Eq 1 0.2273 3.668
22A Eq 1 8.1150 2.003
23 Eq 1 -8.0408 -2.481
31 Eq 1 -241.0992 -2.716
32 Eq 1 466.3003 0.937
33A Eq 1 -56.4650 -4.633
36 Eq 1 -7.7773 -2.896
37 Eq 1 -0.0374 -6.098
t-Statistic
21A
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - China
1A Eq 1 -0.0632 -0.327
1B Eq 1 -215.5361 -3.803
Eq 1 43.8405 0.105
Eq 2 0.1633 0.789
Eq 1 118.9676 1.068
Eq 2 -1.3151 -1.938
Eq 3 0.0019 1.369
5 Eq 1 -0.2771 -4.484
6A Eq 1 -71.0275 -0.404
Eq 1 -14.9362 -0.570
Eq 2 0.0790 0.633
Eq 1 19.7008 2.195
Eq 2 -49.6390 -4.301
Eq 3 0.0843 4.221
Eq 1 -54.4801 -0.704
Eq 2 -28.7753 -0.942
Eq 1 -2.7528 -2.644
Eq 2 1.0951 1.450
7
4
9
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
3
6B
Product 
Category
8
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Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - China (continued)
Eq 1 13.5042 1.484
Eq 2 -1.9950 -2.611
Eq 3 0.0034 2.021
15 Eq 1 -231.4835 -3.268
Eq 1 55.5688 -0.001
Eq 2 -0.1117 -0.698
Eq 3 -0.0007 -3.389
17 Eq 1 -2.0781 -0.478
18 Eq 1 -179.8287 -1.141
Eq 1 188.9131 1.864
Eq 2 -0.4869 -0.591
Eq 3 0.0003 0.284
21A Eq 1 30.5679 1.605
Eq 1 30.3159 2.749
Eq 2 1.4128 2.043
Eq 3 -0.0016 -2.263
Eq 4 1,024.7680 1.272
Eq 1 -2.3730 -0.416
Eq 2 0.1622 0.829
Eq 3 -0.0001 -2.075
21E Eq 1 0.9974 1.702
Eq 1 413.6686 4.247
Eq 2 16.2758 4.023
Eq 3 -0.0296 -4.139
Eq 4 13,620.7300 2.145
Eq 1 3.9460 0.544
Eq 2 2.6026 1.606
Eq 1 -76.9095 -0.827
Eq 2 2.1422 3.310
28 Eq 1 5.1819 1.652
Eq 1 30.6245 2.037
Eq 2 0.2488 0.242
Eq 3 -0.0010 -0.616
31 Eq 1 162.3708 2.074
Eq 1 42.8273 0.329
Eq 2 0.1007 0.818
Eq 1 213.0015 1.439
Eq 2 1.6039 4.994
Eq 1 9.3118 0.962
Eq 2 0.2987 0.634
35 Eq 1 6.3703 2.170
36 Eq 1 3.5176 2.208
Eq 1 17.1126 4.205
Eq 2 0.4832 2.729
33A
32
29
22A
37
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-StatisticProduct 
Category
14A
16
20
21B
21CD
23
22B
33B
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3.5.7.2 Japan 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Japan
Eq 1 -3.8867 -1.874
Eq 2 -1.4391 -2.147
Eq 3 0.0026 1.905
Eq 1 1,701.6040 1.076
Eq 2 2.4391 1.594
Eq 3 -0.0101 -1.844
Eq 1 17.2922 0.672
Eq 2 -1.2341 -3.301
4 Eq 1 -1.0796 -0.481
5 Eq 1 11.1845 4.039
Eq 1 29.3814 0.644
Eq 2 -0.0768 -0.383
Eq 1 314.6894 1.242
Eq 2 1.4667 1.126
8 Eq 1 -9.1263 -0.645
14 Eq 1 45.3955 2.757
Eq 1 43.7211 2.059
Eq 2 2.4619 1.879
15 Eq 1 223.9930 1.551
16 Eq 1 -7.6715 -3.046
Eq 1 0.5184 0.009
Eq 2 -0.7127 -1.379
Eq 3 -0.0005 -0.756
18 Eq 1 -126.8452 -2.136
Eq 1 52.3346 3.389
Eq 2 -0.0662 -0.517
20 Eq 1 168.8079 3.249
Eq 1 -24.3968 -1.294
Eq 2 -1.6839 -2.698
21B Eq 1 1.4163 4.726
Eq 1 77.5887 1.187
Eq 2 0.1556 0.086
Eq 3 -0.0006 -1.326
Eq 1 7.7054 2.555
Eq 2 -1.4364 -3.430
22A Eq 1 9.1360 4.723
22B Eq 1 5.4221 2.977
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
3
1A
1B
6A
14A
21CD
17
19
21A
21E
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
7
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3.5.7.3 South Korea 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Japan (continued)
Eq 1 -27.6034 -0.719
Eq 2 -0.7396 -2.074
Eq 3 0.0003 0.474
Eq 1 -15.1934 -0.099
Eq 2 -3.9333 -1.838
Eq 3 0.0043 1.090
Eq 4 -139.5073 -1.002
29 Eq 1 132.7689 6.185
Eq 1 -23.4042 -0.470
Eq 2 -2.0030 -1.575
Eq 3 0.0029 1.319
Eq 4 -97.9244 -1.809
31 Eq 1 18.4162 0.631
32 Eq 1 88.0895 2.780
33A Eq 1 49.5052 2.425
Eq 1 63.0363 2.612
Eq 2 -1.0582 -2.186
Eq 1 -5.7816 -0.572
Eq 2 0.7840 0.805
Eq 1 -24.6609 -1.747
Eq 2 -2.2179 -4.021
Eq 3 0.0026 3.838
36 Eq 1 0.0364 0.127
37 Eq 1 -4.5835 -3.495
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
23
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
28
29A
33B
34
35
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - South Korea
1B Eq 1 4.3539 4.655
Eq 1 -12.3527 -1.650
Eq 2 -1.3434 -2.460
Eq 3 0.0008 2.848
4 Eq 1 0.9599 0.944
6A Eq 1 37.6079 0.980
6B Eq 1 -5.9797 -1.432
t-Statistic
3
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
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Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - South Korea (continued)
Eq 1 1.1292 1.813
Eq 2 8.8967 5.706
Eq 3 -0.0328 -6.236
8 Eq 1 -0.0008 -2.419
14 Eq 1 31.3675 1.577
Eq 1 25.0428 3.790
Eq 2 -1.3912 -4.055
Eq 1 1.4514 0.194
Eq 2 -2.7514 -0.818
Eq 3 0.0018 0.788
18 Eq 1 11.2056 2.676
Eq 1 -128.8393 -1.956
Eq 2 -51.6108 -1.784
Eq 3 0.1264 1.794
20 Eq 1 7.3421 0.311
Eq 1 5.3778 0.588
Eq 2 -1.4264 -0.874
21B Eq 1 -0.0693 -0.068
Eq 2 -0.0164 -0.052
21CD Eq 1 -1.2650 -0.206
21E Eq 1 0.1348 5.564
Eq 1 -71.1265 -2.505
Eq 2 -1.2921 -0.363
22B Eq 1 -3.9737 -3.227
23 Eq 1 3.0596 1.733
29 Eq 1 9.5023 3.843
Eq 1 -154.3409 -0.723
Eq 2 17.5448 2.521
Eq 3 -0.0669 -2.533
32 Eq 1 -107.3425 -3.915
Eq 1 -42.0587 -0.682
Eq 2 -2.7890 -0.368
Eq 3 0.0024 0.167
Eq 4 -6.2496 -0.556
Eq 1 5.3119 0.344
Eq 2 2.5548 0.991
Eq 3 -0.0059 -1.102
Eq 4 -0.8080 -0.266
Eq 1 -38.7010 -2.479
Eq 2 0.9508 0.561
35 Eq 1 -6.9760 -3.209
36 Eq 1 -0.5003 -3.563
Eq 1 3.0044 0.594
Eq 2 0.5092 0.892
t-Statistic
7
14A
16
37
19
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
34
21A
22A
31
33A
33B
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3.5.7.4 Taiwan 
  
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Taiwan
1A Eq 1 0.1713 1.223
1B Eq 1 1.0255 2.510
Eq 1 -11.0431 -1.557
Eq 2 -1.4373 -3.546
Eq 1 -24.3253 -2.613
Eq 2 -69.2628 -3.232
Eq 1 -5.2221 -1.302
Eq 2 -0.0607 -0.375
6B Eq 1 -33.3514 -2.955
7 Eq 1 -0.0010 -2.272
Eq 1 13.1505 1.640
Eq 2 -3.1503 -3.911
14A Eq 1 0.1933 4.774
Eq 1 -73.1805 -1.321
Eq 2 -0.8362 -1.384
Eq 3 0.0002 1.138
Eq 1 1.5417 1.107
Eq 2 -1.1467 -0.671
Eq 3 0.0003 0.311
Eq 4 -22.6363 -1.993
Eq 1 -5.0939 -2.071
Eq 2 -1.7044 -0.566
Eq 1 0.0747 2.616
Eq 2 -1.7503 -3.939
Eq 1 -17.6457 -1.816
Eq 2 5.0205 0.819
Eq 3 -0.0152 -0.859
21A Eq 1 0.3720 3.297
Eq 1 86.1643 3.143
Eq 2 -0.4693 -0.749
Eq 3 -0.0002 -1.290
21E Eq 1 -0.0413 -1.466
22A Eq 1 -0.0004 -0.827
Eq 1 2.7462 1.259
Eq 2 -0.2889 -1.588
29 Eq 1 2.9247 6.327
19
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
18
21CD
23
20
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
3
6A
17
4
14
16
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3.5.8 Oceania (Australia) 
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Taiwan (continued)
Eq 1 58.0696 -0.028
Eq 2 7.1778 7.222
Eq 3 -0.0277 -7.581
32 Eq 1 6.5234 0.212
33A Eq 1 -37.8160 -1.655
Eq 2 4.0925 1.516
Eq 1 5.0828 0.655
Eq 2 1.4265 2.460
Eq 1 -18.4947 -1.974
Eq 2 0.1755 0.125
Eq 1 -1.2028 -0.931
Eq 2 -1.3277 -2.766
Eq 1 -3.7096 -1.742
Eq 2 0.5421 1.340
36
37
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
33B
34
31
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Australia
Eq 1 0.1564 1.094
Eq 2 -0.2226 -0.833
1B Eq 1 -856.6759 -1.353
4 Eq 1 0.5382 2.530
6A Eq 1 43.6460 2.109
6B Eq 1 3.5724 1.121
9 Eq 1 -15.1341 -5.965
14 Eq 1 -2.0447 -5.317
15 Eq 1 0.5316 0.946
16 Eq 1 0.1255 0.104
17 Eq 1 0.3753 3.065
18 Eq 1 0.6187 0.546
19 Eq 1 -0.0438 -1.161
Eq 1 -3.2523 -3.467
Eq 2 -0.0244 -0.133
21CD Eq 1 -0.0335 -1.099
21E Eq 1 -0.1122 -2.016
22A Eq 1 -1.4049 -2.587
21A
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
1A
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Adjustment Vectors and t-Statistics - Australia (continued)
Eq 1 9.4322 4.129
Eq 2 -3.3741 -4.391
28 Eq 1 -26.7838 -0.704
Eq 1 -6.7758 -1.288
Eq 2 -83.3336 -1.522
Eq 3 0.1894 1.496
Eq 4 1,356.1020 2.212
29A Eq 1 0.0408 0.839
Eq 1 470.110 3.054
Eq 2 -0.727 -3.541
32 Eq 1 -66.350 -1.828
34 Eq 1 0.0974 0.490
36 Eq 1 -0.3994 -0.770
Eq 1 2.0146 1.191
Eq 2 -0.2310 -0.315
Eq 3 -0.0002 -0.133
31
37
23
29
Product 
Category
Cointegrating 
Equation
Adjustment 
Vector
t-Statistic
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4 Graphical Display of Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition  
Section 4 contains graphical displays of the impulse response and variance decomposition 
estimates.  
4.1 Steel Exporting Countries 
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4.1.1.3 Bulgaria 
4.1.1.4 Czech Republic 
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4.1.1.5 Denmark 
4.1.1.6 Estonia 
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4.1.1.7 Finland 
4.1.1.8 France 
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4.1.1.9 Germany 
4.1.1.10 Hungary 
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4.1.1.11 Ireland 
4.1.1.12 Italy 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
OIL QMT VALUE
EXRA RGDP
Variance Decomposition of QMT
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
OIL QMT VALUE
EXRA RGDP
Variance Decomposition of QMT
Appendix: 4 Graphical Display of Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition 
4.1 Steel Exporting Countries 
A 208 
4.1.1.13 Latvia 
4.1.1.14 Lithuania 
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4.1.1.15 Luxembourg 
4.1.1.16 Netherlands 
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4.1.1.17 Poland 
4.1.1.18 Portugal 
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4.1.1.19 Romania 
4.1.1.20 Slovakia 
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4.1.1.21 Spain 
4.1.1.22 Sweden 
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4.1.1.23 United Kingdom 
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4.1.2 Other Europe 
4.1.2.1 Norway 
4.1.2.2 Switzerland 
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4.1.3 C.I.S. 
4.1.3.1 Kazakhstan 
4.1.3.2 Russia 
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4.1.3.3 Ukraine 
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4.1.4 North America 
4.1.4.1 Canada 
4.1.4.2 Costa Rica 
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4.1.4.3 Dominican Republic 
4.1.4.4 El Salvador 
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4.1.4.5 Guatemala 
4.1.4.6 Honduras 
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4.1.4.7 Mexico 
4.1.4.8 Panama 
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4.1.4.9 Trinidad and Tobago 
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4.1.5 South America 
4.1.5.1 Argentina 
4.1.5.2 Brazil 
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4.1.5.3 Chile 
4.1.5.4 Colombia 
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4.1.5.5 Ecuador 
4.1.5.6 Peru 
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4.1.5.7 Uruguay 
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4.1.6 Africa 
4.1.6.1 Algeria 
4.1.6.2 Egypt 
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A 227 
4.1.6.3 South Africa 
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4.1.7 Middle East 
4.1.7.1 Israel 
4.1.7.2 Saudi Arabia 
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4.1.7.3 Turkey 
4.1.7.4 United Arab Emirates 
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5 Trade Distance and Competitiveness Analysis Data  
Section 5 of the appendix contains the data used for the trade distance analyses and the 
competitiveness analyses conduced for the 64 steel exporting countries in section 6.2 of the 
dissertation. The data are provided in tabular form. The tables include data on domestic 
coking coal production, coking coal trade distances, domestic iron ore production, iron ore 
trade distances, steel trade distances, stage of development, overall competitiveness, overall 
and port infrastructure, domestic and foreign market size, and labour costs. 
European Union 5.1
  
Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - European Union
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 1,530 1,541 1,570 1,554
Belgium 3,148 3,191 2,874 2,545
Bulgaria 819 737 579 369
Czech Republic 3,761 3,779 3,591 3,747
Denmark 0 0 0 0
Estonia 41 36 44 39
Finland 985 959 953 948
France 4,900 5,169 4,922 4,947
Germany 9,256 9,229 9,305 9,085
Hungary 677 1,015 1,121 1,101
Ireland 0 0 0 0
Italy 5,042 5,168 5,211 4,944
Latvia 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 2,467 2,383 2,384 2,299
Poland 9,264 10,597 11,208 11,106
Portugal 0 0 0 0
Romania 2,084 1,973 1,816 1,254
Slovakia 2,035 2,046 1,927 1,744
Spain 2,934 3,129 3,023 2,917
Sweden 1,555 1,310 1,316 1,296
United Kingdom 4,810 5,103 4,934 4,805
Source: EIA n.d.k
Table 5.1 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - European Union 
Source: EIA n.d.f 
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Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
Austria landlocked  -  -  -
Belgium Antwerp 22,452 9,386 6,797
Bulgaria Varna 18,088 12,599 10,216
Czech Republic landlocked, net exporter  -  -  -
Denmark Copenhagen 23,285 9,784 7,191
Estonia Tallinn 24,137 10,784 8,190
Finland Helsinki 24,146 10,792 8,199
France Marseille 19,340 10,216 7,830
Germany Hamburg 22,954 9,738 7,145
Hungary landlocked  -  -  -
Ireland Dublin 22,155 8,695 6,102
Italy Genoa 19,079 10,532 8,149
Latvia Riga 24,032 10,677 8,084
Lithuania Klaipeda 23,719 10,382 7,790
Luxembourg landlocked  -  -  -
Netherlands Rotterdam 22,496 9,430 6,841
Poland net exporter  -  -  -
Portugal Lisbon 20,466 8,428 6,043
Romania Mangalia 18,164 12,675 10,292
Slovakia landlocked  -  -  -
Spain Barcelona 19,435 9,879 7,495
Sweden Malmo 23,274 9,808 7,215
United Kingdom Liverpool 22,305 8,749 6,156
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.2 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km) - European Union 
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2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Austria 2,149 2,000 0 0 9,006 5,017 -9,006 -5,017
Belgium-Luxembourg n.a. n.a. 43 90 9,662 12,726 -9,619 -12,636
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 923 526 n.a. n.a.
Czech Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,046 6,800 n.a. n.a.
Denmark n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 43 99 n.a. -99
Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Finland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,156 3,121 n.a. n.a.
France n.a. n.a. 69 58 19,364 18,290 -19,295 -18,232
Germany 418 500 18 34 46,194 44,339 -46,176 -44,305
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 967 1,900 n.a. n.a.
Ireland n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. 0 0 0 n.a.
Italy n.a. n.a. 1 0 17,013 16,313 -17,012 -16,313
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Netherlands n.a. n.a. 25,928 24,750 31,501 32,639 -5,573 -7,889
Poland n.a. n.a. 0 10 8,747 7,785 -8,747 -7,775
Portugal n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. 0 0 0 n.a.
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,260 4,446 n.a. n.a.
Slovakia 300 200 4 n.a. 5,854 5,536 -5,850 n.a.
Spain n.a. n.a. 0 0 5,719 6,328 -5,719 -6,328
Sweden 24,713 23,800 19,034 17,617 70 71 18,964 17,546
United Kingdom n.a. n.a. 4 8 17,365 15,283 -17,361 -15,275
European Union 27,580 26,500 45,102 42,568 186,895 181,219 -141,793 -138,651
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48
Net Exporter (+)         
Net Importer (-)Country
Production of Iron 
Ore
Exports of Iron Ore Imports of Iron Ore
Table 5.3 Iron Ore (in TMT)- European Union  
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Table 5.4 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km)- European Union  
Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
Austria landlocked  -  -
Belgium Antwerp 18,131 9,647
Bulgaria Varna 13,768 11,362
Czech Republic landlocked  -  -
Denmark Copenhagen 18,964 10,480
Estonia Tallinn 19,816 11,334
Finland Helsinki 19,824 11,342
France Marseille 15,020 8,978
Germany Hamburg 18,633 10,149
Hungary landlocked  -  -
Ireland Dublin 17,835 9,334
Italy Genoa 14,759 9,297
Latvia Riga 19,711 11,227
Lithuania Klaipeda 19,398 10,916
Luxembourg landlocked  -  -
Netherlands Rotterdam 18,176 9,692
Poland Gdansk 19,320 10,838
Portugal Lisbon 16,146 7,710
Romania Mangalia 13,844 11,440
Slovakia landlocked  -  -
Spain Barcelona 15,114 8,641
Sweden Malmo 18,952 10,469
United Kingdom Liverpool 17,983 9,482
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
5 Trade Distance and Competitiveness Analysis Data 
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U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
Austria landlocked  -  -  -
Belgium Antwerp    15,116 9,506 6,424
Bulgaria Varna                                              17,960 12,720 9,843
Czech Republic landlocked  -  -  -
Denmark Copenhagen 15,691 9,906 6,820
Estonia Tallinn 16,690 10,904 7,819
Finland Helsinki 16,697 10,911 7,826
France Marseille 15,575 10,336 7,460
Germany Hamburg 15,617 9,858 6,775
Hungary landlocked  -  -  -
Ireland Dublin 14,493 8,815 5,730
Italy Genoa 15,893 10,654 7,776
Latvia Riga 16,582 10,797 7,711
Lithuania Klaipeda 16,290 10,504 7,419
Luxembourg landlocked  -  -  -
Netherlands Rotterdam 15,160 9,550 6,469
Poland Gdansk 16,223 10,437 7,325
Portugal Lisbon 13,849 8,548 5,672
Romania Mangalia  18,036 12,797 9,919
Slovak Republic landlocked  -  -  -
Spain Barcelona 15,240 10,000 7,122
Sweden Malmo 15,716 9,930 6,844
United Kingdom Liverpool 14,643 8,871 5,785
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country
Port of 
Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.5 Steel Trade Distances (in km)- European Union  
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Table 5.6 Country / Economy Profiles - European Union 
Country /  Economy Profiles - European Union
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
Austria Innovation driven / 3 14 6 34 34 37
Belgium Innovation driven / 3 19 15 7 28 20
Bulgaria Efficiency driven / 2 76 109 79 60 59
Czech Republic Innovation driven / 3 33 51 61 40 26
Denmark Innovation driven / 3 3 7 5 46 44
Estonia Transition / 2-3 32 37 20 93 77
Finland Innovation driven / 3 6 5 6 50 47
France Innovation driven / 3 16 4 10 7 10
Germany Innovation driven / 3 7 3 4 5 3
Hungary Transition / 2-3 62 55 70 49 33
Ireland Innovation driven / 3 22 64 64 51 35
Italy Innovation driven / 3 49 73 95 10 12
Latvia Transition / 2-3 54 59 52 79 80
Lithuania Transition / 2-3 44 47 43 70 69
Luxembourg Innovation driven / 3 25 14 21 97 56
Netherlands Innovation driven / 3 8 17 3 20 14
Poland Transition / 2-3 53 110 119 19 22
Portugal Innovation driven / 3 43 23 42 39 51
Romania Efficiency driven / 2 68 117 102 36 53
Slovakia Transition / 2-3 46 65 56 58 46
Spain Innovation driven / 3 29 27 33 11 19
Sweden Innovation driven / 3 4 12 13 32 28
United Kingdom Innovation driven / 3 12 24 30 6 8
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Country
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
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Austria 20.86 49.57 n.a.
Belgium 22.88 46.97 37.82
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a.
Czech Republic 5.88 11.21 9.44
Denmark 32.56 n.a. n.a.
Estonia 5.66 n.a. n.a.
Finland 23.07 44.30 34.17
France 20.30 42.31 33.26
Germany 25.05 55.09 41.17
Hungary 4.71 11.68 6.98
Ireland 24.76 32.75 28.59
Italy 17.80 33.17 31.63
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a.
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 22.65 n.a. n.a.
Poland 4.49 10.04 7.78
Portugal 6.78 n.a. n.a.
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a.
Slovakia 4.69 14.15 7.96
Spain 13.48 32.11 22.69
Sweden 23.80 42.04 34.19
United Kingdom 25.46 34.62 31.96
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
Table 5.7 Labour Costs 2007 - European Union 
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Other Europe 5.2
  
Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
Norway Oslo 23,437 9,675 7,082
Switzerland landlocked  -  -  -
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Port of Departure
Country Port of Destination
Table 5.9 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km)- Other Europe   
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Norway 609 600 740 615 180 152 560 463
Switzerland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8 6 n.a. n.a.
Other Europe 1,909 1,800 2,054 1,315 3,187 3,258 -1,133 -1,943
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48
Country
Production of Iron Ore Exports of Iron Ore Imports of Iron Ore
Net Exporter (+)             
Net Importer (-)
Table 5.10 Iron Ore (in TMT) - Other Europe  
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Norway 0 0 0 0
Switzerland 0 0 0 0
Source: EIA n.d.k
Table 5.8 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - Other Europe  
r : IA n.d.f 
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Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
Norway Oslo 19,135 10,632
Switzerland landlocked  -  -
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.11 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km) - Other Europe  
U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
Norway Stavanger 15,149 9,363 6,278
Switzerland landlocked  -  -  -
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.12 Steel Trade Distances (in km) - Other Europe  
Table 5.13 Country / Economy Profiles - Other Europe  
Norway n.a. 53.57 n.a.
Switzerland 28.17 n.a. n.a.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
Table 5.14 Labour Costs 2007 - Other Europe  
Country /  Economy Profiles - Other Europe
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
Norway Innovation driven / 3 15 28 12 44 42
Switzerland Innovation driven / 3 2 1 17 37 30
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
Country
5 Trade Distance and Competitiveness Analysis Data 
A 497 
C.I.S. 5.3
Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
Kazakhstan net exporter   -  -  -
Russia net exporter  -  -  -
Ukraine Sevastopol 18,387 12,897 10,514
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.16 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km) - C.I.S.  
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Kazakhstan 18,908 17,144 13,153 15,200 183 1,936 12,970 13,264
Russia 104,953 99,272 31,761 24,630 10,682 11,752 21,079 12,878
Ukraine 77,429 71,721 20,723 22,779 3,482 2,869 17,241 19,910
C.I.S. 201,290 188,137 65,638 62,609 14,347 16,556 51,291 46,053
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48
Country
Production of Iron Ore Exports of Iron Ore Imports of Iron Ore
Net Exporter (+)               
Net Importer (-)
Table 5.17 Iron Ore (in TMT) - C.I.S.  
Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
Kazakhstan landlocked* (*Caspian Sea)  -  -
St. Peterburg (West Coast) 20,098 11,616
Vladivostok (East Coast) 7,830 22,641
Ukraine Sevastopol 14,066 11,662
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port  of Destination
Port of Departure
Russia
Table 5.18 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km) - C.I.S.  
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Kazakhstan 2,747 2,897 3,224 2,963
Russia 33,067 33,842 35,554 35,364
Ukraine 20,806 21,191 22,678 21,539
Source: EIA n.d.k
Table 5.15 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - C.I.S. 
Source: EIA n.d.f 
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U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
Kazakhstan landlocked  -  -  -
St. Petersburg (West Coast) 16,971 11,186 8,100
Nakhodka (East Coast) 9,697 18,014 19,172
Ukraine Sevastopol 18,258 13,019 10,141
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Russia
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.19 Steel Trade Distances (in km) - C.I.S.  
Kazakhstan n.a. n.a. n.a.
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ukraine n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Table 5.21 Labour Costs 2007 - C.I.S. 
Country /  Economy Profiles - C.I.S.
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
Kazakhstan Transition / 1-2 66 71 101 54 49
Russia Transition / 2-3 51 78 76 8 6
Ukraine Efficiency driven / 2 72 86 87 29 37
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Country
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
Table 5. 20 Country / Economy Profiles - C.I.S. 
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North America 5.4
  
Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
Canada net exporter  -  -  -
Caldera (West Coast) 14,612 3,728 4,528
Puerto Limon (East Coast) 15,725 2,495 3,687
Dominican Republic Santo Domingo 16,920 3,071 2,797
El Salvador Acajutla 14,236 4,450 5,250
Quetzal (West Coast) 14,183 4,556 5,354
Santo Tomas de Castilla (East Coast) 16,966 1,813 3,098
San Lorenzo (West Coast) 14,507 4,295 5,095
La Ceiba (East Coast) 16,720 1,859 3,108
Mazatlan (West Coast) 12,995 6,732 7,530
Veracruz (East Coast) 18,268 1,591 3,495
Balboa (Southern Coast) 15,305 2,806 3,606
Colon (Northern Coast) 15,375 2,741 3,539
Trinidad and Tobago Port of Spain 17,685 4,026 3,721
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Honduras
Mexico
Panama
Port of Departure
Country Port of Destination
Guatemala
Costa Rica
Table 5.23 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km) – North America 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Canada 3,643 3,526 3,415 3,351
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 0 0 0 0
El Salvador 0 0 0 0
Guatemala 0 0 0 0
Honduras 0 0 0 0
Panama 0 0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 0 0
Source: EIA n.d.k
Table 5.22 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - North America
Source: EIA n.d.f
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Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
Vancouver (West Coast) 14,927 15,657
Halifax (East Coast) 20,731 8,688
Caldera (West Coast) 18,935 8,766
Limon (East Coast) 20,089 8,080
Dominican Republic Santo Domingo 21,283 6,851
El Salvador Acajutla 18,307 9,488
Quetzal (West Coast) 18,209 9,592
Santo Tomas de Castilla (East Coast) 21,331 8,734
San Lorenzo (West Coast) 18,577 9,332
La Ceiba (East Coast) 21,083 8,486
Mazatlan (West Coast) 16,531 11,768
Veracruz (East Coast) 22,633 9,871
Balboa (Southern Coast) 19,670 7,843
Colon (Northern Coast) 19,740 7,777
Trinidad and Tobago Port of Spain 11,240 5,691
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Panama
Port of Departure
Country Port of Destination
Canada
Costa Rica
Table 5.25 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km) - North America 
Iron Ore - North America
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Canada 34,100 32,100 28,139 28,056 7,269 9,073 20,870 18,983
Dominican Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
El Salvador n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guatemala n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico 10,900 11,500 1,381 1,952 3,127 3,875 -1,746 -1,923
Panama n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Trinidad and Tobago n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,894 4,252 n.a. n.a.
North America 97,400 96,600 38,818 41,172 22,679 26,436 16,139 14,736
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48
Country
Production of Iron 
Ore
Exports of Iron Ore Imports of Iron Ore
Net Exporter (+)              
Net Importer (-)
Table 5.24 Iron Ore (in TMT) - North America 
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Steel Trade Distances - North America (in km)
U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
Vancouver (West Coast) 2,274 10,593 11,749
Halifax (East Coast) 10,313 4,307 1,140
Caldera (West Coast) 4,902 3,702 4,857
Limon (East Coast) 6,069 2,466 4,059
Dominican Republic Santo Domingo 7,263 3,042 3,061
El Salvador Acajutla 4,054 4,424 5,580
Quetzal (West Coast) 3,950 4,528 5,683
Santo Tomas de Castilla (East Coast) 7,310 1,785 3,470
San Lorenzo (West Coast) 4,324 4,268 5,424
La Ceiba (East Coast) 7,063 1,833 3,479
Manzanillo (West Coast) 2,363 6,107 7,263
Veracruz (East Coast) 8,611 1,448 3,866
Balboa (South Coast) 5,648 2,780 3,935
Cristobal (North Coast) 5,718 2,713 3,868
Trinidad and Tobago Port of Spain 8,028 4,118 3,955
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Panama
Port of Departure
Country Port of Destination
Canada
Costa Rica
Table 5.26 Steel Trade Distances (in km) - North America 
Table 5.27 Country /  Economy Profiles - North America 
Country /  Economy Profiles - North America
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
Canada Innovation driven / 3 10 10 14 13 15
Dominican Republic Efficiency driven / 2 98 75 74 71 89
El Salvador Transition / 1-2 79 48 81 76 95
Guatemala Transition / 1-2 84 63 63 68 96
Honduras Factor driven / 1 82 72 36 83 88
Mexico Efficiency driven / 2 60 76 94 12 16
Panama Efficiency driven / 2 58 54 15 92 73
Trinidad and Tobago Transition / 2-3 92 60 89 112 86
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Country
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
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South America 5.5
Canada 22.40 44.71 29.59
Dominican Republic n.a. n.a. n.a.
El Salvador n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guatemala n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico n.a. 5.81 3.39
Panama n.a. n.a. n.a.
Trinidad and Tobago n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
Table 5.28 Labour Costs 2007 - North America 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Argentina 1,314 1,799 1,752 2,199
Brazil 8,567 8,260 9,166 9,134
Chile 543 545 627 548
Colombia 506 521 527 527
Ecuador 0 0 0 0
Peru 52 53 0 0
Uruguay 0 0 0 0
Source: EIA n.d.k
Table 5.29 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - South America 
Source: I  n.d.f
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Coking Coal Trade Distances - South America  (in km)
Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
Argentina Buenos Aires 15,207 11,955 11,258
Brazil Rio de Janeiro 16,480 9,853 9,156
Chile San Antonio 12,642 7,849 8,647
Colombia net exporter  -  -  -
Ecuador La Libertad 14,388 4,130 4,930
Peru Callao 14,123 5,347 6,145
Uruguay Montevideo 15,079 11,740 11,043
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country
Port of Departure
Port of Destination
Table 5.30 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km) – South America 
Iron Ore - South America
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Argentina n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,586 7,176 n.a. n.a.
Brazil 336,526 346,000 269,448 281,683 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Chile 7,871 8,400 6,715 5,400 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Colombia 900 900 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Costa Rica n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ecuador n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Peru 7,896 7,900 7,401 7,200 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Uruguay n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South America 373,843 384,700 289,453 299,783 7,258 7,882 282,195 291,901
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48
Country
Production of Iron Ore Exports of Iron Ore Imports of Iron Ore
Net Exporter (+)             
Net Importer (-)
Table 5.31 Iron Ore (in TMT) – South America 
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Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
Argentina Buenos Aires 17,490 2,580
Chile San Antonio 17,537 7,791
Colombia Cartanega 20,279 7,386
Ecuador La Libertad 18,870 9,167
Peru Callao 18,816 10,242
Uruguay Montevideo 17,274 2,365
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Port of Departure
Country Port of Destination
Table 5.32 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km) - South America  
U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
Argentina Buenos Aires 14,716 12,949 11,352
Rio de Janeiro (East Coast) 13,951 9,945 9,250
Itaqui (North Coast) 10,574 6,570 5,876
Chile Valparaiso 9,558 7,756 8,911
Colombia Cartanega 6,258 2,763 3,653
Ecuador La Libertad 6,002 4,104 5,260
Peru Callao 7,122 5,318 6,476
Uruguay Montevideo 14,588 11,832 11,138
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Brazil
Table 5.33 Steel Trade Distances (in km) - South America 
5 Trade Distance and Competitiveness Analysis Data 
A 505 
  
Labour  Costs 2007 - South America
Argentina 5.47 11.73 6.50
Brazil 3.81 12.27 5.95
Chile n.a. n.a. n.a.
Colombia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Costa Rica n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ecuador n.a. n.a. n.a.
Peru n.a. n.a. n.a.
Uruguay n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
Table 5.35 Labour  Costs 2007 - South America 
Table 5.34 Country / Economy Profiles - South America 
Country /  Economy Profiles - South America
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
Argentina Efficiency driven / 2 88 89 92 21 38
Brazil Efficiency driven / 2 64 98 123 9 23
Chile Transition / 2-3 28 29 37 47 43
Colombia Efficiency driven / 2 74 84 108 30 54
Costa Rica Efficiency driven / 2 59 103 128 77 75
Ecuador Efficiency driven / 2 104 105 109 59 72
Peru Efficiency driven / 2 83 113 127 45 55
Uruguay Efficiency driven / 2 75 66 50 87 94
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Country
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
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Africa 5.6
Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
Algeria Algier 19,142 9,664 7,280
Egypt Alexandria 16,559 12,282 9,899
South Africa net exporter  -  -  -
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.37 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km) - Africa  
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Algeria 2,000 1,700 n.a. n.a. 543 213 n.a. n.a.
Egypt 2,000 2,000 n.a. n.a. 4,435 3,562 n.a. n.a.
South Africa 41,559 49,000 30,336 31,592 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Africa 57,736 64,100 42,151 42,592 7,361 6,329 34,790 36,263
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48
Country
Production of Iron Ore Exports of Iron Ore Imports of Iron Ore
Net Exporter (+)             
Net Importer (-)
Table 5.38 Iron Ore (in TMT) - Africa 
Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
Algeria Algier 14,820 8,427
Egypt Alexandria 12,238 11,045
South Africa Durban 9,391 7,752
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.39 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km) - Africa 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Algeria 651 692 685 685
Egypt 1,724 1,661 1,657 1,620
South Africa 2,100 2,363 2,212 2,011
Source: EIA n.d.k
Table 5.36 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - Africa 
Source: EIA n.d.f
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U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
Algeria Algiers 15,025 9,784 6,907
Egypt Alexandria 17,644 12,402 9,526
South Africa Durban 19,771 15,767 14,627
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Port of Departure
Country Port of Destination
Table 5.40 Steel Trade Distances (in km) - Africa  
Algeria n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Africa n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
Table 5.42 Labour Costs 2007 - Africa 
Table 5.41 Country / Economy Profiles - Africa 
Country /  Economy Profiles - Africa
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
Algeria Efficiency driven / 2 99 85 103 52 41
Egypt Factor driven / 1 81 57 69 25 39
South Africa Efficiency driven / 2 45 46 49 22 36
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Country
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
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Middle East 5.7
  
Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
Israel Haifa 16,611 12,718 10,334
Saudi Arabia Jedda Islamic Port 15,060 13,829 11,445
Turkey Istanbul 17,813 12,323 9,938
United Arab Emirates Ahmed Bin Port Rashid 13,736 17,979 15,594
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.44 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km) - Middle East  
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Israel n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Saudi Arabia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,931 7,638 n.a. n.a.
Turkey 3,820 3,700 n.a. n.a. 6,088 6,900 n.a. n.a.
United Arab Emirates n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 896 300 n.a. n.a.
Middle East 25,820 23,700 3,988 3,800 16,716 25,746 -12,728 -21,946
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48
Country
Production of Iron 
Ore
Exports of Iron 
Ore
Imports of Iron 
Ore
Net Exporter (+)             
Net Importer (-)
Table 5.45 Iron Ore (in TMT) - Middle East 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Israel 0 0 0 0
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0
Turkey 3,298 3,542 3,676 4,383
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0
Source: EIA n.d.k
Table 5.43 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - Middle East 
Source: EIA n.d.f 
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Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
Israel Haifa 12,290 11,481
Saudi Arabia Jedda Islamic Port 10,740 12,592
Turkey Istanbul 13,490 11,086
United Arab Emirates Ahmed Bin Port Rashid 8,945 15,636
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.46 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km) - Middle East 
U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
Israel Haifa 18,079 12,839 9,961
Saudi Arabia Jedda Islamic Port 19,190 13,951 11,073
Turkey Istanbul 17,682 12,443 9,567
United Arab Emirates Jebel Ali Terminal 21,485 18,192 15,316
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.47 Steel Trade Distances (in km) - Middle East 
Table 5.48 Country / Economy Profiles - Middle East 
Country /  Economy Profiles - Middle East
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
Israel Innovation driven / 3 23 42 53 48 50
Saudi Arabia Transition / 1-2 27 38 45 21 26
Turkey Transition / 2-3 63 70 88 15 25
United Arab Emirates Innovation driven / 3 31 11 8 55 32
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Country
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
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Asia 5.8
  
Israel 12.52 13.20 12.38
Saudi Arabia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Turkey n.a. n.a. n.a.
United Arab Emirates n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
Table 5.49 Labour Costs 2007 - Middle East 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
China 276,688 324,766 361,261 353,087
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0
India 14,713 13,852 13,825 13,910
Indonesia 0 0 0 0
Japan 41,898 42,681 42,844 40,291
Malaysia 0 0 0 0
Philippines 0 0 0 0
Singapore 0 0 0 0
South Korea 9,849 10,900 10,942 11,968
Taiwan 4,858 4,737 4,675 4,664
Thailand 0 0 0 0
Source: EIA n.d.k
Table 5.50 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - Asia 
Source: EI  n.d.f 
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Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
China Shanghai 8,721 19,626 20,426
Hong Kong Hong Kong 8,601 20,879 21,681
India Mumbai 11,866 18,272 15,888
Indonesia net exporter  -  -  -
Japan Tokyo 8,236 17,872 18,670
Malaysia Port Klang 8,323 21,802 19,416
Philippines Manila 7,515 21,070 21,868
Singapore Port of Singapore 7,978 21,981 19,648
South Korea Busan 8,710 18,692 19,490
Taiwan Keelung 8,143 19,989 20,787
Thailand Bangkok 9,266 23,446 21,185
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.51 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km) - Asia 
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
China 1,039,397 1,190,011 78 10 383,093 444,028 -383,015 -444,018
Hong Kong n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India 206,939 214,000 93,728 101,400 1,122 600 92,606 100,800
Indonesia 20 100 706 1,000 1,737 2,300 -1,031 -1,300
Japan n.a. n.a. 26 0 138,928 140,351 -138,902 -140,351
Malaysia 800 800 828 900 2,677 3,043 -1,849 -2,143
Philippines n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,627 2,700 n.a. n.a.
Singapore n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Korea 400 200 n.a. n.a. 43,722 49,542 n.a. n.a.
Taiwan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16,035 15,571 n.a. n.a.
Thailand 1,500 1,600 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Asia 543,883 584,900 97,189 105,400 592,846 661,166 -495,657 -555,766
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48
Country
Production of Iron Ore Exports of Iron Ore Imports of Iron Ore
Net Exporter (+)              
Net Importer (-)
Table 5.52 Iron Ore (in TMT) - Asia 
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Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
China Shanghai 6,354 21,061
Hong Kong Hong Kong 5,410 19,605
India Mumbai 7,071 15,248
Indonesia Jakarta 2,730 16,251
Japan Tokyo 7,119 22,494
Malaysia Klang 3,708 16,707
Philippines Manila 4,348 19,253
Singapore Port of Singapore 3,365 16,937
South Korea Busan 6,867 21,680
Taiwan Keelung 5,612 20,368
Thailand Bangkok 4,650 18,474
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.53 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km) - Asia  
U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
China Shanghai 11,280 19,597 20,755
Hong Kong Hong Kong 12,534 20,851 22,009
India Mumbai 19,518 18,394 15,516
Indonesia Jakarta 15,217 23,049 20,173
Japan Tokyo 9,524 17,844 19,001
Malaysia Klang 15,241 21,922 19,045
Philippines Manila 12,723 21,042 21,844
Singapore Port of Singapore 14,897 22,151 19,275
South Korea Busan 10,345 18,664 19,821
Taiwan Keelung 11,641 19,960 21,116
Thailand Bangkok 15,099 23,418 20,812
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator)
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.54 Steel Trade Distances (in km) - Asia 
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China 1.06 n.a. n.a.
Hong Kong n.a. n.a. n.a.
India 1.17 n.a. n.a.
Indonesia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan 13.45 32.41 20.83
Malaysia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Philippines 1.19 1.66 1.16
Singapore 10.45 n.a. 12.17
South Korea n.a. 21.40 14.35
Taiwan n.a. 10.69 6.28
Thailand n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S. $)
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Table 5.56 Labour Costs 2007 - Asia 
Table 5.55 Country / Economy Profiles - Asia 
Country /  Economy Profiles - Asia
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
China Transition / 1-2 30 58 54 2 1
Hong Kong Innovation driven / 3 11 8 2 38 7
India Factor driven / 1 50 90 93 4 5
Indonesia Factor driven / 1 55 96 104 16 24
Japan Innovation driven / 3 9 16 25 3 4
Malaysia Efficiency driven / 2 21 19 16 35 17
Philippines Factor driven / 1 71 94 100 33 40
Singapore Innovation driven / 3 5 2 1 53 11
South Korea Innovation driven / 3 13 18 29 14 9
Taiwan Transition / 2-3 17 22 18 18 13
Thailand Efficiency driven / 2 34 35 48 23 18
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Country
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
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Oceania 5.9
Australia U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Newcastle) (Mobile) (Norfolk)
New Zealand net exporter  -  -  -
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.58 Coking Coal Trade Distances (in km) - Oceania 
Source: Author´s calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator) 
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
Australia 299,061 349,800 268,574 308,931 4,217 4,649 264,357 304,282
New Zealand 2,260 2,300 577 500 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Oceania 301,321 352,100 269,151 309,431 4,217 4,649 264,934 304,782
Country
Production of Iron Ore Exports of Iron Ore Imports of Iron Ore
Net Exporter (+)             
Net Importer (-)
Table 5.59 Iron Ore (in TMT) – Oceania 
Source: World Steel Association 2010, Tables 46-48 
Australia Brazil
(Hedland) (Ponta Ubu)
New Zealand Auckland 7,897 15,955
Country Port of Destination
Port of Departure
Table 5.60 Iron Ore Trade Distances (in km) - Oceania 
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 4,198 4,006 4,006 4,008
New Zealand 463 462 468 448
Table 5.57 Domestic Coking Coal Production (in TST) - Oceania 
Source: EIA n.d.k r : I  . .f 
5 Trade Distance and Competitiveness Analysis Data 
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U.S. West Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. East Coast
(Long Beach) (New Orleans) (New York)
Australia Melbourne 13,930 19,062 20,218
New Zealand Auckland 12,169 17,301 18,457
Port of Departure
Country Port of Destination
Table 5.61 Steel Trade Distances (in km) - Oceania 
Source: Author's calculations (vesseltracker.com, Port Distance Calculator) 
Australia 23.90 38.34 30.59
New Zealand 15.95 n.a. n.a.
Country
Manufacturing 
Wages (in U.S. $)
Primary Metal 
Manufacturing
Fabricated Product 
Manufacturing
Hourly Compensation Costs (in U.S.  $)
Table 5.63 Labour Costs 2007 - Oceania 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011 
Table 5.62 Country / Economy Profiles - Oceania 
Country /  Economy Profiles - Oceania
Overall Port Domestic Foreign
Australia Innovation driven / 3 18 25 41 17 34
New Zealand Innovation driven / 3 24 50 23 57 71
Source: Schwab and Porter 2008
Country
Stage of 
Development
GCI / 
(Rank, out 
of 134)
Quality of Infrastructure 
(Rank)
Market Size  (Rank)
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6 The Iron Ore and Coking Coal Trades 
Iron ore and coking coal are essential raw materials for steel production. Stopford (2009: 
445) describes their importance as follows: “If oil is the energy of modern industrial society, 
the major bulks are the building-blocks from which it is constructed. Iron ore and coking 
coal are the raw materials of steelmaking, and steel is the principal material used in the 
construction of industrial and domestic buildings, motor cars, merchant ships, machinery and 
the great majority of industry products.” The seaborne iron ore (A5.1) and coking coal trades 
(A.5) are briefly introduced below. 
Seaborne Iron Ore Trade  6.1
Iron ore is a very dense raw material with a stowage factor of 0.4 m3 per ton and a low-value 
commodity worth about $40 per ton and is almost exclusively shipped via ocean. The 
commodity is the largest of the major bulk commodity trades and the basic ingredient for 
steel production. About 98% of iron ore produced is used for the production of iron and 
steel. On average, it takes 2.5 tons of iron ore to produce one ton of steel. (Hummels 2007a, 
b; Stopford 2009: 446ff., 572; UNCTAD 2009). 
Between 1965 and 2005, seaborne iron ore trade grew from 152mt to 650mt which is 
equivalent to a growth rate of 3.7% per annum. In 2008, iron ore trade increased to 844mt, 
an increase of 6.5% over 2007 (Stopford 2009: 446; UNCTAD 2008, 2009). In 2008, 
Australia (309.5mt; 37% of global exports) and Brazil (281.7mt; 33% of global exports) 
accounted for 70% of total iron ore exports.  
India (101.1mt), South Africa (33.8mt), Canada (22.4mt) and Sweden (16.8mt) were also 
significant exporters. China is the biggest importer of iron ore. Chinese imports increased to 
444mt in 2008 up from 383mt in 2007 and accounted for 53% of worldwide iron ore imports 
(UNCTAD 2009). Table 6.1 shows iron ore import-export relationships for certain countries 
and regions in 2004. 
Seaborne iron ore trade 2004
To:
From: mt %
Scandinavia 7 1 1 1 0 7 16 3%
Other Europe 0 0 1 3 5 1%
West Africa 8 1 3 11 2%
S. Africa 7 0 3 10 17 2 2 42 7%
North America 12 1 0 1 2 2 4 23 4%
Brazil 46 2 8 7 27 54 21 38 205 35%
S.America Pac. 0 4 6 3 1 14 2%
India 1 0 22 40 4 2 68 12%
Australia 15 1 1 0 70 70 39 5 206 35%
Total 2004 95 6 14 8 140 190 71 66 590 100%
Source: Fearnleys Review, 2005 ; cited by Stopford 2009: 449
Other 
Far East Others
TotalMediter-
raneanUK/Cont.
Other 
Europe USA Japan China
Table 6.1 Seaborne Iron Ore Trade 2004 
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Iron ore ocean transport is relatively uncomplicated (Carruthers et al. 2003: 127) and 
predestined for generating economies of scale because iron ore can be stockpiled (Sampson 
and Yeats 1977; Stopford 2009: 420). Therfore, the size of ships used to transport iron ore 
has grown constantly over time and usually the largest ships available are employed (Quinet 
and Vickerman 2004: 450). In 1977, more than 50% of iron ore trade was conducted by 
ships bigger than 100,000dwt. Until the early 1990s, this share had grown to more than 70%. 
At the same time, only 4-5% of iron ore was transported by vessels smaller than 40,000dwt 
(Lundgren 1996). In 2007, the standard size of bulk carriers transporting iron ore was 
150,000-180,000dwt and the largest vessels used are capable of transporting 300,000dwt. 
The average size of iron ore shipments (147,804dwt) is the largest of all major bulk 
commodities (Stopford 2009: 421, 447, 591). 
The trade distance between iron ore exporters and importers has increased since the 1960s 
due to the import of high-grade iron ore from distant locations. In the early 1960s, less than 
20% of worldwide iron ore production was traded between different continents. This figure 
increased to about 30% in the 1970s and to about 35% in the late 1980s (Lundgren 1996; Du 
Jonchay 1978). Stopford (2009: 146) reports a “rapid growth in the average haul in the iron 
ore and coal trades, both of which increased steadily from about 3000 miles in 1963 to over 
5000 miles by the early 1980s.” As a result, increasingly globalised markets have arisen for 
bulk products like coal and iron ore (Lundgren 1996). This trend continued unabated during 
much of the 2000s (Stopford 2009: 450). 
Table 6.2 shows the increase of ton-miles in iron ore trade over time. Ton-miles in the bulk 
trade are expected to increase further with China’s iron ore needs being increasingly met by 
new suppliers such as Latin America (UNCTAD 2008). Therefore, distance has become the 
main driver of iron ore transport costs. 
The consequences of increasing distance and increasing fuel costs for the iron ore trades 
became obvious in 2007/2008. In early 2008, iron ore transport costs from Brazil to China 
were at $64.05 per ton up from $35.50 per ton in 2007. In May 2008, shipping costs per ton 
had already reached $101.80 per ton. While iron ore freight rates for the Brazil-China route 
Table 6.2 Iron Ore Trade 
Iron Ore Trade (in Billions of Ton-Miles)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
iron ore 1,093 1,613 1,978 2,545 2,575 2,731 3,035 3,444 3,918 4,192 4,544 4,849
Source: Fearnleys Review, various issues; cited by UNCTAD 2009
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peaked in mid-2008 at nearly $108 per ton, shipping iron ore from comparatively nearby 
Australia to China only cost $45 per ton (UNCTAD 2008, 2009).  
Seaborne Coking Coal Trade 6.2
The coal market consists of two different segments. Coking coal is used for steelmaking, and 
thermal coal is used to fuel power stations (Lundgren 1996; Stopford 2009: 450). The 
seaborne coal trade is the second-largest dry bulk trade after the iron ore trade and has 
become increasingly globalised in recent decades. Lundgren (1996) reports a significant 
increase in long-distance coal trade since the late 1970s. Between 1970 and 2008, coal trade 
increased from 481 to 3,905 billion ton-miles (UNCTAD 2009). Between 1986 and 2005, 
seaborne coking coal trade increased from 141mt to 191mt at an average of 1.6% per annum 
(Stopford 2009: 387). In 2008, coking coal shipments reached 224.4mt, an increase of 4.1% 
over 2007 (UNCTAD 2009). Australia is the biggest coking coal exporter worldwide with an 
export total of 136.9mt in 2008 (UNCTAD 2009).The relatively moderate increase in trade 
between 1986 and 2005 was due the fact that China, the largest steel producer since 1996, 
could, until recently, cover its coking coal demand by using national reserves (Stopford 
2009: 450). However, China has recently become a net importer of coking coal. 
Coal is a commodity which is easy to transport (Hummels 2009; UNCTAD 2008). 
Internationally, it is usually transported by ship (Hummels 2007) and almost always in bulk 
(Stopford 2009: 419). The size of the vessels used for shipping is rather small when 
compared to the seaborne iron ore trade and ranges from less than 20,000dwt to more than 
160,000dwt with clusters around 60,000dwt and 150,000dwt (Stopford 2009: 59). In 
2001/2002, the average size of coking coal shipments was 43,257 tons compared with 
147,804 tons for iron ore (Stopford 2009: 421). Therefore, there is less potential for 
economies of scale in the coking coal trades. 
Between 1950 and 1970, long-distance transport costs for coal declined by 70% due to 
efficiency gains. Transport costs then increased considerably in the 1970s as a result of the 
oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979 (Lundgren 1996). In the 1980s and 1990s, transport costs 
in the coal trades decreased but this trend was reversed in the 2000s when oil prices 
increased significantly. For example, in 1972 transporting coal by sea from the U.S. to Japan 
cost $4.50 per ton. In 2004, transport costs were at $44.80 per ton (inflation-adjusted) with 
tendency to rise (Stopford 2009: 73). 
